Sri Garib Das Oriental Series No. 311 UMAP ATI’S COMMENTARY ON THE PAUSKARATANTRA CHAPTER 7 : PRAMANA AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION USHA COLAS-CHAUHAN Sri Satguru Publications A Division of Indian Books Centre Delhi, India 4 umApatfs commentary ON THE PAUSKARATANTRA CHAPTER 7 : PRAMANA rn mi r Sri Garib Das Oriental Series No. 311 UMAPATI’S COMMENTARY ON THE PAUSKARATANTRA CHAPTER 7 : PRAMANA AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION USHA COLAS-CHAUHAN Sri Satguru Publications A Division of Indian Books Centre Delhi, India Published by Sri Satguru Publications, Indological and Oriental Publisher^ A Division of Indian Books Centre 40/5, Shakti Nagar, Delhi- 1 10007 India Email: ihcindia@vsnl.com Website: httn://www.indianb ookscentre.com © All rights reserved. First Edition; Delhi, 2007 ISBN 81-7030-857-7 Printed by: ' CHAWLA OFFSET PRINTERS, Delhi-110052 CONTENTS Acknowledgments vii Introduction 1 Translation 51 Text 215 Abbreviations and bibliography 291 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to acknowledge the help of Professor R. Balasubramanian, who readily accepted to discuss the thorny problems of the text and offered suggestions for improving the translation. I am grateful for his continued encourage- ment and interest in my work. I am also thankful to Professors S. Sankaranarayanan and K. E. Devanathan who kindly elucidated several passages of the text in Nayvya- nyaya style. . I am indebted to Professor P.-S. Filliozat for his valuable comments on the first draft of the translation and Professor N. R. Bhatt for his affectionate counsel. I thank Professor K. Bhattacharya for clarifying several doubts about the definition of vyapti, Dr. J. Ganeri for his suggestions on the translation of the pram any a section, and Pandit T. K. Chayapathi Sarma for his help in understanding several passages of the text. I thank the Institut Fran?ais de PondichSry for allowing me to photocopy and use the transcript of JfianaprakaSa’s Pauskaravrtti. The translation of the prdmanya section was printed as an article entitled “Umapati on pramanya” in the Journal of Indian Philosophy (vol. 30, no. 4, August 2002). thank the editor and publishers for permission to include it here. % INTRODUCTION Umapati, the author of the commentary ( bhusya ) on the Pauskaratantra, is generally identified with the 14th-century Saiva preceptor Umapati who wrote several major Saiva doctrinal texts in Tamil.' But S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri * 2 drew the attention of scholars to the fact that the Pauskarabhdsya refers to the Nyaydmrta, a 16th-century Dvaita work. He proposed three possible explanations for this fact: the existence of another earlier Dvaita work bearing the same name as that of the 16th century work, the interpolation of the reference to the Nyaydmrta in the Pauskarabhdsya and finally, rejection of the idea that the Umapati of the 14th century was the author of the Pauskarabhdsya. To this, B. N. K. Sharma replied 3 that there was only one work called Nyaydmrta in Dvaita literature, the one written by Vyasaraya (1478-1539), 4 that the partly misquoted Nyaydmrta verse did not seem to be an inter- polation in the Pauskarabhdsya and that, as a consequence, the attribution of the Pauskarabhdsya to a 14th century author needed to be reconsidered. Sharma also argued that the expression “the followers of Madhva” ( mddhvdh ) could not have become current during the lifetime of Madhva (1238-1317) and that Umapati, who employs that expression (in PauskaraBh on 7.6“), must ' See Thirugnanasambandhan. Sataratnasahgraha , pp. xi-xv; Siva- raman, Saivism in Philosophical Perspective , pp. 36-38; and Ganga- daran, Saiva Siddhanta with special reference to Sivaprakasam , pp. 6- 23 for the date and works of this Umapati. : The Sivddvaita of Srikantha, p. 68. 3 Sharma, “The date of Umapati’s Pauskara-bhdsya" , pp. 65-68. 4 See Sharma, History of the Dvaita School and its Literature, vof 2, pp. 24-60, for the date and works of Vyasaraya also known as Vyasa- tirtha. 2 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala therefore belong to a later period. He pointed out that the polemical style of the Pauskarabhasya, similar to that of the 15th and 16th century dialectics, supported the idea that it was composed at a later date. Sharma concluded on these grounds that Umapati, the author of the Pauskarabhasya, was different from the Umapati who composed the Tamil Saiva text Cahkarpanirakaranam in 1313, and that the author of the Pauskarabhasya “lived probably about the close of the XVI century”. Sharma’s supposition about Umapati’s date is confirmed by a study of the Pauskarabhasya. The style and argumenta- tion of this commentary on the chapter on epistemology ( pramanapatala ) prove that its author was acquainted with the method and technical terminology of navyanyaya developed by Gangesa (1320 A.D.) 1 in the Tattvacintamani . For instance, the inference formulated in the Pauskara- pramanapatalabhasya to establish indeterminate perception ( nirvikalpakapratyaksa ) is the same as that which was proposed for the first time 2 by Gangesa. 3 Its discussions of the validity of cognition (prdmanya ), 4 inherence ( sama - vaya ), 5 cognition of absence ( abhdvapratyaksa ) 6 and means of apprehending invariable concomitance ( vydptigrahopdya ) 7 closely follow those of GangeSa. Its demonstration which ' For the dates of GahgeSa, Paksadhara and Rucidatta, see Potter and Bhattacharyya, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies 6. 2 Compare PauskaraBh on 7.27-28* with Tattvacintamani [=7X7], vol. 1, pp. 817-822'. 3 See Ramanuja Tatacharya, Pratyaksatattvacintamanivimarsah, pp. 320-321. 4 PauskaraBh on 7.5*: compare the definition of the validity of cognition with TC, vol. 1, pp. 381 sqq . ; intrinsicality of the cogni- tion of validity with TC, vol. 1, pp. 170 sqq. (purvapaksa in TC)\ refutation of the intrinsicality of the cognition of validity with TC, vol. 1, pp. 1 84 sqq. ( siddhanta in TC); extrinsicality of the cognition of validity (purvapaksa in PauskaraBh) with TC, vol. 1, pp. 246 sqq . ; extrinsic pnxiuction of validity with TC, vol. 1, pp. 287 sqq. 5 PauskaraBh on 7.35 b -36“: comp, with TC, vol. 1, pp. 648 sqq. 6 PauskaraBh on 7.35 b -36“: comp, with TC, vol. 1, pp. 707 sqq. 7 PauskaraBh on 7.40*: comp, with TC, vol. 2, pt i, pp. 174 sqq. Introduction 3 establishes sabda as an independent pramdna is strikingly similar to that of the Tattvacintamani .' Umapati also seems to be acquainted with several commentaries on the Tattvacintamani. For example, his definition of the validity of cognition is obviously based on the Tattvacintamani definition as developed by Paksadhara (1500 A.D.) in the Tattvacintdmanydloka ; 2 he also adopts Paksadhara’s definition of qualifier (prakdra ). 3 His inter- pretation of the inferences which establish the extrinsic origin of validity 4 and perceptibility of absence 5 follows that of Paksadhara, for he adopts Paksadhara’s expressions explaining the purpose served by the constituents of the inference ( dalaprayojana ). It appears that Umapati was also aware of the Tattvacintamaniprakasa of Rucidalta (1505 A.D.). For example, he borrows Paksadhara’s inference to prove the perceptibility of absence as improved by Rucidatta. 6 His stand that the cognition of non-contradiction (abadhitatvaprama) produces validity in inference 7 follows that of Rucidatta, who introduced it into his commentary on the Tattvacintamani ." Umapati also seems to be aware, directly or indirectly, of the refutation of the Tattvacintamani by Vyasaraya (1478-1539). For example, he refers to two objections against the thesis that true consideration ( yatharthalihgaparamarsa ) produces validity in inference. 9 These are among the objections raised by Vyasaraya against ' PauskaraBh on 7.60 J : comp, with TC, vol. 4, pt i, pp. 22 sqq. 2 PauskaraBh on 7.5“: comp, with Tattvacintamani-dloka [= TCA ] , p. 437. PauskaraBh on 7.5*: comp, with TCA_, p. 193. 4 PauskaraBh on 7.5*: comp, with TCA, p. 354. 5 PauskaraBh on 7.35 b -36“: comp, with Aloka in TC, vol. 1, p. 691. ‘ PauskaraBh on 7.35 b -36*: comp, with Tattvacintdmani-prakasa l- TCP], vol. 1, pp. 725-726. 7 PauskaraBh on 7.5*. • See TCP, vol. 1, p. 355, and vol. 2, pt ii, pp. 146-147. 9 PauskaraBh on 7.5*. 4 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala the Tattvacintdmani in his Tarkatandava That Umapati knew Vyasaraya’s other works is evident from his reference to the Nydydmrta verse mentioned above. Thus, it may be concluded that the author of the Pauskarabhasya belonged to a period later than the first half of the 16th century and that he is not the same as the Umapati who wrote the Cahkarpanirdkaranam in 1313. Umapati occasionally records alternative interpretations of Pauskara verses in his commentary. * 2 Although two such interpretations in the pramanapatala match Jnanaprakasa’s V r tti on the same verses, 3 it is not possible to conclude, without a complete examination of the two commentaries, whether the reference here is to Jnanaprakasa’s commentary,’ or to another written or oral tradition. If these are proved to refer to Jnanaprakasa’s commentary, it would confirm that Umapati ’s commentary postdates that of Jnanaprakasa, who belonged to the 16th century. One of the five introductory verses of the Pauskara- bhdsya announces the name of the author 4 but does not provide any information about him. The colophon of the edited text, however, is replete with references to different episodes of the life of Umapati, the 14th-century Tamil author-preceptor. In the light of. the above discussion about the author of the Pauskarabhasya , the colophon of the edited text should be considered spurious. 5 Neither is there any 40 ^ 41 Ramanuja Tatacharya, Pratyaksatattvacintdmanivimarsah, pp. Of course, the possibility of their being interpolated needs to be examined senously. ] On verses 18 and 80-81* and perhaps also on 20-22 and 37*. rauskaraBh on 1.1, p. I: visvesvaram pranamyddau visvamurtim umapatim/ pauskare jndnapdddmsam vydkhyasye’ham umapatih. pIcVaF- °I a com P lete but untraceable manuscript of the rou^Karabna^ya does not contain these biographical details (see Mahadevasastn./t Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts *.., aitnmnk 5r *™ lt P au ? k «re / hdnapdde tantrdvatdrakam ndma 3E2JX?? Sr ‘”51 L nah ?P^hydyena sakalaveddgamdbhijhena satkarmamratena siddhantasaivasikhdmanind umdpatisivdcdryena Introduction 5 evidence to prove that Umapati, the author of the Pauskara- bhasya , belonged to South India. Umapati, the author of the Pauskarabhasya , is accredited with authorship of the Sataratnasarpgraha 1 and a Sanskrit commentary on it, the Sataratnollekhanl . 2 But the Sataratna- samgraha, which is a compilation of about hundred verses collected from eleven Saiva texts known as Tantras, mentions the name of neither the compiler nor the compilation. 3 In the absence of any definite internal or external evidence about its author, all discussion about his identity can only be conjectural, and pointless for the present purpose. As regards the Sataratnollekhani , it is evident from its introductory verses that the commentator, who does not mention his name, is not the same as the compiler because he distinguishes himself from the compiler, whom he names Umapati. 4 The commentator also refers to the latter as sam - krta pauskaravyakhya sampurna. The text of this manuscript, and that of another complete manuscript recorded by Hultzsch (n° 968 in his Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts in South India , II) but now untraceable, begins with the verse visvesvaram pranamyddau , etc. which is the last of the five introductory verses of the printed edition. This also raises suspicion about the authenticity of the first four introductory verses of the printed text. However, all the five verses arc found in two other incomplete manuscripts of the Pauskarabhasya : that of the Sri Venkateswara Oriental Research institute Library (stock n° 6417) and of the Thiruvavaduthurai Adheenam Library (Ms n° 414 / 2075-P 752 5118). ' Thirugnanasambandhan, Sataratnasarigraha , p. xv; Sivaraman, Saivism in Philosophical Perspective , p. 37; Janaki (ed.), Sri Umapati Sivacarya , “Bibliography”, p. 299. 2 See Swami Bhairabananda’s introduction (p. i) and the colophon of the text. * 3 The name of the compiler is only known from the commentary: umapatir ndma sivagamajha ... cakara bandham sataratnarupam (p. 1) and umdpatisivdcaryas tdvad ... sutraratnasatam samjagraha (p. 2) . The reference in the commentary to the residence of the compiler in Cidambaram (cidambare klptamathah y p. 1) seems to suggest that it identifies him with the 14th-century Tamil author-preceptor whose association with that city is well known. 4 ibid. , p. 1: umapatih ... cakara bandham sataratnarupam... amisdm sataratnandm ullekhah kriyate may a. 4 Umapati *s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala the Tatt\’acintamani in his Tarkatandava . l That Umapati knew Vyasaraya’s other works is evident from his reference to the Nyaydmrta verse mentioned above. Thus, it may be concluded that the author of the Pauskarabhasya belonged to a period later than the first half of the 16th century and that he is not the same as the Umapati who wrote the Cahkarpanirakaranam in 1313. Umapati occasionally records alternative interpretations of Pauskara verses in his commentary. 2 Although two such interpretations in the pramanapatala match Jnanaprakasa’s Vrtti on the same verses, 3 it is not possible to conclude, without a complete examination of the two commentaries, whether the reference here is to Jnanaprakasa’s commentary, or to another written or oral tradition. If these are proved to refer to Jnanaprakasa’s commentary, it would confirm that Umapati’s commentary postdates that of Jnanaprakasa, who belonged to the 16th century. One of the five introductory verses of the Pauskara - bhdsya announces the name of the author 4 but does not provide any information about him. The colophon of the edited text, however, is replete with references to different episodes of the life of Umapati, the 14th-century Tamil author-preceptor. In the light of the above discussion about the author of the Pauskarabhasya , the colophon of the edited text should be considered spurious. 5 Neither is there any 1 See Ramanuja Tatacharya, Pratyaksatattvacintamanivimarsah , pp. 40-41. 2 Of course, the possibility of their being interpolated needs to be examined seriously. 3 On verses 18 and 80-8 l a and perhaps also on 20-22 and 37 a . 4 PauskaraBh on 1 . 1 , p. 1 : visvesvaram pranamyddau visvamurtim umdpatim/ pauskare jhdnapdddmsam vyakhyasye ’ ham umapatih. 5 The colophon of a complete but untraceable manuscript of the Pauskarabhasya does not contain these biographical details (see Mahadevasastri, A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts p. 150): iti srxmatpauskare jhdnapade tantravatarakam ndma astamah evam srlman mahopddhydyena sakalaveddgamabhijnena satkarmaniratena siddhantasaivasikhamanina umdpatisivdcaryena Introduction 5 evidence to prove that Umapati, the author of the Pauskara- bhasya, belonged to South India. Umapati, the author of the Pauskarabhasya, is accredited with authorship of the Sataratnasamgraha' and a Sanskrit commentary on it, the Sataratnollekhani. 1 But the Sataratna- samgraha, which is a compilation of about hundred verses collected from eleven Saiva texts known as Tantras, mentions the name of neither the compiler nor the compilation. 3 In the absence of any definite internal or external evidence about its author, all discussion about his identity can only be conjectural, and pointless for the present purpose. As regards the Sataratnollekhani, it is evident from its introductory verses that the commentator, who does not mention his name, is not the same as the compiler because he distinguishes himself from the compiler, whom he names Umapati. 