and on 14 August a written agreement was signed giving the latter's complete support. Word has been indirectly received that [ ] was withdrawn from any proposed revolutionary activities.

4. Organization inside Guatemala

a. Organization is intact except for two Colonels in jail. These were charged with participation in the Salama revolt, although actually they did not support it. None of subject's organization aided Carlos Simmons at Salama.

b. There are 53,000 anti-Communist Guatemalans organized in cells of three to five men. These in turn are in groups of 25 to 100. There are 3,000 members in the capital, 4,000 to 5,000 in the suburbs, within an hour's radius of the City, the remainder throughout the interior. Those in the suburbs are rated superior to the City people. Part of the interior has not yet been organized, for two reasons: (1) The number already raised is considered sufficient; (2) When prospects of obtaining outside aid declined
attempts to organize were called off.

c. There are two intelligence nets: (1) A line into G-2 through two officers; (2) An extensive service headed by a former

] 3

], and for a short while after his fall in the same position with the new Government."

d. They have five clandestine radio stations.

e. Ample supplies of chemicals have been acquired and stored away, these to be used for sabotage and the construction of bombs. Bombs are to be used to create alarm and confusion at the proper moment.

f. Plans exist for the control or cutting of communications, capture and control or destruction of radio stations, sabotage of the Air Force, capture and use of arms caches intended for Communist labor groups.

g. There are ten regional treasurers. Each was assigned a
quota of $50,000. One raised the full amount, a second, $11,000.

The total to date subscribed was $133,000. All this has been spent during the past year in the maintenance of the two nets and for propaganda. The treasury is dry and funds impossible to raise unless or until there is a general revival in the hope of success of the movement. Other funds were raised for the Carlos Simmons group, at least $38,000 from [ ] and his associates, and $30,000 for [ ]. The failure of these two and the continual postponement of D-Day by KUFUS, has discouraged all financial support.

5. Capabilities

Subject is positive that through his intelligence service he can obtain information on each officer of the armed forces in Guatemala City, and that a plan for their individual immobilization during the critical period is feasible. Subject mentioned that many of the officers are suspicious of one another because of the system installed whereby each is required to report on the other. This opens the way to
excellent FW operations on our part. The Government is doing all it can
to keep the support and loyalty of the key officers by paying good
salaries and giving many special privileges, including the building of
homes. Capture of Guatemala City at the outset of the movement will
require the immobilization or assassination of the key civilian members
of the Government as well as immobilization of a majority of the
officers. Subject mentioned by name and locality officers in key positions
in the interior who have committed themselves to his movement. Full
details are available.

6. Economic measures

Oil stocks are estimated at between 30 and 60 days. Delays in
shipments for one or two months prior to D-Day would have considerable
effect. Since important quantities of oil come in

are shipped by rail, this source would have to be controlled, as well as
entrance via Guatemalan ports. A second effective measure would be
the delay or stoppage of shipping. The Government is in rather tight
financial straits and depends heavily on its customs duties for revenue. Shipping could delay their shipping for a period of several weeks, this would financially embarrass the Guatemalan Government and likewise deny certain essential supplies.

While a falling off in the buying of coffee would hurt the Government, it would have to be done in a way not to appear as an economic sanction taken unilaterally by the U.S.

7. Political measures

A U.S. note replying to Ambassador Torriello's charges is much in order. Subject outlined the weaknesses in the Torriello statement. He showed several newspapers from Guatemala City dated 3 September, playing up in front page headlines the Torriello statements. In his opinion, this indicates full Government support and approval and probably encouragement to Torriello. Subject believes that the threat of an OAS Conference where charges would be brought against the Guatemalan Government and with the possibility of economic measures, particularly against coffee, would have a good psychological effect. The date selected for
8. Financial Requirements

To make maximum use of all facilities, there are the following monthly requirements:

a. To support for maintenance and training of military cadres
   $20,000

b. For intelligence services and other operations inside Guatemala
   15,000

c. For PW activities
   15,000

TOTAL - $50,000

PW activities will include the printing of a clandestine newspaper inside the country. One is now being published and distributed.

9. Recommendations

a. A detailed plan and time table be prepared based on the following assumptions: (1) Ample funds available; (2) Arms and munitions available.

b. A shipment of 8 to 10 tons of arms be made promptly to RUFUS for training purposes. These should come via the channels to be approved through [ ] and it will serve as a test of his
sincerity as well as an excellent means of restoring the morale of the RUPUS group.
DATE: Week 4-11 March 1954 is period covered by this report

PLACE: Central America was scene of meetings discussed herein.

PERSONS: and various individuals in the countries visited. These latter are named as they enter into the discussion.

DISCUSSION:

1. Most of the problems have been settled by delaying the removal of the set up. How overtime and per diem are the only problems. There are men who quit their ordinary work and are working as packers. The per diem and overtime situation must be provided for. The gear state of preparedness is very unusual and that were the best organizers in their field that he had seen. They will make the schedule that has been assigned for them.

2. Went and met with CALLIGERIS and talked to him about the deception plan. In any conversation involving time now it is "to be after the rainy season." We discussed how long we could operate in June and late May. Checks were made with other people in who are acquainted with the Guatemalan situation. In June the streams will not be swollen too much and the main roads will take the traffic we want to have them take in June. As long as the re-supply comes off in the morning, it is OK.

Discussed the factor of jumping the gun and gained assurance that no man in CALLIGERIS' organization would do so. CALLIGERIS assured that there would be no problems there; he has control and there will be no premature jump-off.

Subject of personnel was discussed with CALLIGERIS. Morale of the personnel in Guatemala suffered last month. There was no actual cash with which to operate in Guatemala for a long time. The men within Guatemala asked about support. Morale of the trainees was a little low because they have been busy in camp construction, movement, etc. CALLIGERIS was assured that that is always the problem with men who volunteer to fight.

There are 150 men in and this number was broken down for us. There are about 25 and he can have more at any time. He showed how he planned to pick them up. We set up a schedule of movement for him and we have decided to pull these movements to the staging sites - 15 days prior to D-day.
figured that they could get by with a minimum of 13 R/Os, 7 resident and 6 tactical. CALLIGERIS has guaranteed to bring that number up to 15 by this week. CALLIGERIS picked up a couple of fellows from [ ] who are to be used as an emergency and they will be used as tactical R/Os. Tactical - one each to Puerto Barrios, Zacapa, Coban, Quezaltenango, Jutiapa, CALLIGERIS' CP. The Quezaltenango and Coban operators will be launched to defected groups, for arrival H-5.

[ ] said that the training was under way two days prior to the day of this particular meeting. There was no bilingual problem and as far as he knows there was no trouble with getting the lessons over to the men. [ ] however, is the man who knows if there is someone there who is bilingual and if the lessons are going over and has indicated inferiority in bilingual personnel.

[ ] volunteered the information that we could send a man in there tomorrow black and it was discussed that [ ] replacement could be expedited.

Twenty leaders are there, 10 on the way. There will be a total of 103 men at the camp. We have 37 men in PM training. Eighteen will be kept as saboteurs, 4 as cadre. The remainder to be assigned courier, finca-keeper, guard duty, etc. The 18 (on graduation in approximately one week) will join with 10 incoming potential sab team commanders for approximately 2 additional weeks and then when graduated will go to the staging sites to meet their recruited teams. We have already selected 22 sabotage targets to strike by outside teams plus one "special" team. This requires 23 sab team commanders plus those as-yet-unspecked targets. The expected 15-20 comwo trainees and 10 overhead (bakers, cooks, carpenters, etc) makes approximately 100 personnel.

About the men in Guatemala City - his estimate is that they are only awaiting some indication that we are in operation. We discussed timing and the notification of key personnel. Nobody inside is to know that we are backing the operation until we notify these key members. That will be exactly the way it stands now, on 25 April. Otherwise, the people will only know through funds and because certain people are coming out. CALLIGERIS is getting a roster of all personnel to submit to us. It is to be pouch to us. He has sent the identity of people I requested. We have the requested personnel identification. Couriers and persons from the outside are running checks on these people now.

The schedule, in addition to the people coming in, is:

20 April - 4 staff members, 8 schook troop members, 18 organizers are to be graduated and these are to be assigned to the staging sites to which they belong. Completion of material staging will be attempted.
Trainees in sabotage are to have graduated and will be assigned to staging sites to meet the teams who are also to report on this date to the staging site. This is at all staging sites.
Starting to run the arms - facts were discussed. New breakdown of one particular kind of material, Pto. Barrios B kit. Because of the manner in which it is to be run it needs different packing. This info has been passed to the packers.

25 April - Organizers are launched. They are to be briefed and assigned and across the line. We have selected a D-day by this time, i.e., the Group and the Junta has. We have met with CALLIGERIS with the complete military plan for finalization and agreement. We are in accord on the way this is to be run. CALLIGERIS took detailed notes on the way we are going to run it.

I stated that he is ready now to write up a plan with all the information which he has now gathered. He is ready to write "the plan."

I stated that so far pitifully little of our staff effort has leaked to the field. He feels that he spends lots of his time writing and he would like to get on an operations level.

On 25 April we are launching the resident R/Os advance party.

25 April - Set up the inner area so it is ready to receive the resident R/Os.

I May - R/Os graduate. It is requested that resident R/Os proceed

The tactical R/Os are assigned to the staging sites to which they are to go. There are 11 of them, one to CALLIGERIS, one to Zacapa, one for Coban, one for Jutiapa, one for Quezaltenango and one to Pto. Barrios. Traffic to [ ] is to commence on arrival at staging site for practice.

D -20 This is deadline on launching resident R/Os with radios

D -15 Shock troops arrive at staging site

D -5 Assassination teams are to have been equipped by our men in Guatemala City

D -8 Sabotage teams move toward position across line

L -15 The assassination leaders receive their instructions

D -5 Signal men launched in order to set up signals so that leaders know that they are 72 hrs. away from active.

D -3 Tactical R/Os to Quezaltenango and Coban. Signal men act.

D -1 Zacapa, Jutiapa, Pto Barrios troops move to line of departure.

D -1 1/2 hour Troops move across border 1 hour prior to dawn (X-hour)

I had not made his contact with the high level in

and CALLIGERIS had been waiting for it.

We located the strip 30 km north [ ]

Cover will be provided once rapport is established and gas will be no problem.
We talked with CALLIGERIS in the terms of the use of a staff and in building up of his No. 2 man to where he understood what was going on, too. He said that No. 2 was not much of a military man. The next night he brought a military assistant with him who was an insignificant looking individual. There is no leader other than CALLIGERIS. The question of uniforms, insignia was raised and an insignia was drawn up. (Request for 5,000 of these insignia was made at this time.)

C said he came away with the feeling that CALLIGERIS is a bit sharper than we have been giving him credit for being. He is well organized so far as the running of operations which are pretty smart for an untrained man. The only thing that impresses CALLIGERIS with our efficiency is what leaks down to him.

3. C

C felt that rapport could not be established by CALLIGERIS alone but that it would take C

C tried to determine what commitments C had made to

C on our part. The second day he said that we were "pledged" to support C although on the first day he said we had made no pledge of support.

C brought up the fact that C said ARENAS was a Commie, sewed up fincas on the border, etc. and as C on what basis this had been done. C pulled out C para B as his authority and guide. C felt that by the time we got there with the first cable on taking it easy, the door had been opened to C and the thing had snowballed. C is the type man who will act fast when he feels he's been given authority. C feels C accomplished the first paragraphs of the directive shortly after return and read nothing in the directive to warrant reporting in after completion each step or going slow. He thinks he is in a combat mission.

C said, "I think C is dangerous to our plans."

C is a dangerous politician. C agreed that if we were to pull a deception plan on this fellow, even to the point of having a meeting with him, and if this meeting took place for 2 weeks and kept him busy, releasing him with the thought that he had not produced enough yet, that his danger of "blocking" any CALLIGERIS moves would be negated. Now C believes that he is in full swing. When C left C was beginning to cast around for a way of commitments which had been intensified by cutouts association with C.
The only man who believed absolutely indispensable was and by the second day was there it was a matter of having committed ourselves to the fact and by the third day he was willing to get out of the commitment if necessary, by plans which would negate cutout.

There are two possibilities on airports in We asked for 2 types of support. We selected one airport which is completely black. We know what we have to do to obtain it. If we get complete support we will use No. 2 airport, otherwise we use just the No. 1.

There are nothing but American intelligence officers down there everyone of them worked for us. I met all the informant on a casual visit to the office.

talked to official who had been in Guatemala and who gave him information which he wanted. This man is an American, head of A workable plan for contact of was set up.

There was a meeting with CAL-LIGERIS wrote a letter to ambassador to The first report from the was "inagreement in spirit but assigned to find out the details." He stated that he wanted the members of the Group who were there to meet with and refused that meeting, putting it off on the grounds of security. did not know that was in

sent word that he wanted to see He wanted to assure himself that this was something positive. At this point he was dismayed by the delay in the requested meeting since it had been put off for several hours. even said he would arrange a meeting with the or a yonk, for us to set the time and place. said that he was surprised that no one had been to see him yet. finally went to see him - met him at a private club.

first wanted to know who were; how much money backed them; what company owned the airplanes; how long this Group had worked with CAL-LIGERIS; what part played in (this seemed important point). He was eager but he did not want to take false steps. He said he would take these details given him under consideration and give to CAL-LIGERIS in 3 days an indication of the degree of support which he could expect. specific question was: Will help us or not? The door was NOT closed.

SECRET
I was told that we wanted cover for the operation (his government must be kept officially out of it) and we wanted them to ignore reports of reported moves. I feel their answer will be favorable.

I requested 3 days time before answering. I thinks that I wants to know what I is going to do.

As an afterthought added that CALLIMONIS expressed his complete confidence in I and said he was pleased with what he has been doing.

pm
12 March 1951:
1 January 1954

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION #1
(preparatory to 1 February meeting)

FROM: Chief of
(Note: All words to be removed from copy to \( J \) are marked by asterisk. This paper is to be discussed personally by \( J \) to \( J \)).

I. Operation

A. General

In your conversations with RUFUS* keep the following in mind:

1. The conduct of operations from this point forward will be based on an unconventional* warfare* program. This program consists of a tying together of \( J \), \( J \), \( J \), \( J \), \( J \), \( J \) legs, at the same time keeping them field-compartmented.

2. The \( J \) and \( J \) legs are being carried out independent of \( J \), but each has the sole responsibility of servicing \( J \). These ties are being made at Headquarters level. Your assignment once you have successfully established this concept, is to be in the field of \( J \) only.

3. Insure that RUFUS* knows that his operational plan will be studied carefully in order to preserve full implementation of the indigenous slant as well as to fully utilize his planning to date. His plan as submitted will be built around, added to, unfeasible portions, if any, discarded, or will be completely discarded, the sole purpose of the final operational plans being to conduct the operation by unconventional* warfare* means. The term "unconventional* warfare* means" allows flexibility to the greatest degree. In the \( J \) field it will behoove us to make RUFUS* acquainted with the general framework around which the \( J \) field will be based so that his thinking and planning will coincide with ours and so that the reasoning behind our requests to him will be apparent and the final operational plan will be compatible with his intra-organizational coordination and planning.

4. Each item of this basic framework is subject to change as one, \( J \) information; two, to pertinent information on the assets and former plans; and our further progress shows some items to be superfluous, some to be more easily accomplished by hitherto unrecognized or unconsidered assets. However, as stated above, it behooves us to assure that all concerned realize what this basic thing will be built around.
B. At present it is considered RUFUS has 9 key points with which he will be concerned in the target country:

1. Coban Garrison and Field
2. Zacapa
3. Jutiapa
4. Hacatenango Garrison and Field
5. Quetzaltenango Garrison and Field
6. Quiche Garrison and Field
7. Guatemala City and Central Zone, Garrisons and Field and major cocom points
8. San Jose
9. Puerto Barrios Garrison, Port and Field

The operations against each separate target will be compartmented except at RUFUS's staff level.

C. To maintain this compartmentation separate staging areas for each operation will be obtained. In each case the staging area would be just across the line from the target when feasible. Selection and obtaining of these sites in should be a priority job for you through RUFUS during February. [ ] will arrange for sites within its jurisdiction at your request. [ ] will monitor your negotiations with[ ]. As per our discussion, you should now be examining the problems to be encountered. These sites should be a rented isolated farm area but you may find such farms impossible to obtain in the interests of security, and a black isolated base on the border obtained instead. These observations should be clarified prior to our 1 February meeting and action concerning same discussed at that time.

D. The training now being laid-on to commence 11 January is to produce as discussed:

4 Staff men
10 organizers
10 shock troop leaders
4 saboteur experts
2 assassination specialists

As discussed, the 4 staff men will be returned to RUFUS to assist in his planning. The 10 organizers and 10 shock troop leaders will be retained and, as two-man teams, provide the trained-specialist leadership and/or viewpoint for a specific target. These leader-organizer teams may,
Letter of Instruction #1

1. Send the organizer* to the target to conduct organization while the shock troop specialist* remains at safe site collecting personnel and training and preparing them for action; or

2. The organizer* might enter the target area only long enough to instruct the selected leader already within the target complex in organizing for partisan warfare* and to set up future actions of supplying the partisans* organized and conduct such courier-supply operations as necessary. The shock troop specialist* for that particular target might only instruct already-positioned leaders or possibly lead a shock troop* action in assistance of already-positioned forces or might be released to train and lead a reserve unit if such personnel becomes available. The actual employment of these organizers* and shock troop leaders* can only be determined after RUFUS's* evaluation of his assets and capabilities are thoroughly studied and assessed. Since it is necessary in order for RUFUS's* preparations to get the fullest attention to have the operational plans in his hands by 1 March* at the latest, you can readily see the necessity for making it a priority task to turn in the biographical data on RUFUS's* assets and RUFUS's* operational plans.

E. Sabotage experts* produced from the training will in turn conduct a three weeks' course at 4 appropriate safe areas just inside[ ] for approximately 16 selected team leaders. Where possible these 16 leaders will have been recruited from within the target area* and each will be responsible for a target nearby his natural habitat. When possible, an excuse for three weeks' absence from the target area will be formulated beforehand and a sabotage leader* reinstated immediately to recruit and train his team and commence his operation on signal. Again when evaluation assessment of our present assets near each sabotage target* have been compiled and when [ ] requests have produced sufficient information from which specific targets have been selected, it may be considered more feasible to use the trained expert* as an instructor to persons on the spot in certain instances as well as melting back into the natural habitat and lying dormant until the time to strike. This flexibility in planning must be maintained up until the final operational plan is forthcoming approximately 1 March*. However, positive sabotage targets* planning should be in your hands from this Headquarters 15 February* so that RUFUS* can recruit accordingly. It is tentatively the trend of planning that the sabotage* program will be in three stages:
Stage 1. Passive sabotage* which will be that produced through the effectiveness of psychological warfare* efforts. This will not be a directed sabotage* program nor will NUFFUS* personnel be responsible for any portion of it.

Stage 2 is an active stage which in any case will not be activated earlier than 2 to 3 days prior to the movement of target of the special units (tactical radio operators*, shock troops*, etc.) It is entirely possible that a completed study may show the feasibility of holding this second stage to merely hours short of H hour or even possibly to occur simultaneously with Stage 3.

Stage 3 will be D Day, H hour, overt sabotage* using demolitions* arson* and other overt means to coincide with the opening of overt action and aimed at cutting communication lines*, complete demolition of the main radio station* and blocking reinforcements by the active opposition*. As stated above, designation of these targets should be forthcoming by mid-February* and recruiting should commence accordingly. Again after a study of evaluation of existing assets it will be decided whether assets exist within the vicinity of the target or whether training specialists will return and recruit a team to conduct the mission or whether training specialists instruct the existing assets and provide for equipping them; or whether the mission is to be initiated in concurrence with the attack or whether it is only set up if needed during the attack and consolidation. This planning will come as a portion of the final operational plan due approximately 1 March*.

F. The assassination specialists will be utilized to return to NUFFUS* K* teams for instructional purposes. These K* teams should be compartmented as soon as possible and KI's on their targets will be compiled for them and their operational plans fitted into the overall plan.

G. The Commo* trainees will be turning out both resident* operators* (located near the target but compartmented from the activities at the target) and tactical* operators* (located at the staging site until just prior to operations) who will be the communications* link* during overt operations on D Day. In individual cases where the target commander is now a part of the target garrison* the tactical radio operator* will be positioned with a protective unit and the marriage with the partisan* unit will be at H Hour. In individual cases where the target will be
attacked by shock troops* from the outside, the tactical radio operator* will travel with his unit. In combined situations the tactical radio operator* will travel with the shock troops*. The resident radio operator* will not enter into the overt phase but will provide intelligence* before and after the operation. Using proper clandestine procedures, we will effect a contact with the leader of the underground* and serve as message center* between the underground leader* and RUFUS*. When D Day operations commence, transmission of radio traffic* will go through the tactical radio operators*. During the entire proceeding*, will get field messages direct from both tactical* and resident radio operators*. [ ] will stand as the message* center* during all operations. The first two and best two radio* operators* will be sent to RUFUS* to establish direct comms*, [ ] to RUFUS*. All incoming intelligence will be forwarded to RUFUS* immediately. All RUFUS* instruction will be passed to his target leader* via [ ]. This will in no way affect the speed of transmission nor will RUFUS* control of the situation be lessened by the fact that the equipment* and signal plans* are at[ ]. Until the D Day trigger is pulled, Headquarters will be utilizing this control to lend direction to all operations. During the overt action stage, Headquarters can only serve as a disseminator of messages* and will be set up to handle a heavy traffic quickly. It is now estimated that 5 hour round trip traffic can be expected—RUFUS*—to—Headquarters*—to—RUFUS* and RUFUS*—to—Headquarters*—to—target commander* and vice versa, allowing decoding*, answering* and recoding*. RUFUS* should personally conduct the principal city target* country* operation physically at the scene of action. It is realized the increased value to be gained from instantaneous radio comms* with his individual units. However, there is little RUFUS* could do with instantaneous communication in this situation and the major job of conducting the principal city* operation will occupy his full time and attention. The 5 hour time lag will keep him well-informed as to events over the country before phone lines are re-established and inter-target consolidation is accomplished.

3. The operational planning will allow for three different stages of planning, the first being the one just discussed and the second to accomplish consolidation once Stage 1 has been completed successfully; the third being a guerilla warfare plan which would be put into operation in areas if the first plan is only partially successful. This thinking needs to be more thoroughly studied but tentatively it is planned for stand-by overflights with which these units can be resupplied and consolidated with successful segments of plan one.
II. Finance

A. The $19,090 pouched to you, c/o L is to be dispensed at the rates and within the limits we discussed at our last meeting. This breakdown will be accounted for as follows:

1. For L Camp

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food, 35 men and 15 guards</td>
<td>$1,500</td>
<td>$2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay, gd. force, 15 men</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Supplies</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
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<td>POL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Rent</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L Office, 2 men &amp; rent</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation facilities</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,200</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,600</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. For holding 220 men
(Incl. selection SAB.* experts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,650</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,650</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. As per our discussion, the accountability for January expenditures will be your responsibility. For February expenditures, you will be responsible only for that portion allotted to HOPUS* for recruitment and L operations. Finances for training camp expenditures will be pouchied to L who will be responsible for dispensing of and accounting for the February funds concerning training.

C. In addition, expenses for running the Compo* training camp will be pouchied to, and dispensed by, and accounted for, by the Compo man* at the training camp.

D. As discussed, the other phases of project expenditures, namely L and L, will be the responsibility of those officers in charge of the phase of that leg and will be of no concern to you.

E. Your February finances will be delivered at our 1 February* meeting and accounting of January expenditures insofar as possible made at that time.

III. Scope of responsibility
Letter of Instruction #1

A. The entire project as discussed, has been broken into  
    and consists of:

1. Training

2. Operations, has the responsibility for training

which includes logistical support of the camp in addition to

directing conduct of training and insuring that training meets

project standards.

Your responsibility in operations is as case officer, which officer:

a. Directs the Principal Agent in all matters

    to see that standards are maintained in the

    fields of:

1) Recruitment

2) Disbursal of funds

3) Preparation for operations including all

    contacts made by the PA; commitments made in the

    project name by the PA; and the conduct of the

    preparations so that the operations can

    be carried out as project operational plans direct.

4) Conduct of operations in accord with

    project Headquarters directives.

5) Security in that the PA fully understands the

    necessity of confining development of operational

    plans to his immediate staff.

b. It is not expected that this direction must be in the

    form of commands to be followed "or else" but you are

    directed to employ methods of presentation so that the

    preparations for operations are carried out within the

    broad framework of the directive given you. Latitude

    will be considered in every case to allow for your

    advice and experience to be utilized and for advice and experience to be utilized but such latitude

    will be checked out through me when practicable and I

    will direct you within the framework of the directive

    given me. Every attempt will be made to give your advice

    complete consideration and you are to work within this

    directive which has been broadened as far as possible for

    your implementation.
Letter of Instruction #1

Page 8

c. Maintain a flow of information to project Headquarters through:

1) Monthly assessment of personnel as to their ability, morale and state of readiness.

2) Bi-weekly assessment of the training program as discussed.


4) Maintain a close bibliographical analysis on all recruited personnel and potential personnel being considered.

d. Add your advice on the practicability of the planning and form an indigenous perspective and from the active opposition perspective on all matters under consideration by project Headquarters.

e. You are to maintain compartmentation between training and operations. Command channel is straight to this office. Your connections with the training camp will be limited to:

1) Setting up of the camp and camp procedures as discussed;

2) Presentation of project personnel in the spirit necessary.

3) Within the limits of our previous discussions.

4) Delivery of the bodies and assessments to the training area (all assessments to be known to the training chief by code number only).

5) Delivery of bodies from the training area to the staging areas.

6) Contact and coordination with KUPUS to insure that his personnel receive direction and motivation and preparation for coming up to standards of training.
7) Bi-weekly assessment to this office on training progress and standards.

3) Close coordination of your operational ideas with them for the purpose of implementing them into training.

9) The reception of incoming equipment and training and disposal as discussed (contact report 22, 23, 24 December and memorandum on black flight preparations.

f. You are to operate independent of the except to keep it informed on matters which they need to know in order to cover illegal operations connections with the U. S. Government.

g. You are to discuss all problems within the jurisdiction of and with those and receive their approval before

1) Making contact with or indigenous personnel outside the U.S. organization.