4 The commentator also refers to the latter as sam- krtd pauskaravydk hya sampurna. The text of this W)68^n that of another complete manuscript recorded by Hultzsch(n 968in his Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts m South India, H) but now untraceable, begins with the verse visvesvaram pm which is the last of the five introductory verses of the P™‘“ This also raises suspicion about the authenticity of die first fou introductory verses of the printed text. However, all the five verses are found in two other incomplete manuscripts of the Pau^karabhc^y. that of the Sri Venkateswara Oriental Research institute JUbrary (stock n° 6417) and of the Thiruvavaduthurai Adheenam Library (Ms n 414 / 2075-P 752 511 8) ' Thiruenanasambandhan, Sataratnasangraha, p. xv; Sivaraman, ’in Philosophical Perspective, p. 37; Janaki (ed.), $n Umapati ^See Swami^ Bhairabananda’s introduction (p. i) and the colophon of the text ^ 5 The name of the compiler is only known from the commentap'. umdpatir ndma sivdgamajha ... cakdra bandharji sataratnarupam (p. 1) and umbpatisivacaryas tavad ... sutraratnasatam samjagra (P- 2) The reference in the commentary to the residence of the compil in Cidambaram (cidambare klptamathah p. 1) seems tosuggesttha^ it identifies him with the 14th-century Tamil author-preceptor whose association with that city is well known. _ ^ - - w 4 ibid., p. 1: umapatih ... cakdra bandham sataratnarupam ... amisam sataratndnam ullekhah kriyate mayd. 6 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala grahakdra in a manner which sugests that they are different. Above all, the Sataratnollekhanl sometimes reproduces, verbatim and without acknowledgement, passages from well-known commentaries on different &aiva works. This also renders difficult the attribution of this work to an author of the stature of Umapati, the commentator of the Pauskara. Three more Sanskrit works, Srimannatarajasahasranama- bhasya, Pdtahjalasutrabhdsya and Vdyusamhitdbhdsya, are attributed to Umapati by the editor of .the Pauskarabhasya. Umapati is also said to have written various hymns and commentaries on religious texts. But the identity of the author(s) of these works with that of the Pauskarabhasya remains to be proved. Some passages of the Pauskarabhasya are very similar to, and sometimes identical with, several passages of the Siva- jhdnabodhavistarabhdsya 5 and the Saivaparibhdsd. These 1 See, for example, pp. 3, 6, 45. _ ... _ . „ 2 Thus compare, for example, Sataratnollekham , pp. 4-5 with Sadyo- iyotih’s Vrtti on Svayambhuvasutrasamgraha , pp. 4-8; bataratnol- lekhdni, pp. 17-19 with Ramakantha’s V r tti on Matahgaparamesvara, vidydpdda, pp. 39-46; Sataratnollekhani, pp. 55-56 with N^ayana- kantha’s Vrtti on Mrgendra (vidya- and yoga-padas ) pp. Tf the Sataratnollekhani could be a valuable work for the study of Saiva traditions, because its author belongs to a tradition which is apparently different from that of Sadyojyotih, Ramakan{ha, and others: tasya samgrahasya sadyojyotihpddaramakanthanarayana- kanthdghorasivddivyakhyanusdrena asmadgurusampradayanusarena ca vyakhya kriyale (p. 2). ,. J See the communication ( vijhapanam ) preceding the lam introduction in the Cidambaram edition of the Pauskarabhasya. 4 See Thirugnanasambandhan. Sataratnasahgraha, p. xv. . • 5 Compare, for example, PauskaraBh on 7.5* (prdmdnya) with Sivajndnabodhavistarabhd^ya pp. 9S-m\ PauskaraBh on 7.27-28 ( nirvikalpakapratyaksa ) with iivajndnabodhavistarabna^ya , pp. 11; PauskaraBh on 7.60* (sabda) with ^jnambodhavistarabha- sya, pp. 120-121; PauskaraBh on 4.48\ p. 232-240 < jrtoksa ) with Sivajhanabodhavistarabhasya, pp. 481-494, etc. ... a. 6 Compare PauskaraBh on 4.48* , pp. 232-234 (moksa ) with Saiva- paribhdsd (Madras cdn), pp. 343-346 (parts of this are similar to Sivajhanabodhavistarabhasya , pp. 483-486). Introduction 7 ,wo works are ascribed io Sivagrayogin,' who ^belonged to .he second half of the 16th century. A quick sur ey 117 assa.es — and the Pauskarabhasya shows the fonner are often more on mo,, of the those in ^ Kr 'f p ZaTalr^LpaSabhasya’ Only an topics treated in the Pauska p • • Sivaihdnabodha- extensive study would reveal wh *^l \/ Pa ^rabhdsya 77717*7.1..°/ 'bir written by .he same person also requires senous ^'f^a the PauskaraBh o ed in .he 16th century and wrote several baiva ' The attribution of these twc L m/fdiffe. on many imponam topics **—**>• types of ^ "- ,2 CutS two works disas '? ! ° V^Si'^Tan^MIuSslarabhasya 3X see* m — •**- ,n pramana. . . )h orev ious note could be explained 4 The divergence referred to in «j» P* has w con f or m to the thesis by the fact that as commentator, P di) expresses his dis- of the Pauskara. But' Umapati, wh [ ons> do es not do so agreement with the Pausfcara on 1 2 * 4 5 6 ^ explains away the_ duee- with regard to the four-pram c ee PauskaraBh on 7.4 . pramLia theory without much discussion. dich6ry , the P'S manuscript T 110 a. the IMM g^he introductory verse name of the commentator is no^memionei i in ^ ^ gunW nf ,hA work : sanesam sanujam satpvun a ham. t. 1S jmmpadavrttau , etc. 8 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala works in Tamil and Sanskrit. 1 * His commentary on the pramanapatala , as on the other chapters of the Pauskara, is brief and to the point. He appears to confine himself to the epistemological views expressed by the Pauskara, whereas Umapati sometimes reinterprets them and introduces new elements. The question of why two commentaries came to be written on the Pauskara in the 16th century is intriguing, especially since the two commentators, Umapati and Jnanaprakasa, seem to follow the same line of interpretation as regards metaphysical matters. Also, there is no evidence to prove the existence of an earlier commentary. The Pauskara is said to be a subsidiary ( upabheda ) of the Paramesvara 1 one of the twenty-eight texts generally known as tantra , 3 agama or samhitd which are recognized as authoritative by the Saiva school. Jnanaprakasa informs us that the Pauskara is an abridged version of the Para- mesvara: 4 Only that section of the Pauskara, which deals with doctrine and is referred to as jnanapada , 3 is known and is edited with Umapati ’s commentary. The statement of the sages at the beginning of the Pauskara 6 that they wish to learn the jnanapada, after having been taught the kriyapdda and caryapada, suggests that the doctrinal section was preceded by the sections which discussed ritual and conduct. ratna ^ a j e ^ apathi ’ $ aiva Siddhanta, p. j 1 and Michael, Sivayoga- - See the Table des agama el des updgama facing p. xix of the Kauravagama , vol. I. The .Pauskara designates itself as tantra. See Pauskara 1.6V: tatredam pauskaram tantram arthavddadilopatah. According to Jnanaprakasa, ParameSa taught the Paramesvaratantra to Ananta, who abridged it and instructed it to Srikantha, who further summarised it ns Pauskara and taught it to Sanakaand other sages. See PauskaraV, pp. 1 and 891. This could explain the ineat similarity of s<%ne Pauskara verses with those of the Matahga- paramesvara, another subsid.ary of the Paramesvara. Jnanaprakasa also refers to the Pauskara as Pauskaraparamesvara (see, for example, PauskaraV, p. 68). v ’ l P au ? l < ara ] -4 b : adhundjhanapddam tu sroium icchd gariyasi. rauskara 1 .4*: kriydcarye prasddena tavdsmabhih srute purd. Introduction 9 This reference to kriyapdda and caryapada cannot be rejected as fiction. 1 Mention in the jnanapada (and in the commen- tary on them by Umapati and Jnanaprakasa) of discussions on initiation in the earlier parts of the Pauskara attests to the existence of its kriyapdda. 1 ' The Pauskariyapadadiksa- samgrahakdrika cited by Ramakantha in his Matahgaparame- svaravrtti must have been, as noted by Bhatt, 3 based on the ritual described in the Pauskara. Many verses concerning ritual or conduct, attributed to the Pauskara by Narayana- kantha and Ramakantha 4 but not found in the jnanapada of the Pauskara, also prove that the Pauskara possesses kriyd and carya sections. Some scholars believe that the Pauskara commented upon by Umapati and published from Cidambaram is not “the original”. 5 Goodall, who does not include the Pauskara in his list of “demonstrably early Saiddhantika scriptures” since it does not satisfy any criterion of the relative antiquity of a '“Siddhantatantra" fixed by him, 6 believes that it is a 1 Compare Goodall, Kirana, p. xliv, note 102. : See, for example, Pauskara 1.45*: diksdydm bhagavams tattvam sivdkhyam sodhyam iritarn-, Pauskara 6.7*: diksdydm tu pura purest bhuvandny uditani hi. See also PauskaraBh, pp. 8 and 39; PauskaraV, pp. 11-12. 1 Matahgaparamesvara, kriyd-, yoga- and caryd-padas, Introduction, p. lxxxiii. „ . 1 See, for example, the “Index des ouvrages et des auteurs ... in Mrgendra , kriyd- and caryd-padas, p. 282; “Matangavrttav udahrta ...”, in Matahgaparamesvara, kriva-, yoga- and caryd-padas, p. 485. 5 See H. Brunner, "Jnana and kriya: Relation between Theory and Practice in the Saivagamas”, p. 53 (note 178): “the extant Pauskara (similar to the one commented on by Umapati in the fourteenth century) ... has little to do with its namesake quoted by old commentators”; H. Brunner, “The Four padas of Saivagamas”, p. 262 (note 7): “the text printed as the vp [that is, vidyapdda] of i auskara and commented^ upon by Umapati in the 14th century does not belong to the original Agama of this name”; Goodall, Kirana, pp. xlm-xliv. “A later, probably South Indian, Pauskara that has receivea commentaries by Umapatisivacarya and by [Sahvatmi'-as* , Jnanaprakasa ... bears no relation to the original”. 6 Which are: its transmission also in early Nepalese ^ Kashm. .. manuscripts, the existence of attributed quotations by early au.:.crs jp -DUijtnf DJW/UDS m wDUD]tnfDs :(/[as Djm/os woaZZr ^ LZ ! 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Z "" T ss *'“ J» »n JO l “ s 4 Dum l snD d 3 W1 oj pajnqujjB «? ™*invj aqj j G suoJS ff£ ^ U3,S!X3 ^P«nf oj wpio ur paidopB Djvysnvj M au auiTjou nt J .° U ° !Py 341 pajoadsns si oq M our^fnvj M au [n ,^ ->^oxjoq aq, aq 0J Pub sbjiubx Jaqjo puc ofmtsnnj Z' i0 joso4S gwa'S? j1 S ,S°^ Stsr ‘— 1 » —i ~ -‘wsspsnriss =^r£“S”” 2ssa BqjuBMBiupai oi .. 4 ,3UyS3J3lu I r®R SSJBpjSOd PUB Vmva ^ ° l U - ou ^n M0.qM v^tnnj ^puj ^ vpwdoumuvjdDjtnjsnDj ay; wo Kuvtwwwoj s ;; D< fo W/7 Q , 1 2 Umapati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala according to the maturity of their mala. 1 Another singularity of the Pauskara is its methodology, for it frequently employs inferential argumentation to support its thesis and to refute that of the opponent. The Pauskara is also remarkable from the point of view of epistemology because it reflects the state of several logical concepts before they became fixed under the influence of different systematized philo- sophical schools. Particularly notable are the Pauskara's similarity with texts like the Nyayasara which stands apart in the field of logic 2 and its refutation of concepts such as ekendriyavada, svabhavavada, etc. which called forth considerable debate in early philosophical works. The Pauskara devotes one chapter each to describing the Lord (pati), the material cause of the pure realm ( bindu ), that of the impure realm ( mdya ), bound selves {pasu ) and bonds ( pasa ), which are five of the six admitted categories (padd- rtha ). 3 The other three chapters discuss ‘the state of being an individual’ of the self (pumstva), the means of knowledge ( pramana ) and the descent of scripture from the higher to the lower realm (tarttr avatar a) respectively. The presence of a full-fledged chapter on pramanas in the Pauskara is remarkable 4 because apart from brief 1 See Pauskara 2.56: karmadinairapeksyena malapakanusaratab anugrhnaii vijhanakevalan apardn api, and 4.49: icc/iayaiv^^ y- adausivo vijhanakevalan / malapdkam apeksyatva kamsctc chuddha- ^Compare, for example, the Pauskara definitionsof h ^^tecis with those of the Nyayasara. Also note the similanties * Pauskara 1.6“ and Yogasutra 1.8, Pauskara 7.16 and Naiskarmya- S ^tmcLs%raka), which is the sixth category, is ; defined l but not discussed in th ejhdnapdda. Umapad stales that a chapter on. karaka is absent in the jhdnapdda because karaka (that is, dlk ? a \ ^] n ^ action (kriyd), the varieties of diksa and the results ensuing from them are described in kriyapada . See PauskaraBh on 7. 1 -3 . 4 Both Umapati and JnanaprakaSa justify its presence Cqualifie y JnanaprakaSa ( PauskaraV , p. 807) as incidental patalah) on the grounds that the cognition of the means of knowledge is a precondition for the cognition of objects of knowledge. Introduction 13 descriptions or passing remarks, 1 no other published dualist 3aiva Tantra treats epistemological topics. The Pauskara thesis that perception (pratyaksa ), inference ( anumana ), verbal testimony ( sabda ) and presumption ( arthdpatti ) are pramanas is also unique, for no known orthodox or heterodox philosophical school seems to admit this combination of pramanas. Also, the four-pramana theory differs from the generally admitted thesis that Saivas recognize pratyaksa, anumana, and sabda as pramanas. Moreover, the schools which do not accept arthdpatti as an independent pramana generally reduce it to the inference consisting of an only-negative reason ( kevalawatirekin ), while those who admit arthdpatti pramana do not also admit this type of reason. The Pauskara, however, recognizes arthdpatti as a distinct pramana and also admits only- negative reason. This perhaps indicates that the arthdpatti pramana held by the Pauskara does hot correspond to the arthdpatti pramana as it is generally known. The exact nature of arthdpatti recognized by the Pauskara is difficult to understand because this pramana is not defined. From the point of view of epistemology, a considerable gap of time seems to separate the Pauskarapramanapatala and Umapati’s commentary on it. The Pauskara clearly represents an earlier period of logic whereas Umapati’s commentary reflects the changes which many logical 1 For example, the Matahgaparamesvara, yogapada, 4.14-39 (on three pramanas, pratyaksa, anumana and agama ); the Suprabheaa, vidydpada, 12-18 (on how siva tattva cannot be known through the six pramanas). Commentaries and sub-commentanes of Naraya^a- kantha, Ramakantha and Aghorasiva on different Tantras sometime touch upon epistemological matters. Doctrinal works of S«dyojyotip, Bhoja and others, grouped under the title A ^P rakar ^' 0 i 02 ; ca i some information. There is a long discussion a ^°V‘ e p^ tDana dfpika topics in the Saivaparibhasa of Sivagrayogin and _*e JWf of Srikumara. Commentaries on the Stvajnanabodha also discuss ^S^geTted for example, in the Matahgaparamesvara, vidyapdda, 3.4-5, the Mrgendra , vidydpada, 5.16, etc. 14 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala concepts underwent. Moreover, the epistemological concepts of the Pauskara are eclectic. Besides those proper to the $aiva school, the Pauskara holds views which are today identified as Samkhya, Nyaya, VaiSesika or Mimamsa tenets. Umapati’s approach (often from the point of view of a fully developed Nyaya doctrine) sometimes obliterates the specificity of certain Pauskara theories. For example, according to the Pauskara , doubt is an indefinite cognition, such as “The tallness which 1 perceive, belongs to a man or a pillar”, in which the mind cannot decide between' two objects which are recalled on the perception of a common feature. This definition, similar to those of the ancient texts, refers to the presence of two substantives (man and pillar) in doubt, and to its character of uncertainty. 1 Umapati interprets the Pauskara definition of doubt as a cognition of multiple contradictory features in an object, for example, “This (object which I perceive) is either a man or a pillar”, where the reference is to the incompatible nature of two possibilities (being a man or a pillar) with regard to the same substantive (referred to by “this”). Umapati’s commentary on the pramanapatala is extensive. He elaborates topics such as the definitions of invariable concomitance (v ydpti) and authoritative statement (aptokti), which are explained briefly in the pramanapatala. He supplies arguments which prove the existence of indeterminate cognition ( nirvikalpakapratyaksa ), inherence ( samavaya ), cyclic destruction of the universe (pralaya ), etc. He also introduces certain modifications to the theories of the Pauskara. For instance, according to Umapati, the causes which produce doubt are three and not, as affirmed by the Pauskara, one. He classifies inference ( anumana ), refers to many fallacies of proposition (pratijhabhasa ) and example ' For example, the Prasastapadabhdsya, p. 174: ubhaydvalambi yi- marsah samsayah, and p. 239: samsayotpattau visayadvaitadarsa- nam kdrananv, Nyayasara, p. 12: anavadharanajhanam samsayah. Introduction 15 ( drstantdbhdsa ) which, are not discussed in the Pauskara. He reinterprets the set of fallacious reasons ( hetvabhasa ) described in the Pauskara and redefines some of them. He treats subjects such as the validity of cognition (prdmanya ), perception of absence ( abhavapratyaksa ), inference as an independent pramana ( anumanapramanya ), means to cog- nize pervasion ( vyaptigrahopaya ), etc., which are not dealt with in the Pauskara. He discusses anyathdkhyati, criticises bhedagrahakhydti and other theories of error. He does not explicitly discuss the pramana named non-apprehension ( abhava ), but supplies arguments which prove that verbal testimony ( sabda ) is an independent pramana, and shows how comparison ( upamana ) could be subsumed in verbal testimony {sabda) or in inference (anumana), inclusion (sambhava) in inference, and finally, tradition (aitihya) in verbal testimony, thus confirming the four-pramana thesis. Umapati twice distinguishes between the point of view of the accepted doctrine (siddhanta) and that of the Pauskara in his commentary on the pramanapatala.' The Pauskara defines perception as the sense-object contact. But Umapati states that according to the accepted doctrine, consciousness (cit-sakti), delimited by the intellectual operation (buddhivrtti) produced by the sense-object contact, is perception, and not the insentient sense-object contact. While the connection of the senses with objects is sixfold according to the Pauskara, Umapati specifies that it is fourfold according to the accepted doctrine. Umapati’s reference to the tenets of the Pauskara as others’ doctrine (paramata, matdntara), which he distin- guishes from the accepted doctrine (siddhanta.) on the one hand and from his own position ( svamata ) 2 on the other. ' On Pauskara 7.32-36*. 2 For example, on 6.242, p. 453-454; on 4.48*, p. 238 (refers also o paramasiddhdnta that is, the ultimate accepted doctrine); on (Umapati qualifies the Pauskara view as svamata), etc. 1 6 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala raises questions about the place of the Pauskara in the Saiva and other philosophical schools, the identity of Umapati’s own tradition, .the relevance of the Pauskarabhasya to Saivism, and so forth. The position of the Pauskara cannot be precisely situated in the Saiva tradition with regard to its epistemological concepts, for discussions on this subject are too brief in the other published Saiva Tantras. It is also difficult to assess the authority of the commentaries on Tantras and of Saiva manuals in this matter. For example, Srikumara cites a Bhutasuddhitantra verse according to which the Saivas, like the Samkhyas, follow the anyathd- khyati theory of error. 1 But he goes on to explain that the word samkhya in the verse refers to sesvarasamkhya , that is Yoga. While the similarity of the Saiva ontology with that of Samkhya is well known, the nature of the £aiva epistemo- logy in relation to other schools remains to be studied. Moreover, as pointed out by Dvivedi, the Bhutasuddhitantra statement is enigmatic because anyathdkhyati is generally attributed to the Naiyayikas. 2 • No information with regard to the sectarian affiliation of Umapati emerges from his commentary. He does not appear to be a zealous devotee of Siva. He employs plain expres- sions such as mulakdra 3 and granthakara 4 to refer to the author of the Pauskara. He seems to be well acquainted with the doctrine and literature of the Saiva and other I philosophical schools. He refers to Salikanatha, Bhoja and Trilocanasiva in his commentary on the pramdnapatala . He cites in the same chapter, without attribution, from the Tarkikaraksd , Sribhasya , Nyayakusumdhjali , Prakarana - pahcikd , Pramanavarttika , Vdkyapadiya , Svayambhuva , Nydya- See Tdtparyadipika, p. 41: anythdkhydm upasritya samkhyavac chivasasanam . : Dvivedi, Astaprakarana , Introduction, p. 1 1. But compare Pauska - ra 7.6“ with Yogasutra 1.8 and see PauskaraBh on 7.6*. ' Whose thesis he rejects in PauskaraBh on 6.44 u , p. 371 . 4 See, for example, PauskaraBh , pp. 305, 306, etc. Introduction 17 sutra, Suprabheda, Ratnatr ay aparlksaT and, with attribution, from the Nyaydmrta, Matahgaparamesvara , Vayavyasamhita, Mrgendra and Siddhantasardvall. He also cites the Chan - dogya - and Svetasvatara-upanisads and the Sutasamhitd. The nature of Umapati’s commentary on the pramdnapatala also raises further questions. Does Umapati represent a specific Saiva group, or a school of logic with a penchant for Saiva religion ? Was the Saiva milieu of that period such that it could accomodate different points of view on the same logical issue, some of them even in conflict with the general Saiva doctrine? For example, the thesis that the validity of a cognition is produced from extraneous causes is clearly in contradiction with the satkaryavada , which is considered to be a fundamental principle of the Saiva philosophy. The Pauskarapramdnapatala is taken up for translation not only because it is an important source of information on the subject of Saiva epistemology, but also because it contains significant uncommon elements valuable for the study of early Indian logic. Umapati’s commentary is chosen because of its dialectical character. The translation is as literal as possible because it aims at accuracy, especially with regard to the technical aspects of arguments, rather than elegance. The translation of the Pauskara verses follows Umapati’s interpretation. The printed text (Cidambaram, 1925, Grantha script) appears to be generally coherent, though a fresh look at the manuscripts could benefit some passages and, certified beyond all doubts of interpolation, 1 the text would confirm Umapati as the author of the proposed innovations. 1 For example, the alternative explanation of Pauskara 7.72 about the evolution of speech from bindu, interwoven with pasyantU madhyamd , etc., appears to be problematic. Some text seems to be missing in the discussion on Sabda as an independent pramana in PauskaraBh on 7.60*. The inclusion of a variety of fallacies ot examples ir. the commentary on 7.58 b -59 seems suspect. 1 8 Umapati s Commentary on the P auskarapramanapatala This translation intends to bring out an important aspect of the Saiva doctrine to those who are not well versed in Sanskrit, and to facilitate comparative studies on Saiva epistemology from Sanskrit and Tamil sources. Epistemological discussions in the Civananacittiyar , a 13th century Saiva doctrinal work written in Tamil, established epistemology as an important subject in Saiva doctrinal works in Tamil. Not only is the Civananacittiyar said to be based on Sanskrit texts, 1 but also several of its 16th century commentators, Vedajna, Sivagrayogin, Jnanaprakasa, and others wrote doctrinal treatises in Tamil and Sanskrit. A comparative study of these works in the light of the pre-13th century Saiva Sanskrit works would give an objective picture of the history of the Saiva doctrine. The present work is a mere translation with explanatory footnotes. No attempt is made at an analytical or comparative study because the rich material, epistemological and doctrinal, contained in the pramanapatala and its commentary calls for an extensive study which oversteps the scope of this work. Brief remarks about the nature of the individual self and cognition according to the Pauskara Some doctrines of the Pauskara may be recalled here for a better comprehension of its discussion of pramanas. According to the Pauskara , the individual self is omniscient, omnipotent, all-pervasive, subtle and similar to, but not identical with, Siva. It is said to be bound when its natural state is obstructed by mala or pasutva. 2 Bound selves are of three kinds: sakala is the self whose capacities are obstructed by mala, which is furnished with a cognitive and conative 1 Devasenapathi, Saiva Siddhdnta , p. 5. 2 Pauskara 4.1-2 a : pasuh pasutvasamyo^ut na muktah pasur ucyate / yasmdt svadrkkriyasdll kaldhinc py anisvarah // vyapakas cinmayas suksmas sivavat samvyavasthitah ; 1 14 a : niruddham yena sarvajnyam sa malah paripathyate . Introduction 19 apparatus by maya (the material cause of the impure realm), and which is forced by its karma to function in the universe created out of maya. The self whose capacities are obstructed by mala, but which is dissociated from maya’s creation due to the dissolution of the universe or due to the annihilation of its matured karma, is the pralayakala self. Vijndndkala is the self which is free from the limitations created by maya and karma but in which some traces of mala persist. Only the sakala, whose beginningless natural mala attracts further bondage (pdsa ) consisting of kald, etc. from maya and which undergoes experience in the universe helped by this bondage, has the ‘state of being an individual’ (pumstva ) and is named ‘person’ (purusa ). Neither the vijndnakala which lives in the pure path which transcends maya, nor the pralayakala which exists in the state in which the evolutes o maya are dissolved, is the knower described in the pramana- patala-, for they have neither the instruments to know and act provided by maya, nor the objects of cognition and action also supplied by maya. 2 The liberated self too is not a ‘person’ because it is beyond the pure and impure realms created respectively by bindu and maya. The cognitive and conative apparatus of the sakala consists of kald, vidyd, rdga, kdla and niyati, 3 which are the subtle creation of maya. These are specific to each self and 2 PpauTkar'a^ *-3: pancakancukasamyuktah prakrtini _ udyatah// avidyddisamdyuktah purusah parikirtitah / tenandpi pralayakevalah // purusakhyam labhed yasman navtdyadi- vivarjitlh /tasmdt sakala e^nurlabhatepur^ah^yam. , 1 While niyati and kdla could be translated respectively . Z ! S. .he other three terms ea„ hardly be ■»£* ££££ word because they are complex concepts. Thus, kala ™ to act)’; (of the obstruction produced by mala to the self s P y ^fy. vidyd is the ‘revealer (of buddhivrtli that is, cogn • , -^ 5 ^ rdga is ‘(the manifesto! of the self’s capacity to) attachmen w functions are also partial and temporary, ca ^ ’ the se if wouid destroy mala-obstruction completely and for ever, become omnipotent, and so on. 20 Umapati 's Commentary on the P auskarapramanapatala constitute its bondage . 1 Nevertheless, they favour the self, for kala restrains the mala which obstructs the capacity of action of the bound self; vidya helps the self to cognize the function of the intellect, as well as the objects which feature in it. These two, namely kala and vidya, allow the self to act and know in the world according to its karma . 2 Rdga lifts the obstruction to the faculty of attachment of the self. It thus impels the self to crave for objects and to undergo experience . 3 Finally, niyati connects the self to the results of its karma and, along with kala, forces the self activated by kala, vidya and rdga, to experience as destined and timed by its karma . 4 These operate together to help the self to exhaust its karma. Kala and vidya are connected on the one hand with rdga, which associates the self to the world, and on the other, with kala and niyati which make the operation of kala, vidya and rdga viable. Maya also provides prakrti and its evolutes which produce the senses, etc., which constitute the gross cognitive and conative apparatus specific to each sakala self . 5 Thus, the sakala self is a knower of objects only ' Pauskara 5.1-2*: atha pasdh puroddistas sruyatdm munipumgavah / kala vidya ca ragas ca kdlo niyatir eva ca // pancaitanica totfvam mayeydni dvijottamah-, 5.21 b : kaldvidydhvayau bandhau kartur ^Pauskara^. 2 b -5‘: maldn sarvdn manag bhitva caitanyaprasaratma- nah II caitanyavyahjikd hy atra kala malanivartanat / caitanyarp jnatva-kartrtvarupam tad balam atmanah // kalaya vyajyatejat tasyaiva hi tiraskrtam / sarvdtmana kala naitac caitanyamvyanjayaty anoh // kirn tu karmdnusarena kala vrtyaikadesatah; 5.9: kalaya^ kartrbhutasya buddhilaksanakarmanah / dlokane yat karanam sa vidya sivasasane. . , ' 3 Pauskara 5.22-23*: pravrttasya prasaktyartham apt ragafy pra- vartaie / bhogabhdvdd asaktasya bhuhjanasya malimasdn // bnogan atrptes tasyatah kartur evopakdritd. . 4 Pauskara 5.23 b -24: kalah pravrttam evanum kalayaty atrnavrttmih Iniyatis ca tatha karmaphale niyamayaty anum / tasman niyatikalau ca sthitau kartrupakarakau . . 5 Pauskara 3.60 b -61: mdydto dvividhd srstih sthula suksmatmikety api // drkchaktivyahjikd suksmd sthiid tattvdtmandtmam / sthula bhuyana- rupena sariradydtmand sthita; 4.18 b -19‘: sakalas tu kalayoga suksmd sthula ca sa dvidhd // pratipumniyatam tattvam kaladyavam pascimam . Introduction 21 when it is an actor, possesses instruments of experience, is attached to objects of cognition and action created by maya, exists in time, and is guided by its destiny to experience according to its karma. The capacity to know {jnatrtva ), together wi capacity to act (kart r tva), is the natural property of the sell, it forms its very consciousness {caitanya)\ the self remains .a knower and doer even when its capacity is obstructed by mala. It should be noted that the Pauskara distinguishes two aspects of consciousness: capacity (sakti) an unc (karya): Bondage affects neither the self nor its conscl< ™ m ness, it merely prevents the capacity of consciousness fr functioning, thus preventing the self from knowing and acting. But these functions are regained, though temporan y and in a limited manner, in bondage with the help of maya- The cognitive capacity which is consciousness 0 e is also as eternal and all-pervasive as the self; the self knows itself and everything else. The Pauskara declares that this awareness cannot belong to the intellect {buddht) because^ being constituted of inert prakrti, the intellect cannot know :* S elf And, as the manifestor of objects, intellect is logi y proved to be different from the self for which U manifests objects. It cannot be said that the cognitive opacity of self is reflected in the intellect. If the insentient intellect were to reflect the cognitive capacity of the self, it wou conscious and the self, then reduced to a cease to be conscious. Moreover, only tangible enUties can be reflected. The formless self cannot be reflected in the insentient intellect,- neither can the insentient intellect b " ,n .he sell. Nor can k be said iba. ilre capacuy io 22 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala implies the pre-existence, elsewhere, of the superimposed attributes; awareness, however, is found only in the self. 1 The cognitive capacity (also known as cit-$akti) of the self is said to be the means of knowledge (pramana) because it procures awareness of objects for the self. The self, helped by its cit-sakti activated by kala, etc., cognizes the operation of its intellect (buddhivrtti , also called jhdna 2 * ) and becomes aware of the objects featuring in it. According to the Pauskara, the role of the senses is to fetch sensation (alo- cana), which is an awareness devoid of all particularities ( vikalpavidhura ). The function of the mind ( manas ) is to focus attention on a particular sensation ( vikalpa ), thus preventing simultaneous cognition of multiple objects, and to recognize, helped by past experience, that the attributes featuring in awareness belong to a particular object ( sam - kalpa). The mind also supplies the name of the object learnt in the past. The object seized by the mind is then appropriated, i.e. connected with the self (grdhakasamgati ) by the egoity ( ahamkdra ) and finally, it is apprehended by the intellect. 1 Although the intellect cognizes an object, it is not aware of itself because it is made up of the sattva element of inert prakrti. The self, which is conscious, is aware of itself, of the cognizing intellect and of the object cognized by the intellect. 