2) Acquiring land within the jurisdiction of the station responsibility.

h. You are to receive approval before recruiting non-U.S. personnel for any writing duty within the project.

1. Your reports verbal and written and your cables are to be addressed to.

IV. Support

A. \[ \] Conco and have the sole function of making your activities a success.

B. The initial equipment is arriving as discussed (see \[ \] contact report and memorandum on black flight arrangements)

C. 1. A breakdown of equipment per target for placing at the safe site area for that target is being considered. Your sum total of equipment is as discussed (arms and equipment assayer\[ \] memo). This is designed to make all men during the short-term active operational period self-sufficient as to weapons, equipment, medical and survival rations to operate with full efficiency and self-sufficiency for a ten day period. The method of getting the material into the target
area and the time for movement of equipment to the target area is yet to be firmed up except that it is contemplated moving into the staging sites will be by black flight* into nearest fields or pre-arranged airdropping and prearranged movement to the staging sites by means to be developed. Movement to the target area will be determined by the target area sites and will fit the individual case. It is contemplated by subject to and study that continuous black trips* by courier transport utilizing surplus personnel as couriers and subsequent storing and cashing will permit a build-up for assets-in-position while the 50 pound self-sufficiency equipment kit will enable the shock troop and radio operators* and incoming sabotage teams* to be self sufficient for the ten day maximum expected period. More research will be forthcoming along this line of thought.

2. Support requirements during the second phase of overt * operations will be limited to possible replacement of key instruments and items necessarily destroyed by sabotage*, consolidation requirements, operational funds, special consolidation items.

3. Support equipment for the third phase of the overt * operations will have been arranged, gathered, packaged, and were marked for emergency black flight* so that if any of the units finds it necessary to go into this third phase, re-supply can be arranged through their tactical radio*. This third phase operational plane will of necessity be limited to a short number of weeks due to the topography of the target country and the nature of the expected consolidation of those units successful in the first stage.

V. The purpose of this letter of instruction was to define the scope of your responsibilities and acquaint you with the path of thinking now prevalent in your project headquarters. The implementation of this contour contemplated program are subject to constant change as the situation develops and you will be notified immediately on any changes.

VI. Yours and confidence that I feel the massive scale of planning and preparation that is going into this project is the determining factor in the amount of success achieved. The conversion of this plan into actual fact is a heavy responsibility and that fact is recognized in this project Headquarters. Take advantage of the excellent support that I feel is behind you.
26 MAY 1954

Acting Chief of Station, Guatemala City INFO: RESUCCESS, Headquarters

LINCOLN

Tactical Instructions (Part II)

1. Request that you hand the attached notes to ( ) with the usual warning that he should either return them to your files or destroy them as soon as he has finished with them.

2. Expect the order to start Operation "A", as described in paragraph 6 of the attached notes, to be given on/or about June 3-5, with "B" following very shortly thereafter. Have ( ) preparations accordingly.

3. Fullest and fast reporting on the progress of these tactical preparations will be greatly appreciated.

Attachment

25 May 1954

Distribution:
2 - GUAT (w/att)
2 - WACC (w/att)
3 - LINC (w/att)
For ( )

1. This is the second installment of the "Emergency Instructions" for ( ), which we began in our letter #751, dated 12 May. We were gratified to learn from your wire #603 that the chiefs for all city teams except one have already been selected and that the other preparations, indicated in our first set of instructions, are making quick progress.

2. The first tasks of each city chief — apart from assembling the personnel specified in paragraph 5 of #751 — include particularly:
   a) establishing secure communications with ( ) underground headquarters. There should be at least one courier between each chief and headquarters; this courier should preferably not know the chief, but should be dispatched from, and return to, some other point. Most definitely, he must not know the location of ( ) headquarters, but must deliver and receive his messages elsewhere (safe house, live drop). In addition, there should be an emergency procedure for fast communications, telephone or telegram messages to a safe address, using a simple open code for instructions like "Start operation immediately" or "Expect new police measures today" or the like. There should be different codes for each team so that, if one code will be compromised, the others can be continued in use.
   b) Procuring and storing the equipment described in paragraph 6, #751.
   c) Giving his deputy all the necessary instructions as to how to carry on in case he, the chief, should get arrested or should have to disappear in order to avoid arrest or other enemy measures.

3. Activities of each team (other than the preparatory measures described here and in #751) must under no circumstances begin before we give the word. Members of the teams should therefore withdraw from any overt oppositional activities in which they may have engaged — or, better still, should be chosen from among people who had not been especially active or at least are not known to the local police (or to the local communists) for such activities. Strict compliance with this rule — at ( ) underground headquarters as well as in each of the nine teams — is imperative to conserve our forces for the critical phase. On the other hand, once the signal is given, all teams should become fully active at once. It is therefore necessary that you pass the signal at all times to ( ) or to his deputy and that he can alert his city chiefs without delay, as suggested in paragraph 2, a above.

4. Each city chief must get in touch with the commander of the Liberation Forces in his city. The commander will tell him when and where to take specific local action within the general framework of the instructions which we are giving you. This subordination is indispensable in order to avoid as much as possible local confusion and to insure maximum integration of all available opposition forces in each given place. At present, each city chief is only to be told in general terms that he will be brought into touch with other opposition groups in his area and the need for discipline and subordination must be explained to him. We shall send you specific instructions as to when, where and how these contacts between ( ) city chiefs and the local commanders of the Liberation Forces are to be made, in due time.
5. ( ) Ought to give each City Chief detailed advance instructions for the following types of operations, each of which ought to start on a given day. We should therefore arrange for a simple code word for each of these types of operations so that the beginning can be signaled quickly as soon as we tell you. (In one case, Operation "A" may be referred to as "Aunt Amala", "B" as "Uncle Benno", etc., while for another city team the code words may be trees or flowers with the appropriate initials, or the like).

6. OPERATION "A":

(I) Rumor campaign — Specific themes for rumors are to follow later:

( ) First explain to each Chief how to get rumors started (and believe as much as possible), how to take specific cues from the clandestine radio and from further messages he will send. FII, the main purpose of the rumor campaign is to create the right psychological atmosphere for the final phase, to confusing and discouraging our enemies.

(II) Serve war against enemy key personnel -- Each City Chief is to select a limited number of enemy personalities (government and police officials, communist leaders, unfamiliar army officers etc.), not more than he and his team can effectively handle. Against each of these target personalities, a series of measures are to be devised which will lower his morale, if possible get him to abandon the enemy side or at least get him out of the way in the critical hours. These measures must be "custom tailored" for each individual case, since different people have different vulnerable spots and react in different manners. Some of the means to be used might include the following (plus whatever local inventors may suggest):

a) Sending death notices
b) Telephone calls -- preferably between 2 and 5 a.m. —, whispering a threat or a warning (either against impending purge by UST or government -- or against being blacklisted by Liberation Movement)
c) Marking subject's house "here lives a Moscow agent" or the like (luminous paint!)
d) Sending cardboard coffin or hangman's noose through mail or depositing before subject's house or office.
e) Sending subject a fake summons, asking him to appear in Guatemala City to answer charges of deviation from the party line (if a PGT member), or embezzlement or betrayal of government secrets (if a government official)
f) Informing subject's wife that he is in danger and that she must see to it that he seeks safety.
g) Exposing true or very likely dark spots in subject's private life, by telling him, or his wife or denouncing him to his superiors or publishing the story via black leaflet.
h) Sending subject a wire, announcing a successful business deal to be made, asking him to come for important meeting, or pretending an accident which befell family member, mistress or close friend in far-away place, to remove him from scene for critical moment, and so forth.

(III) Encourage people to listen to the clandestine radio, by word-of-mouth propaganda, by painting wave lengths and times on walls, etc.
7. OPERATION "Q":

(I) Start distribution of the material (leaflets, posters) which( ) is receiving from you and which he will have divided up among the City Teams for storage in advance -- since bulk shipments to outlying cities are likely to become increasingly difficult towards the final phase.

(II) Start production and distribution of local, mimeographed bulletins and leaflets -- exploiting the local situation plus news heard on the clandestine radio, publishing black lists of dangerous enemies, communists, police informers etc. (as a further step in the "nerve war" described in Operation "Q" above).

(III) Start painting slogans on walls.

c. OPERATION "Q" (This is the most sensitive part of the entire enterprise. We leave it to your judgment how much of it you want to tell to .) Already now, In any case, he must not tell any of this part to his City Chief any earlier than is absolutely necessary:

1. Prevent, or slow down as much as possible, hostile action by the Army or by the Police, for instance

a) by preliminary propaganda aimed either at the military and police personnel as a whole or at individual officers and men, considered potentially friendly to us;

b) by organizing, if locally feasible, demonstrations by women and children in front of the police station or the army barracks, slowing down the departure of troops, preventing the use of firearms, clamoring for the release of political prisoners, etc.

(II) frustrate communist-led strikes or provoke, on the contrary, strikes which can help the liberation movement (like all parts of Operation "Q", this one has to be particularly carefully coordinated with the local commander of the liberation forces, as set forth in paragraph 1 above) -- for instance, a railroad workers strike to hold up troop movements, a strike at the city electrical power plant plunging the city into darkness a printers strike to prevent publication of pro-Arbenz newspapers, leaflets or posters, and so forth.

(III) Use all locally available resources, leaflets, bulletins, possibly also local newspapers and radio stations, word of mouth, meetings (if and as practicable) etc. to rally the local population around the liberation movement, to keep them informed about the progress of our action, to counteract enemy announcements, propaganda or rumors and to provide discipline mass support for the liberation forces.

9. The security implications of the above are obvious. Just as you will pass these instructions to( ) not earlier than required,( ) in turn will give each City Chief and the men at his underground headquarters no information prior to the moment where it is needed and will give no individual more information than this individual requires in order to accomplish his own assignments. Each City Chief again will pass on instructions to the members of his team on a strict "need-to-know"
basic and will not reveal any sensitive fact any earlier than necessary. Certain parts of the intended activities require considerable preparations, for instance, the collection of relevant information for the "nerve war", defined above as part of Operation "A" — i.e., this is a comparatively non-sensitive task. Information on communications, whether with Headquarters or with the local Commander of the Liberation Forces, or any preparation for Operation "C", on the other hand, is highly sensitive and must be confined absolutely to the people who need them. Impress upon everybody the fact that at least a few members of the entire organization are likely to be arrested during the preparatory period, while others might talk under the influence of liquor, women or money: the safest way of keeping the possible damage to a minimum is to let nobody know more than he must know — or any earlier than he has to know. No amount of torture or corruption can extract from a person information which he has not got.

10. You may expect to receive the final set of our instructions as well as the signal to start Operations "A" very shortly. Complete preparations therefore as speedily as possible and keep sending us full reports on all phases of this work.
MEMORANDUM

31 March 1954

TO: All Staff Officers
FROM: O/T 7

SUBJECT: Selection of individuals for disposal by Junta Group.

C/O has requested a list of names be compiled for study by Staff Officers to determine if they meet the latest criteria for inclusion on the Junta's disposal list.

Consideration for inclusion on the final list should positively establish that the individual falls into one or more of the following groups:

1) High government and organizational leaders whose outward position has not disclosed the fact they are motivated and directed by the Cominform and who are irrevocably implicated in Communist doctrine and policy.

2) Out-and-out proven Communist leaders whose removal from the political scene is required for the immediate and future success of the new government.

3) Those few individuals in key government and military positions of tactical importance whose removal for psychological, organizational or other reasons is mandatory for the success of military action.

This document is routed to Staff Officers for deletions, additions, and/or comments. It is requested that a final list of disposees be approved promptly to permit P.M. planning to proceed on schedule.

The following list of individuals for consideration has been assembled from old lists supplied by the Junta and from recent intelligence available at [ ]. Your careful consideration is requested in making additions or deletions.

Each officer is to indicate his concurrence by placing his initials after each name on the attached list which he believes should remain on this list. Exceptions, additions or deletions are to be noted on the blank pages following the attachment.

Attachments:
1. Disposal list
2. Blank pages
3. Biographic data
* Biographic data attached.
ABOVE IS TRUE WORDING FROM DOCUMENT. CSI/HRG REVIEW TEAM UNABLE TO MAKE A LEGIBLE COPY.
BIOGRAPHIC DATA ATTACHED.
A STUDY OF ASSASSINATION

DEFINITION

Assassination is a term thought to be derived from "Hashish", a drug similar to marijuana, said to have been used by Hassan-San-Salah to induce motivation in his followers, who were assigned to carry out political and other murders, usually at the cost of their lives.

It is here used to describe the planned killing of a person who is not under the legal jurisdiction of the killer, who is not physically in the hands of the killer, who has been selected by a resistance organization for death, and whose death provides positive advantages to that organization.

IMPLEMENT

Assassination is an extreme measure not normally used in clandestine operations. It should be assumed that it will never be ordered or authorized by any U.S. Headquarters, though the latter may in rare instances agree to its execution by members of an associated foreign service. This reticence is partly due to the necessity for committing communications to paper. No assassination instructions should ever be written or recorded. Consequently, the decision to employ this technique must nearly always be reached in the field, at the area where the act will take place. Decision and instructions should be confined to an absolute minimum of persons. Ideally, only one person will be involved. No report may be made, but usually the act will be properly covered by normal news services; whose output is available to all concerned.
JUSTIFICATION

Murder is not morally justifiable. Self-defense may be argued if the victim has knowledge which can destroy the resistance organization. Assasasinination of persons responsible for atrocities or reprisals may be regarded as just punishment. Killing a political leader whose burgeoning career is a clear and present danger to the cause of freedom may be held necessary.

But assassination can seldom be employed with a clear conscience. Persons who are morally squeamish should not attempt it.

CLASSIFICATIONS

The techniques employed will vary according to whether the subject is unaware of his danger, aware but unguarded, or guarded. They will also be affected by whether or not the assassin is to be killed with the subject hereafter. assassinations in which the subject is unaware will be termed "simple"; those where the subject is aware but unguarded will be termed "casual"; those where the victim is guarded will be termed "guarded."

If the assassin is to die with the subject, the act will be called "dual." If the assassin is to escape, the adjective will be "safe." It should be noted that no compromise should exist here. The assassin must not fall alive into enemy hands.

A further type division is caused by the need to conceal the fact that the subject was actually the victim of assassination, rather than an accident or natural causes. If such concealment is desirable the operation will be called "secret;" if concealment is immaterial, the act will be called "open;" while if the assassination requires publicity to be effective it will be termed "terroristic."
Following these definitions, the assassination of Julius Caesar was safe, simple, and terroristic, while that of Kuey Long was lost, guarded and open. Obviously, successful secret assassinations are not recorded as assassination at all. Prince of Thailand and Augustus Caesar may have been the victims of safe, guarded and secret assassination.

These assassinations usually involve clandestine agents or members of criminal organizations.

**THE ASSASSIN**

In safe assassinations, the assassin needs the usual qualities of a clandestine agent. He should be determined, courageous, intelligent, resourceful, and physically active. If special equipment is to be used, such as firearms or drugs, it is clear that he must have outstanding skill with such equipment.

Except in terroristic assassination, it is desirable that the assassin be a transient in the area. He should have an absolute minimum of contact with the rest of the organization, and his instructions should be given orally by one person only. His safe evacuation after the act is absolutely essential, but once again contact should be as limited as possible. It is preferable that the person issuing instructions also conduct any withdrawal or covering action which may be necessary.

In lost assassination, the assassin must be a fanatic of some sort. Politics, religion, and revenge are about the only feasible motives. Since a fanatic is unstable psychologically, he must be handled with extreme care. He must not know the identities of the other members of the organization; for although it is intended that he die in the act, something may go wrong. Significant information, while the Assassin of Trotsky has never revealed any, it was assumed to depend on this when the act was planned.
When the decision to assassinate has been reached, the tactics of the operation must be planned, based upon an estimate of the situation similar to that used in military operations. The preliminary estimate will reveal gaps in information and possibly indicate a need for special equipment which must be procured or constructed. When all necessary data has been collected, an effective tactical plan can be prepared. All planning must be mental; no papers should ever contain evidence of the operation.

In resistance situations, assassination may be used as a counter-reprisal. Since this requires advertising to be effective, the resistance organization must be in a position to warn high officials publicly that their lives will be the price of reprisal action against innocent people. Such a threat is of no value unless it can be carried out, so it may be necessary to plan the assassination of various responsible officers of the oppressive regime and hold such plans in readiness to be used only if provoked by excessive brutality. Such plans must be modified frequently to meet changes in the tactical situation.

Techniques

The essential point of assassination is the death of the subject. A human being may be killed in many ways but sureness is often overlooked by those who may be emotionally unstrung by the seriousness of this act they intend to commit. The specific technique employed will depend upon a large number of variables, but should be constant in one point: Death must be absolutely certain. The attempt on Hitler’s life failed because the conspiracy did not give this matter proper attention.

Techniques may be considered as follows:

It is possible to kill a man with the bare hands, but very few are skillful enough to do it well. Even a highly trained Judo expert will hesitate to risk killing by hand unless he has absolutely no alternative. However, the simplest local tools are often much the most efficient means of assassination. A hammer, axe, wrench, screwdriver, fire poker, kitchen knife, lamp stand, or anything hard, heavy and handy will suffice. A length of rope or wire or a belt will do if the assassin is strong and agile. All such improvised weapons have the important advantage of availability and apparent innocence.

The obviously lethal machine gun failed to kill Trotsky where an item of sporting goods succeeded.

In all safe cases, where the assassin may be subject to search, either before or after the act, specialized weapons should not be used. Even in the last cases, the assassin may accidentally be searched before the act and should not carry an incriminating device if any sort of lethal weapon can be improvised at or near the site. If the assassin normally carries weapons because of the nature of his job, it may still be desirable to improvise and implement at the scene to avoid disclosure of his identity.
2. Accidents.

For secret assassination, either simple or chase, the contrived accident is the most effective technique. When successfully executed, it causes little excitement and is only casually investigated.

The most efficient accident, in simple assassination, is a fall of 75 feet or more onto a hard surface. Elevator shafts, stair wells, unscreened windows and bridges will serve. Bridge falls into water are not reliable. In simple cases a private meeting with the subject may be arranged at a properly-located location. The act may be executed by sudden, vigorous of the ankles, tipping the subject over the edge. If the assassin immediately sets up an outcry, playing the "horrified witness", no alibi or pretentious withdrawal is necessary.

In chase cases it will usually be necessary to stun or drag the subject before dropping him. Care is required to ensure that no wound or condition not attributable to the fall is discernible after death.

Falls into the sea or swiftly flowing rivers may suffice if the subject cannot swim. It will be more reliable if the assassin can arrange to attempt rescue, as he can thus be sure of the subject's death and at the same time establish a workable alibi.
If the subject's personal habits make it feasible, alcohol may be used successfully to prepare him for a contrived accident of any kind.

Falls before trains or subway cars are usually effective, but require exact timing and can seldom be free from unexpected observation.

Automobile accidents are a less satisfactory means of assassination. If the subject is deliberately run down, very exact timing is necessary and investigation is likely to be thorough. If the subject's car is tampered with, reliability is very low. The subject may be stunned or drugged and then placed in the car, but this is only reliable when the car can be run off a high cliff or into deep water without observation.

Arson can cause accidental death if the subject is drugged and left in a burning building. Reliability is not satisfactory unless the building is isolated and highly combustible.

3. Drugs.

In all types of assassination except terrorist, drugs can be very effective. If the assassin is trained as a doctor or nurse and the subject is under medical care, this is an easy and sure method. An overdose of morphine administered as a sedative will cause death without disturbance and is difficult to detect. The dose of the drug will depend upon whether the subject has been using narcotics regularly. If not, two grains will suffice.
If the subject drinks heavily, morphine or a similar narcotic can be injected at the passing out stage, and the cause of death will often be held to be acute alcoholism.

Specific poisons, such as arsenic or strychnine, are effective but their possession or procurement is incriminating, and accurate dosage is problematical. Poison was used unsuccessfully in the assassinations of Rasputin and Kolochan, though the latter case is more accurately described as a murder.
1. Edge Weapons

Any locally obtained edge device may be successfully employed. A certain minimum of anatomical knowledge is needed for reliability. Puncture wounds of the body cavity may not be reliable unless the heart is reached. The heart is protected by the rib cage and is not always easy to locate.

Head wounds were once nearly always mortal, but modern medical treatment has made this no longer true.

Absolute reliability is obtained by severing the spinal cord in the cervical region. This can be done with the point of a knife or a light blow of an axe or hatchet.

Another reliable method is the severing of both jugular and carotid blood vessels on both sides of the windpipe.

If the subject has been rendered unconscious by other wounds or drugs, either of the above methods can be used to insure death.

2. Blunt Weapons

As with edge weapons, blunt weapons require some anatomical knowledge for effective use. Their main advantage is their universal availability. A base or may be picked up almost anywhere in the world. Baseball and cricket bats are very widely distributed. Even a rock or a heavy stick will do, and nothing resembling a weapon need be procured, carried or subsequently disposed of.

Blows should be directed to the temple, the area just below and behind the ear, and the lower, rear portion of the skull. Of course, if the blow is very heavy, any portion of the upper skull will do. The lower frontal portion of the head, from the eyes to the throat, can withstand enormous blows without fatal consequences.
6. Firearms

Firearms are often used in assassination, often very ineffectively. The assassin usually has insufficient technical knowledge of the limitations of weapons, and expects more range, accuracy and killing power than can be provided with reliability. Since certainty of death is the major requirement, firearms should be used which can provide destructive power at least 100% in excess of that thought to be necessary, and ranges should be half that considered practical for the weapon.

Firearms have other drawbacks. Their possession is often incriminating. They may be difficult to obtain. They require a degree of expertise from the user. They are noisy. Their lethality is consistently over-rated.

However, there are many cases in which firearms are probably more efficient than any other means. These cases usually involve distance between the assassin and the subject, or comparative physical weakness of the assassin, as with a woman.

(a) The precision rifle. In guarded assassination, a good hunting or target rifle should always be considered as a possibility. Absolute reliability can nearly always be achieved at a distance of one hundred yards. In ideal circumstances, the range may be extended to 250 yards. The rifle should be a well made bolt or falling block action type, handling a powerful long-range cartridge. The .300 H.F. Magnum is probably the best cartridge readily available. Other excellent calibers are .375 H.F. Magnum, .270 Winchester, .30 - '06 cal., 8 x 60 Mx Magnum, 9.3 x
62 in. and others of this type. These are preferable to ordinary military calibers, since ammunition available for them is usually of the expanding bullet type, whereas most ammunition for military rifles is full jacketed and hence not sufficiently lethal. Military ammunition should not be altered by filing or drilling bullets, as this will adversely affect accuracy.

The rifle may be of the "bull gun" variety, with extra heavy barrel and set triggers, but in any case should be capable of maximum precision. Ideally, the weapon should be able to group in one inch at one hundred yards, but 2½ groups are adequate. The sight should be telescopic, not only for accuracy, but because such a sight is much better in dim light or near darkness. As long as the bare outline of the target is discernable, a telescope sight will work, even if the rifle and shooter are in total darkness.

An expanding, hunting bullet of such calibers as described above will produce extravagant laceration and shock at short or mid-range. If a man is struck just once in the body cavity, his death is almost entirely certain.

Public figures or guarded officials may be killed with great reliability and some safety if a firing point can be established prior to an official occasion. The propagandistic value of this system may be very high.

(b) The machine gun.

Machine guns may be used in most cases where the precision rifle is applicable. Usually, this will require
the subversion of a unit of an official guard at a ceremony, though a skillful and determined team might conceivably dispose of a loyal gun crew without commotion and take over the gun at the critical time.

The area fire capacity of the machine gun should not be used to search out a concealed subject. This was tried with predictable lack of success on Trotsky. The automatic feature of the machine gun should rather be used to increase reliability by placing a 5 second burst on the subject. Even with full jacket ammunition, this will be absolutely lethal if the burst pattern is no larger than a man. This can be accomplished at about 150 yards. In ideal circumstances, a properly bedded and targeted machine gun can do it at 850 yards. The major difficulty is placing the first burst exactly on the target, as most machine gunners are trained to spot their fire on target by observation of strike. This will not do in assassination as the subject will not wait.

(c) The Submachine Gun

This weapon, known as the "machine-pistol" by the Russians and Germans and "machine-carbine" by the British, is occasionally useful in assassination. Unlike the rifle and machine gun, this is a short range weapon and since it fires pistol ammunition, much less powerful. To be reliable, it should deliver at least 5 rounds into the subject's chest, though the .45 caliber U.S. weapons have a much larger margin of killing efficiency than the 9 mm European arms.

The assassination range of the submachine gun is point
blank. While accurate single rounds can be delivered by sub-machine gunners at 50 yards or more, this is not certain enough for assassination. Under ordinary circumstances, the SMG should be used as a fully automatic weapon. In the hands of a capable gunner, a high cyclic rate is a distinct advantage, as speed of execution is most desirable, particularly in the case of multiple subjects.

The sub-machine gun is especially adapted to indoor work when more than one subject is to be assassinated. An effective technique has been devised for the use of a pair of sub-machine gunners, by which a room containing as many as a dozen subjects can be "purified" in about twenty seconds with little or no risk to the gunners. It is illustrated below:

![Fig. 1 - 2](image)

While the U.S. sub-machine guns fire the most lethal cartridge, the higher cyclic rate of some foreign weapons enable the gunner to cover a target quicker with acceptable pattern density. The Bergmann Model 1934 is particularly good in this way. The Danish Rodea SMG has a moderately good cyclic rate and is admirably compact and concealable. The Russian SMG's have a good cyclic rate, but are handicapped by a small, light protective which requires more hits for equivalent killing effect.

(d) The Shotgun.

A large bore shotgun is a most effective
killing instrument as long as the range is kept under ten yards. It should normally be used only on single targets as it cannot sustain fire successfully. The barrel may be "sawed-off" for convenience, but this is not a significant factor in its killing performance. Its optimum range is just out of reach of the subject. 00 buckshot is considered the best shot size for a twelve gage gun, but anything from single balls to bird shot will do if the range is right. The assassin should aim for the solar plexus as the shot pattern is small at close range and can easily miss the head.