4 While the intellect cognizes an object by means of the senses, mind, etc., the self cognizes this cognition of the intellect through its subtler cognitive apparatus consisting of kala, vidya, etc., and becomes aware of the object featuring in it. 1 Pauskara 4.93-100. 2 Pauskara 6.49“: dharmo jhanam ca vairagyam aisvaryam buddhi- vrttayah. ' See Pauskara 6.204 b -210. 4 Pauskara 6.43 h -44“: bodho 'tra dvividho bhavo vyavasayatmakas tatha//adyo 'nadhyavasdyatma vyavasayatmakas tu yah / sa buddhir itaras tv dtmasvabhavo grahakatmanah; 4.95“: paraprakdsakatvam ca nityam nityaguno yatah; 4.100 h : jhatrtvam api tan nityam dharma- tvan nityavastunah. See also Pauskara 6.204 h -210. Introduction 23 The Pauskara refers to a kind of perception which arises independent of kala, the senses, etc., and which is natural to the self’s consciousness free from mala. According to Umapati, it is twofold: the self-awareness of the liberated self and its intuition of Siva. The Pauskara, however, does not explicitly refer to the nature of the cognition of the liberated self. It merely states that Siva is to be reached through the knowedge of Siva (patijnana ), and that Siva is the only means. 1 A short summary of the Pauskarapramanapatala and Umapati’ s commentary on it The pramana patala of the Pauskara begins with the request of the sages (headed by Sanatkumara) to the Lord (SrTkantha) to explain to them the nature of the means of knowledge (pramana). They state that the six categories ( padartha ) described in the earlier chapters would not be well apprehended if the means employed to cognize them were not known (verses 1-3* 1 )- The rest of the chapter forms Srikantha’s reply, which explains the nature of pramanas. Pramanas are four: percep- tion (pratyaksa ), inference (anumana), verbal testimony (sabda) and presumption (arthdpatti). Consciousness-power (of the self) (cit-sakti) free from doubt, etc., is pramana (3 - 5 a ). According to Umapati, the statement that Saivism recognizes three pramanas, namely pratyaksa, anumana and sabda, implies that anumana pramana includes arthapatti pramana. He defines pramana as the consciousness of the self (cit-sakti) delimited by a valid intellectual operation (buddhivrtti that is, cognition), and undertakes a detaile discussion of the validity of cognition (prdmdnya) and of the apprehension (jfiapti) and origination (utpatti) o t «s validity. He rejects the definitions of validity based on 1 Pauskara 1 .94“ : patijhdnaikagamyo 'yam pads tad dhetur eva c 24 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala correspondence between an object and its cognition (arthasadrsya), those based on the absence of contradiction (arthavyabhicaritva), and those based on the notions of qualifier (prakara ) and substantive (visesya). Some of these definitions fail in the case of partially valid cognitions (for example, an erroneous cognition which is valid with regard to the substrate) and in the case of the cognition of an object partly pervaded by the qualifier (such as the cognition of a connected object because contact, which is the qualifier here, exists only in a part of the connected objects). Other definitions of validity, constituted of the object-qualifier relation in positive and negative terms, also prove to be defective. According to Umapati, the validity of a cognition signifies the apprehension of an object as qualified by a qualifier which belongs to the object, and which is cognized as related to the object by the very relation existing between the object and the qualifier. Umapati declares that the validity of a cognition is known intrinsically ( svatah ), that the invalidity of a cognition is known extrinsically (paratah) and that the validity of, a cognition is produced extrinsically. The validity of a cognition is known by the same means which cognizes that cognition; for when the mind knows a cognition in the introspective cognition (anuvyavasaya), it also knows the validity of that cognition. Umapati defends this thesis of intrinsicality against the critics and refutes the theory that the validity of cognition is known extrinsically (paratah ) by inference (anumana). The invalidity (aprdmdnya) of cogni- tion, however, is known extrinsically (paratah ), i.e. through inference. As regards the origination (utpatti) of validity in cognition, it is extrinsic (paratah ) because it is produced by certain causes which are different from the general causes which produce cognition. Thus, the conjunction of the senses with all aspects of the object (bhuyo’vayavendriya- sannikarsa) produces validity in perceptual cognition. The Introduction 25 cognition of non-contradiction (abadhitatva), or the cogni- tion which has a reason as its qualifier (hetu-prakaraka) and ‘something possessing the thing to be proved (by that reason)’ as its substantive (sddhyavad-visesyaka), produces truth in inferential cognition. True cognition of the meaning of the utterances of the speaker (vaktrvakyartha-yathartha- jhana) produces validity in verbal cognition. According to the Pauskara, doubt (samsaya) is a cogni- tion based on two entities due to the perception of a feature common to both of them. Error (viparyaya) is the cognition of an object (for example, a piece of shell) as possessing a form (for example, silver) which does not belong to it. Memory (smrti) is the cognition of objects experienced in the past. Cit-lakti, which is not delimited by these, is the means of knowledge (5 b -7“). Umapati introduces two more causes, perception of special features (asadharanadharma- darsana) and cognition of contradictory statements (vipratipatti-sravana), which produce doubt. He defines error as a cognition which has a particular attribute (for example, silverness) as its qualifier (prakara ) while having something devoid of that attribute (for example, shell), as its object (visesya). He identifies the theory of error defined in the Pauskara as anyathdkhyativdda (generally ascribed to the Naiyayikas), and defends it against the criticism of those who hold bhedagrahavada (attributed to the Prabhakaras). According to the Prabhakaras, error is not a single cogni- tion but two cognitions which are understood to be one due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the two (bhedagraha). For example, in the perception of a piece of shell as silver, the person desirous of silver cognizes the shell in its general form, that is to say as brilliant, etc., and not in its specific characteristics which differentiate it from another brilliant object like silver. At the same time, influenced by this general feature, the cognizer remembers silver, and due to the absence of discrimination between perception and 26 Umapati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala remembrance, picks up the shell thinking it to be silver. Thus, non-apprehension of difference induces exertion in error. The anyathdkhyativadin, however, believes that the cognition qualified by the features of a desired object (silver in the above example) induces action in error because such qualified cognition ( visistajnana ) is the inducer to all action. The bhedagrahavadin ^disagrees because, according to him, the features of an object (here, silver) which is absent at the time of error, cannot be perceived. Umapati points out that if non-apprehension of difference induced exertion in error, it would lead to an illogical situation in which a person would act and simultaneously refrain from acting. For example, in the erroneous cognition “these are silver and shell about a shell and silver, a person would pick up the shell because the non-apprehension of difference from the desired object (namely, silver) is present. At the same time, he would not pick up the shell, because the non-apprehension of difference from the undesired object (namely, shell) is also present. Umapati refutes the theory of error of the Dvaitins that a non-existent ( asat ) silver appears as existent in the shell, that of the ViSistadvaitins that the silver perceived in the shell is real (sat), that of the Buddhists (dtmakhyativddins) that the silver, which is mental ( jnandkara ), appears as if external in the shell and, finally, the theory of the Advaitins that the silver perceived in the shell is neither real nor unreal (sad- asadvilaksana). Umapati specifies that memory is the cognition produced not directly from an experience (as is stated in the Pauskara), but from the impressions (samskara) left by an experience. According to him, hypothetical argument (tarka) is a kind of error. He explains that the word ‘consiousness- power’ (cit-sakti) in the definiton of pramana prevents the overpervasion of the definition with regard to the self which is the conscious possessor of that power. Introduction 27 The Pauskara states that the word ‘cit-Sakti’ in the definition of pramana refers to the object-directed con- sciousness of the self, and not to the other consciousness (7"). According to Umapati, the distinction here is between the consciousness which is directed towards objects, and the consciousness which is prevented from turning outwards due to mala-obstruction. The consciousness which is the knower is not object- directed, while the consciousness which is the means of knowledge is directed outwards (8 a ). Producing the state of being an object of cognition (pra - meyabhava), etc. in the object is the result of pramana. (8 b ). This replies to the objection that if knowledge, which consti- tutes knowing (jnapti ), were the pramana, the distinction between the means of knowing (pramana ) and the result of knowing (pramiti ) would disappear, and as a consequence, there would be nothing which would correspond to an object of knowing (prameya ). Umapati explains that cit-sakti brings objects to the awareness of the knower and reveals them. And this is the result, which is different from the means. Thus cit-sakti, which is directed to objects and delimited by intellectual operation in the form of objects, is the means of knowledge (pramana ); the self which possesses such cit-£akti is the knower (pramatr ); objects like pot are the objects of knowledge (prameya ); and the operation of cit-£akti, which consists of forging an object-cognition relation and creating awareness about an object, is the result ( phala ) of pramana. The Pauskara declares that its definition of pramana is free from the three possible defects of definition, namely underpervasion, overpervasion and impossibility; the defini- tion applies to pramanas like perception (which are the entities to be defined), and does not apply to objects of knowledge, etc. (which are not intended to be defined by it) (9-11*). 28 Umapati S Commentary on the Fauskarapramanapatala Having defined pramana, the Pauskara refutes the definitions proposed by others. An instrument of cognition (pramiti-sddhana) cannot be held to be a pramana because instruments of cognition such as the intellect senses, etc would also have to be accepted as pramanas, but these are objects of cognition, not means of cognition. A pramana is not something to be known through a pramana whereas objects like sound are known through a pramana Inversely an object cannot be a pramana, because only that trough which an object is known can be a pramana. (11 3). common verbal usage “I see with my eyes” only signifies that the instruments of cognition such as eyes are auxiliary to pramanas; it does not prove that they are pramanas ( )• Umapati explains that although the intellect senses, lamps etc. participate in the cognitive process, they cannot be accepted as pramanas. In fact, anumdna , sabda, etc. are said to be pramanas only figuratively, for cit-sakti alone is the pramana in reality. It is referred to as different pramanas depending on the limiting adjuncts which are the cognitive process. Thus, cit-sakti is known as pratyaksa when the operation of the senses is the instrument, as anumdna when the cognition of pervasion ( vyapti-jnana) the instrument, and so on. ... According to the Pauskara, only that of which the absence leads to the absence of cognition should be accept as pramana. The senses cannot be pramana because t y not indispensable towards all cognition. They cognize on y those objects which come within the range of their capacity the !ye can see, it cannot hear; the ear can hear, it cannot see. Cit-$akti, on the other hand, is fit to be pramana because it is the means to all types of cognition. It is proved to indispensable towards all cognition because cognition arises only when it functions and nothing is known when it does not function (14 b -l6). . . Introduction 29 The Pauskara declares that although intellect ( buddhi ) is the ultimate means to all kinds of cognition, it too cannot be pramana because, being a product of prakrti, it is as in- sentient as the senses. Moreover, intellect is not exclusively a means of cognition because it also becomes an object of cognition when it is cognized in the form of happiness, sorrow, etc. by the self (17-19“). Umapati agrees that the intellect apprehends that which is sensed by the senses and determined by the mind. Yet, it cannot be considered to be pramana (in the Saiva doctrine) because it too becomes an object of cognition for the self. Moreover, it is not an indispensable means to all cognitions since vidya, and not the intellect, is the instrument that cognizes the function of the intellect. Although cit-$akti too becomes an object of cogni- tion through inference, etc., unlike objects and the intellect, which would remain unknown if they were not revealed by a pramana, cit-Sakti does not depend on another means to prove its existence, because it is self-luminous consciousness. It could be said that although the senses, etc. cannot individually be pramanas, the totality of these cognitive causes ( samagri ) could be pramana, since cognition arises when all the causes which produce cognition, namely the knower, the object, the senses, etc. are present. The Pauskara rejects this thesis on the grounds that if pramana was comprised of these, it would not be possible to distinguish the knower from the object, etc. It cannot be claimed that they are pramana collectively, and the knower, etc., individually; for a totality does not exist over and above the collected. That which is never found separated from something, is not different from it; like one’s own nature. The Pauskara concludes that only cit-sakti, which is free from doubt, etc., should be accepted as pramana (19-22). Umapati discusses and rejects the definition of the Bhattas that pramana is the means to the cognition of a previously unknown -entity, that of the Prabhakaras that all experience 30 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala pramana, and that of the Buddhists that uncontradicted cognition, namely the cognition which produces a successful activity, is pramana. Conjunctions of cit-sakti with objects through the senses are said to be perception ( adhyaksa ). It may be objected that since ciUakti cannot conjoin with objects by itself (due to obstruction by mala), its contact with objects requires some other means. The Pauskara admits that cit-sakti cannot conjoin with objects by itself in the state of bondage. But when it conjoins with objects with the help of instruments like kald, it is called perception (pratyaksa ), since t e connection occurs through the senses. Sense-object conjunctions themselves cannot be perception because devoid of consciousness, they are incapable o pro uci g awareness about anything (23-26). Umapati adds that neither the senses, nor kald and other constituents of the cognitive apparatus can be accepted as pramanas because they too are insentient. . . . . tn Ka The same cit-sakti, which is perception, is said to be twofold on account of its connection with determining factors: the cognition of mere objects (vastusvarupamdtra is indeterminate perception ( nirvikalpaka ) and the cognition o objects together with their connection with determining factors like name, universal, etc. 0 ndmajdtyddisambcmdha- sahita) is determinate perception ( savtkalpaka ) (27-2 ). Umapati states that nirvikalpakapratyaksa cannot be known through perception, but can be inferred