(c) The Pistol

While the handgun is quite inefficient as a weapon of assassination, it is often used, partly because it is readily available and can be concealed on the person, and partly because its limitations are not widely appreciated. While many well known assassinations have been carried out with pistols (Lincoln, Harding, Gandhi), such attempts fail as often as they succeed (Truman, Roosevelt, Churchill).

If a pistol is used, it should be as powerful as possible and fired from just beyond reach. The pistol and the shotgun are used in similar tactical situations, except that the shotgun is much more lethal and the pistol is much more easily concealed.

In the hands of an expert, a powerful pistol is quite deadly, but such experts are rare and not usually available for assassination missions.

.45 Colt, 1a Special, .455 Ely, .45 1cr (U.S. Service)
rounds can suffice but are less reliable. Sub-power cartridges such as the .32s and .25s should be avoided.

In all cases, the subject should be hit solidly at least three times for complete reliability.

(f) Silent Firearms

The sound of the explosion of the propellant in a firearm can be effectively silenced by appropriate attachments. However, the sound of the projectile passing through the air cannot, since this sound is generated outside the weapon. In cases where the velocity of the bullet greatly exceeds that of sound, the noise so generated is much louder than that of the explosion. Since all powerful rifles have muzzle velocities of over 2000 feet per second, they cannot be silenced.

Pistol bullets, on the other hand, usually travel slower than sound and the sound of their flight is negligible. Therefore, pistols, submachine guns and any sort of improvised carbine or rifle which will take a low velocity cartridge can be silenced. The user should not forget that the sound of the operation of a repeating action is considerable, and that the sound of bullet strike, particularly in bone, is quite loud.

Silent firearms are only occasionally useful to the assassin, though they have been widely publicized in this connection. Because permissible velocity is low, effective precision range is held to about 100 yards with rifles of carbine type weapons, while with pistols, silent or otherwise,
are most efficient just beyond arm length. The silent feature attempts to provide a degree of safety to the assassin, but mere possession of a silent firearm is likely to create enough hazard to counter the advantage of its silence. The silent pistol combines the disadvantages of any pistol with the added one of its obviously clandestine purpose.

A telescopically sighted, closed-action carbine shooting a low velocity bullet of great weight, and built for accuracy, could be very useful to an assassin in certain situations. At the time of writing, no such weapon is known to exist.

7. Explosives.

Bombs and demolition charges of various sorts have been used frequently in assassination. Such devices, in terrorist and open assassination, can provide safety and overcome guard barriers, but it is curious that bombs have often been the implement of most assassinations.

The major factor which affects reliability is the use of explosives for assassination. The charge must be very large and the detonation must be controlled exactly as to time by the assassin who can observe the subject. A small or moderate explosive charge is highly unreliable as a cause of death, and time-delay or booby-trap devices are extremely prone to kill the wrong man. In addition to the moral aspects of indiscriminate killing, the death of casual bystanders can often produce public reactions unfavorable to the cause for which the assassination is carried out.

Bombs or grenades should be thrown at a subject. While this
Always cause a sensation and may even result in the subject’s death, it is sloppy, unreliable, and bad propaganda. The charge must be too small and the assassin is never sure of: (1) reaching his attack position, (2) placing the charge close enough to the target and (3) firing the charge at the right time.

Placing the charge surreptitiously in advance permits a charge of proper size to be employed, but requires accurate prediction of the subject’s movements.

Ten pounds of high explosive should normally be regarded as a minimum, and this is exclusive of fragmentation material. The latter can consist of any hard, to & material as long as the fragments are large enough. Metal or rock fragments should be walnut-size rather than pea-size. If solid plates are used, to be ruptured by the explosion, cast iron, 1" thick, gives excellent fragmentation.

Military or commercial high explosives are practical for use in assassination. Homemade or improvised explosives should be avoided. While possibly powerful, they tend to be dangerous and unreliable.

Anti-personnel explosive missiles are excellent, provided the assassin has sufficient technical knowledge to fuse them properly. 81 or 82 mm mortar shells, or the 120 mm mortar shell, are particularly good.

Anti-personnel shells for 85, 88, 90, 100 and 105 mm guns and howitzers are both large enough to be completely reliable and small enough to be carried by one man.

The charge should be so placed that the subject is not over six feet from it at the moment of detonation.

A large, shaped charge with the caps filled with iron fragments (such as 1" nuts and bolts) will fire a highly lethal shotgun-type
to 50 yards. This reaction has not been thoroughly tested, however, and an exact replica of the proposed device should be fired in advance to determine exact range, pattern-size, and penetration of fragments. Fragments should penetrate at least 1° of seasoned pine or equivalent for minimum reliability.

Any firing device may be used which permits exact control by the assassin. An ordinary commercial or military exploder is efficient, as long as it is rigged for instantaneous action with no time fuse in the system.

The wire-screen electric target can serve as the triggering device and provide exact timing from as far away as the assassin can reliably hit the target. This will avoid the disadvantages of stringing wire between the proposed positions of the assassin and the subject, and also permit the assassin to fire the charge from a variety of possible positions.

The radio-switch can be used to fire a charge, though its reliability is somewhat lower and its procurement may not be easy.

There may be presented brief outlines, with critical evaluations of the following assassinations and attempts:

Marat
Lincoln
Harding
Grand Duke Sergei
Pitrue
Archduke Francis Ferdinand
Ramputin

Hedrich
Hitler
Roosevelt
Truman
Mussolini
Benes
Aung Sang
Nadare
Kirov
Huay Long
Alexander of Yugoslavia
Trotsky

Nassara
Abdullah
Obandi
Conference Room Technique

1. Enters Room Quickly but Quietly
2. Stands in Doorway

4. Covers group to prevent individual dangerous reactions. If necessary, fires individual bursts of 3 rounds.

Finca located south of Santa Lucia Cotz. Cotz location 14 degrees 20 minutes north, 91 degrees 1 minute West, Cotz on main road 6B between Sech-Cucuitla and Mazatenango. The dirt road leading to finca branches off to south at Cotz. Railroad exactly 2½km south of Cotz. 700 meters south of RR is wooden bridge. Finca believed just south of this bridge.

Identifying data: runway, approx 1 mile from main complex finca bldgs.

Bridge leading directly to finca is made of iron.

Above is best I can make of data we have. I says in his report that he will submit a more detailed report and possibly a map. This is not here to my knowledge. Suggest Cunt be info on all any action cable you may write, so that they may forward more precise data, if they have it.
TO : Chief, WH
From : 

SUBJECT: Current Political Picture, Honduras, C. A.

1. General Tiburcio CARAS Andino and President Juan Manuel GALVÉS reconciled their political differences at a meeting held on December 2nd at the home of Vice-President Julio LOZANO, S. The threatened split in the National Party has been averted.

2. Galvés is not to run for re-election. Both Carías and Galvés have agreed, in the interests of party solidarity, to withdraw from the presidential race and unite behind a common candidate, who is as yet unspecified.

3. Carías is still the undisputed head of the National Party, as indicated by the following:

a. On Sunday, November 30th, in nation-wide elections for town mayors, General Carías' candidates won overwhelmingly. Total votes for his candidates were nearly four times the combined votes for all other candidates – i.e. – those supported by Galvés and those supported by the Liberal Party. This was a direct test of strength between the supporters of General Carías and President Galvés.

b. The National Assembly, opening its annual meeting on December 3rd elected several pro-Carías men as leaders for the current session.

c. The earlier report that the 5% contribution from each government employee to Carías had been stopped proved erroneous. As head of the National Party Carías still receives the contribution.

4. General Abraham WILLIAMS has been eased out of the picture for the present. Just where Williams stands politically is not clear at the moment, except that he has been temporarily shelved.
5. The Guatemalans attempted to exert political influence, approaching Gálvez and offering their support in helping him remove Carias. They failed in this move.

6. Francisco Morazán, a Honduran, currently private secretary to President Arbenz of Guatemala, visited Gálvez in Teucrígala (November 1952) and offered himself as a compromise candidate between General Carias and President Gálvez.

7. There is some form of liaison between Francisco Morazán and General Williams, the nature of which is not clear at this time. On his recent trip to Honduras Morazán delivered a truck-load of arms to the finca of General Williams, near Choluteca. The arms are still there.

[Comment: This does not necessarily reflect a true picture of popular sentiment, since in many instances Carias' men controlled the local election machinery. Also many people voted the National Party ticket without realizing there was any question of choosing between Carias and Gálvez.]

Attachments:

"A" — Meeting, Carias-Gálvez
"B" — Political Parties
"C" — Election Results
SUBJECT: Meeting Between President Juan K. Gálvez and General Tiburcio Carías Andino, December 2, 1952. Tegucigalpa, D. C.

SOURCE: CALLIGERIS, for paragraph 2.

1. General Carías, President Gálvez, and don Julio Lozano (Vice-President) met in the home of don Julio for a meeting which lasted two and a half hours. Carías and Gálvez agreed to drop out of the picture, solidify the National Party, and work for don Julio as successor to Gálvez. Reports indicate that General Williams, who was not invited to the meeting, was not taken into consideration in any way and will be left to shift for himself.

2. Gálvez, during his meeting with Carías, included in his remarks the following:

   a. That the Guatemalan government through its official representatives in Honduras had offered to help him remove Carías, by assassination if necessary;

   b. That both he and Carías must be very careful of their personal security in the future and use bodyguards.

Source Comment: The Guatemalans recognize in Carías the major obstacle to their political aspirations in Honduras, and they are prepared to employ any means to effect his elimination.
SUBJECT: Political Parties; Partido Nacional and Partido Liberal

SOURCE: [Honduras, C. A.]

1. The two traditional parties, and the only ones which presently have any apparent strength, are the Nacional Party (Partido Nacional) and the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal). There are several lesser political parties, such as the Honduran Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partido Democrático Revolucionario Hondureño), and others which are subdivisions of the National or Liberal parties. However, at this writing we have no information on these smaller groups and hence shall leave them for a later report.

2. The relative strength of each one of the parties depends on the leaders of same and the propaganda which each party issues.

3. There is nothing in Honduran law which obliges the political parties to inscribe themselves as such in any register, in order that they be considered legal political parties. All the political groupings which exist in the country are legal. The National Party is the only one which has specifically requested recognition as a legal entity. This was done to enable it to acquire property, to have money deposits, and to exercise any other faculty which only natural or legal persons are capable of exercising.

4. The political parties meet in conventions to designate their candidates. All the officers and party members or supporters who can, attend these conventions. The rules of each party set forth the regulations for conventions, and it is the Directory group of each party which sets forth the date for such meetings according to the political circumstances.

5. In conformance with the Political Constitution of Honduras, the next presidential election must take place the second Sunday of October, 1954, and the President will take office the first of January, 1955.
ATTACHMENT: "C"

Top Report No. 21

SUBJECT: Mayoralty Election Results
Congressional Officials

SOURCE: Local newspapers, Tegucigalpa, D. C., Honduras, C. A.

1. The following are the official results of the nation-wide mayoralty elections, held November 30th:

National Party group (General Carras) 79,884
Liberal Party 13,883
so-called "Mixed Group" (Dr. Gálvez) 8,638
Others 5,756
Blank Ballots 166
Annulled Ballots 562

Total 108,889

2. A few departments still have some votes to report. This will in no way change the results of the elections.

3. The individuals chosen in Congress on December 3rd, 1952, to head the legislative body this coming year are:

President - Ingeniero Camilo Gómez y Gómez (departamento de Francisco Morazán)
Vice-President - Lic. Francisco Salomón Jiménez Castro (departamento de Francisco Morazán)
Secretario 1º - P. Q. Conrado Bonilla (departamento de Cortés)
Secretario 2º - Jerónimo Alcerro Castro (departamento de Santa Bárbara)
Pro-Secretario - Fernando Bustillo (departamento de Francisco Morazán)
Pro-Secretario - Jesús Villalba Vidal (departamento de Coatepeque)

4. The voting on the above slate of officers ran 24 in favor with 22 opposed. Most of the above men are considered Carístas.
6. The officers of the National Party are the following:

Tiburcio Carías Andino
Manuel Romero L.
Eduardo R. Coello
José María Casco
Marcos Ramírez
Fernando Zepeda Durón
Gabriel R. Aguilar
César A. Ramos
César F. Katomoros
Salomón Jiménez
Antonio B. Raquel
J. Francisco Martínez
Eleazar F. Vargas
Rafael López
Miguel A. Cruz Zambrano
Luis P. Lardizábal
Octavio Vallecillo
Eligio Elías Quiñónez

Supreme Chief
Committee President (Presidente del Comité)
Vice-President
Supervisor (Fiscal)
Vice-Treasurer
Treasurer
Presides in absence of President & V.-P. (Vocal)

7. The officers of the Liberal Party are the following:

Ramón Villeda Morales
Pedro A. Zúñiga
Félix Zavala Nóñez
Oscar A. Flores
Manuel F. Barahona
Alfonso Alvarado
Juan Miguel Mejía

Vocal 1°
" 2°
" 3°
" 4°
" 5°
Secretary
Secretary
MEMORANDUM FOR: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: Situation Report - PBSUCCESS for the Period 20-26 April 1954

27 April 1954

I. Operational - The following events of operational significance occurred during the reporting period:

A. Ambassador Peurifoy arrived in Washington from Guatemala City on 20 April and met the next day with officials of this Agency for debriefing. Notes on this meeting may be found in a detailed Memorandum for the Record dated 22 April 1954 in PBSUCCESS files. At present, [Redacted] is preparing to brief the Ambassador on pertinent aspects of PBSUCCESS.

B. On 21 April 1954, [Redacted] reported that [Redacted] chief of the PP group in Guatemala, became the object of a police search as the result of a crackdown by the Guatemalan Government on the 32 campaign. [Redacted] took refuge in [Redacted] apartment, but left later that same night as he felt that his hiding would be evidence of his guilt. In connection with the police attack on the [Redacted] group, Radio Internacional was attacked the night of 21 April by five armed masked men believed by the radio station owner to be members of the Guatemalan Secret Police. The owner based his belief on the fact that police had previously warned him against carrying anti-Communist programs.

C. On 21 April President Osorio of El Salvador stated that he and President Arbenz of Guatemala have a secret pact pledging mutual non-interference. Osorio also said that he has information regarding recent large arms shipments to Guatemala. The bold assassination attempt on President Somozas of Nicaragua, coupled with the foregoing, genuinely worries Osorio in regard to Guatemala's intentions toward El Salvador.

D. [Redacted]

E. The Guatemalan Governments intends to replace Rogelio CRUZ to as Chief of Police but is withholding action until police complete an investigation of telegrams intercepted by their agents in an unnamed
nearby country. These telegrams reportedly reveal details of Calligeris' activities. One of the telegrams reads, "In estan comprados los X". It was also reported that GRUZ Wer refuses to give up his office until the return to Guatemala of Col. Carlos Enrique DIAZ, Chief of the Guatemalan Armed Forces who at present is touring South America. DIAZ was responsible for GRUZ Wer's appointment as police chief.

F. Two black flights were successfully completed on 26 April, carrying a total of 10,000 pounds of cargo. Another black flight is scheduled for 27 April and will carry communications gear for Sherwood.

G. In regard to threatened resignation, Calligeris wrote a letter expressing distress at his threat to resign and expressed concern for the latter's health. He went on to remind him of his patriotic duty and stated that he hoped the two could meet in the U.S. as soon as possible to discuss his resignation, future relationships, and political plans. In conclusion, Calligeris admits some of his mistakes.

In the event that follows through with his plan to resign from PBSUCCESS, Calligeris states that is his choice to replace.

H. The team is now in preparing to process about twenty three persons previously not available for testing.

I. had an interview with the possibility of securing employment with that company. reported to Mr. that the interview was satisfactory as far as he was concerned but that no definite commitment of employment was made. Company officials stated that would bear from them in about ten days. In the interim was authorized by Mr. F to travel from to his home.

J. The site for the Sherwood Program has been established and is ready for operation.

K. Headquarters prepared a labor paper to be presented to Calligeris for his approval, the purpose of which is to insure the emergence of a free-trade union movement upon the completion of PBSUCCESS.

II. Administrative Support Activities

A. Logistics

An air freight flight was accomplished without incident from on 23 and 24 April. The cargo consisted of approximately 10,000 lbs. of communications gear for Sherwood.
B. Personnel

Several routine personnel transactions were accomplished during the week. The main problem with regard to personnel is the matter of their present and future status and promotion policy while assigned to FB SUCCESS. Lincoln continues to recommend personnel for promotions and does not feel that promotions must necessarily be in accord with present WED policy. A staff paper outlining the problems will be submitted next week for study.

C. Finance

Headquarters received the monthly requirements for additional funds to be forwarded to Lincoln and regional command stations. The request has been submitted and approved by DD/F and the funds will be pouched through the regular secure finance channel.

D. General

Twice weekly pouch service in and out of I has been established for regional command stations.

[ ]
ANNEX B

PARA-MILITARY

PART TWO by Assistant PM Officer,

Departure from LINCOLN was made early in June with several purposes in mind to be accomplished upon arrival. They were:

a. Bring the shock troops to a state of preparedness which would permit the initiation of the campaign at an early date and at the same time would permit support of a premature uprising which might be caused by any one of a number of actions within the target country.

b. Organize five-man "Hornet" teams for the harassment of the enemy in localities far removed from the obvious area of activity.

c. Launch the remaining resident radio operators to their respective points.

d. Move all shock troop equipment to selected staging areas near the border.

e. Move by all possible methods, land, sea and air, arms to the inner organizations.

f. Bring sabotage plans to the final stage. Ready the sab leaders for launching to their areas.

g. Prepare for launching to his targets.

h. Check the final military plans and modify them to suit the latest analysis of the situation.

Upon arrival, and after meeting with as well as with all the leaders of the CASTILLO Armis organization, it was obvious that much of the above would be very difficult to accomplish in the short time which remained. It was apparent that CASTILLO Armis had very little knowledge of the numerical strength of his own organization. At various times he claimed to have from 300 to 500 men. It was on the basis of these figures that the decision to form the five-man teams was made. During the attempts to form these groups CASTILLO Armis made a number of excuses as to why this could not be done. It was finally apparent that he undoubtedly did not have the men that he claimed to have and a list of all men was demanded by name. He submitted a list of men far below the number that we had hoped was present. The list contained 150 names. This not only did not permit the formation of the five-man teams, but it also did not furnish the required numbers for the shock troop organization. This information came only a week before the intended D-Day.

Upon the receipt of this information, my first inclination was to relay the shocking facts to LINCOLN with an urgent plea to postpone the initiation of the campaign. After much careful consideration, however, it was my decision that due to the possibility of gathering considerable
sympathisers along the way, we could launch the campaign as planned. I felt that any relaying of such information would have the effect of deterring from and demoralising the enthusiasm of the CASTILLO Armas organisation as well as having the effect of possibly postponing a campaign which might bog down hopelessly if not permitted to begin on schedule.

Much of the preparation for the campaign was made very difficult by the turn of events within the target country. The crack-down after the first leaflet drop made arms ingress almost impossible. Most of our methods broke down completely and we had to rely on such methods as J and his plane delivering arms to his personal friends. We were able to send individuals across the line with arms in suitcases and bags. It is not known at this time how much of that was effective. We tried every method imaginable and we are confident that some of them worked. Even the launching of the radio operators was extremely difficult and hazardous for them. We are sure that a number of them were picked up and of those who did get to their respective areas, only a few came on the air.

I had done a fine job of preparing the sabotage leaders and all were eager to get in and begin their work. There remained the problem of getting the proper equipment in for them to work with. Some was sent in through J and some was taken by hand. While mentioning J it might be added that he had done wonders in organising CASTILLO Armas' staff into the proper sections. All hands had the utmost respect for J and his command presence as well as his language qualifications made him invaluable.

In looking over the final military plans, it struck me that the movement of our [ ] troops by way of Guatun would not only give the enemy adequate warning of the movement but the concentration of Communist personnel at Guatun would hinder our advance to such a degree that the J enemy forces might stage a successful counter-attack. It appeared that a pincher movement on J would be more likely to succeed. A plan was worked out to bring an additional force from Copan Ruias down through Camotan and Jocoten for an attack upon Chiquimula and there to J. The mission of this force was 1) to aid in the capture of J. In the event that the J team experienced difficulty, and 2) if J fell to us early, to move rapidly through the Jalapa area to the capital. In the latter case, the J forces would protect the rear of this column. CASTILLO Armas' staff took to this plan with alacrity and it was decided that the CP would be with this group.

Much of my time was taken up with interviews of personnel newly arrived from Guatemala, both military and civilian. Upon the arrival of J and, following an interview with him, I recommended that he be placed in command of the J force, replacing J. I felt that J had been in command of the garrison off J at one time, along with his higher rank and greater experience, he should be commander of this very important force.

Another arrival was Colonel J. I was very much impressed with his force and bearing and recommended him for some command. In this case it was command of the force which was to cross from Nueva Guatoppeque.

In the absence of the five-man teams for harassment, it was decided to utilise the talents of J. In this line. He had been most anxious to do something other than deliver arms to his friends and claimed to be able to perform bombing missions with his Cessna 150. I was frankly skeptical.
about the accuracy of such bombing, but he convinced me that it was possible.

4. Constructed bombs of TNT blocks surrounding concussion grenades, armed so that they would detonate upon impact. I took off on his initial flight of this type, headed N.

5. He had met two men, for as a "bomber pilot," he flew in almost on the ground toward the gasoline tanks at San José. As he approached the tanks, he pulled into a semi-stall and the bomber turned the bomb. His first attempt was a direct hit and the tank burst into flame. He then flew to Retalhuleu and did the same thing to the SHELL and ESSO tanks there. He ran out of bombs but "strafed" the tanks with a Hessen gun, successfully puncturing them and then set them afire with grenades. I flew another of these missions to X. His audacity was illustrated by his calling the field tower at X, saying that he was an air force plane wishing to land. The tower gave him the proper instructions and he came in to his bombing mission on the TEXACO tank. He received much AA fire as he tried to bomb an A-3 with a rocket on the runway of the field. In eluding the fire he dived into a group of trees and caught a branch of one of them in his control surfaces. He had to land at the first available field to remove it.

6. I was very anxious to perform very hazardous missions at all times and was invaluable to our efforts.

Our safe house facilities included a house where the staff of CASTILLO Armas could function as a unit. There were maps, tables, conference rooms and briefing rooms. I met there every day early in the morning and worked there all day with the staff.

7. I worked in another safe house, too, which served as a storehouse for our supplies. He worked with his sabotage leaders there. The latter house was located high on the mountainside outside of the city. Upon the arrival of the POP radio personnel, we activated another safe house about halfway between. This house was ideal for the radio station as it was well into the suburbs and comings and goings were not noticed. After this house was opened, we spent much of our time there.

Upon the arrival of the planes and very shortly after his arrival the campaign was initiated. It should be noted here that the entire organization of CASTILLO Armas had completed confidence in me and in his leadership. So far as I could tell, none of his decisions were ever questioned and for that matter, neither were any of mine, before he came. CASTILLO Armas made the same plea for strong air attacks to, for that he had made previously to me. He was not given any assurance whatsoever that air support would be forthcoming other than for air delivery of supplies, which we felt would be a sure thing. All of the personnel who came out of the country to us were of the firm opinion that, should powerful air blows be delivered on the city in the early phases, the campaign would not be a long one. The concensus of opinion was that if several bombs were dropped on the Guardia de Honor, on La Aurora Air Field, on the Base Militar and possibly one other one on a selected target - the Government would fall immediately. Colonel [redacted] insisted that the Government almost fell with the first leaflet drop.

Just before the arrival of the organize returned to [redacted]. He had been captured by several soldiers who recognized him from a former association in the army. He was tortured but escaped to return with valuable information. People were coming and going along the border at this time without interference, particularly in the [redacted] area.
One of our big problems was the movement of men and supplies. We had cooperation with an representative to the extent that he agreed to send a truckload of arms into the country. However, this did not work out. We did send several loads of arms in specially constructed private automobiles with false compartments. We had no cooperation from the President there.

Movement of shock troops to the staging areas began in small numbers. Receiving parties were sent ahead and when we received word that the areas were ready, movement was initiated. Movement was very slow and in very small numbers. Finally, when time became short and D-day approached, more speed was necessary and troops were moved in larger and less clandestine groups. This movement caused a flood of newspapermen to descend, making operations all the more difficult. Final movement of the shock troops brought the operation fully into the open as it became necessary to move the troops by commercial, chartered airplanes. This was necessary in order to assemble the troops at the staging areas at the proper time for the attack.

Difficulty was encountered in the plans for the seaborne operation for which we had purchased a boat at La Ceiba on the north coast of Honduras. The boat was loaded with equipment which was delivered to La Ceiba through the cooperation of who, incidentally, was of tremendous help in many ways. transported equipment in planes for us to many points and into fields which were not well-suited to his planes. A group was dispatched to La Ceiba to man the boat but discovered it to be missing. Presumably the boat had made a run to the islands for cover purposes. Finally the team caught up with the boat and boarded it for the operation. It is not entirely clear at this date what developed from this operation, it is known that the boat was picked up, but more than that is not known.

Communications were good with the exception that at night all contact was lost between and SHERWOOD, thereby causing a terrific pile-up of messages in the morning and a consequent bogging down of those messages. There was considerable time lag between the sending of messages from the field and their reception at. For this reason, it was decided to move the back to in order to give more adequate service to the field. With respect to answering some messages which came in from the field, it was frequently impossible to gain contact with the field stations for some hours. More urgent messages would follow and some of the original messages went unanswered.

With regard to security, it is obvious that many of the desirable security measures which would normally be employed in a truly clandestine operation were disregarded in this instance. In order to accomplish the job, much of the clandestinity had to be abandoned. We had to move openly in and to and from safe houses, thereby undoubtedly identifying ourselves with the organization of CASTILLO Armas. It can be said, though, that this movement was kept to an absolute minimum and that some of it was absolutely necessary to accomplish the task. The safe house where the FCP was located was by far the best and kept the most clandestine.