to be the perception which invariably- precedes all determinate perception. I s existence is proved thus: since all qualified cognition ( visistajndna ) is produced through the cognition of the qualification ( visesanajnana ), determinate perception, w ic is a qualified cognition, is also produced from the cognition of the qualification. And this cognition of qualification, which produces determinate cognition, is argued to e indeterminate because if it were determinate, it would have Introduction 31 to be preceded by another cognition of qualification, thus leading to infinite regress. In this context, he discusses the cognition of absence which is a determinate cognition qualified by absence (abhavavisista-jnana). Since an absence invariably refers to an absent entity (namely, the counterpositive), all cognitions of absence presuppose the cognition of the counterpositive. Consequently, the cognition of absence cannot be preceded by a cognition of qualification which is indeterminate. Umapati mentions two views in this regard. The first accepts that the cognition of absence could be produced from a cognition which is determinate. The second holds that the cognition of the counterpositive is necessary only for the cognition which has absenceness as the qualifier (. abhdvatva- prakdra) and not for the cognition which grasps absence as “this” that is, without reference to its determinate and negative nature. Thus, an indeterminate cognition of absence could arise which could produce a determinate cognition of absence. Umapati also refers to the theory of those who believe, to escape the above difficulty, that a qualified cognition need not be produced from the cognition of the qualification ( visesanajnana ). It could also be produced from the cognition of the substantive ( visesyajnana ). Umapati presents another argument (which may be attributed to the VaiSesikas) which proves the existence of indeterminate perception: since every determinate cognition is delineated by speech which (speech) can neither be perceived nor inferred during the cognition, it is assumed that there is a pre-cognition in which a bare awareness of the object arises, whic. (object) revives the memory of the word signilying that object. And this pre-cognition, which supplies the word that appears in determinate cognition as inseparably connected with the objet, is indeterminate perception. Perception is also threefold according to another mode o classification: ‘dependent on the senses’ ( indriya-sapeksa ), 32 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala ‘non-dependent on the senses’ ( indriya-nirapeksa ) and ‘dependent on the internal organ’ (antahkarana-sapeksa). ‘Non-dependent on the senses’ is the natural conjunction with the infinite being by the cit-Sakti which is absolutely free from bondage (28 b -30 a ). Umapati explains that since the cit-sakti of the released self is free from mala-obstruction, it perceives itself and others without the help of the senses, mind, etc. The intuition of Siva by the self, however, occurs through a special capacity bestowed on it by Siva. ‘Dependent on the senses’ is the perception in which cit- sakti requires the senses, etc. to connect with objects through the operation of the senses. ‘Dependent on the internal organ’ arises when the external senses are overcome and cit- sakti perceives objects fit to be contemplated through the mind (30 b -32 a ). Umapati specifies that ‘dependent on the internal organ’ is twofold: the extraordinary perception of yogins and the perception of happiness, etc. by the bound self. The connection of each sense, which is called perception (adhyaksa), is sixfold: the perception of substances like a pot is through conjunction ( samyoga ) of the sense of sight; the perception of the quality (guna ) and universal (samanya) is by inherence-in-what-is-conjoined (, samyukta-samavaya)\ the perception of qualityness (gunatva ) is by inherence-in-what- is-inherent-in-what-is-conjoined (samyukta-samaveta-sama- vaya)\ the perception of sound is as inherent ( samaveta ) in the sense of hearing; soundness is perceived by inherence- in- what-is-inherent ( samavetarthasamavaya ); inherence and absence are cognized either as a qualification (vises ana) or as a substantive (visesya) (32 b -36 a ). Umapati declares that according to the accepted doctrine (siddhdnta), the connection of the senses with objects cannot be considered as perception. It is called perception metaphorically because it helps cit-sakti to conjoin with objects. He further states that the declaration in the Pauskara Introduction 33 that the sense-object contact is sixfold is according to others’ doctrine (paramata ). It is fourfold according to the accepted doctrine ( siddhdnta ) because sound and soundness are cognized through inherence-in-what-is-conjoined (. samyukta - s amavaya) and inherence-in-what-is-inherent-in-what-is- conjoined (samyukta-samaveta-samavaya) respectively. He defends the relation of inherence (. samavdya ) and presents the following reasoning to prove its existence: since the cognition of a qualified object is produced by the presence of a relation between the object and its qualification, the cognition of an object qualified by name, universal, etc. is also produced by a relation. The relation established by this inference cannot be conjunction (samyoga) because it only connects separable entities; so a relation which connects inseparables entities such as an object and its qualities must be accepted and that is inherence. Umapati also discusses ‘being qualified’ (vaisistya) (which is recognized by the Bhattas as a distinct contact) and rejects it. Some (who may be identified as the Prabhakaras) hold that ‘being a qualifica- tion or a substantive’ (visesana-visesya-bhava) need not be admitted as the connection in the perception of absence because absence is not different from the substrate, etc. where it is perceived. Some others (namely, the Bhattas) believe that although absence is a distinct category, it is not perceived but known through a specific pramana named non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). Umapati refutes these two theories and proves that absence is different from its substrate, etc., and that it is perceived either as an object or as a qualification. The pramana called inference (anumdna) is the means to the cognition of mediate objects through a well-established pervasion (36 b ). Umapati reminds us that this is a metaphorical definition of anumdna pramana. In fact, inference is cit-sakti delimited by the cognition of the presence of the reason (hetu) in the subject (paksa ), which 34 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala (cognition) is qualified by the cognition of the pervasion (vyapti). He also classifies anumdna into two: ‘for oneself (svartha) and ‘for others’ (pardrtha). According to the Pauskara, anumdna consists of five members: proposition (pratijna), reason ( hetu ), example ( drstanta ), application ( upanaya ) and conclusion ( nigama ). Pratijna is the declaration of the thing which is desired to be proved. Hetu is the elucidative statement of the reason which possesses pervasion. Drstanta is that by which the reason (lihga), positively and negatively connected to the thing to be proved ( sadhya ), is illustrated. Upanaya is the statement of the presence in the subject (paksa ) of the reason (hetu) illustrated in the example (drstanta). Ji/igama is the re- statement of the proposition (pratijna) accompanied by the reason (37-39). Umapati discusses the purpose of these five members and rejects the opinion of the MImamsakas who believe that inference consists of either the first three or the last three of the five members, and that of the Buddhists who hold that inference contains only two members, namely example and application. The Pauskara defines pervasion (vyapti) as the natural relation between the thing which proves (sddhana, i.e. reason) and the thing to be proved (sadhya) (40 J ). Umapati explains that a natural relation is that which is free from a vitiating condition (upadhi). Here, a condition-free relation signifies that the reason does not co-exist with an absence whose counterpositive is not the counterpositive of the absence co-existing with the thing to be proved. He also defines it as: the relation of the reason with the thing to be proved which (thing to be proved) has all the substrates of the reason as its substrate. Umapati refutes the arguments of those who do not accept anumdna as an independent pramana. Some believe that inference, which contains the cognition of pervasion, is not a pramana because pervasion cannot be known. Umapati replies that pervasion is Introduction 35 apprehended by perception aided by the cognition of the co- existence (sahacdragrahasacivddhyaksa) between the reason and the thing to be proved, which (cognition of co- existence) is accompanied by the absence of the cognition of non-co-existence (vyabhicarajhdna-viraha). Some others believe that inference is not a pramana because it only proves that which is already proved (siddha-sadhana). Umapati rejects this criticism and concludes that it would not be possible for the opponent to prove that anumdna is not a pramana without resorting to one. Umapati explains why comparison (upamana) and inclusion (sambhava) need not be admitted as independent pramanas. Upamana is defined by some as the means to the cognition of the relation of a word with the object meant by it. Umapati points out that since this cognition depends on the cognition of similarity which is known from the statement of a trustworthy person, upamana could be subsumed in sabda pramana. Upamana is defined' by some others as the means to the cognition of the relation of a word with the universal of the object meant by that word, for example the relation of the word gavaya with gavaya-hood. Umapati demonstrates how the same cognition could be derived though inference, and concludes that upamana need not be accepted as a distinct pramana. Inclusion (sambhava), which is defined as the means to the cognition of the presence of a part in a whole through the cognition of the whole, is not an independent pramana either, because the cognition derived through sambhava could be known through anumdna. Pervasion (vyapti) is of two kinds: negative (vyatireka) and positive (anvaya). Positive pervasion is the connection of the thing to be proved (sadhya) with the reason ( sddhana ) through affirmation, and negative pervasion is 'he connection through negation (40 b -41). 36 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala Reason ( sadhana ) is of two kinds: ‘seen’ ( drsta ) and ‘generally-seen’ ( samanyatodrsta ). The former is that which gives rise to the inference of objects fit to be perceived by the senses, and the latter is that which gives rise to the inference of objects which are imperceptible by* nature. According to another classification, reason (sadhana) is threefold: positive-negative (anvayavyatirekin), only-negative (kevalavyatirekin), and only-positive (kevalanvayin) (42-44 1 ). According to Umapati, these refer to three kinds of inference, for he interprets the word sadhana as inference (anumdna). The Pauskara, however, does not mention any classification of inference. The positive-negative reason is that which is the attribute of the subject, resides in a similar instance, is absent from a dissimilar instance, is not contradicted, and does not have a counterbalancing reason. Subject (paksa ) is that which possesses the thing to be proved by the inference. Similar instance (sapaksa) is that which has the same thing to be proved. Dissimilar instance ( vipaksa ) is that which does not have that thing to be proved. Contradiction (bddha) is the contrary proof obtained through another pramana. The state of having a counterbalancing reason ( vipaksatd ) arises when two reasons concerning the same subject are found to possess only three characteristics (of the five characteristics of the positive-negative reason) with regard to their respective things to be proved. Only-positive reason is that which is devoid of a dissimilar instance and only-negative reason is that which is devoid of a similar instance (44 b -47°). The reason of the inference “A particular place has fire; because it has smoke; like a kitchen” is positive-negative. “All (materials) become effects supervised by someone; because they are entities; like mud supervised by a potter” contains an only-positive reason (because a dissimilar instance, that is to say an entity which is created without being supervised by someone, does not exist which could Introduction 37 demonstrate a negative connection of the reason with the thing to be proved). “Every effect comes into existence only being (pre)existent (in its cause); because it is produced; an effect which is non-existent (in its cause), cannot be produced; like a hare’s horn” contains an only-negative reason (since all. effects are included in the subject of the inference, a similar instance cannot be shown which could demonstrate a positive connection of the reason with the thing to be proved) (47 b -49). Fallacious reasons are classified into five by the Pauskara : unestablished ( asiddha ), contradictory ( viruddha ), deviating (anaikantika), inconclusive (anadhyavasayika) and time- lapsed (kalatita). The fallacy of unestablishedness (asiddhi) arises when the presence of the reason (hetu) in the subject (paksa) is not certain. The unestablishedness of the reason in the inference “Atoms are the cause; because they are eternal” is due to the nature of the reason (since atoms are non- eternal according to Saivism, the reason ‘being eternal’ is absent in ‘atoms’, the subject of the inference). Corresponding fallacies arise due to the unestablishedness of the attribute (visesana), substantive (visesya), etc. (50-51). Umapati subsumes inconclusive reason (anadhyavasayika) in deviating reason ( anaikantika ), and recognizes ‘identical with the question’ (prakaranasama ), which is not mentioned in the Pauskara, as a fallacious reason. His definition of several fallacies differs from those of the Pauskara ; he also adds several sub-varieties which are not mentioned in the Pauskara. Umapati classifies asiddhi into four varieties: ‘unestablishedness due to the nature of the reason’ (svarupa- siddhi), ‘due to the pervasion’ (vyapyatvasiddhi), ‘due to the subject’ (asraydsiddhi), and ‘due to the cognition of the reason, pervasion and subject of the inference’ (jhdnasiddhi). ‘Unestablishedness due to pervasion’ is twofold: caused b;, the absence of the means to know the pervasion, and caused by the presence of a vitiating condition (upadhi). He 38 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala includes the fallacies which arise due to the attribute and substantive of the reason in svarupdsiddhi and those due Jo the attribute, etc. of the subject, in asrayasiddhi . The reason which is present in the subject (paksa) and a dissimilar instance ( vipaksa ) is contradictory ( viruddha ). The reason is contradictory in the inference “The pervading is not all-pervasive; because it is not limited by space (the reason ‘being not limited by space’ is found both in the subject and in the dissimilar instance; for example, the all- pervasive self is a dissimilar instance because it lacks non- pervasion) (52). Umapati defines contradictory as the reason which resides only in a dissimilar instance. Deviating ( anaikantika ) is the reason which is present in the subject (paksa ), the similar (sapaksa) and dissimilar instances (vipaksa). It is illustrated by the inference “The self is eternal; because it is knowable” (since everything is knowable, the reason is found in everything which could be the subject, the similar and dissimilar instances) (53). According to Umapati, deviating reason (which he calls sa- vyabhicara ) is three-fold: too general (sadharana), inconclu- sive (anadhyavasita) and too specific (asadharana). The deviating reason (anaikantika) mentioned in the Pauskara is an independent fallacy, but Umapati identifies it as the too general deviating reason (sadharana-savyabhicara). According to the Pauskara, inconclusive (anadhyava- sdyika), the fourth fallacious reason, is that which is present only in the subject; it does not lead to the thing to be proved (54 1 ). In this half-verse, Umapati finds the definitions of two varieties of deviating: anadhyavasita (inconclusive) and asa- dhdrana (too specific). According to him, inconclusive (an- adhyavasita) is the reason which does not lead to the thing to be proved because its co-existence with the thing to be prov- ed is not known, and too specific (asadharana) is the reason which resides only in the subject although it has a similar instance. Introduction 39 According to the Pauskara, the inference “The universe exists constantly; because it is a product illustrates anadhy- avasdyika (as the reason ‘being a product exists only in the subject, ‘the universe’, its relation to the thing to be proved ‘constant existence’ cannot be cognized anywhere else, and so'it cannot lead to the thing to be proved) (54 b ). Umapati considers this as an illustration of inconclusive (anadhy- avasita) and states that the example of too specific (asadha- rana) is not given because it is well known. According to the Pauskara, time-lapsed (kdldilta) occurs when a reason is attributed to a subject (paksa) which is contradicted by a pramana. The reason in the inference The universe which is devoid of a material cause, is a product, because it is adventitious” is time-lapsed (since the reason ‘being adventitious’ is attributed to the subject, ‘the universe devoid of a material cause’, which is contradicted by scrip- tural authority that declares that the universe has a material cause) (55). But Umapati interprets the fallacy time-lapsed (kdldtita) as the fallacy sublated (bddhita) that arises when a reason is ascribed to a subject which is devoid of the thing to be proved by that reason. He illustrates it with the inference “Fire is cool; because it is a substance” (the reason ‘being a substance’ is attributed to the subject fire which is devoid of the thing to be proved ‘coolness’). According to him, the definition of the fifth fallacy, namely ‘identical with the question’ (prakaranasama ) is not given in the Pauskara in this context because it was described earlier (while discussing the characteristics of a positive-negative reason). Since a reason operates through pervasion (vyapti) to prove the presence of the thing to be proved (sadhya) in the subject (paksa), the disruption of pervasion, caused by a fallacious reason, is the main impediment to inference (56- 57*). Umapati states that the cognition of the presence of the reason in the subject (paksadharmatd) is also a cause to inference, and declares that inference is also impeded by the 40 Umdpati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala breakdown of consideration (paramarsa), namely the cogni- tion of the presence in the subject, of the reason as qualified by the pervasion. According to the Pauskara, fallacies like ill-enunciated ( sadurdista ) arise on the transposition of the first two of the five members of the inference, etc.; for example, the statement along with the reason, “Not hot, is fire; because it is a substance”. The example in the inference The self is eternal; because it is all-pervasive; like the sky is deficieht of the thing to be proved’ ( sadhyavikala ) (because the sky is not eternal). It is also ‘deficient of the reason (sadhana- vikala) (sky is not all-pervasive because as a product of prakrti, it pervades the impure realm and not the pure realm) (57 b -59). Umapati presents a variety of fallacies of example (drstantabhasa) and refers to the grounds of defeat ( nigraha - sthana ), quibble ( chala ) and false rejoinder (Jati) which obstruct inference. These are not mentioned in the Pauskara. Verbal testimony ( agama ) is the utterance of a trust- worthy person, and it is the ultimate means to the cognition of objects not given to immediate perception. A trustworthy person is the one who utters the sense well ascertained by perception or by inference; Siva is the most trustworthy of all trustworthy persons (60-6 l a ). According to Umapati, a trustworthy person is the one who knows the true meaning of the uttered statement, and who speaks true. A valid sentence is a group of words, possessing expectancy (, akdhksa ) and juxtaposition ( dsatti ), uttered by a trustworthy person. Umapati refers to two inferences put forward by those (who may be identified as the VaiSesikas) who believe that the pramana named sab da is not different from the anumana pramana because meaning, which is the connection between the words (pada ) or the word-meanings (padartha) of a sentence, could be known through inference. A third inference (which could be attributed to the Prabhakafas) is presented: it attempts to prove that the meaning of a sentence Introduction 41 is inferable through the cognition of the intention of the speaker (sandarbha). The Prabhakaras believe that while Vedic statements are authoritative because they are not uttered by a human being, secular statements are unreliable, for they could be rendered invalid by the defects of the speaker. According to them, only Vedic sentences are sabda pramana and all mundane ytterances are anumana pramana. Umapati rejects these three inferences. According to him, the reason ( hetu ) of the first two inferences is unsound. Neither is the third inference a proof, because only the meaning which is known directly from words induces action and not the meaning understood indirectly through inference. Therefore verbal testimony, which is the means to the direct cognition of meaning, should be accepted as an independent pramana. Umapati states that since gesture ( cesta ) conveys meaning through convention ( samketa ), it should be sub- sumed in sabda pramana. Tradition ( aitihya ) which is true, is to be accepted as sabda pramana, while untrue tradition is to be rejected. According to the Pauskara , the utterances of Siva are the most authoritative and the veritable means to liberation because Siva is the most trustworthy. His knowledge is perfect, for He is omniscient, free from all sense deficiencies, changeless, cognizer of everything and eternal perceiver of the truth; He is also independent, impartial and com- passionate (61 b -63 a ). Umapati notes that Siva does not possess a body composed of maya or bindu, which produce respectively, the bodies of the selves in the impure and pure realms; but it is admitted that He possess a body constituted of His capacity ( sakti ) and it is also supported by verbal testimony (sabda). Having transformed the knowledge of the six categories, which arose in the form of the inaudible nada, into audible verses, and having endowed some perfected selves in the pure path with special powers, Siva taught them the tenfold 42 Umapati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala Saiva texts and the eighteenfold Raudra texts. The same knowledge came down to the earth in the form of scripture (tantra) through the intermediary of preceptors (63 -66). Umapati specifies that Siva taught the ten Saiva texts to the ten Sivas led by Pranava and the eighteen Raudra texts to the eighteen Rudras headed by Ananta. Srikantha declares that, having selected this Pauskara from those texts, setting aside the eulogical statements, he transmitted it to the sages. He enjoins them to promote it on the earth among the eligible selves devoted to preceptors (67-68*). According to Umapati, although the purport of scripture could be learnt from the well-known texts like the Kamika, since they are extensive, inaccessible and complex, the Pauskara is composed to render the teaching of scripture accessible to all. He explains that this tantra, which is*the essence of Saiva scripture, is named Pauskara due to its similarity with the pauskara honey, which is the essence o the puskara lotus. Although Veda and other scriptures are another path (anyamdrga), they lead to the bondage of the individual self; the authority of the scriptures composed by Brahma, Visnu and others is limited to the realities (tattva) admitted in the respective scriptures. The path to liberation is beyond the enjoyment of heaven, etc. (68 b -69). Umapati does not seem to make the distinction which is made in the verse, for he explains that the states of liberation promised in the Vedic ritualistic passages ( karmopasanopadesabhdga ), and in scrip- tures composed by Brahma and others, are situated within the realm of bondage. Since these authors have a limited knowledge, the state of release taught by them is confined to the attainment of different lower states. However, the teaching of the Upanisads, like those of the Kamika and other Saiva treatises, is another means ( updydntara ) to liberation. Umapati adds that while both the Vedic scripture (■ vedagama ) and Saiva scripture ( saivagama ) are authoritative Introduction 43 for those who belong to the first three social classes. , (trivarna), only Saiva scripture is authoritative for the other classes. The statement that scripture in the form of nada comes forth from that which is beyond differentiation ( niskala ) may not seem appropriate, due to the absence of the sense of speech. The Pauskara states that Siva’s power does not require the sense of speech; being absolutely pure, it is operative everywhere. And the function of speech signifies the capacity to induce bindu to produce nada and to provoke the emergence of words ( sabda ) from nada (70- 72). Umapati identifies niskala with Siva and net His power bindu, which is the origin of nada and labda. Hi -.If.' identifies nada with pasyanti speech and sabda with vaikkari speech, and explains the evolution of speech as follows: from the nada which comes into being from bindu, arises another bindu (which he calls aparabindu in the tantrd- vatarapatala) which is the origin of the madhyama speech, which in turn produces the audible vaikhari speech. The Pauskara states that words (sabda) are indirect indicators to the knowledge of Siva. (73*). Umapati explains that since the audible words do not come from Siva, it may be objected that the scripture, which is composed of these words, cannot lead to the knowledge of Siva. It is therefore stated in the Pauskara that words can only indirectly be traced to the knowledge of Siva. And this, according to Umapati, is through the inference of the existence of intermediary states like madhyama from which words arise. The words which describe the pure categories of the pure realm (sivagocara) were not acquired with attention by some sages; the words which issue from some other sages are confined to the lower realm constituted of prakrti. Therefore, the utterance of Siva cannot be understood through the compositions of authors possessing limitr knowledge; nor can it be overruled by them. For the wor 44 Umapati 's Commentary ort the P auskarapramanapatala of the sages cannot be set aside by those of ordinary human beings; nor the words of the divine beings by those of the sages; nor those of Brahma by those of the divine beings; nor those of Visnu by those of Brahma; nor those of Rudra by those of Visnu; nor those of Siva by those of Rudra, due to the excellence of the successively superior. But the successively inferior statements are set aside by the successively superior (73 b -76). Umapati states that the discussion of the comparative superiority of scriptures does not arise because Siva Himself is the redactor of all scriptures. The above discussion concerns the treatises ot secondary authors such as Brahma and Visnu. Also, the declaration in certain texts that the Saiva scripture overrules the Veda (composed by Himself) does not sigm y opposition. It only means that the teachings of the Veda are to be supplemented with those of the Saiva scripture with regard to the subjects which are not found in the Veda, in order to render the Vedic and Saiva scriptures compatible. 11 the Saiva scripture were opposed to the Veda, the importance given to Vedic duties in certain texts, and the declaration in some other texts that the teaching of the Saiva scripture is the essence of the Veda, would be meaningless. The Pauskara declares that all scriptures are constituted unopposed to the Saiva scripture. The Saiva scripture is authoritative by itself; it should not be declared to be valid because it is unopposed to another scripture, nor because it is in conformity with it. Since the Saiva scripture contains the knowledge of other scriptures, it is said to be the perva ex | ( vydpaka ) and other scriptures are said to be the perva (vyapya) by it (77-78*). According to Umapati, when scripture like Samkhya is in contradiction with the Saiva scripture, it should be interpreted in accordance with the Saiva scripture. Saiva scripture, on the other hand, shou not be modified in the light of another doctrine, nor should its authority be upheld on the grounds that it conforms to Introduction 45 other scriptures, because it is composed by Siva, who possesses more knowledge than the authors of other scriptures and is, consequently, more authoritative. According to the Pauskara , the authority of the different scriptures is only as great as the pervasion proclaimed by the respective scripture (78 b -79 a ). Umapati explains that the declaration of the supremacy of the Saiva scripture and the admission, at the same time, of the authority of all scriptures, is not contradictory. In the case of difference of opinion with regard to doctrine, where an alternative standpoint cannot be admitted, the doctrines which conflict with the Saiva scripture are to be rejected. But with regard to action, where an alternative to the prescribed rules is permitted in accordance with the qualification of the performer etc., other scriptures are considered authoritative The Pauskara does not define presumption (- arthapatti ), the fourth pramana, but only gives two examples. The first is: the fact that the Saiva scripture describes a state of liberation which is superior to that described in other scriptures leads to the cognition that these other scriptures are composed by someone who is not omniscient (79 b -81 a ). Umapati also gives a slightly different explanation of this illustration: since the statements which describe liberation cannot exist without an author who is conversant with their meaning, it is first presumed that these statements have an author. Subsequently, as the Saiva scripture proclaims a state of liberation which is superior to the states described in these statements, through the presumption of the absence of omniscience of their authors, it is presumed that these statements are composed by authors who are not omniscient. The second example of presumption proposed by the Pauskara is as follows: as omniscience is proclaimed by the scripture, the absence of omniscience which is experienced implies the existence in the selves of something called pasutva , which produces that absence of omniscience (81 - 46 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala 82). Umapati explains: since the absence of omniscience which is experienced by the omniscient self is inexplicable, an obstruction which explains that absence is presumed first. Subsequently, on the authority of the scripture which declares that the omniscience pf 3iva is never obstructed, it is presumed that the obstruction named pasutva exists only in the selves. He gives an alternative explanation: since the scripture declares that omniscience exists only in the sentient selves (and not in buddhi, etc.), it is presumed that the factor which obstructs the omniscience also exists in the selves. He defines arthapatti as the presumption, from the cognition of something which is inexplicable, of something else which explains it. Umapati considers the first example as presump- tion from words (srutarthapatti) and the second illustration as presumption from perception ( drstdrthdpatti )* but this classification is not made in the Pauskara. The Pauskara states that the arthapatti pramana is different from the anumana pramana because they produce distinct results (83*)- Umapati presents and refutes the inference proposed by those who believe that the knowledge derived through arthapatti pramana could be derived through anumana pramana and that arthapatti