After the movement to, the FCP functioned much more efficiently and was able to offer the desired support to the field. The fact that the Jettiff worked right with the Air Ops facilitated this support, in addition to keeping everyone informed as to the field situation - which situation had not existed prior to this time.
Other than the numerous small lessons learned during the campaign, there are, in my opinion, two main lessons to be learned from the overall situation. First, at the very outset of the planning for an operation of this type, a decision should be made as to the importance of its success. Upon reaching this decision, the amount of power to be utilized and the method of employment of this power should also be decided. This power (and in this case it was air bombardment) should not be withheld. It should be utilized at the very beginning of the operation. It is my considered opinion that if the air power which was used in the final phases of the operation had been used on the first day in the same manner, the campaign would not have lasted 48 hours. Undoubtedly, a few lives would have been lost in the bombing, but many more lives could have been saved by shortening the campaign. This opinion is based upon both the reports of persons who came from and my previous knowledge of the Latin people.

Secondly, I believe that the program could have been better coordinated with the program. By this I refer to the leaflet drops. The reaction to these drops was terrific. The results, however, were definitely detrimental to the effort, and the reaction of the staff of CASTILLO Armas. It was one of dejection. It was the opinion of all of us, including that it would have been well if the field had been consulted before the decision to make the drop had been made. The leaflet drops caused a crackdown within Guatemala which would have come eventually when the movement of our troops to the border was noticed, but it came at a time when we were still able to make delivery of arms, radio operators and sabotage personnel into the country. After the crackdown, it was virtually impossible to accomplish this. I pleaded with us to permit no more leaflet drops as every one reduced the effectiveness of his air operations. The overall effect of such activity cannot be underestimated, but it is recommended that in the future they be coordinated with the activity so that they can be mutually supporting.

With regard to communications, as in operations in which I have been involved in the military service, much of the planning is based upon split second contact between units and command by radio. I have never seen this contact work out completely as planned, even with highly trained operators. In this case, with indigenous operators and difficult conditions, while the results were amazing, they did not work out as planned. Only in the final phases did the radio come begin to work properly.

Finally, while an operation of this type is most difficult to keep clandestine, it would have been much more easily accomplished if the enemy had not been fully alerted some weeks before D-day. Had not martial law been proclaimed and the curfews, police patrols, etc., not been in effect, our movement and sabotage plans would have been much more likely to succeed. It is not known at this time how much of our sabotage was completed, but so far not much of it has been reported.
ANNEX B

PARA-MILITARY

PART FOUR - by PM Operations Officer,

The following is a summary of the course of events from the time [ ] was dispatched [ ] all January 1951, to the end of activities against Guatemala.

The synopsis will attempt to shed light on all phases, that is: training, organization, security, operational matters and the effect which the overall training had on the final phase and success of the project. This report is divided into three phases: (1) From [ ] departure to the White Paper; (2) Training period; (3) Setting up of the para-military organization of CASTILLO Armas.

Phases 2 and 3 are considered the most important as far as activities are concerned. They deal mostly with training and organizational setup.

PHASE I

Upon [ ] arrival [ ] a semi-organization for para-military activities had been set up. A total of fifteen men were on hand as the advanced training element. The equipment had not arrived and selection of the training site had not been settled.

Originally, training was to begin by 1 January but up to that date no facilities had been made available.

After considerable negotiations with [ ] authorization was given to commence movement of personnel and equipment to [ ]

First difficulties encountered were movements of equipment and personnel while taking into consideration the most strict security measures. After an unsuccessful attempt to have [ ] furnish a boat for transfer and movement, negotiations with a private concern were made to rent a suitable launch. Cover story was that a crew of engineers were to work on private experiments for [ ] This story was maintained throughout entire project.

On taking over [ ] the only facilities made available were a barn and an inadequate water well. A complete training site had to be constructed. Two living quarters, mess hall, sanitary units and showers were built along with development of suitable areas for training activities. During this period evaluations, observations, complete interviews and background studies were made of the trainees. Food and building materials were shipped on a daily basis and continued until approximately 22 January.

On or about 22 January food shipments were discontinued, (reasons unknown to [ ] at that time) although daily messages were air dropped stating all was fine and that an attempt by [ ] was being made to purchase a boat to enable the project to discontinue use of the rented launch. No attempts were
made to pick up our distress messages telling that absolutely no food was available and that serious conditions existed, although a pre-arranged method for pick-ups of messages had been made. (A rig had been constructed solely for this purpose.)

During this critical period, I had one serious malaria case, an appendicitis case, a hernia patient and two VB cases. No medical items had been included in the entire shipment of equipment. Every effort was made to justify the conditions to the trainees. It was certainly one of the darkest periods as far as the trainees were concerned and it is mentioned here only because I was never allowed to forget it by the trainees who had experienced it. After a week of such conditions, a small boat arrived with small quantities of foodstuffs and building materials. I immediately returned to inquire about the disorganized logistics.

On arrival at ... all newspapers were carrying the accounts that CHACO DELGADO had passed on to the Guatemalan government.

As [ ] was in the United States, I immediately began liaison with [ ], requesting a new location. Arrangements were made and all equipment and personnel were evacuated that same night without incident or problems.

Again, the new location was without adequate facilities and work was begun immediately to construct suitable billets, training sites, etc.

During the brief stay ... some training had begun, primarily to develop a small cadre for future use as instructors.

A half-day training and work schedule had to be implemented. Labor units worked in the mornings and group instruction took place during the afternoons. Individual instructions were held after supper.

During this early training period only one major problem was on hand. It had been reported that the advance element would be comprised of CASTILLO Armas' top leaders who were to be semi-trained or experienced, and to bear in mind that they were to be the revolt's organizers. This was truly an underestimate. In fact, of the first twenty-seven trainees arriving at ... only four had the possibilities, or were considered capable, of becoming organizers or leaders. This later slowed down normal training operations because separate groups had to be maintained.

Schedules were revised and instructions changed to meet the requirements for the conditions originally set up. Three groups were established which consisted of officers, sub trainees and troops. Three complete running schedules, independent of each other, were drawn up. During the second phase of the training, sub trainees and troops were made interchangeable.

COMMENTS:

1. Security prior to the "White Paper" had been extremely lax on the part of the personnel working in [ ] This was primarily because no control was maintained over the personnel. No serious precautions or attempts at compartmentation had been undertaken.
Compartmentation was unheard of among the principal factions and contacts in most cases were made overtly. A cutout system was never employed.

2. No adequate facilities were maintained for complete security regarding incoming or outgoing correspondence. Safes were not made available and file folders were available for inspection by anyone. All personal folders were made interchangeable among the principals. The "need-to-know" principle was never practiced. All conversations, even those regarding the highest operational matters, were discussed "openly" with absolutely no regard for security.

3. It is felt that because of the above lax security DELOADO was able to secure and photograph a large number of documents.

PHASE II

On receiving word to reactivate training at all efforts were then concentrated on the training program.

By the early part of March a total of 65 trainees were at

The following schedule was adopted and carried out with full force:

a. Classes for officers were held from 0700 to 1800 hours and from 1930 to 2230 hours.

b. Classes for staff personnel were identical.

c. Classes for the troops were the same except for guard and KP duties.

During the first three weeks, theory and blackboard problems and instructions were in order. Classes organized for officers concentrated primarily on the following courses:

a. Troop leadership.

b. Command and staff problems.

c. Map reading and terrain evaluation.

d. Basic infantry tactics.

e. Deployment of troops in guerrilla warfare.

f. Guerrilla tactics.

g. Effective use of fire power.

h. Supply problems and aerial resupply.

i. First aid.

j. Attack on, and control of, cities.
k. Security

l. Nomenclature, care and cleaning of all weapons.

m. Tradecraft problems.

Subjects on which stress was placed were: Deployment of troops, effective use of fire power, aerial resupply, map reading, troop leadership and guerrilla tactics. Security was stressed in tradecraft instruction. Also included were lectures on cutout systems, contacts, surveillance, CE, CI, etc. After the theory and blackboard instruction, live problems were conducted.

Officers were then assigned definite jobs and placed as group leaders. A continual rotation to various duties was mandatory for each officer to familiarize him with other duties in addition to his squad duties. Such duties as Sanitation, Hens, Adjutant, First Aid (Medical Officer), Instructor, Liaison, Staff Control, etc., gave each officer a wealth of experience.

During the same period Sab training was also conducted in full force. Selected Sab trainees totaled approximately 30, with an eventual prospect of using the best 20 for operations. The training commenced with preliminary theory instruction. During the course of training it was discovered that most of the trainees were limited in mathematical calculations and a simplification method had to be employed. Stress was on photograph targets, rather than mathematical calculation. Included during this period were simulated charge positions, actual handling of charges and detonators, electric wiring, handling and demonstrations of electric and non-electric caps, time calculations and improvised charges.

During the second week actual participation in Sab problems was conducted by the trainees, permitting the student to attain the necessary confidence in handling explosives.

The third week was a continual nightmare for the trainees. Strict problems were conducted mostly at night. Stress was on target approach and coordinated attacks. A model village was erected in the midst of the jungle approximately six kilometers from [ ]. It consisted of several small houses, rail track sections, small generators, automotive parts and gas and oil drums. Approach to target was consistently changed with simulated action being conducted while trainees were at work. Observers were always on the 'spot for checking of Sab personnel or teams.

The third element, the foot soldiers, were instructed in care and cleaning of weapons, firing techniques, patrol and recon procedures, methods to overcome terrain difficulties, security, individual survival, first aid, map study, etc.

By late March and early April the three groups were working together in an effort to establish coordinated attacks. Constant critiques were in order. For final exercises a three day CPX was conducted.

On many occasions [ ] student tactical radio operators were utilized in training, Sab and field problems.
COMMENTS:

1. During the entire Phase II period, I bore in mind the necessity for developing "organisers" and in some respects viewed it with skepticism for the following reasons:

a. The caliber of personnel sent to SARABAC was not what it was expected to be.

b. Of the 99 trainees, only about ten were qualified as organisers.

c. Most of the men were of the "hood" type and could only be utilised in regular troop units, guerrillas or sab teams.

2. For the above reasons the term "instructors" was designated to what was originally intended to be organisers. According to later results the organisers had been selected and were either living covertly or overtly in their designated targets.

3. Logistics: This was, above all, the biggest headache. It took anywhere from one complete day to two days for the purchasing of foods and materials to maintain the camp actively. Goods had to be purchased i.e [Personnel had to be detached with a considerable loss of valuable man-hours].

4. Security: Overall excellent. Guards were posted on a regular tour of duty. During the period several stragglers were made captive and turned over to [On one occasion, two "gun runners" were apprehended who later turned out to be principals in the attempted assassination of [It was also during this phase that [requested the transfer of [because of their laxness in security].

5. Liaison: Liaison was maintained with [on a very good relationship, discussing periodically matters as directed by LINCOLN, procurement of documentation, local authority support, etc. Relationship with top officials was on such a confidential basis that it enabled [to obtain considerable first-hand, high-level information with regard to internal and external government machinations. This is evident from cable correspondence maintained during that period.

6. Training: On completion of training, it was felt by [that results obtained could be considered excellent for the following reasons:

a. Ideological motives were chiefly involved rather than materialistic.

b. Trainees were extremely eager and willing to learn. Their willingness to endure the hardship of training and their constant cooperation made it extremely easy to handle and instruct the men.

c. The majority had been at one time or another political prisoners or tortured by the opposition.
d. I took advantage and exploited the "Sentimentalism," a trait at every opportunity.

e. Trainees were made to feel "highly superior" in relation to the opposition troops by constantly indoctrinating them in the fact that they would be better trained, have superior weapons and fire power, and were led by highly efficient officers.

f. Morale during the period of training was always high. Every effort to attain the best recreational facilities was made. Disagreements among the men were referred to Captain and were always settled by boxing matches.

g. The "We are born to win for God and Country." This was the premise by which the men and officers lived and trained which kept uppermost in their minds day and night.

PHASE 3

After closing, I returned to LINCOLN for reorientation, instructions and further preparations before departing to rejoin the CASTILLO Armas organization.

On May 6, 1954, I departed with instructions to act as the CASTILLO Armas in every possible way. The first few days were spent in just making observations and assisting wherever possible. To the amazement, no semi-military organization had been established. A request to correct this situation was forwarded to CASTILLO Armas and he was asked to assign one of his top military aides to me. In order to begin organizing and building a staff, Colonel Castellanos was assigned and made Chief of Staff at LINCOLN. A definite military organization was then established, with G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4 sections to insure the preliminary working stage for staff study, assignments, etc. Job assignments were then given to all officers to insure that all available resources were put to use in the best interest of the movement. Up to this time no such organization had existed despite repeated assurances by CASTILLO Armas.

Other sections organized were: A training center for the instruction of new arrivals, security section, and C.I. and C.E. working units.

Shock troop units, as well as S&D and instructor assignments, were organized.

Operations forwarded by LINCOLN were studied and necessary changes made because of rapid and constant changes in the internal situation in Guatemala.

Several separate operations were established which later had a strong bearing on the success of the project. These operations were those at Copan Ruinas, Nueva Ocotpeque, Morales and "La Siesta." For comments on results see Attachment 1.

It is extremely difficult to give a complete and full report of the successes and defeats of all military operations as well...
as the Sab actions because of the lack of information and confirmations. All information on the successes and defeats mentioned in the Attachments are as a result of debriefings with the exception of "La Siesta" operation. The latter information was received on the monitored radio reports passed on by  

2 Attachments

- 25 -
ATTACHMENT I

On June 16, 1951, all shock troops were in position. These included, other than the land and air troops, the 17th and 18th Diez's troops.

Each of the above operations will be dealt with separately in an attempt to focus some light as to their successes or failures.

I. SHOCK TROOPS.

The assignment of shock troops was to strike on the night of D-Day with the ultimate goal of completely sealing the exit of government troops that might attempt to assist or to control the rail line between the Canal Zone and the French Guiana coast.

As far as can be determined and in the debriefing of one member of that force, the shock troops arrived at and did block the tunnel located approximately six kilometers from the canal and also set up a block at Piedra Parada, located on the Atlantic Highway on D + 1. From reports, several small guerrilla groups were sent to the outskirts of Diez for harassment purposes. These positions were maintained for approximately three days.

Information received from monitored calls confirmed that opposition troops had been continuously flown from Guatemala City to with the primary objective of re-establishing the connection between forces with those of

Approximately four days after D-Day, a sizeable enemy force counter-attacked and disorganized the shock troops. The troops dispersed and commenced retreating which eventually terminated at Los Corredores, Honduras.

II. GROUP

This group consisted of approximately 30 organized men and had the mission of taking and holding a located between the French Guiana coast and Bananera, holding both for three days until the break-through of the enemy forces from the Canal Zone. During this period, the leader, had organized and reinforced his group totalling approximately 120 men.

Failure to achieve further success, according to the lack of supplies. After a delay in action, the group gave way and retreated, but not until they had caused considerable damage and casualties to the enemy forces. retreating to his jumping off base, Los Tarros, Honduras, with approximately 100 men.

His request for more supplies was granted and immediate steps were taken to consolidate the shock troops with the group with the primary objective of retaking, which has an airfield, by 30 June, and commencing movement toward with the objective of attacking and capturing it.
On the eve of 29 June this force was on the outskirts of fully equipped, and ready to attack when word was sent of the peace negotiations, and to remain in position until further notice.

**III. GROUP**

This group totaled 27 men who sailed from an area approximately above Santo Tomas which is located below and Southwest of . Their primary mission was to harass . This action was planned and coordinated so that they landed approximately D + 1.

According to monitored radio reports the group made a successful landing. The ship was discovered and captured on the day of landing, but minus its cargo and men. Reports further indicated that this group was fighting a losing battle against the enemy forces because the enemy Commander, Colonel Bolanos, was consistently requesting additional reinforcements from Guatemala City to cope with the small force. It was not until nine days later that it was reported that group had finally been defeated and that nine members had been captured. It was also reported that all were executed.

This group did not have a TAO. Several attempts were made to localize this group from the monitored reports but every one failed. It was therefore impossible to give them an aerial resupply or to aid them with air support.

It is felt that this group was the most courageous and sustained the enemy, limiting their objective in reestablishing the and connections by continuously defeating and harassing the city and keeping those elements occupied during the other battle phases.

**IV. SHOCK TROOPS**

The primary mission of this group was in accordance with original plans. Only one change was made and that was to bypass Gualan by detaching a small group and blocking the small element that existed in Gualan.

According to the debriefing of the TAO, this plan was in order until a battle began between the enemy forces and the small detachment. The detachment requested aid from the shock troop leader who, with his force, was on his way to . The troop leader temporarily changed his plans and returned to Gualan and captured same only after a fierce battle.

On reaching Gualan, the shock troop staff moved into the cuartel to reorganize and build up their troops for continuation of their march to .

During this period, it was presumed by the TAO, that request for reinforcements had been dispatched to by the Gualan commander prior to his defeat, because the following morning a sizable force was detected coming from the direction of . A battle commenced and lasted for approximately 50 hours with the complete annihilation of Castillo Armas' forces in Gualan. The only force not caught in this was ... detachment which had been deployed south of Gualan near Choyo.
The TRO was asked if any blunders were committed that might have resulted in the defeat. Subject stated that it was his honest belief that if troops had had enough rest that circumstances might have been different. He further stated that the trek across the mountains and the continual push by the commander to meet his dead-line resulted in only having fatigued troops. They were completely exhausted, even before commencing the fight, and the fighting continued for three straight days without them having the benefit of rest or sleep.

The later successes of can be attributed to the tremendous losses sustained by the enemy due to both the battles of Cualan and the last ditch stand of

V. COPAN RUINAS AND NUEVA OCOTEPEQUE

These two forces can be included in the same movement, although their jumpoff points were distinctly apart. Both forces merged at Quezaltepeque for the eventual attack of Chiquimula.

The success of Chiquimula can be attributed to many situations, with only a few mentioned here:

The successful aerial resupply of these forces, the fact that the Advanced CP was here and the majority of the high level staff were together, the successful aerial support and the checking of a possible pincer movement by enemy forces coming from Chiquimula and a southern movement from Ipala. A force totalling 100 men were dispatched to check this latter group with success on the part of Castillo Armas' troops. Had maintained constant enemy OB situations from monitored radio reports and principally dispatched troops to this area to avoid a rear attack of the Chiquimula forces.

The capturing of a considerable quantity of munitions, weapons including 81mm mortars intact with large quantities of shells, was indeed evidence that the majority of troops had been dispatched from in an early attempt to defeat troops there rather than at the strategic.

The movement never developed because of the intervention by These forces were merged with the Nueva Ocotepeque troops.
ATTACHMENT II

SAB ACTIVITY

During the action, Sab activity was in action at the following points:

a. Rail and communications between Entre Rios and Tenedores.

b. Rail and communications between Tenedores and Morales and between La Libertad and Morales.

c. Rail and communications NE of Guanacaste and NW of Guanacaste.

d. Rail and communications NE of Francisco Bridge, located below Tenedores. The above Sab activity was coordinated to assist all troops.

Other Sab operations were as follows:

a. [ ] It was reported that destruction of the oil storage tanks, which was to have been the signal to begin activities, did occur on D-Day at approximately 0320 hours, just ten minutes before the exact time of plans.

b. TOW. It was never reported whether an attempt or actual activity occurred against TOW. Although the station continued to broadcast, it was reported that TOW and other hookups had been grouped to enable the continuation of broadcasts also utilizing the Quezaltenango transmitters.

c. All possible telecommunications in or around the capital by three separate teams.

d. Rails and communications leading to El Salvador.

The Sab activity successes have been the most difficult to determine. Whether attempts or actual action was accomplished on selected targets is problematical because of the inaccurate reports, the tight security maintained by the enemy forces during the stage, and because of lack of information.
SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

SUBJECT: Meeting at the Newport Hotel, 10:30 a.m., 2 May 1952, with

1. Suitable cover for Mr. and Mr. was discussed. The consensus of opinion is that Mr. could be attached to the in Guatemala, with an assignment which would give him complete freedom of movement and keep him in constant contact. Mr. could go as an engineer to where the is more active than in Guatemala. Contrary to Mr.'s opinion a few days ago, Mr. said that there are no immediate projects in Guatemala requiring the services and that their current policy of cutting expenses to the bone has been so enforced that the arrival of on the scene might arouse suspicious comment.

2. described his meetings with Castillo Armas in Honduras. He asked Armas if he knew how to prepare an Order of Battle. Armas said he did, and requested him to put all details on paper. Some 15 to 20 pages were prepared and these were delivered on 7 prpl to an indicated person of the Embassy in who in turn was sending them to Mr. said that Castillo Armas, although willing to delay his cover until he is given the green light, calls attention to the fact that the rainy season begins at the end of May or early June and continues to December and that those months would be the poorest for military action. Castillo Armas would welcome military advice and counsel. If Mr. is qualified, it would be a big asset. Castillo Armas is low in funds and Mr. gave him $1,000 to tide him over. Approaches have been made to Castillo Armas by Armas and the post of a European Embassy was dangled in front of him as bait. He refused. Four men have been sent to assassinate him, but one of the four tipped him off and he is safe and sound — for the moment!

3. Recently assisted a certain Guatemalan to escape from there by dressing him up in mechanic's clothes and storing him away in his plane, flying him to Honduras. Although presumably no one knew of this, there was a leak. Mr. knows that one of the staff disclosed the operation.

4. are flying this evening to Washington and will meet at our office tomorrow at 9:00 a.m. with Col. Mr. is then flying to Honduras and would like to have a further list of questions to put to
Castillo Armas. I informed him that I would be somewhere in Central America during the next two weeks and if there is any important material obtained, would act as courier.

[ ]

CWH

[ ]

5 May 1952
9 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Central American Situation

1. At 9 a.m. on 9 October 1952, a meeting was held in the office of the Director. Present were the Director, and

2. The Director explained that all plans for action were canceled. Then pointed out the responsibilities we have towards the people who are already in the field and who have committed themselves, and the dangers to the entire Caribbean area of the decision reached yesterday. The Director replied that he was fully aware of the dangers inherent in such a decision, but that this Agency is merely an executive agency to carry out the policies of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, and if they instruct us not to engage in a certain operation, we shall not engage in that operation. Then commented that the Department of State might very well change its position in the near future because of the explosive situation in the Caribbean. To this the Director agreed.

Then stated that there had been developments since report last evening to the Director, and that it appeared we had received all the necessary clearances for the shipment of machinery from New Orleans in spite of the questions raised yesterday by State. Stated that he was not even suggesting action in violation of the position taken by State yesterday, but that this shipment could go out as planned except that it would be to a new consignee and to a secure place under our absolute control. The General asked what place did have in mind - was it our own? When the answer was in the affirmative, the Director telephoned and informed him that while we were not shipping the machinery to the country for which it was originally destined, apparently we had all the necessary clearance and would ship it to a place of our own in . Although expressed himself as surprised that we had such clearances, apparently no objection was interposed. The Director authorized to proceed with this shipment to our place if it could be securely arranged and if it were true that necessary authorizations did exist.

3. and described the situation of RUFUS, with a number of men already mobilized, and the need of supplying RUFUS with cash at once for a liquidation action if we were not to be even more embarrassed with our Central American friends. The Director asked how much was needed. Replied $3,000 a week. The Director said he would go along for four weeks and would approve $15,000.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Central American Situation.

1. At 10 p.m. on 8 October 1952, a meeting was held in the offices of [ ]. Present were [ ] and [ ].

2. [ ] informed the group that as a result of a policy decision by State yesterday opposing the shipment of machinery as planned, this decision being precipitated by indiscretions of Somoza, all of the action planned in support of the opposition was off. [ ] explained that Tachito Somoza had indirectly approached Assistant Secretary Miller in Panama and asked him where was the machinery; and both the Nicaraguan and Dominican Ambassadors had called on Mr. Mann at the Department of State to discuss the same matter. This confirmed our general belief that no Latin American can be trusted to keep his mouth shut. [ ] raised the question of the feeding of the man who are already mobilized, and pointed out that even though no further action is taken, MUFUM must have money to liquidate his forces if he is not completely to lose face; that approximately $3,000 per week are MUFUM's present requirements. The possibility was discussed of using the ship arriving in New Orleans on Monday for shipment of machinery to our own place. [ ] said this could be done without difficulty if there were no trouble in getting the machinery on board. He was sure he could re-route his ship and have it go direct to our own place.
MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Compromise of Cable Traffic - PBSUCCESS

1. The Lincoln station advised headquarters on 19 February 1954 that a major compromise of Commo and project security was discovered on or about 17 February 1954 by ( ) replacement with the Castillo Areas group. The following is a chronological report of the compromise as received by WHD from Lincoln:

   a. During the week of 15 February 1954, ( ) not occupied ( ) and settled his account during this meeting, ( ) handed to ( ) the original copies of all messages which have been passed by the Chief of Station, ( ) to ( ) advised that ( ) left these messages in the apartment when he left the country. ( ) further stated that because of the apparent importance of the information contained in the messages, he had made said messages immediately available to his good friend, ( ). When ( ) examined the messages in question, he immediately realized that a serious exposure of Agency cryptonyms and PBSUCCESS organizational methods and procedures had been revealed to at least two known unauthorized persons and probably an indeterminable number of others. He immediately called Station Lincoln advising them of the compromise in general terms and indicated that he was departing for Lincoln immediately with the documents in question.

   b. Station Lincoln alerted headquarters at 1300 hours, 19 February 1954, by telephone and advised that a courier would arrive at headquarters at 2200 hours, 19 February 1954, with the compromised documents. Lincoln followed the telephone call with cable 612 which indicated that fact that the compromise consisted of 5 pages of slightly paraphrased text containing all basic cryptonyms and pseudonyms applying not only to PBSUCCESS but to the Agency at large. The PBSUCCESS desk made a preliminary examination upon receipt of cable 612 and determined that the compromise involved roughly six cables. It was not possible at that time, however, to determine exactly which cryptonyms had been exposed. When the courier arrived with the compromised messages, ( ) of Commo was called and he and ( ) desk officer PBSUCCESS, examined the documents together and compiled an
accurate list of exposed indicators. Mr. ( ) of the Security Office was advised of this list the morning of 20 February and a copy of the list was hand-carried to his office at 1020 hours that date.

c. The following is a list of those cryptonyms and pseudonyms which were exposed to ( ) and an indeterminable number of others:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINCOLN (LIN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBOCCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALLIGERIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LINCOLN Security Officer Compromising phrases

2. A preliminary analysis of the exposed messages has been performed, and based on that analysis and assessment the following assumptions have been made:

a. That ( ) and an indeterminable number of others now know that a powerful, well organized, official United States organization is backing the Castillo Armas group.

b. That a definite possibility exists that the information contained in subject messages may have gotten into the hands of Raul Saqueda, chief of personnel for the Castillo Armas group, and ( ) pilot, soldier of fortune and ( ) . If this happened, it could well be that any or all of the information may have gotten into the hands of the Guatemalan government through agents in the Castillo Armas organization.

c. If ( ) is less than he purports to be, the information may have been passed to any one of a number of other intelligence services. As regards ( ) however, a preliminary investigation gives indication that he is pro-American and that he probably has handled the messages in the manner he indicated.
3. A preliminary analysis of the report by ( ) (attached hereto), otherwise known as ( ), re the circumstances under which he procured ( ) messages in( ) clearly indicates the following about ( )

a. Specifically as regards the copies of paraphrased cables, he apparently intentionally withheld from the Agency information of what was known to him to constitute a major breach of security directly affecting the security of the project and the security of the Agency. The fact that this was known to him is clearly indicated by his having arranged, while in Washington, without notifying the Agency, the mailing of a letter to ( ), who is not yet cleared, in ( ) the expressed aim of which was the recovery of the papers.

b. ( ) is completely unreliable, professionally and personally.