is not an in- dependent pramana. The discussion of pramanas in the pramanapatala concludes with a description of the withdrawal of the universe known through these pramanas. The Pauskara declares that the dissolution should be admitted to be in an order inverse to that of the creation because the evolutes are causally connected. The effect, which merges into its cause on destruction, would be rendered baseless if its cause disappeared first. Since dissolution begins with the final effect, the earth element (prthivi ) is the first to disappear (83 b -85‘). Umapati presents and refutes the viewpoint of those who believe that the universe exists continuously, that it is neither created nor dissolved. He also proves, with the Introduction 47 help of scriptural statements, that Siva undertakes dissolution not out of cruelty, but to give respite to selves tired by transmigration, to restore to maya and bindu the inclination to create, and to allow the karma of selves to ripen. According to the Pauskara, the five elements ( bhuta ) merge into the subtle elements ( tanmatra ) during the dissolu- tion: the subtle elements, the senses ( indriya ) and mind (manas) into egoity ( ahamkara), ; egoity into intellect ( mati ); intellect into the gunas ; the gunas into prakrti; prakrti, as well as the group of five tattvas beginning with raga, merge into maya. Maya, however, does not disappear, because it is eternal (85 b -87*). Umapati specifies that the subtle elements merge into the egoity predominated by tamos, the senses of action ( karmendriya ) into the egoity predominated by rajas and the senses of knowledge (jnanendriya) and manas into the egoity predominated by sattva. The pure path ( suddhadhvan ), which exists beycnd maya, merges into bindu. Bindu, the material cause of (pure) kald, etc., supervised by Siva, remains forever in His presence as His sphere of activity; and the universe comes into existence again in the regular order, beginning with bindu (87 b -89‘). TRANSLATION UMAPATI’S commentary ON THE PAUSKARAPRAMANAPATALA [1] Now begins the pramdnapatala . Now, after the discussion of all the six categories {paddrtha )' through the means of knowledge {pramana ), statement ( uddesa ), definition ( laksana ), examination {pariksd ), etc., since there is difference of opinion among the disputants about the nature of the means of knowledge {pramana ) and since, in the absence of that certainty, due to lack of discrimination between the true and pseudo-pramanas, the discussion of the things to be known (prameyaf would also be as if in- complete, the sages 4 desirous of knowing it, with a recapitu- ■ According to the Pauskara, the Lord (pati ), the material cause of the pure realm {kundalini, that is bindu), the material cause of he impure realm (may a), the selves (pasu ), the bonds (pasa)and the means (kdrako), in short, are the six categones declared by the Saiva texts. See Pauskara 1.8: patih kundalini maya pasuh pasas ca kdrakah /id proktah padarthas sat saivatantre samdsatalt. 1 The cognition of the means of knowledge {pramana ) is fundamental because the cognition of objects depends on the means employed to acquire it. Naming the category {uddesa), presenting the feature which distinguishes the category from others {laksana) and examining the applicability of the definition (pariksd) too are necessaryto assure the infallibility of cognition (see Tarkabhasa, p. 27). The expression ‘etc.’ should refer to the classification of the objects under examina- tion {vibhdga), which is sometimes proposed as the fourth pre- requisite of an enquiry into the nature of an object. See Tarkabhasa- prakasika, p. 101. . 3 The six categories mentioned above. ... k „ 4 Sanatkumara and others to whom the Pauskara is instructed by Srikantha (whom Umapati identifies as a form of Siva, see tne following note). See PauskaraBh on 1.1, p. 2: ... ^™>*yam tantram upadisatah srikanthaparamesvarat sorutd ^ j prcchanti. According to Jnanaprakafa, Paramesa (that is. Siva) taught the Paramesvara to Ananta (that is, Brahma), who abndgd t and instructed it to Srikantha. Srikantha f^hersumm^ditmrn Pauskara and transmitted it to a group of sages headed by ^ana kumara. See PauskaraV, pp. 1 and 891. 1M3 52 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala lation of the subjects already discussed, request (Isana to explain to them) the nature of pramana. O Lord! lord of the chiefs of gods! engaged in bestowing grace on devotees! the six categories . are explained through many arguments (by you) out of compassion. O merciful! now we wish to hear about the means of knowledge without knowing the nature of which the knowable would be dubious. Therefore O liana! kindly explain those (pramanas) to us. (1-3*) Bhagavan, O Lord, endowed with the six (auspicious) qualities; 1 ruler also of Brahma, Visnu and other chiefs of gods; bhaktdnugrahatatpara , engaged in bestowing grace on devotees. He also undertakes the creation, etc. (of the universe), but these are performed out of grace, 2 for conferring grace is His main intention. Such is the meaning. Or the significance is that He is engaged in bestowing devotees with a specific grace consisting of protection, instruction of knowledge, etc. Paddrthdh, categories, the six categories beginning with pati and concluding with karaka; samuddistah , explained, well examined. Although the entities which belong to the category of karaka are not examined separately, it is stated that the six (categories) are explained because initiation, which is of the nature of karaka 1 Srikantha is addressed as bhagavan because he has the six qualities known as bhaga : sovereignty ( aisvarya ), valour {virya ), glory (ya- sas), prosperity (in'), wisdom (jhana) and freedom from all worldly desires (vairagya). See PauskaraBh on 1.1, p. 2. Umapati explains that when applied to others, the title bhagavan refers to the possessor not of these six qualities, but of excellence of knowledge, etc. acquired through the grace of Isvara (ibid., p. 3). 2 The purpose of the creation of the universe is to provide the bound selves (pasu ) with bodies, worlds filled with objects and the means to experience them, in order that they exhaust the karma which binds them; for the self cannot attain liberation unless its karma is annihilated through experience. The aim of the dissolution of the universe is to give repose to the selves tired of transmigration. See PauskaraBh on 7.85*. Translation 53 category, is described in detail in the kriyapada (of the Pauskara) and because its definition is also declared here (in the vidyapdda) while discussing the categories pati and pasu, by (the verses) “That which gives rise to enjoyment (in the pure worlds), release (from bondage) and manifestation (of siva-hood)” 1 and “Only initiation slackens bondages”. 2 Krpaya, out of compassion, with the desire of removing the sorrow of others and not with the intention of any personal gain; anekayuktibhih, through many arguments, means, according to the intellectual capacity of the hearer, for it is said, “The wise are to be taught through reasoning”. 1 Having thus praised the Supreme Lord, the sages state the inquired object, adhund, etc. But then, after the examination (in the previous chapters) of the objects to be known such as pati, together with the means of knowing them, it is improper to inquire now about the nature of the means of knowledge; moreover, its discussion is fruitless. This is answered, yad, etc. Avijhaya, without knowing, not knowing the nature and extent of which, namely of pramanas; prameyah, the knowable, pati and other categories; vyarthah, would be dubious, (knowledge about them) would be uncertain; vyarthah means ‘that which has diverse meaning*. In other words, although explained, pati and other categories would be as if unexplained; for there could be doubt and error about (the nature of) pati and other (categories discussed earlier) in the event of a doubt whether inference, etc. are pramanas or not, of uncertainty about their nature and scope, and cf erroneous employment of a pramana towards objects to be known. Tasmdt, therefore, to prevent this; since pramanas are to be discussed necessarily; Isana, liana, O lord of all ' Pauskara 1.14*. 2 Pauskara 4.47 b . 1 Pauskara 1.78 b . kYJT 111*11***44*4* 54 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala knowledge; asmakam, to us, desirous of knowing; tani, those, pramanas; vaktum arhasi, kindly explain. [2] Thus requested, Paramesvara explains (the nature of) pramanas preceded by the statement of proposition ( pratijha ). Listen now if you desire to hear about the means of knowledge. O twice-born! those means of knowledge (maria), perception, etc., are four: perception (pratyaksa ), inference (anumana), verbal testimony (sabda) and presumption (arthapatti). Consciousness-power (tit-sakti) free * from doubt, etc. is said to be the means of knowledge. (3 b -5 a ) Atha, now, after the examination of the six categories; manani , the means of knowledge, pramanas; srotum kautuhalam , desire to hear, if you wish (to know them); srnudhvam , hear, ‘which are being explained’ is to be supplied (to the verse). Atmanepada (in the word srnudhvam) is archaistic. [The author] answers the inquiry about the nature and number of pramanas, catvari , etc.; he dvijah , O twice-born; tani pratyaksadini , those pramanas, percep- tion, etc. are catvari , four, only four. We will accordingly discuss the intended inclusion or exclusion of pramanas such as comparison (upamana) among the (accepted) pramanas while examining the respective pramanas. [The author] states , pratyaksam, in order to explain that which is meant by the word ‘etc.’. The declaration “Perception and inference together with verbal testimony (are the pramanas) in Saivism” in a certain text 1 signifies that (the pramana known as) presumption (arthapatti) is included in (the pramana called) inference (anumana). Although classification is always presented after the statement of the general definition, if inference, etc. were not declared here at the 1 Not traced. Also cited in the Saivaparibhasa (Madras edn), p. 2; the Sivajhanabodhavistarabhdsya , p. 108, etc. Translation 55 outset as (forming part of) the accepted pramanas, the proposed general definition being common to inference, etc. may bring the opponent to suspect the overpervasion (of the definition) with regard to those (pramanas). Therefore, a classification is announced beforehand to ward off this (doubt) and to indicate that inference, etc. also are included in the thing to be defined. Following the maxim “(The statement of) the specific definitions should be preceded by that of the general definition”, 1 [the author] states the general definition of pramana, samsaya , etc.; vinirmukta , free from, doubt, etc., that is to say doubt, error and memory. This means, it (namely citSakti) 2 being devoid of objects (of cognition) featuring in the intellectual operation (that is, cognition) 3 such as doubt; in other words, it (namely citsakti) being that which has objects (of cognition) featuring in the intellectual operation which is true experience ( yatharthanubhuti ). [3] But then, what is this state of possessing truth (yatharthakatva) (or trueness) of an intellectual operation 1 Compare Nydyamahjari, p. 11. 2 Cit-Sakti is the consciousness of the self. It is said to be a power because it is made up of the cognitive and conative capacities of the self. See Pauskara 5.3 b : caitanyam jhatvakartrtvarupam tad balam atmanah. Consciousness is said to be the means of knowledge because it procures awareness of objects for the self. 3 Cognition, according to the Pauskara , is an operation (vrtti) of the intellect (buddhi) of the self. See Pauskara 6.49*: dharmo jndnam ca vairdgyam aisvaryam buddhivrttayah . Like the senses, mind and ego, buddhi too is produced from prakrti and, along with them, forms the gross cognitive apparatus. For an object is grasped by the senses, identified by the mind, appropriated by the ego and cognized by the buddhi. But this cognition by the buddhi (also known as buddhivrtti and jhdna) is inert because buddhi can know an object but not itself. While the buddhi cognizes objects through the senses, mind, etc., the self cognizes this cognition of buddhi through a subtler cognitive apparatus (also supplied by bondage) consisting of kola , vidya , etc. The cognition of the self, however, is conscious, that is to say it knows objects and itself, because it is the property of a conscious self. See Pauskara 6.43 b -44: bodho 'tra dvividho bhavo vyavasdya- tmakas tat ha // ddyo ’ nadhya vasdydtmd vyavasaydtmakas tu yah / sa buddhir itaras tv dtmasvabhavo grdhakdtmanah. 56 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala (that is, cognition) ? It cannot be (its) similarity to (its) object' because similarity in some way or other is also found in error, 2 while complete similarity is absent even in the (true) cognition. 3 ’ . . [4] Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is) its having as its qualifier (prakara ), 4 a property which is not the counterpositive of an absence ( abhavapratiyogin ) located in the substantive ( visesya ); 5 for there would be under- pervasion in (true) cognitions such as “The ground possesses a pot”. This cognition has pot as its qualifier which is the counterpositive of a mutual absence (anyonyabhavaprati- yogin) 6 located on the ground (which is the substantive of that cognition). . . [5] Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is) its having as its qualifier, a property which is not the counterpositive of an absolute absence (atyantdbhavaprati- yogin) * 1 located in the substantive; for there would be > For if the adjective yathartha (whidh literally me^s 'as the object is’) were to signify the similarity of the cogmtion w.th .ts object the deftSn woffile overpervasive with regard to error and under- **■> as existence <»<«>>. knowability (prameyatva ) could be found between an erroneous cognition and the object of that cognition, since both exist, ar ^S^nce^the^ognition of an object is not identical with the object. (.SSU « .he objec. which is .he conjm of a |»g .ionTnd prakara (qualifier) is .he feawre as quahfie dby whig^ nhiprt is cognized in that cognition. In the cognition 1 his is silver , the object referred to by ’this’ is the substantive of the cognition and silverness is the qualifier of the cognition because the object (referred tr. hv ‘this’) is being cognized as qualified by silverness. K WdTcognil “This is silver” would consist in itl having as its qualifier (prakara) a property (silverness) w^ch is not the* counterpositive of an absence located >n the object (of that cognition), namely silver, designated by this (v/sesytf). 6 Mutual absence perceived, for example, in the cogmti ^The* undemervasion pointed above is removed by the clause ‘absolute absence’ because although pot is the counterpositive of mutual absence (anyonyabhava), it is not the counterposi ive Translation 57 overpervasion in the eiror “This is now red” about a black badara fruit. Since redness would appear in it (when badara ripens), its absolute absence (that is to say the absolute absence of redness) is not admitted there (in the badara )’ and (consequently) that cognition has the above property (namely redness which is not the counterpositive of an absolute absence located in the badara) as its qualifier. 2 [6] Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is) its having as its qualifier, a property which is not the counterpositive of a relational absence (samsargabhavaprati- yoginf located in the substantive; for there would be under- pervasion in the true cognition “The badara is red” (about a black badara ); because that true cognition is predicated of redness which is a property which is the counterpositive of a prior absence (pragabhavapratiyogin) located in the badara . 4 Moreover, (the above definitions are not tenable because) there would be underpervasion in the true collective cogni- tion (samuhdlambanapramaf “These are a pot and a cloth”; for that cognition has, as its qualifier, clothness and potness absolute absence (antyantabhava) since it is perceived on the ground. Thus, the revised definition of trueness would include the cognition in question. 