4. ( ) has been recalled to headquarters from his home ( ) He will be given a very thorough and detailed interrogation. The situation cited in paragraph 3a above clearly and painfully indicates that FBSUCCESS may be compromised to a degree heretofore considered beyond the realm of possibility, and further, a large amount of information yet unrevealed may be in the hands of the Arbenz government.

5. It must be kept in mind that the foregoing report is at best a cursory examination of the situation and that a more detailed analysis cannot be presented formally until Lincoln and headquarters have had time to collect and collate all information re this specific incident and ( ) a general pattern of action since October 1953.

ATTACHMENTS:
1. True copy of compromised messages
2. ( ) report
3. Memo from Security re ( )
5. Memo to Security re Compromise of Cryptonym.
14 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR:  REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT L. DENNISON
       NAVAL AIDS TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT:  Estimate of Situation in Guatemala

The Director of Central Intelligence has requested that
the subject memorandum be shown to the President. It is to
be noted that the information contained therein has not been
coordinated with the members of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee.

SIGNED

J. S. EARMAN
Assistant to the Director

Enclosure
Memo dated 11 Jan 52 (from Col, King, OPC, to DD/P - K-2-1611)

O/DCI JSEarman/d
Distribution
Orig & 1 - Addresses
2 - Signer
1 - DD/P w/oc of memo of 11 Jan 52 /CAP 1654 52
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

SUBJECT: Estimate of Situation in Guatemala

Communist Activities

The Communists continue to be very active in Guatemala and continue to receive Government support. Since the anti-Communist rioting in July 1951 the Communists have softened their overt campaign for immediate action in the political field, but they have forged ahead in the labor movement, succeeding in forming, under the guidance of Vicente LOMARDO Toledano and Louis LAILANT, a central labor organization comprising almost all the unions in the country. The Communist newspaper Octubre is published regularly and circulates freely. It has devoted its columns to anti-United States propaganda and to trying to aggravate the United Fruit Company's labor troubles. The Guatemalan Communists are small in number, but their influence in both government and labor is substantial.

Anti-Communist Activities

The Anti-Communist Party of Guatemala has been formed since the July rioting and has received strong support from the Catholic middle class and from the Indians. The university students have furnished leadership to form a substantial bloc in the Party. They have requested President Arbenz to disband the Communist holding positions in the Government, and to expel all foreign Communists. The movement continues to develop in all sections of the country.

Political Situation

President ARBENZ has shown no sign of changing the policy set by AREVALO as regards Communism. He has stated his opposition to the anti-Communist movement. Raulino OROZCO Penique, leftist Minister of Government, has recently resigned and been replaced by Ricardo CHAVEZ Mackman. CHAVEZ is generally regarded as an anti-Communist. However, in January 1952 he announced that the government had decided to ban all anti-Communist demonstrations. Colonel PAZ Tejada, who had staunchly avoided attending all Communist rallies, but who was forced to attend the last one as the representative of President ARBENZ, has been replaced as Minister of Communications by Colonel Carlos ALVARADO Sandoval, an Arbenz supporter. PAZ Tejada has been placed in charge of the construction of the highway to the Atlantic.
Economic Situation

The economic situation in Guatemala was described as very bleak, with labor troubles and a threat to withdraw from the United Fruit Company making the outlook even darker.

Activity of Political Exiles

At least three Guatemalan exile groups are plotting against the Arbenz regime. They are, in probable order of strength:

a) a group headed by Colonel Castillo Armas, former Comandante of the Guatemalan Military, and now in Costa Rica, who originally planned a January 1952 uprising. It has been reported that Castillo Armas has been offered aid by the United Fruit Company and a Peruvian group, possibly the government;

b) a group in Mexico headed by Colonel Arturo Ramirez who has been in exile since an attempted revolt in 1948. This group may be financed in part by American oil promoters;

c) supporters of General Tinoco Fuentes, unsuccessful presidential candidate of the 1950 elections who is now in El Salvador.

The Castillo Armas and Ramirez groups have been in contact, but no agreement has been reached. If the two groups were to unite, a successful revolution might result.

Conclusions

Communist influence in the Guatemalan government continues to be serious. Rumors persist in Guatemala that President Arbenz is ill with leukemia. Efforts to verify these rumors are being made. In the event that Arbenz were forced to leave his office, Roberto Alvenado Fuentes, president of the Guatemalan congress, could constitutionally assume presidency. Such an eventuality would further aggravate the situation in Guatemala because Alvenado Fuentes is a strong Communist supporter having recently attended a Communist sponsored pro-peace meeting in Vienna.

J. Calvert King
SA/DE/P-14
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET

TO: [Blank]
FROM: OPERATIONS
CONFIRMATION: WH (1-2)

INFORMATION: A1 (3-4-5), AO/SO (6), AO/PC (7), OPS (8), STC (9), CAL (10), S/G (11-12-13), ODD (14)

MASH 2567

TO: [Blank]
CITE: MASHFG

RE: [Blank] (IN: 29399)

1. AGREE CASTILLO MUST BE CONTACTED. HOPE [Blank] CAN HANDLE.

2. [Blank] WILL CONTACT YOU PROBABLY 25 MARCH. WITH YOU WE SHOULD ASCERTAIN: (1) OPPOSING FORCES, (2) OPPORTUNITY FOR BUYING SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY ARMY GUARDIA CIVIL AND KEY GOV'T FIGURES, FOR IMMobilizing FORCES NOT BUYABLE THROUGH STUDENT CHURCH OR LABOR INSPIRED ACTION, (3) ALL DETAILS REQUIRED FOR ESTIMATING SUCCESS OF PROPOSED MOVEMENT AND HOW WE CAN ASSIST.

3. [Blank] NOT HINTING AT PRESENT OF OUR INTENT TO AID BUT IS FULLY CLEARED.

4. SUBMIT FULL REPORT OF CONVERSATIONS.

SECRET

RELEASED BY: [Blank]
ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOD: 1753Z 22 MAR 52

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE
MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Conference with ( )

Conference of ( ) and ( ) on 31 July, and ( ) on 1 August developed the following points:

1. ( ) has maintained excellent cover ( ).

2. ( ) has met with CALLIGERIS on eight occasions, but has been very discreet in his meetings and is confident that his association is known only to ( ).

3. ( ) has apparently gained CALLIGERIS' complete confidence as the representative of an anti-Communist group in the United States. CALLIGERIS has discussed his plans and problems frankly and seemingly without reservation. After discussions with ( ), CALLIGERIS has developed a revised plan which involves the following variations on the original:

   a. Smuggling arms to his people within his country and mounting revolt primarily from within the country rather than as invasion from outside.

   b. Elimination of requirement for bomber and fighter aviation.

   c. Reduction of requirement for combat shipping to point where local shipping will serve.

   d. Reduction of requirement for communications equipment.

   e. Elimination of requirement for kitchens and food-stuffs.
MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Guatemalan Situation

Summary:

The growing Communist tendencies of the present Guatemalan Government have alienated the majority of Guatemalans to such an extent that a popular uprising to overthrow the government is to be expected as a normal reaction. Forces supporting the government are confined to the Communists and fellow-travelers and to those members of the Armed Forces and labor who have benefited materially under the present regime. The recent passage of the Agrarian Reform Act, which makes land available to all Guatemalans in the Communist pattern, is expected to win further adherents to the government although it is opposed by the landowning class whose influence will wane as the Act takes effect.

Armed action against the government has been planned and pending since early this year and is now imminent. Details of the plan for such action, which follows through to the establishment of a democratic government, are known to us. [ ] considers that if proper support can be provided the plan is feasible and practical and has a good chance of succeeding if it is put in effect by 1 September 1952.

Col. Castillo Armas, now resident in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, is the leader of the movement which is supported by organized groups in Honduras, El Salvador, Mexico and Guatemala. Cordova Cerna, resident in Guatemala City, is Castillo's man in Guatemala. Carlos Simon, resident in Guatemala City, is the leader of another large anti-government group in Guatemala which is planning armed action, but which is not as yet working in coordination with Castillo. Coordination is being effected. These three are of exceptional ability and character and are fast friends of the U. S.

Castillo's movement has the moral support of President Somosa of Nicaragua and of President Calvac of Honduras, and it is believed that material support from these two men would be forthcoming if they could be assured of U. S. approval.

Castillo's plan envisages moving against the government with clandestine armed forces from the borders of Mexico, El Salvador and Honduras and from the sea on Puerto Barrios in conjunction with
internal revolt. He can arm the group in Mexico through purchase of material in that country and his other forces have some arms available. However, he will require assistance with material from some source outside the area. His requests for combat air support are not considered to be necessary, but his request for air transport support should be met. His requests for shipping support can be met through procurement in the area. Simons can procure arms locally for his part in the action. Considerable local financial support has already been obtained by both Castillo and Simons, but further support is indicated. Castillo’s additional financial needs are estimated at $175,000 and Simons’ at $50,000, to include purchase of arms available in the area.

Conclusions:

1. Armed action in Guatemala is imminent.
2. The success of any action undertaken without further outside support is questionable and may well result in the elimination of all effective anti-Communist opposition in Guatemala.
3. Support in the form of direction, arms and equipment, enlisting the aid of area chiefs of state, finance, and air transport and shipping support can guarantee a good chance of success.

Recommendations:

1. That two more men from WHD be sent [ ] to assist the man now there in advising on operations.
2. That support with arms and equipment be provided. (These to be returnable upon successful conclusion of the operation.)
3. That Simons and Galves be informed that any assistance they give to Castillo will not reflect to their discredit.
4. That financial support in the amount of $225,000 be provided. (This amount to be reimbursable upon the successful conclusion of the operation.)
5. That air transport and ocean shipping support be arranged by the other parties interested in the operation.

[ ]

ACWH

Distribution:

Copy 1 of 4: Addressee
Copy 2 of 4: 
Copy 3 of 4: ACWH File
Copy 4 of 4: WH/III File

SECRET

COPY OF SECT 3 COPIES
**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

**FROM:**

**NO.**

**DATE**

8 October 1952

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**FORM NO. S1-10**

**FEB 1950**

**SECRET**
MEMORANDUM FOR: [ ]

SUBJECT: Guatemala

1. Early in July Mr. Dulles, [ ] and myself visited the State Department where we had a conference at which were present Assistant Secretary of State [ ], his Deputy, Mr. [ ], and Mr. [ ]. The CIA delegation posed the following three questions: (as well as I can remember)

   1. Would the State Department like to see a different government in Guatemala?

   2. Would the State Department oppose a government established by the use of force?

   3. Does the State Department wish CIA to take steps to bring about a change of government?

2. The first question was answered positively. The second question was answered negatively. The third question was not answered clearly but by implication, positively.

3. Mr. Dulles asked me to make a Memorandum of Conversation in long-hand and deliver the one copy to him. I did this and waited in his office while he showed it to the Director. In a few minutes I was called into the Director's office, and it was soon clear that the Director was dissatisfied with the lack of a direct answer to the third question. He then telephoned to Mr. [ ] to make arrangements for a meeting.

4. I later gathered from Mr. Dulles that the Director had received a satisfactory answer from Mr. [ ]

Distribution: Orig & 1: Addressee

SECRET
CHRONOLOGY OF MEETINGS LEADING TO APPROVAL OF PROJECT A

1. 10 July 1952

A meeting was held in the office of [ ], to discuss Project A. Those present: Mr. [ ], Mr. [ ], Mr. Dulles, Mr. [ ], and [ ]. Project was approved by inference. Details of the meeting are covered in memorandum of Mr. [ ]'s dated 8 October. Original paper is believed to be in Mr. Dulles' files.

2. 11 July 1952

A meeting was held in the Director's office. Those present: the Director, Mr. Dulles, Mr. [ ] Mr. [ ]. A report was made of the previous day's meeting with State. The Director was dissatisfied with the inconclusive position taken by Mr. [ ] and Mr. [ ]. He telephoned to make an appointment to discuss Project A with [ ].

3. 12 August 1952

A meeting was held in Mr. [ ]'s office. Those present: Mr. [ ] Mr. [ ], and [ ]. Mr. [ ] stated that authority to furnish materiel was given.

4. 13-14 August 1952

A meeting was held in Mr. Dulles' office. Those present: Mr. Dulles, Mr. [ ], and Mr. [ ]. Conversation seemed to be carried on on the assumption that action was being taken. Mr. [ ] specifically asked Mr. Dulles whether we had the "green light" and Mr. Dulles replied affirmatively, stating that [ ] had been told that they could have the material if and when they would indicate where they wished to pick it up. (At this or at a previous conference, Mr. Dulles mentioned that the Director had had conversations with [ ].)

5. 18 August 1952

A meeting was held in the Director's office. Those present: the Director, [ ] Mr. Dulles and [ ]. The Director called[ ] and instructed him to make recommendations as to future action. He requested that a memorandum be prepared and presented to him. On 19 August the memorandum was prepared for the signature of [ ], was discussed with Mr. Dulles by [ ], and forwarded to the Director. It was approved by the Director on 9 September.

8 October 1952
To: [ ]

From: OPC/OSO

Confirmation: WHD (1-2)

Information: IR (3-4), AD/50 (5), OPS (6), S/C (7-8-9), STC (10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

1. HQ. DESIRES FIRM LIST TOP FLIGHT COMMUNISTS WHOM NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD DESIRE TO ELIMINATE IMMEDIATELY IN EVENT OF SUCCESSFUL ANTI-COMMUNIST COUP.

2. REQUEST YOU VERIFY FOLLOWING LIST AND RECOMMEND ADDITIONS OR DELETIONS:

[ ]

19382 26 JAN 52

SECRET

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OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

To: [ ] "SECURITY INFORMATION" PRIORITY
From: [ ] 29 JAN 52
Confirmation: [ ] (1-2) OUT 53112
Information: IR (3-4), AD/SO (5), OPS (6), STC (7), S/C (8-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-S

WASHINGTON 24924

TO: [ ] CITE: WASHFG
RE: WASHINGTON 24629 (OUT 52650)

1. HQ. DESIRES LIST COMMUNISTS AND/OR SYMPATHIZERS WHOM NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD DESIRE ENCARCERATED IMMEDIATELY IN EVENT OF SUCCESSFUL ANTI-COMMUNIST COUP.

2. REQUEST YOU VERIFY FOLLOWING LIST AND RECOMMEND ADDITIONS OR DELETIONS:

3. ABOVE SECONDARY TO LIST IN CABLE REFERENCE.

[ ] DESIGNATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

29 JAN 52

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Copy No. 1
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

FROM: [ ]

TO: [ ]

ACTION: (1-2-3)

INFORMATION: IR (4-5), AD/SO (6), OPS (7), STG (8), S/C (9-10-11)

ROUTINE

29 JAN 52

IN 16927

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) CDA AR-340-3

TO: WASH

CITE: [ ]

REF WASH 24629 (OUT. 52650)

1. SUGGEST ADD FOLLOWING:

2. CANNOT SAY ALL ON LIST ARE COMMIES BUT THEIR LEANINGS ARE SUCH THAT CONSIDERED DANGEROUS OUR INTERESTS. NOTE YOU INCLUDED

3. MINIMUM ACTION OF ARREST AND DEPORTATION ALL ON LIST SHOULD BE A NEW GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE. CONSIDER DOUBTFUL NEW GOVT COULD LONG CONTROL WITHOUT DEPORTATION MAJORITY ON LIST.

01152 30 JAN 52

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE
TO: Chief, [ ]
FROM: [ ]

SUBJECT: Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of during Military Operations of Calligeris

1. Included herein is the list of Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of during military operations to be carried out by Calligeris.
   a. Category I - persons to be disposed of through Executive action (attachment #1)
   b. Category II - persons to be disposed of through imprisonment or exile (attachment #2)

2. This list is a revision, revised by Calligeris, of an original list prepared by Headquarters in February 1952.

Attachments: 2

Distribution: Orig. & 1, Headquarters
[18 pages of biographic material have been deleted - HRG]
18 September 1952

TO: Chief, WH
FROM: 
SUBJECT: Liaison Between Calligeris and General Trujillo of Santo Domingo

1. On 12 September 1952 an agent from General Trujillo, one , arrived in Honduras for a conference with Calligeris. 1

2. stated that General Trujillo desired and was prepared to aid Calligeris with arms, aircraft, men, and money.

3. In return for this help General Trujillo asked that four (4) Santo Dominicans, at present residing in Guatemala, be killed a few days prior to D-Day. (Names of the four men are not at present available.)

4. Calligeris stated that he would be glad to carry out the executive action, but that it could not be done prior to D-Day for security reasons. He pointed out that his own plans included similar action and that special squads were being designated. was assured that the action could and would be carried out on D-Day.

5. Calligeris is confident that this matter can be resolved between him and General Trujillo.

6. Further conferences are scheduled.

1 Source comment - is one of General Trujillo’s most trusted men. He is employed at present in the

Distribution: Orig. & 1, Headquarters
TO: Chief VI.

Date of Report: 1 December 1952
Date of Inform: 27 Nov. - 1 Dec. 1952

SUBJECT: Conference

1. Attached hereto is a report on the conference held by and during the period 27 November through 1 December 1952.

2. The report is divided into two sections as follows:

Section I - Current Activities of the Guatemalan Government.

Section II - Activities of the GALLINARI Organization in Guatemala.

3. was unable to attend the conference as scheduled due to serious family illness.

Attachments: Letter from to and "The Group".
SECTION 1 - CURRENT ACTIVITIES OF THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT

1. Military.

a. The Guatemalan government has, during the last few weeks, shifted three or four of its garrison commanders. This of course is one measure taken to prevent anti-government forces from becoming established in the army. In two instances this shifting of commanders has worked against us and we have been obliged to select new leaders within the garrisons concerned. We anticipate further moves of this nature and expect to counteract it by having at least two of the superior officers in our organization.

b. Recently, we learned of the government's plan to make Quetzaltenango its headquarters in the event of revolution. The government expects any invasion to start from across the Salvadoran frontier and believes its best chances for defense are to fall back on Quetzaltenango and establish a defensive line roughly north and south through that city. Terrain favors such a defense and, by so doing, the government will have in its rear, i.e., the area between Quetzaltenango and the Mexican frontier, the wealthiest and most productive section of Guatemala from which to draw support. The government recently transferred one of its best officers to command Quetzaltenango and has reinforced the area with troops and arms. Fortunately at the same time the government transferred to the garrison as its command one of our best officers. Thus, as long as he is there we will be fully informed on all government plans for the area. In this instance shifting of commanders has worked in our favor.

Comment: This information, i.e., that the government is thinking defensively in stead of offensively in the event of revolution is of considerable importance and supports CALIERS' plan for heavy initial shock action and rapid concentration around the Capitol.

c. Because the government no longer completely trusts the army it has begun the development of a secret force of non-military personnel. Though full details are not available the force numbers approximately 1500 men all of which are handpicked for their experience and toughness. The total force breaks down into three
separate organizations. These are:

(1) Caribbean Legion. About 200 men mostly Central Americans, commanded by General RAIXEZ, a Santo Domingan; the second in command is Col. Rivas MCINTYRE, a Honduran. General RAIXEZ at present owns and operates a sawmill on the outskirts of Jalapa where he has the 200 men supposedly working. We believe it is a training area for the Legion. Col. MCINTYRE is living in Guatemala City where he heads Aviastec for the Guatemalan government.

(2) Secret Communist Organization: Composed of roughly 500 men scattered throughout Guatemala. Commander of this organization is a closely guarded secret. The function of this group is to act as "Shock" troops in the event of trouble and, to liquidate any communist leaders who get out of line. President Arbenz and the other top communist leaders are well aware of this latter function.

(3) ? No known name for this organization. Its leader is one FERKINDEZ, a Cuban of Spanish origin(?). The group is composed of Cubans and Spanish republicans. Size of organization is unknown. We do know that FERKINDEZ is in close contact with Carlos Price SOCCARES, a Cuban. I believe this organization more dangerous than the Legion.

d. The Guatemalan government has been purchasing arms from El Salvador, Czechoslovakia, and probably Mexico. We do not know the extent of these purchases. Interestingly enough we do know that none of the arms purchased are going to Guatemalan army. We have reason to believe the arms are going to labor organizations and communist groups.

Comment: CALLIGRIS reports that Czech arms purchased to date have consisted of six (6) AA MG .50 Cal.
2. **Political.** Present political activity of the government centers around the following:

a. Communist infiltration of all legal political parties in Guatemala. For this purpose, the government is not using men well known as communists, but men known to it, the government, as communists or communist sympathizers. During 16-18 January 1953, deputies to the national congress are to be elected. Though the communists now control the national congress, they hope to dominate it completely by placing their men through the other parties.

b. In March 1953, all judgeships in the supreme and lower courts come up for re-appointment. The deputies elected in January take office on 1 March and they will make the appointments to the courts. These appointments will carry down to the city, magistrate, and, thus, if the communists completely dominate the national congress through the election of their deputies in January, and I assure you they will, they will in turn appoint their own men to the courts and will, by 15 March, completely dominate the three branches of the government, i.e., executive, legislative, and judicial.

c. The government has embarked on a campaign to sell communism to the people. The usual propaganda outlets are being employed. Recently they have begun the publication of pamphlets, copies of three of which I have given you. The booklet on the Agrarian Law is being widely distributed in Honduras and Salvador.

Comment: Copies of the pamphlets referred to are enclosed.

d. Honduras. Guatemalan political activity is on the increase.

1. We have information that in northern Honduras there are more than forty (40) communist cells in existence.

2. is on the Guatemalan payroll. As far as we can determine he is receiving $2000.00 a month from the Guatemalan government.

3. we believe the man the government really intends to support is Francisco Terrazas, a Honduran, at present private secretary to President Arbenz of Guatemala.
Economic conditions in Guatemala are very grave and are becoming worse every day. Capital is leaving the country. It is going to Mexico and United States.

a. On 21 November last I was told by President Arbenz is preparing to invoke the Economic Emergency Law (La Ley de Emergencia Económica). Under this law all capital in the country, local and foreign, will be frozen.

b. The Guatemalan government is preparing to impose a 6% tax on all imports and exports.

SECTION II - ACTIVITIES OF THE CALLIGERIS ORGANIZATION IN GUATEMALA.

I am not fully informed on every phase of our military preparation in Guatemala, that being primarily CALLIGERIS' responsibility, however I can say that we have reached a high degree of organization and have never been in a better state of readiness than we are at this moment.

1. Troop Organization.

a. Jativa. The Guatemalan [ ] here is with us as are his three (300) hundred soldiers. Our initial striking force in this area consists of three (300) hundred armed civilians. In addition we have fifteen (1500) men ready but without arms. We have sufficient trucks to move this entire force.

b. Jalapa. The officers and one (100) hundred men stationed here are with us. We have eight (600) civilians ready but without arms.

c. Santa Rosa. No army garrison here. We have one (1000) thousand men ready here but without arms.

d. Zacapa. The garrison here has six (600) hundred soldiers well armed. They have four (4) 75mm cannon and four (4) AA MG .50 Cal. We are not sure of this garrison but hope they will join us.
e. Guatemala. No garrison here. We have two (200) hundred men here armed.

f. Coban. Army garrison here of about fifteen (1500) hundred men. The group has four (4) 75mm cannons (pack how.) The second and third in command plus a nucleus in the ranks are with us. We have two (2000) thousand men ready here as an initial force. More than an adequate number of trucks.

g. Balan. No garrison here. We have a force of six (600) hundred men ready without arms.

h. Quetzaltenango. There is a garrison of eight (800) hundred men in this area. The [ ] in command are with us. In this area we have organized a group of fifty (50) commandos in sub-units of five (5) men each. Their mission will be to kill all political and military leaders in the city. In the general area we have three (3000) thousand men. They need arms. The city has an excellent airport which we plan to capture and use.

i. San Jose. (Port on the Pacific ocean) No garrison. The city has an excellent military airfield built by the Americans. The field is not used by the military there being no Guatemalan air force units here.

j. Huehuetenango. Garrison of three hundred and fifty (350) soldiers. The [ ] in command are with us. We have eight hundred (800) men organized here but without arms.

k. Chimaltenango. No garrison. We have one thousand (1000) men here without arms. We have sixty trucks (60) ready. We are building an airfield here.

l. Sanarate. (SW of El Progreso) No garrison. We have five hundred (500) men ready without arms.

m. El Progreso. No garrison. We have five hundred (500) men without arms.

n. Puerto Barrios. Garrison of one hundred and fifty (150) men. The garrison recently received four (4) AA MG .50 Cal. The [ ] in command is with us. I do not know the size of our civilian force.
c. Guatemala City. The government here has about five thousand (5000) men including soldiers and police. Within the city we six hundred (600) men organized in commando units each with a specific mission.

Dog groups. Mission to kill all leading political and military leaders. The list has already been drawn up. I have in my (here a city map showing the location of the homes and offices of all targets.)

Saboteurs. We have teams ready to sabotage, communications, utilities, all headquarters, transportation, military installation and equipment. For these teams we have selected men whose civilian employment is at or near the targets assigned. We do not plan permanent but only disruptive sabotage.

Documents teams. These teams will capture and impound all documents in government office, party headquarters, and labor unions.

p. Liberation Committees. Independent of our fighting organization we have organized in each town a liberation committee. The function of these committees will be to assume political and police control in each town as it is liberated and thus re-establish and assure public order and welfare until the new government is prepared to assume these functions.

q. Identity Cards. To protect our personnel and prevent enemy personnel from changing sides during and after the action I have prepared and issued 40,000 identity cards.

2. Intelligence Service. We have developed an intelligence organization. It exists in the government, police, and the army. The head of this service is a man we trust implicitly and a man who has over 20 years intelligence experience. At present he is seeking to penetrate the labor unions.

3. Airfields. We are selecting and developing airfields all over Guatemala, and in particular around the Capitol. Our major field in the Capitol area is near the town of Dolores (SSE of Guatemala City and ENE of Esquintla) a particularly isolated area. Here we expect to bring in by air arms and equipment and assemble 3000 men which force will comprise one column for the march on the capitol. We already have the necessary trucks earmarked.
In selecting our airfield sites we have enlisted the aid of an American living in Guatemala. He served as a pilot in WW II and has agreed to fly for us. He states that he can buy us four (4) DC-3's and get us three more American pilots.

Comment: Has asked that this can be sent to visit.

4. Psychological Warfare. We have prepared a psychological warfare program.

(a) the farmers of Guatemala have collected money to carryout a press and radio campaign. This is being developed.

(b) We are prepared to carryout CALLIGERIS' 30 day campaign.

(c)

5. Current Plans of the Organization. CALLIGERIS recently asked me to visit General Trujillo and ask for help. I believe such a trip would be profitless because neither General Trujillo or General Soccor will give us material help without being properly assured by the United States government that approves of such help. Without this approval both of these men stand to lose too much.

We have been building our organization before March of this year. We counted heavily upon your help. Unfortunately that help has now been withdrawn. We used that promise of help as a restraint upon our people from impatient action. Now we can restrain them no longer. Secondly, the Guatemalan government is now proceeding on a plan of action which, if successful, will give that government complete domination of every phase of Guatemalan life. If we permit the government to succeed in its present plan then our chances of eventually overthrowing that government will be very considerably reduced. It has therefore been the decision of the group controlling our organization to strike not later than the first of February 1953 with whatever means we have at our disposal.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: [AC/WH/PW]

SUBJECT: PW Conference in [ ]

1) The main themes discussed in [ ] between CWH, WH/PW and the [ ] were:
   A. Present PW facilities in the Central American area;
   B. The means of PW support for the Guatemalan anti-Communist movement; and the -
   C. Feasibility and means of Central American PW support of any possible activity of RUFUS.

2) It was concluded that, with proper support with specialists and money from Headquarters as indicated in pro-
   ject [ ] all teams will be able to give PW support to any PW campaign or action on the part of RUFUS and/or any other Guatemalan anti-Communist.

3) Our contact with RUFUS reported the following:

   A. RUFUS has read and rewritten the '30 day plan', including all the major themes (see attachment);

   B. Material for the 'plan' will be printed in Guatemala. All facilities are ready for immediate use. The estimated cost of production will be $5,000.

   C. RUFUS is presently reprinting 1,000 copies a week of a Guatemalan anti-Communist bulletin [ ]. The expenses are being borne out of the personal funds of RUFUS.

   D. RUFUS is creating a PW team and arranging for the covert dissemination of the '30 day plan', PW materials and any latter propaganda to be used in combat and consolidation.

   E. All possible propaganda will be printed as soon as funds are made available to insure better dissemination when the time is ripe.
4) The following chart is an illustration of the means of promoting the widest dissemination of PW themes. It was agreed upon as the most efficient and secure means of accomplishing our objective:

```
RUFUS

Raw PW material, photos and press releases via courier or air mail to...

OR NEWSPAPERS

Raw PW material, etc.
via courier, mail, cables or newspapers

clippings via pouch

WH HEADQUARTERS

All available PW material
via cable and pouch to...

Press Releases and photos via anti-Communist press service to...

ALL REMAINING WESTERN HEMISPHERE
```
5) have stated that they are able to support any future RUFUS PW on the following themes:

A. RUFUS forces represent a popular uprising;

B. RUFUS forces are acting in defence of the Guatemalan Constitution;

C. The Guatemalan Communists were plotting complete subjugation of Guatemala;

D. Guatemalan government arms have been sent by the Soviet orbit countries;

E. Guatemalan government is only a tool of the USSR;

F. Participation of the other Central American Republics in the uprising indicate a higher prestige and prosperity for Guatemala under RUFUS;

G. Guatemalan army atrocity stories and pictures;

H. Any material on RUFUS and supporters and their aims.

6) will initiate the following actions if feasible:

A. The populace will be ordered to arrest any fleeing Guatemalan Communist agents, who finding themselves unable to operate any longer in Guatemala, are attempting to re-establish themselves in neighbor countries; and

B. In the event that Arbenz escapes to a press release will be sent to the newspapers, allegedly from Arbenz, stating that he was held a prisoner by the Communists. Newspapers will check this story. He will have to accept or deny his Communist affiliations. Either way there is a story. Any further action against Arbenz will depend on his own attitude.

7) will be responsible for the following actions:

A. Alert all if any high Guatemalan official hides out in the Soviet Embassy.
B. Attempt to prevent important statements from which would support the present Guatemalan government; and

C. Immediately expand the circulation of the Guatemalan anti-Communist news bulletin so that it will be familiar to all important Latin American newspapers.

8) Miscellaneous data:

A. RUFUS is studying the use of liquidation lists;

B. The means of preventing the rise of Communist martyrs is being considered by RUFUS and WH/;

C. [Blank]
ANTI-COMMUNIST

Nov. 1

A poster showing Stalin trampling on the flag and Constitution of Guatemala.

Nov. 2

The text of article 32 and a promise of its complete fulfilment.

Nov. 3

Posters with patriotic and religious themes.

Nov. 4

An attack on the Communists by press, radio and leaflets.

Nov. 5

An appeal to all the Christians to unite in a fight against Communism, and an appeal directed to the members of other religious sects.

Nov. 6

By means of pamphlets, list the principle Communists accused of being traitors to their Country and their religion.

Nov. 7

Continue with the same subjects as those mentioned for the 4th, 5th and 6th days.

COMMUNIST

Nov. 1

Circulate leaflets, signed by any Communist cell in Guatemala, which favor a national religion. These should be distributed in a semi-anonymous manner and in a small quantity.

Nov. 4

A Communist alert calling together all their followers for the defense of "the revolution" against an armed movement planned by the reactionaries for the night of 12 November.

Nov. 7

Accuse the Christians of plotting against the government and accuse the clergymen of participating in national politics demanding a revision of the permissions granted to the nuns and Jesuits and prohibiting the wearing of their robes on the streets.
Publication of the first draft of the minutes of a Communist session, thus:

1. Establishment of a National Church.
2. Colonisation of new lands as a means of political domination — and the dissociation of family and social ties necessary for the complete establishment of a Communist regime.
3. The official establishment of a party police to collaborate in the support of the regime.
4. A study of the possibility of acquiring a number of Russian teachers, for the schools.
5. The establishment of the Russian language as a means of communication, both inside and outside of the Party.
6. Elimination of the clergymen who oppose the realization of a National Church.
7. Collection of funds among the affiliates and sympathizers of the Party for the erection of a monument to the greatest leaders of the workers of the world.
8. A study for the change in the patriotic symbols — (flag, National anthem and Coat of Arms)
9. To request a law for urban reform, with an equal distribution of dwellings.
10. Free discussion.
11. Close of session.

A poster depicting Russian dominance over the Guatemalan government.

Poster denying the veracity of the meeing and accusing the Catholics of forgery, and of plotting against the government of Col. Arbenz, and, in addition, presenting Catholicism as anti-Nationalist and idolatrous.

Answer to the anti-religious poster and a request for the union of all the Christians in a fight against Communism.
Nov. 11

A petition to the people that they show their repudiation of Communism and their loyalty to their religion and Country by placing posters in their homes and businesses. (Posters: WE ARE ANTI-COMMUNISTS FOR GOD AND FOR OUR COUNTRY)

Nov. 12

The placing and dissemination of anti-Communist posters.

Nov. 13

A poster depicting the tortures that the Communists have used in Guatemala.

Nov. 14

Point out, by means of pamphlets, the principle Communists of Guatemala and the positions that they occupy in the government.

Nov. 15

Nationalist and anti-Communist propaganda.

Nov. 15

A general appeal to the proletariat for the defense of the October revolution, endangered by the projects of the reactionaries, who, plotting with some of the unrecognized officials and members of the Party within the country will try to undermine the constitutional order on the morning of the 22 of November.

Nov. 16

Mockery of the fears of the Communists.

Nov. 16

Posters blaming the opposition for national restlessness, accusing the pardoned politicians of having supported subversive organizations, "Biting the hand that gave them the bread of freedom", asking the government for action against those evil patriots who handicap the great social purposes of the Revolution.

Nov. 17

A defense of the pardoned members and a pamphlet denying the intention...
Nov. 17

to overthrow the government by force; ridiculing the fear of the Communists.

Nov. 18

A notice on the creation of a splinter-group of Communists who refused to be guided by Russia and wanted a National Communist Party — resembling the APRA.

Nov. 19

Nationalist propaganda ridiculing the idea of erecting a statue to the great leaders of the workers of the world.

Nov. 20

National and anti-Communist propaganda, showing the crimes committed by the Communists.

Nov. 21

Petition so that the Communists will not be able to enter nor remain in the National Congress.

Nov. 22

Petition for the local excommunication of Communists.

Nov. 23

Declare a "boycott" of all Communists.

Nov. 24

Lists of Communists to be distributed by means of leaflets.

Nov. 19

A furious denial of any speculation concerning the disaffection within the Communist ranks and re-affirming their strength, preparation and unity to be used against the enemies of the Revolution.

Nov. 20

A petition to the people so that with their assistance, the Communist Party may acquire a greater number of representatives in Congress and may comply with what was suggested by their followers during the campaigns and presidencies of Dr. Arevalo and Col. Arbenz.
Denounce the Terrorist Plan of the Communists (a Bogotazo) ready to be executed.

An appeal to the surrounding people to integrate the Committees of Defense in their districts.

An enraged denial of the Terrorist Plan and an accusation attacking the clergy and the opposition—accusing them of conspiring with high military officials for the overthrow of the government—for this reason the President is asked to fill the positions of greatest responsibility with military men of known loyalty to the October cause.

An offer made by the Committee of the Districts to the authorities to maintain order in any circumstances.

Accusing the Communist Party of possessing arms and explosives and a claim of a tour of inspection—pointing out one of the deposits.

A petition to the people asking them to refrain from going out of their homes at night except for worthy reasons. (Sickness and Work)

A petition to the members of the Party to remain alert for an opposition attack on the government with their phoney Committees of Defense, offering the government their unconditional aid, adding that although many of them are disarmed, they will be ready to defend themselves in the districts when the moment is designated.
PROGRAM SCHEDULE FOR SEPTEMBER

ANTI-COMMUNIST

1. 32 Poster - Dios y Libertad, with cross and no. 32.

2. Communist statement following line of how Guatemalan Communist love Catholicism. (Handbill)

3. The ArchBishops statement on Communism (Handbills).

4. Explanation of 32 and get rid of Communism in Guatemala. (Poster)

5. Religious poster - one with Stalin in sheep's clothing.

6. Stalin and the local Communist party stamping on 32 and the little people labeled "derechos", "libertad", etc.

7. ---------------SUNDAY-----------------  

8. Poster ridiculing the Communist alert of the 5th.

9. List of Communist Fronts which are violating Art. 32 of their very existence and support of Communism and the USSR.

10. Comment on the formation of the Communist splinter group.

11. Poster showing fronts as backers of atheism and the destruction of Guatemalan liberty for the glory of - not Guatemala - but solely for the USSR.


PRO-COMMUNIST

A Communist alert to the effect that rumors say that an attempted revolution will begin Saturday. Mobilize all forces (Handbills)

Provide evidence of a Commie splinter group through a poster, handbill, claiming this group to be a real Nationalist "communistic" group such as the ancient Indian population had.

Communist blame all trouble on the ignorance of Catholics - ridicule the Virgin of Guadalupe and quote their leaders. (Handbills)

Communists again point to immediate dangers and request a show of strength for the following day.

Communist request for funds to be sent to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, or to the Guatemalan Treasury.

Communist invitations to a fiesta--free food, drink and entertainment. All paid for by the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, the local Communist Party and the Guatemalan government.
13. Poster ridiculing the alert of the 10th.

14. --------------------------SUNDAY--------------------------

15. Poster and handbill on Communist treatment of Catholics in all nations where they are in control.
Handbill commenting on the use of funds from the National Treasury for a Communist fiesta.

16. Handbill naming leaders of Communist fronts who have betrayed Guatemala and their religion. Keep simple and to the point.

17. Poster calling attention to Communist plans.

18. Handbill pointing out that the Guatemalan Government has done nothing to back up article 32 of the Constitution nor any other article except those that better the cause of the USSR.

Communists deny payment by the USSR Embassy. Claim money for fiesta is only from local Party and Guat. Treas.

A copy of minutes of a meeting between top Communists in Guatemala is discovered. These minutes should deal with: (1) Establishment of a new national Communist church to worship Stalin; (2) Arbitrary resettlement of the population to destroy family ties; (3) The establishment of Guat. NVD; (4) The importing of Soviet teachers for better education of Guatemalans; (5) The establishment of Russian as the first language in Guatemala to be used in all official communications; (6) The destruction of all existing churches, and the summary imprisonment of all clerics; (7) The abolishment of Sunday as a legal holiday; (8) The construction of 10X statues honoring Stalin and Lenin; (9) A new Guatemalan flag and a new constitution modeled after that of the USSR. AND ANYTHING ELSE WHICH WOULD CREATE ANGER ON THE PART OF THE GUATEMALAN PUBLIC.

Communists again call for mobilization for the 17th.
Communists deny "plan" even though such things may have happened in other Communist nations, they say that these things could never happen in Guatemala.

Splinter Communist group claims that all funds collected are going to high Communist Party members and the USSR. None for Guatemala.

Communists report that funds are not being received by the USSR Embassy in Mexico. That this will make the USSR angry at Guatemala and to all Guatemalans who should owe allegiance the the Soviet Union.
19. Handbill denouncing all phases of the Communist plans. Keep brief, concise and play on all sentiments of populace.

Invitations to a meeting where the Soviet Amb. to Mexico will speak. Also Lombardo Toledano, Luis Carlos Prestes and Diego Rivera and any other Communist who would be hard to get. Also promise the presence of certain high government officials of Guatemala.

20. Poster showing statues of Stalin everywhere - Soviet flags with caption: "If this is Guatemala, where are the Guatemalans?" or something to that effect.

21. SUNDAY

22. Poster naming Communist leaders in Guatemala calling them traitors to Guatemala, labor, their Church and their families.

Communist apologize for other false alerts and say that the real danger is on the 23rd – all workers excused from work to defend their homes.

23. Handbills saying: "Why are the Communists afraid? What is there to be afraid of? Are they afraid that patriotic Guatemalans will turn against the men who would sell us out to Moscow?

Splinter group calls attention to the needs of the Guatemalans, but points out that funds are going to the USSR. Don't support Communist or these men. Name leaders of the local party and Comie fronts.

Communist invite public to pay homage to the new President of Guatemala, Marshall Stalin.

24. Handbill reacting to Communist desire to pay homage to Stalin. Suggest people pay homage to genuine Guatemalans and get rid of people who pay homage to a foreign ruler. Name Comie leaders in the Guatemalan government.

25. Poster calling attention to the statement of the Guatemalan Arch Bishop.

Communists again call for an alert of people and especially the labor groups who have been armed by the government.

26. Poster illustrating some of the Communist plans.

Communalist splinter groups attacks the senseless alerts, but suggests that it might be a good ting for Guatemala if the people arose and got rid of the people who are apparently so enamoured with the USSR.
27. Poster ridiculing the continuous alerts which obviously are more expressions of a guilty conscience of those who have so brazenly sold out Guatemala to the USSR. Name the prime targets with evidence.

28. Name the traitors and their backgrounds.

29. Same on request action.

30. A call to arms to protect the Constitution and Guatemala.

In the event of action it will be advisable to publish the names of those who are on the side of God - spread rumors to the effect that Communists have fled Guat. and are hiding in the USSR Embassy in Mexico - spread the word that other Communists have used Party funds to build fortunes in other countries and have already departed or are preparing for immediate departure - gain control of the radio and cite control of various locales - loudspeakers and leaflets should reiterate the Communist plan - and plants in labor and the Communist part of the armed forces should spread conflicting orders via every available means. Rumors to the effect that some army unit carry the Soviet flag rather than the Guatemalan one, but that the USSR has withdrawn moral and financial support of the local party for bungling the Guatemalan situation. Rumors should be spread that the Communists outside of Guatemala have denounced their comrades and any other rumors which would affect the morale of the troops such as saying that there is a boat waiting for all Officers who have party cards - troops will be deserted, etc.
TO: Chief, [ ]
FROM: [ ]

SUBJECT: Current planning of CALLIGERIS organization

1. Submitted herewith is report on current planning by CALLIGERIS organization in preparing for proposed military operation.

Attachments:

A - Arms purchases by Guatemala in Mexico
B - Captain
C - Schores
D -
E - Plan for Arms Purchases by CALLIGERIS
1. The CALLIGERIS organization is preparing for a D-Day in late January 1953 at which time it will attempt to overthrow the present Guatemalan government.

2. CALLIGERIS has been forced into this decision by a) the current political and military activities of the Guatemalan government, and b) the state of readiness of his own organization and the impatience of its members.

3. Current political and military activities of the Guatemalan government consist of:

   a. Political - Plans for a series of political moves in the National Congress and in the courts of the country which will, by March 1953, give the government complete domination of country and people. These moves, plus certain contemplated economic steps, will enable the government to progressively stifle all will to resist on the part of the people through political, economic, and police control.

   b. Military - The government has taken the following military measures:

      1) Frequent shifting of military commanders to keep the opposition off balance.

      2) Development of a defensive area, in the event of uprising, based on the city of Quetzaltenango.

      3) Arms purchases. (See attachment "A" for a report on the most recent purchases.)

      4) Begun the arming of labor and political groups loyal to the government. It has been verified that all recent arms purchases have been turned over to these groups rather than to the army.

      5) Created a secret police force to fight anti-Communists in and outside the country. The second in command of this force is one Captain. His known mission is the assassination of CALLIGERIS. (See attachment "B" for more on this man.)
4. The CALLIGERIS organization, from the standpoint of organization and morale, is in excellent condition to begin operations. Members are becoming increasingly-urgent in their demands for action. It reports that among the general population there are symptoms of apathy towards the government which in time can lead to resignation and acceptance.

5. In a general review and evaluation of the situation the CALLIGERIS organization believes it must begin operations within six to eight weeks. This it proposes to do.

6. On the matter of weapons procurement the leaders of the organization have accepted the plain fact that whereas many groups and countries want to help none will do so without some form of approval from the United States. Thus the leaders have turned to direct purchases as the only means of arms procurement.

7. Arms will be purchased to the limit of the organization's financial ability and the time available. Approximately $100,000.00 has been raised; this however must suffice for all purposes. CALLIGERIS estimates about $500,000.00 in total will be necessary.

8. As the attempt to overthrow the government will be made with fewer arms than at first expected, a major change has been made in the original plan of operations. CALLIGERIS now proposes to make maximum use of "K" Group, sabotage, and the large force to be assembled in the Jutiana area to overpower and capture the Capital immediately. He counts upon this rapid seizure plus destruction of all political and military leaders and a popular uprising throughout the country to bring about the capitulation of the government. As a minimum accomplishment CALLIGERIS believes the country can be thrown into a state of civil war which his organization, in the long run, can win. On this premise then, planning is going into the final stages. (see attachment "D")

9. Under the conditions outlined in paragraphs 5 through 8 the important question now is, "what financial help are Headquarters and now prepared to give?" To further emphasize the aid Headquarters may want to give and, through force of circumstances, may have to provide, a list of questions is presented below.
a. What financial aid will Headquarters and provide? If any, how much? And when available?

b. 

c. Does Headquarters still plan to advance funds for the 30 day propaganda campaign?

d. It has been recommended that Headquarters place a documents team in Guatemala to process captured documents. Does Headquarters approve? If so, forward pertinent instructions.

e. Can Headquarters stop gasoline deliveries to Guatemala three to four weeks prior to D-Day?

f. CALLIGERIS is counting heavily on sabotage. Would it not be worth the experience to use ideas and techniques developed by TSS?

g. If the proposed military operations bring about a prolonged state of civil war, is Headquarters prepared to support CALLIGERIS?

h. Assuming a state of prolonged civil war, neighboring countries and groups are going to take an active part. Has Headquarters plans to cope with this possibility?

i. In the event of complete victory by CALLIGERIS, is Headquarters and/or prepared to support him financially, if necessary, during the period of consolidation by his government?

10. Headquarters's answers to the questions "a" through "f" will have a direct bearing on final planning. In addition, time is short. For these reasons this report is being forwarded by courier with the request that he be held at Headquarters until the answers are ready.
SUBJECT: Arms Purchases by Guatemala in Mexico.

1. During November 1952 the Guatemalan government made the following arms purchases in Mexico:
   
   200 Machine Guns, medium
   500 Machine Guns, light
   7 Carbines
   7 Hand Grenades
   7 Ammunition for the machine guns.

2. Delivery of these purchases has already been made to Guatemala.

3. These weapons were not given to the Guatemalan army but were turned over by the government to labor and political groups.
Attachment "B"
Te: Report No. 22.

Date of Inform: 6-8 Dec. 1952

SUBJECT: Captain [ ]

SOURCE: [ ] paragraphs 1, 2, and 3.

1. Subject is Guatemalan Army Officer.

2. Subject is [ ] in command of the Guardia Judicial in Guatemala.

3. Subject's missions;
   a. To establish an internal police force and frontier guard to capture anti-Communists.
   b. To assassinate CALLIGERIS.

4. On 5 December subject was seen in Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

5. [ ] has received instructions from [ ] to notify him if subject asks for a visa to [ ] intends to jail subject should he enter [ ]
SUBJECT: [ ]

1. These two men met in Mexico, D.F. while attending the inauguration of President Ruiz Cortines.

2. During their conversations [ ] reworked;
   a. Honduras and El Salvador must prepare to take joint action against Guatemala.
   b. That the two countries should back CALIGERI.
   c. Asked if he, [ ] could approach the El Salvador government on this matter.

3. Since then the [ ] has been instructed to continue these conversations with the [ ] government.
Attachment "D"
To: Report No. 22.

SUBJECT: [ ]
(Ref: Report No. 20, Section I, par. 1c(3).)

1. Subject is leader of a group (size unknown) of Cubans and Spanish Republicans in Guatemala.

2. Subject is Santo Dominican, former chief of secret police in [ ] under [ ]

3. With the fall of [ ] subject fled [ ] with the help of the Guatemalan ambassador.

SUBJECT: [ ]
(Ref: Report No. 20, Section I, par. 1c(1).)

1. Subject is now commander of the [ ] in Guatemala.

Field comment: General Trujillo of Dominican Republic has placed a reward of $50,000.00 on the head of each of these men.
SUBJECT: Plan for Arms Purchases by CALLIGERIS

1. CALLIGERIS has opened up two sources wherein arms can be purchased. These are [ ] A third possible source, as yet not fully investigated, is [ ].

2. CALLIGERIS proposes, for security reasons, to use trusted [ ] as purchasing agents. All purchases will be moved by air-lane or boat to [ ]. The possibility of moving all arms from [ ] is being studied. The purpose of this plan is, in the event of discovery, to give the impression that the arms are for military operations against [ ].

3. From [ ] the arms will be transported by airplane, boat, and truck to Guatemala.
INCOMING

SECRET

SMN: —
——GPS

MRN: —
30 MAR 53 0941
DATE: RCD 31 MAR 53 1302Z
CN: 011

FROM: [ ]
TO: [ ]

INFO:

FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM [ ]:

"DIR SQUAT [ ] CITE [ ] 0720. REF [ ] 0719. PB FORTUNE.

1. COL [ ] , CHIEF OF [ ] —

TODAY TOLD SOURCE FOLLOWING:

A. WILL NOT DECLARE WAR AGAINST GUATEMALA.

B. NICARAGUAN, HONDURAN AND SALVADORAN SOLDIERS WILL INFILTRATE GUATEMALA ARMED, BUT IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES.

C. THEY WILL ASSASSINATE UNNAMED COMMUNIST LEADERS.

2. COL [ ] INSPECTING BARRACKS. OTHER HIGH ARMY OFFICERS UNUSUALLY BUSY.

3. [ ] INDICATED EXECUTION OF PLANS BAKER AND CHARLIE DURING HOLY WEEK. SOURCE [ ] EVAL B3. PASSED EMBASSY

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

( CONTINUED )
AND M. A. NOTE: EVALUATION OF \( \phi941 \) IS B3.
PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION IF PLAN IS NOT CONTINUED IN PRESENT FORM

1. Increased emphasis on penetrations of:
   a. Guatemalan Communist Party.
   b. Armed labor groups.
   c. Foreign Office.
   d. Presidential Secretariat.
   e. Department charged with arms procurement.
   f. Police.
   g. Armed Forces intelligence.
   h. Establishment of one of our agents under enemy control for the purpose of our intelligence CE.

2. Defections.
   a. Army officers in command positions.
   b. Police officers in command positions.
   c. Labor officials.
   d. [ ]
   e. [ ]
   f. [ ]
   g. Other Cabinet members.

3. Eliminations.
   a. [ ]—After the creation of a story that [ ] is preparing to oust the Communists. His elimination will be paid to the Commies and used to bring about a mass defection of the Army officers group who still support him.

4. Sabotage.
   a. Delay and, if possible, prevent the movement of supplies into or out of Guatemalan ports. This would be done by sabotage of the railroad, blowing up of highway bridges, road blocks
of all sorts, sabotage to trucks and attacks on shipments to and from the ports. This would be accompanied by propaganda explaining the objective is to bring about the immediate bankruptcy and consequent fall of the Communist government in Guatemala and is an indication of the strength of the opposition.

b. Oil storage facilities.

c. Cement plant (This was suggested by [ ]).

d. Coffee bags.

e. Execution of cotton plan as proposed by Mr. X to [ ] for the purpose of ruining financially Arbeau and his [ ]

5. Harassments.

Send threatening messages to the small fry among the known Communists, follow up with damage to their homes and, in some cases, with physical violence.

6. Intensified propaganda.

a. Maximum exploitation of clandestine radio station.

b. Anti-Commie labor conference [ ].

c. Anti-Commie hemispheric conference [ ].

d. Spread stories of dire economic consequences resulting from possible OAS action in September.

e. Continue present planned propaganda campaign within Guatemala.

f. Intensify efforts in Latin American countries whose support of any OAS action against Guatemala is doubtful, to obtain that support.

7. Movement of Arms.

a. Utilize the already trained special squads to capture or destroy the Communist arms caches whose exact location has been reported. This will reduce the capabilities of the enemy, encourage the resistance, lessen the number of border crossings required to bring in arms, and furnish an excellent cover story for the acquisition of arms by the resistance.
b. Periodic black flights \[ \text{[ ]} \] and border crossings into Guatemala to keep FM assets in being and furnish the resistance with essential supplies for the carrying out of the missions listed above.
The urgency for effecting a change in the Government of Guatemala
while effective opposition still exists and before the growth of Communism
has spread and established itself still more firmly in this beleaguered
state is further aggravated by the approaching coffee harvest and the con-
current necessity for at least threatening some economic pressure be-
fore this year's crop is sold in December. While other action will be
necessary, it is recognized that only through military action can a
new and stable government, friendly to the United States, be established
promptly. It is agreed that MRDO is the only individual with the back-
ground, ideals, following and organization who can satisfactorily effect
this change through armed action. However, during the past year the
Government of Guatemala and the Communist elements within the country
have strengthened their position, while that of at least some of the
opposition elements has deteriorated.

1. The probability of military success will be greatly strengthened

If plans are revised to include:

a. Capture of Guatemala City from outside, rather than from
without by a ploy which would be dangerous upon possibly unsu-
liable guerrilla forces from the interior. The capture of the
capital can be accomplished from the outside. If the officers of its
garrison are captured, converted, subdued or assassinated con-
currently with other effective measures. Although the purported
organization of 50,000 anti-Communists is small, they still be
intact, the effective participation of an appreciable percentage
of this group in organized formal military action is too uncertain at this time to permit sound planning to place too heavy dependence upon them as members of a guerrilla army. Unless there is a decided re-estimation of anti-Communist elements coupled with strong indications of initial success on N-Day, it is possible that many elements would not rise to form such a guerrilla army. It also appears that some of these elements could be utilized more effectively in types of action which do not call for sustained combat courage in the face of organized troops.

3. Establishment of the new provisional government in the capital rather than in a remote point such as Puerto Barrios as originally proposed. The announcement from the capital of a new government with appreciable armed forces backing, coupled with the announcement of strong forces moving on the capital from outlying districts, would carry with it assurance of success and would give the necessary courage to rise to many of the civilian components who might be unwilling otherwise to take the initiative. A provisional government established in the capital would also command more respect and permit more open support from other governments than one precariously established at a remote point.

4. Capture of the communications and public utilities facilities at the very outset of the attack. Capture of the Government Radio Station in Guatemala City is an important element in enabling the new provisional government to rally the people quickly to and
and to solicit the support of other governments. Plans should
insure at a minimum the denial of all communications facilities
(including military air), throughout the country, to the Guatemalan
Government.

3. The probability of military success can be further strengthened
if support can come on the part of a major proportion of the Army
Fuerza. A follow-up campaign to precede armed action should there-
fore shake the faith of the Army in its Government and in its own future
under that Government by:

a. Showing up the known fact that the Government is killing
    civilians and placing more reliance on the Contras than on its
    own military.

b. Refusing moral support and military assistance more with
    Rafaela's proposals.

c. Providing useful and military training missions to
    Rafaela's proposals.

d. Refusing military missions to reinforce and permit
    Rafaela's proposals.

The non-political Guatemalan Army Forces are quite likely to turn
against a government which, by its premeditated actions, is weakening
its military and forcing the strengthening of its neighbors, and at the
same time is killing its own pro-Communist civilians. Individual officers
are rarely loyal to the Government and are eliminated by other means.

3. The probability of military success can be further strengthened.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. The possibility of different processes may be further explored</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. The feasibility of different processes may be further explored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The possibility of different processes may be further explored</td>
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</tbody>
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This document is sanitized.
support of MRFU and his group, as a minimum

a. With a payment of $10,000 in the immediate future to
   partially repay debts and expenditures.

b. With $10,000 monthly regular payments from 1 September
   until D-Day which will permit MRFU to hold his present organi-
   zation together.

The payments listed above are considerably lower than the figures
projected by MRFU, but are believed to be sufficient to maintain an
effective resistance group, and not so high as to attract undue attention
to the maintenance of such a group. Such payments can be made through
foreign sources so that they cannot be attributed to any U. S. source.
Other payments for the purchase of transport and other items of special
equipment may be necessary.

c. With the expenditure of further sums at the time military
   action is initiated and during the establishment of the new govern-
   ment. In the thirty days prior to D-Day as much as $250,000 may
   be required. Necessary requirements during the period in which the
   new government is establishing itself can be handled on an overt
   loan basis.

   All action taken must be carefully planned in detail, timed to
   perfection, and ruthlessly executed. Support of all interested groups
   must be prompt and complete.
MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THROUGH: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
SUBJECT: Guatemala - General Plan of Action

1. Attached is the requested general plan of action and
summary budget estimate concerning proposed operations against
Guatemala, prepared jointly by Mr. [ ] Chief of
Operations [ ] and [ ] of the WH
Division specially assigned to the project.

2. The plan was given provisional approval by the undersigned
and submitted to the working group connected with the project, which
includes Messrs. [ ] and [ ] of the
State Department and Mr. [ ] at a meeting on
9 September 1953.

After thorough discussion, all members of the group concurred
in the general plan.

[ ] Chief,
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Guatemala.

During the past few years Guatemala has become the leading base of operations for Moscow influenced communism in Central America.

Ruled by powerful, anti-US President Arbusa supported by a leftist coalition government, with all key positions below cabinet level thoroughly controlled by a Communist dominated bureaucracy, Guatemala now represents a serious threat to hemispheric solidarity and to our security in the Caribbean area.

Essentially a primitive, rural country the size of Louisianna with a population of 3 1/2 million, Guatemala is currently engaged in an intensely nationalistic program of progress colored by the touchy, anti-foreign inferiority complex of the "Banana Republic".

With labor to a large degree organized according to communistic methods, and a land reform plan benefiting the peasantry, the present Arbenz government commands substantial popular support in spite of evidence of opposition in the capital, Guatemala City (Population 180,000).

With an army of 7000, the well-trained, and quite well equipped, hard core of which is stationed in the capital city, Guatemala maintains the balance of military power in Central America. This, coupled with communist subversive activities extending across the Guatemalan borders, is a matter of increasing concern to nearby States including Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.

The disturbing and subversive influence of communist dominated Guatemala within the Pan-American orbit, as well as an aggressively hardening anti-US policy targeted directly against American interests in
the country, has recently caused the United States Government to adopt a somewhat firmer attitude towards Guatemala than heretofore. Based on NSC 144/1 and up-to-date PSB policy guidance, 'CIA has placed top operational priority on an effort to reduce and possibly eliminate Communist power in Guatemala. Appropriate authorization has been issued to permit close and prompt cooperation with the Departments of Defense, State and other Government agencies in order to support CIA in this task.

A study of available intelligence estimates (most recently NIE-54) reveals no internal conditions that could be developed into a vital threat to the present Arbenz administration without determined support from the outside.

Though it is pointed out that the main political opposition to the government is located in the capital city, it is also stated that, although the dissatisfaction of important urban elements will probably increase, effective political unity among these elements is not likely to be achieved. The political union of urban and rural interests is even less likely.

Additional information appears to indicate that previously available active resistance to the government is decreasing rapidly due to general discouragement, especially after an abortive uprising earlier this year, which resulted in the imprisonment and/or exile of important opposition leaders.

It is further estimated that the army is the only organized element in Guatemala capable of rapidly and decisively altering the political situation and that there is no reason to doubt the continued loyalty of the army high command and most of the army to the President, who in turn is

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY
under the direct and indirect influence of Communist officials in key
government posts and firmly entrenched within pro-Administration
political parties.

Military units outside the capital are reported to have little
potential for effective revolutionary action due to poor equipment,
lack of training and the vigilance and security measures of trusted
area commanders.

The police force (3500) could neither defeat an army coup nor
itself overthrow the government without army support.

Another of the few organised elements of any consequence, the
Catholic Church, is reportedly handicapped by the meagerness of its
resources, the small number of priests in proportion to population, the
fact that most priests are aliens subject to deportation, and the lack of
a program capable of competing with the Communist-led labor movement
or with agrarian reform.

A study of a recent evaluation of CIA's political and psychological
warfare operations indicates that past efforts by the Agency to combat
Communism in Guatemala have been hampered by a policy of extreme
caution adhered to by State Department representatives in the field. As
a result of this, existing CIA assets personnelwise and otherwise in
respect to psychological warfare and political action within Guatemala are
negligible.

The main operational asset immediately available to CIA is a group
of revolutionary activists numbering a few hundred, led by an exiled
Guatemalan army officer (RUFUS) and located in Honduras. More than a
year ago, some planning within the Agency contemplated the implementation

TOP SECRET
EVE ONLY

TOP SECRET
EVE ONLY

TOP SECRET
EVE ONLY
of an ambitious militant plan of revolutionary action on the part of RUFUS and his group. For a variety of reasons this operation was indefinitely postponed; meanwhile RUFUS has received financial aid from private American interests. He allegedly controls considerable clandestine elements and contacts within Guatemala; in fact the above-mentioned operation would have depended for its success on immediate popular support of RUFUS and his revolutionaries, backed by active assistance of an extensive underground resistance organization and certain outlying army garrisons, as soon as RUFUS and his men entered the country.

In light of existing conditions in Guatemala, with the government steadily strengthening its position, and active opposition deteriorating, the original RUFUS plan is now considered substantially obsolete. It is disturbing that reports from the CIA case officer indicate that unless the RUFUS asset is operationally activated within a very short time (maximum 120 days), it will be subjected to a serious morale problem, and RUFUS' alleged clandestine support organization within Guatemala is likely to disintegrate along with other government opposition.

Undoubtedly there are means and ways of maintaining the RUFUS group on a stand-by basis. The RUFUS plan would in any case have to be radically readjusted to meet a more adverse situation. Also, any major action on the part of RUFUS and his supporters would have to be preceded by elaborate covert payoffs, political action, sabotage and similar operations that would require a time-consuming
build-up of Agency assets of various kinds, including the placement of
qualified personnel in the field.

In this connection, it would be the primary concern of CIA to
ascertain the existence, scope and potential of alleged Guatemalan covert
resistance elements, and alleged clandestine contacts suitable for psycho-
logical warfare and political action purposes, as well as for possible
active support of a para-military effort at a later date.

There is a general feeling of urgency in respect to action against
Guatemala on the part of State and Agency officials connected with this
priority task, but also a growing realisation of the fact that existing opera-
tional assets do not permit any optimistic viewpoints relative to speedy
success within a relatively short period of time.

It is recognised that the task headed by CIA calls for a general,
over-all plan of combined overt and covert action of major proportions.
Some steps have already been taken to initiate certain preparatory measures
in regard to supporting overt action and other US government sponsored
pressure aimed at offsetting the leading position of Guatemalan military
strength in Central America.

A general outline of a contemplated course of action follows:

(a) Military Aid to other Central American States: In order to isolate
the target country (Guatemala), military aid agreements will be con-
cluded with Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. Implementation of
such aid programs will be expedited on a priority basis and US military
missions will proceed to the countries in question to supervise de-
liveries of military equipment and offer technical assistance. Nego-
tiations with Nicaragua are progressing (ACTION: State and Defense).

[Signatures and dates]

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY
and it is expected that arms shipments will commence shortly

(ACTION: Defense and FOA). Preliminary steps to encourage Honduras to follow suit are in progress (ACTION: CIA, subsequently State and Defense), and El Salvador is expected to join up without delay (ACTION: State and Defense). (March 1974)

(b) Cessation of Military Aid to Guatemala: US military missions will be withdrawn from Guatemala at an appropriate time. Deliveries of arms, heavy equipment and other industrial products of military use have been stopped (ACTION: Defense and State). Efforts should be made to curtail or stop similar deliveries from foreign sources wherever possible (ACTION: State).

(c) Supporting Official Pressure: The US Government must from here in adopt a strong, critical attitude towards the Guatemalan Arbenz Government. Every opportunity to crack down hard on Guatemala in response to official correspondence or statements must be fully exploited and subsequently followed up by active measures wherever feasible. (ACTION: State).

(d) Official Discrediting of Guatemala: The threat of a conference of OAS or of Foreign Ministers should be made and reiterated in due course. The objective of the conference is to consider evidence that Guatemala constitutes a menace to Hemispheric solidarity and the internal security of friendly nations through aggressive Communist subversion. (ACTION: State). Collection of evidence, or fabrication of same, will be attended to accordingly (ACTION: CIA and State).

(e) Economic Pressure: Considering that Guatemalan Government economy is susceptible to pressures, covert economic warfare methods targeted against oil supplies, shipping and vital exports and imports, where feasible, will be applied. In this connection, an already cleared group
extensive experience in Latin American banking, shipping, publicity, general investments and oil, will be assigned the task of preparing a plan of covert action. This will be augmented by advice from guided by three of his most trusted advisers in economic affairs who have just arrived from Guatemala for consultation. These men occupy high positions in Guatemalan business and industrial life.

Real, or when necessary fabricated evidence re. aggression and subversion, will be used at an OAS conference to obtain approval of the American States for multilateral economic action against Guatemala, particularly in respect to coffee. A study is under way to determine what phases of the coffee industry may be attacked which will damage the Arbenz government and its supporters without seriously affecting anti-communist elements (ACTION: CIA and State).

(i) Psychological Warfare: Paywar activities but targeted against Guatemala, will be stepped up forthwith through the exploitation of exile groups and internal anti-communist organizations presently engaged in active operations (ACTION: CIA). A complete psychological warfare campaign for internal implementation in Guatemala is in the planning stage. The Chief organizer of an extensive clandestine resistance movement, recently joined RUFUS in Honduras after being exiled from Guatemala. Contrary to current intelligence reports, it claims control over substantial assets that would be capable of covert Paywar activities and black operations using contacts within the press, radio, church, army and other organized elements susceptible to rumor, pamphleteering, poster campaigns and other subversive action. is presently in Washington assisting in preparations for Paywar activity and political action. It will be
necessary to strengthen the CIA field station in Guatemala forthwith

in order to supervise the launching of a sustained Paywar program and
verify the capabilities of the /RUFUS clandestine organi-

zation in Guatemala City and elsewhere (ACTION: CIA).

(g) Political Action: Preparations for subversion and defection of Army
leaders as well as government officials and political personalities are
in progress. Here again, is assisting and offering capabilities
for operational exploitation. (ACTION: CIA).

(h) Para-Military Action: As described in the foregoing, RUFUS and his
small revolutionary group in Honduras (300) is the revolutionary nucleus
around which last year's operational plan was formulated. Success
depended entirely on immediate popular support inside Guatemala and a
month-long military campaign gaining momentum through a series of
complicated maneuvers and rendez-vous climaxing in an irregular assault
on Guatemala City. This plan is now considered obsolete; however, it is
still contemplated to make proper use of the RUFUS asset in appropriate
coordination with an overt and covert "softening-up" effort described in
the foregoing.

Current thinking singles out Guatemala City as the key target upon
which all efforts must be concentrated including a swift, climactic
military action sparked by a reinforced RUFUS group with essential
support from defected elements of the City garrison and active civilian
resistance groups backed by a series of well-prepared unconventional
warfare operations. This must include the neutralization of key military
figures and control of power and communication centers.

Much preparatory work has already been completed to ensure
logistical support of RUFUS. He and his group should take early
advantage of the offered use of a military base

Supplies now available in the Caribbean should be sent forward without delay to support an extensive covert training program. RUFUS and must at once take steps to strengthen their force by arranging for exfiltration of additional revolutionary personnel from Guatemala; leader and organizer types should be selected initially for intensive training, and some of these should be re-infiltrated to resistance elements within Guatemala. RUFUS' basic nucleus should eventually be built up to match as closely as practicable the numerical strength of the garrison of Guatemala City (approximately 3000).

The proposed expansion of the RUFUS group would in itself provide some measure of evidence as to RUFUS' estimates and claims of control of resistance elements currently dependable in Guatemala.

Further proof of the existence of organized clandestine resistance should be obtained by the gradual activation of one selected group after another within Guatemala commensurate with the development and increasing momentum of the psychological warfare and political action campaign. Some subversive operations should likewise be carried out to further testify to the existence of the alleged RUFUS capabilities inside the target country, and in order to stimulate popular interest and support. (Suitable target for one of these operations: disruption of a 15-man communist delegation scheduled to leave Guatemala City on 10 October '53 by commercial air carrier for a Communist Labor Congress in Vienna.)
Steps will immediately be taken to review the RUFUS plan according to concepts set forth in the above and progressively geared to take advantage of operational developments resulting from the before-mentioned overt and covert course of action. (ACTION: CIA supported by State and Defense as appropriate).

(1) **Strengthening of CIA Station in Guatemala:** As previously indicated, CIA assets in the field personnelwise and otherwise are negligible. No time should be lost in order to reinforce the station with a senior FI operator and an experienced senior PP operator. The current PP and FI effort is considered far short of even beginning to tackle the task at hand. Expert leadership is required to supervise the clandestine build-up in Guatemala without which no RUFUS plan involving revolutionary action sparked from the outside can be implemented with a reasonable chance of success. (ACTION: CIA - Priority.)

It is estimated that the contemplated operation can be mounted and completed over a period of not less than eight months. A provisional estimate of expenditure aggregates $2,735,000, as per attached specification.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Warfare and Political Action</td>
<td>$270,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subversion</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence Operations</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintenance of present cadre (8 months)</td>
<td>$160,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expansion of cadre to 500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arms and Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation of Training center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support of Internal Organization (estimate)</td>
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<td>Transportation, storage, and travel (estimate)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport Aircraft and maintenance</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current liabilities</td>
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<td>Contingencies</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,755,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AIR

CHIEF, LINCOLN

CHIEF OF STATION, GUATEMALA

Operational

Death Notices

References LNO 1725

1. Attached are two different samples of death notice cards used in this area. The larger, folding type was obtained from the central office through The smaller, less elaborate type was obtained from Mexico in early 1955 and is not unlike cards used in

2. For your information, the contemplated operation was previously tried here in 1955. Acting on instructions contained in DIR 47/52, one death notice was sent each day for thirty days to Each card contained the name of a prominent communist who had been purged, after he had outlived his usefulness. Each card also contained the request to pray for the soul of the particular communist victim. After thirty days, three additional cards were sent on successive days to each of the four persons named above. On these cards the names of the addressees were inserted.

3. The first cards described in para. 2 above were mailed on 15 April 1955. Beginning 15 June 1955 the operation was repeated. In neither case was there any reported or observed reaction, but it is possible that it had the desired effect which was to implant a feeling of insecurity among the targets individuals and their associates. If at this time you wish to repeat this type of operation, we will attempt to observe and report the results and reactions.

4. If you wish to review the operation described above you may refer to DIR 47/62, OWA 840 and 825.

5. For your information we have under consideration a similar operation in which we will employ birth announcements to advise selected addressees of the impending (re)birth of liberty in The purpose is the same as that which you contemplate in LNO 1725 to create a feeling that the anti-communist victory is inevitable. More details regarding this proposed operation will be submitted in a separate report.

Enol: as noted
19 April 1956

Distributions:
2 - Lincoln
2 - Washington
1 - Files

/Signature/
MEMORANDUM FOR: [ ]

SUBJECT: Summary of Directives and Instructions on PBSUCCESS

1. Pursuant to your verbal instructions of 4 November, there are listed below the principal directives, instructions and sources of instructions for Project PBSUCCESS.

2. General (in "Policy" folder)
   a. "Guatemala-General Plan of Action" TS # , dated 11 Sept 1953
   b. PBSUCCESS Status Report, dated 29 October 1953

3. US Military Assistance (in "Policy" folder):
   a. Various memos of conversations between [ ] and [ ]
      JCS have approved arms assistance negotiations with Nicaragua, and formal Defense Department notification to State is expected momentarily. JCS have not yet approved negotiations with Honduras or El Salvador.

   b. The Guatemalan Government has requested several additional US Army personnel on a TDT basis, to be added to the US Military Mission.
      State ( [ ] ) has forwarded the request to Defense without comment. If necessary, State is prepared to ask Defense not to make the personnel available.

4. Economic Warfare
   a. The Director of Security has been requested to obtain biographical data on proposed EW consultants. ("Policy" Folder).

   b. In discussions between [ ] and [ ] in New York on 2 November, it was agreed that there should be an approach to [ ] to decide on EW methods directed toward cutting off petroleum and other supplies of the Guatemalan government. (For further details, see contact report written by [ ] in "EV" folder.)

5. II
   a. Attached Memorandum from C/WED to Chief of Station, Guatemala (Attachment # 1) outlines priorities for development of [ ].

6. PP
   a. WED Field Memorandum 50-53 (Attachment # 2) and 138-53 (Attachment # 3) instruct all WED stations on how to support the anti-Guatemala [ ] campaign throughout the hemisphere.

   b. WED Field Memorandum 81-53 (available from [ ]) also deals with hemisphere-wide support of the above campaign.
SECRET

Security Information

c. Attachment #1 outlines PP tasks of Guatemala Station.

d. The noting that has ordered us to use all covert media to disseminate information which urges the US government to invoke the Monroe Doctrine in fighting Communism in the Western Hemisphere.

In discussions between CG (Opr. Div.) and CG (Intelligence), there has been talk of attempting to base various PP activities in Guatemala and of organizing some sort of "International Organization for the Liberation of Guatemala from Communism." (Note: in "Policy" folder)

f. The $30,000 given to KUS through November. (Contact Report of dated 6 October 1953, in "Policy" folder.)

7. Instructions from WHD to Guatemala Station during 1953 (material extracted from Guatemala Chrono-File)

a. 5 January, instructed Station to have continue writing articles about Guatemala for planting elsewhere in hemisphere. (According to now writes such articles.)

b. 26 February, Station was requested to furnish PO Box numbers used by Guatemalan Communists.

c. 6 April, Station was requested to furnish information on religious persecution in Guatemala for use elsewhere in hemisphere.

d. 2 April, Station was instructed to mail "mourning cards" for 30 successive days to and top Communist leaders. Cards were to mourn the purge or execution of various Communists in the world and to hint forthcoming doom to recipients.

e. 17 June, Station was requested to collect the following material for hemisphere-wide propaganda:

(1) evidence of worsening economic conditions

(2) photos and facts on failure of land reform

(3) evidence that only Communists were profiting

f. 19 June, Station was requested to report:

(1) its facilities for placing material in press and on radio

(2) its facilities for preparing material, printing and distributing it

(3) its capabilities to initiate strikes, etc.

(4) its access to Communist or official Guatemalan letterheads, signatures, seals and to information useful for character assassination.
(5) Suggestions as to what action taken by the Guatemalan government would make it most unpopular at home; what the best targets for defenestration are; which character assassinations could be most readily and profitably performed.

1 July, implied and direct criticism of Station performance was made by dispatch. Station was told that:

1. It had perhaps too willingly agreed to limitations imposed by the US Ambassador

2. It did not seem to be using security techniques

3. It had objected to the use of propaganda within Guatemala prepared outside the country, and had not made any alternate suggestions

4. It had been slow in answering dispatches or had not answered at all

5. Action and reporting on the labor situation were deficient.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: SECURITY INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Program for PBSUCCESS

REFERENCES:
A. "Guatemala - General Plan of Action", The, dated 11 September 1953
B. Project PBSUCCESS Status Report, dated 29 October 1953

A. Objectives

1. To remove covertly, and without bloodshed if possible, the menace of the present Communist-controlled government of Guatemala.
2. To install and sustain, covertly, a pro-US government in Guatemala.

B. Statement of the Problem

1. The Communists have become strongly entrenched in Guatemala and if the Guatemalan government, thus constituting a threat to United States welfare in the Western Hemisphere.
2. The Guatemalan non-Communist opposition has become disillusioned and disunited. However, a latent anti-Communist resistance potential is believed to exist.
3. The resistance potential must be built up to the point where it can contribute materially to the accomplishment of the objectives of PBSUCCESS.
4. In view of growing Communist strength and declining non-Communist cohesion in Guatemala, the implementation and successful completion of the objectives of PBSUCCESS must proceed without delay.
5. It must be recognized that any major effort to dislodge the Communist-controlled government of Guatemala will probably be credited to the United States, and possibly on CIA. Covert accomplishment of the objectives of PBSUCCESS is therefore defined as meaning accomplishment with plausible denial of United States or CIA participation.

C. Plan of Operations

1. Step One - Staffing and Assessment -
   a. Assignment of Project Personnel
   b. Field Survey by Communications Adviser
c. Briefing and dispatch of project field personnel.

d. Assessment and analysis of friendly assets.

e. Assessment and analysis of enemy assets.

f. Preparation of detailed operational plans for Headquarters approval.

2. Stage Two - Preliminary Conditioning (D-1)

a. Project Headquarters moves to the field.

b. Create dissenion and defection within the target.

c. Discredit target at home and abroad.

d. Demonstrate inability of target regime to represent best interests of the people.

e. Create hope and encourage patience among non-Communists.

f. Complete military agreements with Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.

g. Withdraw US military personnel from target at appropriate time.

h. Begin economic pressure.

i. Begin formation and training of a para-military force in exile.

j. Assess accomplishments.

k. Obtain Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.

3. Stage Three - Build-Up (D-75)

a. Create maximum antagonism to target regime.

b. Fan passive will to resist.

c. Apply internal and external economic pressure to create serious difficulties.

d. In concert with majority of QAS members, apply diplomatic pressures.

e. Demonstrate urgency by speeding military build-up of neighboring countries (not including Mexico).

g. Initiate passive sabotage program.

h. Assess accomplishments.

i. Obtain Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.

4. **Stage Four - Critical Period (D-25)**

   a. Apply maximum economic pressure.

   b. Accentuate divisionist activity within target.

   c. Intensive rumor campaign stimulating fear of war for the purpose of drawing enemy forces away from capital.

   d. Constitutional revolutionary forces claim support of people.

   e. Para-military force in readiness.

   f. Passive sabotage evident.

   g. Assess accomplishments.

   h. Obtain Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.

5. **Stage Five - Showdown (D-5)**

   a. Implement aggressive sabotage plan against key targets.

   b. Constitutional leader claims capability to seize power by force and issues ultimatum to target regime to capitulate in order to avoid needless bloodshed.

   c. Populace is told to await target regime's reply and further instructions from constitutional leader.

   d. If ultimatum fails, popular uprising begins; para-military force enters target country, proclaims authority, declares target regime null and void.

   e. Secure position and restore order.

6. **Stage Six - Consolidation (D+ 2)**

   a. Roll-up of Communists and collaborators.

   b. Dramatic initial proclamations and edicts.
c. Formation of government.

d. Announcement of long-range domestic and foreign policy.

e. U.S. countries announce immediate recognition and support of new regime.

f. United States offers aid.

g. PROSUCCESS terminated.

D. Organization and Authority

1. Priority

   a. PROSUCCESS has been given "Top Operational Priority" in the Agency.

2. Authority and Responsibility

   a. Primary field authority and responsibility is vested in the Officer in Charge, PROSUCCESS.

   b. This officer is designated "Special Deputy for PROSUCCESS, WHD."

   c. The command channel will be direct from Special Deputy to CWH.

3. Staff Requirements

   a. The following staff requirements for PROSUCCESS are believed to be the minimum for adequate implementation and control of the Plan of Operations envisaged herein. Additional personnel may required for varying periods of time.

   b. The T/O outlined below is exclusive of WHD's current T/O.

PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pos. No.</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>GS-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Operations Officer(Deputy)</td>
<td>GS-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Operations Officer</td>
<td>GS-13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Operations Officer GS-12
5. Operations Officer GS-11
6. Operations Officer GS-11
7. Operations Officer GS-11
8. Intelligence Officer GS-9
9. Budget and Fiscal Officer GS-12
10. Logistics Officer GS-11
11. Administrative Assistant GS-7
12. Secretary-Steno GS-7
13. Secretary General GS-6
14. Secretary General GS-6
15. Secretary-Steno GS-5

7. Finance

a. Upon approval of this program, financial accountability will be vested in CWH, under whose direction CWH/AD will be the accountable disbursing officer for Headquarters expenditures. Under the general direction of the CWH, the Special Deputy for PBSUCCESS will be the accountable disbursing officer for field expenditures.

b. Procedures for allocation, disbursement, and accounting of funds will be in a manner acceptable to the DD/A, and as shall be arranged between him and the CWH/AD.

APPROVED:

[Signature]

DD/P

CWH
1. CALLIGERIS INDICATES:
   A. COMPLETE CONFORMANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DATE.
   B. CONFIDENCE THAT FEARS COS ON RAPPORT, GROUNDLESS. WILL TEST THIS WEEK.
   C. ADAMANT IN BELIEF DANGEROUS POLITICIAN.

2. REQUEST BE INSTRUCTED:
   A. PROCEED 13 MAR.
   B. SET SCHEDULE GRADUATE LEADER CLASS 20 APRIL.
   C. STRESS TEAMWORK LEADER CLASS; I.E. NO INTRIGUES IF DESIRE SUCCESS.

3. PLS PASS FOLLOWING: NINE MOST SILENT RIFLES TO BE MARKED XZ FOR DELIVERY SECOND CAT DESTINATION AREA TWO. REMAINDER XG DESTINATION AREA ONE.

4. REQUEST TOTAL WAR BUDGET $6,000 BE RELEASED.

5. COAL TRAINING REPORTEDLY UNDER WAY. REQUEST QUERY IF IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE.
08 MAR 54

\[ 038 \text{ (IN 25314)} \]

PAGE -2-

AN/GRC-9's DELIVERED.

6. SUCCESSFUL PREPARATIONS FOR AIR STAGING IMMINENT.

7. \[ \text{ETA} \begin{array}{c} 1125, 8 \text{ MAR.} \end{array} \]

END OF MESSAGE
TO:  DIR
FROM:  
ACTION:  
INFO:  

[ ] (IN 66672)  18412  5 JAN 54  
TO:  DIR
ATTN:  [ ]

PBSUCCESS [RYBAT]

CONTACT [ ] D AND T TO REQUEST SPECIAL PAPER ON LIQUIDATION OF PERSONNEL. THIS PAPER IS TO BE UTILIZED TO BRIEF TRAINING CHIEF BEFORE JAN 10 DEPARTURE.

END OF MESSAGE
APPRECIATE YOUR ADVICE ON THIS REQUEST. SEE NO OBJECTION TO PURCHASING DIRECT AS ONLY CONTRACT INVOLVED NOT AN ENTIRE WEALTH.

END OF MESSAGE
TO: [ ]

ATTN: [ ]

PBSUCCESS [RYBAT]

1. CONTACT TSS AND INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITY OBTAINING 20 SILENCERS FOR 22 CAL RIFLE AND ADAPTING THEM TO SINGLE SHOT SECOND HAND RIFLES. IF MARCH 10 DEADLINE COULD BE MET, PROCEED WITH DEVELOPMENT.

2. INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITY CONVERTING TO CRUDE FOLDING STOCKS MADE FROM SPRING STEEL OR SIMILAR TO M3. IF STEADINESS CAN BE INSURED, PROCEED WITH DEVELOPMENT.

3. PURCHASE ON MARKET 20 USED SINGLE SHOT 22 CAL RIFLES TO IMPLEMENT ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE
(at roughly 3055 on the ( )

( ) talking:

"If you wait beyond February, I think you may have lost because if too many of these birds get out they will be back in about three years. So a very, very essential part of (unintelligible) campaign is a list of some 57-8 top men, (unintelligible) assassinated those first hours of the revolution as well as 22 (unintelligible). The idea is that to destroy this thing you've got to pull the roots out. And let's face it, in any population even this country you destroy the leadership and the mass are going to be effected.

(at roughly 3315)

( ) talking:

"....As far as I'm concerned, if any man escapes and gets to ( )(unintelligible) earmarked and get him. Put assassins... (sic) in( ), and they must be dealt with immediately as soon as possible. In other words, if one man gets to( ) but he's on that list...(unintelligible)... he's shot in( )...(unintelligible)... If you wait a week and start killing people, public reaction's bad."
Note: a non-negative attitude will permeate the entire proceeding. However, these notes are to represent discussion points which are likely to come up and represent the basis of CPM prior concept. [ ]

Believe this is what Rufe will want to know once you have an understanding of technique and we in agreement the work should come along within too much hime.
3 February 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: CALIGARIS Briefing Notes

1. Attached are sterile notes from which intends to work in the coming meeting with CALIGARIS. Deviation to fit the situation will undoubtedly change the complex of control points, however these notes will be adhered to insomuch as possible.
SUBJECT: Briefing Notes

1. Former planning of Indigenous Commander will be utilized as fully as possible, the basis of which being to rearrange the plan to comply with unconventional warfare standards.

2. The major consideration in all alterations in the Indigenous Commander's plans will be to avoid a prolonged siege situation and to avoid placing many assets at the disposal of the tricks of the opposition. To accomplish this we must realize that only key points of resistance should come under our control immediately at H hour. The conditions under our control should be accomplished at each key point of resistance by one of or a combination of the following methods:
   a. First Method: Seizure by outside force with mission of support being performed by an inner organization, organized by the Indigenous Commander's personnel from his personnel plus defections obtained through Psychological Warfare persuasion.
   b. Second Method: Seizure by an inner organization such as above without the aid of outside forces.
   c. Third Method: An inner organization as above to the point of capabilities of control and nullifying the positive action of any areas of resistance until success at other key areas is obtained and consolidated to the point of capability of supporting outside force on arrival to prevent a siege situation.
      Note: Army unit personnel form priority target for defection.
   d. Fourth Method: Blocking strong resistance points from the entire action by organizing strategic surrounding areas for their retarding and harassment, and blocking by specially placed sab teams.

3. Unless the positive assurance of control of Guatemala City by one of the above first three methods is obtained, no overt move will be made. It is considered there are nine points of resistance at this time:
   a. Guatemala City: garrison, communications, and air facilities
   b. Puerto Barrios: garrison, communications, air facilities, and port facilities
   c. Jutiapa: garrison, communications, and air facilities
   d. Zacapa: garrison, communications, and air facilities
   e. Mazatenango: garrison, communications, and air facilities
   f. Quezaltenango: garrison, communications, and air facilities
   g. Quiche: garrison, communications, and air facilities
   h. Coban: garrison, communications, and air facilities
   i. San Jose: garrison, port facilities, and communications.
4. It is contemplated that during this first discussion certain portions of the Indigenous Commander's prior estimates of the situation and contemplated needs will arise. The theme to be used on each anticipated subject is to be as follows:

a. A feeling by the Indigenous Commander that on the capture of certain of small outlying garrisons, Guatemala City and other strong points can be expected to capitulate. Recent disclosures have proven that the enemy may approach in efficiency those standards met in other Communist countries. We know that several of the enemy are Soviet trained. Soviet trained active opposition gathers its knowledge thoroughly and employs it at the opportune time only. We must design our mode of attack and preparation for the attack so that a limited bit of knowledge obtained by the active opposition cannot be built into possession of the full details. We are attempting to aid in these standards by utilizing compartmentation within the new target organization between the new target organization and the surrounding partisan forces, between the Quat complex and the outside shock troops and specialists, and between shock troops and specialists for each target and troops and specialists for another target. The entry of shock troops and specialists will be designed as nearly as possible to an infiltration type entry rather than that of regular forces placed along communication routes. Techniques of partisan warfare will be applied to the Indigenous Commander's prior planning and preparations in the best manner to support more conventional military tactics. This technique of combining two types of tactics has proven itself in military history by reducing the number of personnel necessary, lessening bog-tying logistical problems, and utilizing strike mobility, surprise, and tactics making the opposition fight on your terms, at your time and place for which you are better equipped, trained, and mentally adapted to. By the same token infiltration entry by small, light-traveling units avoiding possible military traps by the opposition will negate the enemy's utilization of material they possess concerning us, the extent of which is unknown to us.

Therefore, an understanding of the key position of the elite corps forming Guatemala City Military Command is imperative. Then the Indigenous Commander will inquire as to what possible reason could be behind the thought of a military campaign not employing combat aircraft: The utility of bombing and strafing tactics to neutralize any strong point is being shied away from even as a psychological factor by the Group in view of the fact that the very concept of our movement, that of release of persons from oppression, and all of our actions must allow this discontented element to participate in the overthrow of oppression or at least aid by sympathy or nonintervention. Our tactics should veer away from terrorism of this faction and veer towards inviting their participation. NOTES: Writer will employ non-rigidity in the above in the presentation to allow for the following deviation:
(1) It is admitted that there is a psychological value to the appearance of aircraft. If strafing and bombing aircraft are made available by outside support to the Group, that they can be utilized if the Indigenous Commander's assurances of complete control of that support will be maintainable by Group and Indigenous Commander during operation to the point of not allowing one round to be fired or one bomb to be dropped unless prior Group-Indigenous Commander concurrence is pre-determined. Writer will call upon disastrous personal experiences to point out possible hazards of group air support even when air-ground liaison teams and air force have been strenuously trained and when operating under best conditions. Writer will point out Group's yet-unfirm initial planning on preparations for reserve support under Plan Able or emergency support under Plan Baker and Plan Charlie by Group air facilities.

5. Communications: Indigenous Commander may query the Group's former claim to communications efficiency. The writer's position here will be that of pointing out difficulties experienced in utilization of varied radio trained tactical situations even of the comparatively small enormity if encountered in inter-company raider situations encountered in semi-conventional tactics. The proven reliability of the technical equipment being proposed and the security efficiency that can be maintained should aid in setting the basis of communications plan.

6. Logistical Support: The Indigenous Commander will query methods of getting material in the hands of recipients. Here the writer will outline basic concepts of the logistical support plan as prepared in the rough from which each was composed. Without going into the exact method of getting material to the staging site and without being dogmatic on the Choggi system as being the only method, Flame throwers will be dispelled by pointing out lack of portability, wrong psychological effect, and availability. German bazookas will be mentioned as being sought. Special equipment such as silenced rifles, survival kits, Napalm, shaped charges, and canned grenades will be played up.

7. The entire basis of the writer's approach to this conference will be the realization that the Group must follow, both from their groups and our groups standpoint and that side from the known opposition tactics and precautionary measures, that we are coming up against and are faced with the third factor of opposition's trained Communist Tacticians in the field of security, stay behind, subversion, and intrigue which would make our employment of straight military tactics, alone, an issue of doubt. All of us involved must over-plan and over-prepare and be prepared to "drive the tack with a sledge hammer" in the event the sledge hammer turns out to be a railroad spike.
8. In the event accord or mutual compromise is apparent at this point the Indigenous Commander will be queried in order to initiate the formation of such organizations we should start preparing specifications on the following:

   a. The name and biographical data on the person or persons the Indigenous Commander considers to be the key man or men to be nucleus of the organization within the garrison. We should consider a strong executive officer (probably to be chosen by the key man himself if the Indigenous Commander considers feasible). We should choose personalities for Partisan Leaders around which organizations of the surrounding areas can be built. We should determine the personalities most suited for residence radio operators for each specific target. We should choose personalities for leaders of sabotage teams and move them the latter part of March to the staging area which has been selected for the particular area of interest so that graduates of the present training program can be assigned to instruct them. We should pin down the air fields near by the staging areas to which material can be sent to the staging area. The Indigenous Commander should ascertain at this time his ability to operate secure landing at these airfields from the head of the countries concerned, similar to the arrangements for the last similar flight made by the Group. The Indigenous Commander should inform the Group soonest on obtaining the answer to this query if such answer is not available at this conference.

9. The Indigenous Commander will be acquainted with at this point, if deemed feasible by writer, the proposed methods of initiating these first steps and at this time can comment on feasibility at specific instances. Contact of the selected key personality in each area of resistance by one of the graduates of present training, which contact to be instructional in nature, the secrecy of which contact we will guarantee by the techniques of clandestine trade, which contact will be limited to one man in whom the Indigenous Commander has confidence. The reasoning here to be stressed is that the building of the new organization should be comparatively cautious to prevent the recent disclosures to the enemy from contaminating the new organization. This key figure will be instructed to work even within his garrison by using one strong assistant to provide the implementation of his organizing efforts thereby preventing exposure of himself through too much activity. The key figure will be instructed to organize within the garrison one man to form the necessary organization to negate air facilities (i.e. prevent opposition aircraft from entering the action); one man to form the necessary organization responsible for cutting communications; one man responsible for instructing and organizing special mission details (assassination, destruction or seizure of materials and stock piles, physical submission of garrison troops, etc.); one man as a courier cutout with liaison with incoming resident radio operators; one man for possible courier contact (emergency with Indigenous Commander). In addition, personalities chosen to head area organizations in the surrounding area will be contacted by graduate trainees for instructional purposes to acquaint the area raiders with harassment and retardation tactics and organizational style.
10. Discussion on reason for compartmentalization of staging training sites and specific locations will be handled.

11. Once Indigenous Commander's assignment February is determined, he will be asked to present financial estimate for discussion.

12. It is the purpose of this conference to reach an understanding with the Indigenous Commander and find personnel and geographical requirements which will initiate a positive forward move in the military field during his forthcoming trip to his home area.
OUTGOING CABLE

TO: [DIRECTOR] FROM: [ ]
INFO:  
PRICEDENCE: ROUTINE
TOT: 21 JAN 54 15342

RE: DIR 34976
FSUCCESS/KBAT

1. CANNED DRY AND PACKED.

2. YES.

3. RIFLE USED TO 150 YDS MAX. REQUEST MAXIMUM DEGREE SILENCE ACCOMPLISHED BY TSS WITH DELIVERY DATE WASH 20 FEB. OR DELIVERY DATE [ ] 1 APRIL.

END OF MESSAGE

DISTR:
1-CHRON FILE
1-ORIGINATOR
1-SUBJECT
1-STATION FILE

ORIGINATOR: [ ] 3/2154
APPROVED BY [ ]

[Signature]

[Signature]
27 September 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR:  [REDACTED]  
SUBJECT:  Cost of Support for PBSUCCESS

Items are listed approximate total cost only. This includes material, labor and overhead.

772 each Dead Drop Rods  170.00
Canning Project  2,240.00
20 each Silenced Weapons  1,835.00

Photo Copy of Maps
5,000 Armbands
150,000 Leaflets
200,000 Leaflets  915 man hrs.
5,000 Posters
1,000 Letterheads and Envelopes
10,000 Pennants  4,575.00

Glass Etchers  125.00

Total  $8,945.00

Chief, TSS/Technical Operations

TSS/OCT
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<td>Letter from Amb. Paunifoy to Ass't Secy of State Cabot dated 28 Dec 53</td>
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<td>[ ] Activities - Travel and Contacts</td>
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<td>[ ] Progress Report 12 Feb-30 Nov 53 - EFGTV</td>
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<td>&quot;Communism versus Progress in Guatemala&quot; by Theodore Geiger</td>
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<td>&quot;Utilization of CRIT for PBSSOCSS Purposes&quot;</td>
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<td>Estatutos del Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT)</td>
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<td>21.</td>
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<td>[ ] re: Clerical Personnel dated 8 Jan 54</td>
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<td>[ ] re: Administrative Letters dated 8 Jan 54</td>
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<td>23.</td>
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| 24.  |              | [ ] re: "Contem-

<p>| STATE CHEQUE NO. 174 dated 31 Dec 53 |
| 25.  |              | [ ] re: Activities |
| 26.  |              | Envelope addressed to [ ] |</p>
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<td>Copy of TASS report of FRAVDA note re Guatemala</td>
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Calligeris reports as follows:

1. \[\text{he does not have nor has he ever had, an active part in my plans for Guatemala.}\]

2. I have never communicated to him any part of my military plans.

3. I last had correspondence with \[\text{in February 1952. He wrote me a letter outlining the general situation in Guatemala and expressing the hope that something could be done. I answered him saying that I too hoped that in time something would be done. Since then we have had no further correspondence.}\]

4. About three (3) months ago I instructed my men in Mexico that \[\text{was to be considered dangerous to our cause and, as such, was to be avoided.}\]

5. Your \[\text{information that is a paid agent of the present Guatemalan government is true. I am aware of it.}\]

6. \[\text{his present addresses are:}\]
   a. Home address: \[\text{]
   b. Business address: \[\text{]

7. Some weeks ago (20-22 August) you gave me information which showed that the present Guatemalan government had intercepted my letters to some of my men in Mexico. I had the matter investigated and now believe that \[\text{received that information from conversation with my people. My men report they burn all my letters on reading them.}\]
Those in attendance were:

Mr. [ ] first explained [ ] as a complete assessment to determine factually the resources and capability of RUFUS to fulfill project requirements. If warranted, a cadre class of military leaders will be selected, screened for [ ] training [ ]; if warranted, assets developed for [ ] force; if warranted, equipment will be moved to training site; and a 9-week training program implemented.

Mr. [ ] went on to say that [ ] were to keep a card file, and when a case officer sent a name through to be cleared, they should thereafter report every time that name cropped up — [ ] be on the alert for any information or activities of that person.

Mr. [ ] continued by briefing the group as to what RUFUS is supposed to have gathered by 15 February:

1. The names of key civilian personnel which RUFUS considers pledged to himself in each major area of resistance.

2. The names of all personnel to be connected in any way with logistical movements that are expected to occur [ ] in late March — that means truck drivers, the people who unload the plane, those who will be coming into the truck park — anyone who is going to be connected with the logistical part.

3. The names of all personnel now in [ ] training for commo and RH.

4. The names of all persons connected with [ ] training sites in administrative and labor capacities.

5. The names of all personnel to be trained in the second [ ] Leadership class, to commence approximately 5 March.
6. The name of the key man of each military garrison that we plan to head up -- of particular interest to Chief of Station, Guatemala, because this man will be the first to know the details. We do not know when these names will be available.

I then asked if Lincoln would be able to tell him these names, and replied that Chief of Station, Guatemala, would receive a check list on which would be indicated the intended use for each of these men -- the 9 (actually 12) military personalities that come out of Guatemala.

A discussion ensued, in which requested that lateral cables be sent to him regarding such names, so that he could also keep a watch list. however, speaking for MI activities, said that no lateral cables will be sent on garrison personnel. RUFUS has been assured that we would confine very strictly this information.

then discussed the Leadership Class:

On 19 January, 27 men commenced a 9-week training course designed to produce staff specialists for return to RUFUS' staff:

10 organizers
10 shock troop leaders
4 saboteur instructors
2 assassination specialists.

RUFUS had been asked by the Case Officer to produce 30 low-level saboteurs. RUFUS indicated a desire to send his key men to the course. The present training class was converted immediately to retaine 20 recruited saboteurs, the retraining to begin 5 March. The remainder of the present class will be used for courier services, logistical functions, etc.

stated that had been right about the caliber of the people but he does have 10 qualified persons. A class is being assembled now
by RUFUS and will begin movement a about 1 March, is to keep informed. The present class is due to graduate 25 April. Under the present plan, that should clear us out of R4 activities. About 10 May will be graduation of the radio operators.

That completes

then defined Staging Sites. He stated we were to reconnoiter the border area to select suitable sites for basing R4 teams. As a result of the previous night, had suggested three sites which were agreed upon: Site A, Site B and Site C. is to get the information on the man at Site A, and send it up for clearance; when gives him the word, he is to have recruit the man.

stated that the man for Site C is cleared, but we do not have his name. It may be

then directed to cultivate but not to make any commitments until headquarters gives the green light. When the men are recruited for A and B, then we will ask them to establish a cover story.

stated that would do that.

stated there would be no recruiting until RUFUS returns to confer with and discloses what he finds out. If headquarters sends the word, is to prod who is the man with whom RUFUS will negotiate.

then stated that does not have the full confidence of

directed that, in working with was to be
simply an advisor and contact to furnish headquarters with advice. is to do the work in the FM field, and is to keep himself out of it. then informed that a cut-out has been selected -- businessman and ex-Air Force pilot was instructed to get all data available on him at once, but to make no overt approach to him prior to receipt of is then to give him a good security lecture.

went on to describe an air strip -- a strip 2100 feet long now owned by and located has been requested to arrange, by suitable cut-out, to extend the field to 400 feet. Expected maximum expenditure, $500.00.

The new air strip relegates to secondary importance a field previously used by and possibly blown. The new field is also nearer to an intermediate Staging Area presently owned by RUFUS.

defined Training Base Utilize facilities of through RUFUS, establish and maintain a covert training school for 30 students; prepare training agenda, secure maneuver area apart from training site, prepare to accommodate a radio operator training class for 20 students, providing full assistance to instructor.

stated that, following the recent disclosure of the interest in RUFUS' activities, the FM training site has been moved at the order of to a point on one of fincas. A field crypto of has been assigned to this location. For
Reasons previously stated, the Training Site was changed to graduate the present class and receive the new class. A total of only six radio operators was obtained for the commo training, due to a misunderstanding on the part of RUPUS as to the caliber that he was to produce. His attempt to produce only previously experienced radio operators in order to shorten the training period and conduct an operation in late February, had reduced the available personnel to considerably under the required 20. As a result of the Lincoln conferences, the 20 radio operators are being recruited and will move \( \square \) prior to 25 February.

---

\( \square \) pointed out that the above is an evaluation of things we have done, and short-term plans we have made. Now we should go into anybody's idea on long-term plans. \( \square \) added that \( \square \) liaison \( \square \) would probably continue to be a problem; \( \square \) replied that he has very good liaison \( \square \).

\( \square \) then stated that one long-term development was as follows: \( \square \) are to develop to the point of recruitment \( \square \). HM will join the forces who are to utilize this man after C/S and FI have determined his usefulness and clearance -- after that, HM will come into the field and assign a man to be hired by \( \square \).

It was agreed that the responsibility of the \( \square \) contacts is that of spotter when assigned, producer of clearance data, and where practicable discreet preparation for recruitment.

\( \square \) then brought out that we should be prepared for the refugee problem which would result if the project blows up. \( \square \) agreed, stating that we are trying to get \( \square \) to throw up border controls.
to prevent the escape of Communists; in the event of a blow-up, someone should be ready to engineer the elimination of these border controls, to permit the revolutionists to cross the borders.
FOLLOWING ACTIONS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION:

A. SEND PKGS CONTAINING ALARM CLOCKS TO GOVT LEADERS, REDS, TO SIMULATE TIME BOMB. INCLUDE NOTE "NEXT TIME, REAL THING."

B. CALL COMMIE, GOVT LEADER IN AMERICAN-ACCENTED SPANISH, SAY OTHER COMMIE, GOVT LEADER MUST COME TO CLANDESTINE MTG WITH KNOWN "REACTIONARY", IE UFDO, IRCA REP, TEXAN MILLIONAIRE, ETC. "KISS OF DEATH" TECHNIQUE.

END OF MESSAGE
1. DESPITE COMPROMISE PBSUCCESS MOVING FORWARD APACE. COMPROMISE COST ONLY TOP ECHELON AND PLANS THAT EVENTS HAVE INVALIDATED ANYWAY. BUT MASS OF ORGANIZATION REMAINS INTACT AND IN STATE OF NEAR-READINESS.

2. RO'S, ORGANIZERS, SAB LEADERS PRESENTLY BEING LAUNCHED. THEY WILL CONTACT UNBURNED SECOND, THIRD ECHELON AND PROCEED AS PLANNED.

3. NUMEROUS 5-MAN HARRASSMENT TEAMS BEING READIED FOR LAUNCHING, WITH MISSION TO ATTACK COMMIES AND COMMIE PROPERTY, BUT NOT ATTACK ARMY.

4. CAPACITY TO AIR SUPPLY FRIENDLY INTERNAL FORCES SHOULD EXIST SOON.

5. SHOCK TROOPS MOVING TO STAGING SITES. HIGH DEGREES OF READINESS, BOTH IN PROFICIENCY AND SPIRIT.