1 By the rule that the absolute absence ( atyantdbhdva ) of art object cannot occur in a substrate where the prior absence (pragabhava) of the same object is located. See Nydyasiddhantamuktavali, p. 98. 2 Here redness is not the counterpositive of the absolute absence (atyantdbhavapratiyogin) located in the substantive (the black badara) simply because the absolute absence of redness ( raktatyanta - bhava) cannot be spoken of in the black badara which possesses the prior absence of redness ( raktaprdgabhdva ). Relational absence (samsargabhava) here refers to prior absence ( pragabhava ). This modified definition prevents overpervasion in the error “This is now red” about a black badara thus: since the qualifier (redness) is the counterpositive of a prior absence (of redness) ( rakta - pragabhavapratiyogin) located in the substantive (the black badara ), it could be said that it (namely redness) is not a property which is not the counteipositive of that absence (raktapragabhavapratiyogin). 4 Redness, which is an effect (because it is something which is produced in the badara ), is the counterpositive of its prior absence ( pragabhavapratiyogin ). 5 A cognition which has several independent objects as its content. 58 Umdpati's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala which are the counterpositives of the absence located in the pot and the cloth.' There would also be underpervasion in the true cognition of conjunction ( samyogaprama ). [7] Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is its) non-deviation from (its) object ( arthdvyabhicdritva ). If non-deviation ( avyabhicdritva ) were to signify (the cogni- tion) not being present in a substrate which is not the substrate of the object 0 arthanadhikaranavrttitva ), there would be underpervasion (in a true cognition, for example that of a pot); for its operation (intellectual operation in the form of a pot) (in other words, a cognition) appears in the intellect, which is not a substrate of objects like pot; and (to prevent this underpervasion) if it (that is, non-deviation) were defined as ‘(the cognition) not being present in a substrate which is not a substrate of the relation with the object’ (arthasambandhanadhikarandvrttitva ) , 3 there would be overpervasion (in doubt and error) thus: since doubt and error occur in the intellect, which is a substrate of the relation with the object ( arthasambandha ), (it could be said that) they do not occur in that which is not its substrate (namely the substrate of the relation with the object). ' Which absence is perceived in the cognitions "The pot is not the cloth” and “The cloth is not the pot”. . , . , ^ The above definition of trueness would fail to include the true cognition “The tree has monkey-conjunction about a tree w * h a monkey sitting on its branch. Since conjunction (samyoga) is of incomplete occurrence ( avyapyavrtti ), that is to say, is s0 ( n ® thl "S which occurs in one part of an entity and not in another part of the same entity, it could be said that the tree has monk cogn?- well as the absence of monkey-conjunction. Thus, the above cogni tion has monkey-conjunction as its qualifier S positive of the absence of ‘monkey-conjunction delimited by the tree roots’ which is found in the substantive (the tree). 3 Though intellect is not a substrate of objects like pot, it is a s strate of intellectual operation, that is to say, of cognition. And since a content-container relation (vijayavi^^ between a cognition and the object which fea u ’ b _ could, through the cognition which arises in it, £ ‘Xt^us the strate of the relation with the object (urtAwamian^a) Jh^the modified definition would remove the underpervasion pointed abo . Translation 59 [8] Nor (is the trueness of a cognition its) having as its qualifier, a property (for example, silverness) which is present in the substantive (in the ‘this’ of the true cognition “This is silver”); for there would be overpervasion in the error “These are two fires” about a collection of fire and a heap of gunja' and in the error of inversion (y yatyasta- bhrama) (about the same), “These are a heap of gunja and fire”. 1 2 [9] Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is its) not having something as its substantive which is not the substrate of the qualifier (of that cognition); for there would be underpervasion in a true collective cognition ( samuhd - lambanapranu 5). 3 [10] Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is its) having a property as the qualifier, while having ‘something possessing that property’ as the substantive, for there would be underpervasion in the true cognition Here (in the pot) potness” because it does not have a substantive possessing pot. 4 And there would be overpervasion in the erroneous cognition “pot” in potness. 5 Therefore the state of 1 A red berry which is generally used as a measure of weight by ^ Because these two errors have fireness as the qualifier and fireness is present in the substantive referred to by the expression ‘these . •' The cognition, “These are a cloth and a pot”, about a pot and a cloth, has a pot and a cloth as the substantive which are not the sub- strate of the qualifiers of that cognition, namely clothness and ^ A^the possessive suffix vant in the expression tadvat signifies something which is a substrate ( adhikarana ), the substantiate (refereed to by the word tadvat) is required to be the substrate of die qualifier according to the definition of trueness; but potness, which is the substantive of the above cognition, cannot be the substrate of pot (which is the qualifier of the above cognition) nor of any other qualifier. Thus the definition is defective. . . 5 This cognition would be true according to the definition because it has potness as its qualifier while having a pot P? sses ®“^JV property (namely potness) as the substantive. But it is enonaxis because a pot does not exist in potness; qualities, genus, etc. exist in a substance and not vice versa. 60 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala possessing truth [yatharthakatva ) (of a cognition) cannoi be explained. , . . . • [11] It is replied that the trueness (of a cogni ion) having a particular property as the qualifier, while being delimited by the fact of having as the substantive, something which possesses that particular qualifier (as its property) or a relation with it, which (property and relation) are being ap- prehended ( ullikhyamana ) as not delimited by a property contrary to them. 1 [12] The purpose of the clause ‘not delimited by a property contrary to them’ is to prevent overpervasion (of I the definition of trueness) in the (erroneous) cognition ( e tree possesses) monkey-conjunction at the roots”, which (cognition) has a substantive (namely the tree) which possesses the property ‘monkey-conjunction delimited by the branch’. It should not be said that this overpervasion could be prevented by the clause ‘delimited by the property which is the delimitor of its own presence’ 3 and that the words ‘not’ and ‘contrary’ are redundant; for they are required to prevent underpervasion in the (true) cognition “Tree possesses monkey-conjunction”, which does not refer ' Thus the trueness of the cognition “This is silver would consist in its having silverness as its qualifier while having as its subslant ve. sUver which is qualified by silverness or related to silverness also these (qualifier and relation) should not be delimited, respectively, y apropertywhich is not silverness and by a relation which is not be- S'ddimW by a ****£»*£ which is qualified by and connected to monkey-conjunction, as i substantive. But since the substantive ya bLfasya — tasydtah kartur evopakdritd). Finally and «> nstram the - p if to undergo experience as destined and timed by its karma , {see Pauskara 5 23 b -24 Tkalah pravrttam evanum kalayaty atmavrtnbhih // niyattica ftwA6 kLaphak ni -num / lasmm myvnkalm ca ^Bes^eTtoM^tc^which are the subtle creation of maya specific to JSfiit iSs.it aiso acquires h*. «c. £*£«• to atmand sthita. These internal and external means help the self to re cover its faculties and to know and act in bondage. ' Mala, in no manner, can modify cit-sakti which is sciousness. It can only obstruct its capaci ity. Suni arly. kah, the senses, etc. too cannot affect the nature of cit-Sakti, ^^they only part y remove mala-obstruction and allow it to connect w.th objects wd to function. This is said to be the manifestation of the cit-§akti ot bound self. Translation 107 ksam ity ukt am, it is called perception. Cit-sakti reposes in itself because it is obstructed by mala; although i kald, etc. and the sense of sight, etc. are subsequently instrumental in manifesting consciousness, they cannot be accepted as the principal pramana because they are insentient. Such is the meaning. But then, how does cit-sakti acquire contact with external objects by mere self-manifestation ? Also, how does it come to be known as perception by mere connection with objects, which also exists in the case of objects which are inferred, etc. ?' [The author] answers aksam, etc.; aksam, the sense, such as the sense of sight. The contact of cit-£akti with exter- nal object is made possible through the operation of the appropriate instrument (like the senses, invariable concomi- tance, words, etc.) and, conditioned by these (instruments), it acquires the appellation such as perception. Thus, cit-sakti, free from doubt, etc., when conjoined with objects through the senses, is (the pramana) named perception. The same is to be understood with regard to inference, etc. [The author] declares that, as in the case of the senses, the sense-object contact too cannot be considered pramana, na ca, etc. indri- yarthamdtrasya samyogah , mere contact of the sense and the object, cannot be considered perception. [The author] explains why it is so, cit, etc.; yatah, due to; akimcit- karatd, the ineffectiveness, the absence of the capacity of revealing objects for those sense-object contacts which are insentient by nature and devoid of association with con- sciousness; therefore,- they cannot be admitted as pramana. Such is the meaning. ' In other words, the same cit-sakti is named as different pramanas as pratyaksa, anumana, etc., but this distinction cannot be due to its connection with objects because connection with objects is common to all pramanas. 108 Umapati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala [53] [The author] classifies tte perception defined above into two kinds, as indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determi- nate ( savikalpaka ), and explains. That one (cit-)sakti is said to be twofold due to connection with determining factors. The cogni- tion of mere objects is indeterminate (percep- tion); that (cognition of objects) along with (their) connection with name, universal, etc. is determinate (perception). (27-28") Sa, that, cit-sakti; although ekd, one; vikalpayogat, due to connection with determining factors, such as name, universal, etc. (of the object).' This also refers to the absence of connection with them. In other words, owing to its connection, or absence of connection with determining factors; dvividham, twofold, it (namely cit-sakti, which is perception) is said to be of two kinds, as determinate percep- tion and indeterminate perception; the word dvividham is an adverb. [The author] defines indeterminate perception, vas- tu, etc. The expression ‘mere’ excludes (connection with) name, universal, etc., thus preventing overpervasion (of the definition) with regard to determinate perception. [54] Although its existence (namely that of indeterminate perception) cannot be proved through perception because it is beyond the senses, 2 it can be proved by the (following) 1 Just as the determinate perception Devadatta arises about a person because he is connected with the name Devadatta, so also the cogm- tTons f cow' “white”, “staff-bearing” and “walks” occur because the contents of these cognitions are connected respectively, with cowness (a universal), white Colour (a quality), staff (a substance) and walking (an action) which are determining factors. , f n i Indeterminate perception, which is an awareness devoid of all qualifying attributes, cannot be cognized because th e P r esence of an attribute, which differentiates one cognition from another is ■ for a cognition to be known by another cognition. Its existence only be inferred. This thesis is generally attributed to a group of Naiyayikas. See TC, vol. 1, p. 817. Translation 109 inference: 1 “The first produced qualified cognition (janya - visistajnana ) about Devadatta (that is to say the qualified perception “This is Devadatta” arising for the very first time) is caused by a produced (prior) cognition of a qualification { janyavisesanajnanajanya )\ 2 because it is a produced qualifi- ed cognition; like inferential cognition, etc.”. 3 The force of the word ‘first’, which is the attribute of the subject of the inference (paksa ), establishes (to prevent infinite regress) that the cognition (of a qualification) which produces (the above determinate cognition) is devoid of a qualifier (. nisprakdraka ); (and that is indeterminate perception). For ' This inference proves that since every qualified cognition is produced from the cognition of qualification, determinate perception which is a qualified cognition, also is produced from the cognition of qualification. It is further held that this cognition of qualification, which produces determinate cognition, has to be indeterminate be- cause if it were determinate, and by consequence qualified, it would depend on the cognition of its own qualification, leading to infinite regress. This passage of the commentary differs from the point of view of the Pauskara expressed here and in another part of the text. Accord- ing to the Pauskara , indeterminate perception is that which grasps mere objects. The sense connects with objects in this type of percep- tion, but the mind, which focuses attention on a particular object and identifies the determining factors, does not yet function; hence the perception is indeterminate. Moreover, according to the Pauskara , indeterminate perception is perceived by the self through vidyd. See Pauskara 5.15: kimcaksavastusamyogad yo bodho nirvikalpakah / sa ca vidyatmako jheyo buddhes tatrapravrttitah . 2 The cognition of the qualification is said to be the cause of qualified cognition because a qualified cognition ( visistajnana ) cannot arise without a prior cognition of the qualification ( visesanajnana ). For example, a person who does not know a staff cannot have the qualified cognition “The staff-bearing Devadatta”. 3 In this inference, the subject (paksa ) is ‘The first produced qualified cognition about Devadatta’, the thing to be proved (sddhya) is ‘is caused by a produced prior cognition of qualification’, the reason (hetu) is ‘because it is a produced qualified cognition’, and the ex- ample (drstdnta) is ‘like inferential cognition, etc.*. Just as the infer- ence “The hill is fiery” is produced from the cognition of the fire which qualifies the hill, the qualified cognition “This is Devadatta” about a person also is caused by the cognition of the qualification, namely ‘devadatta-hood’, which qualifies thaf person. U31UM uondaaiad aiBuiuuaiap am ui aAijireisqns aqi sb jo Jagiimb aqi sb jainia aSreuia pinoo qoiqM ‘uoudaoiad aiBUiuuaiapui aqi ui umou^ ioadsB ub 01 jaiai ppoo Dtnsuvfoqqn pjom aqi JO 681 ' d l lPP um t -o/Codu aac uoijBoyirenb jo aMiUBisqns aqi are Xaqi jaqPM M luauioui 1BU1 IB u/v\oux iaX l'ou SI 11 qSnoqi ‘uoudaoiad aiBuiuuaiapui aqi ui nozmSoo are uotidaaiad aiBuiuuaiap aonpoid qoiqM sasrreo aqi n B aAaiiaq oum (sB^sajiBA aqpaidurexa joj) asoqi oi SuipJoooB si spy, t •' ‘ j3yi|Bnb jo api sii ui uoiiBoyqBnb aqi jo uoiquSoo aui aq li reqi paiinbai iou si ii inq uoiiBoyqBnb b jo uoyiuSoo E uiojj paonpojd si uomuSoo payipnb b reqi pres si q ‘spjOM Jaqio ui ■(vumiMupvs) paAoad aq oi Suiqi aqi jo uoyiuSoo aqi jo uuoj aqi ui sT( vunufvuvsasiA) uoiiBoyqBnb b jo uoyiuSoo aqi ‘ajaq puy , luaiuoo sii SB ^uoiiBoijipnb aqi puB aAiiUBisqns aqi) qjoq sBq uoyiuSoo aiBUiuuaiapui asnBoaq (uoyiuSoo paijqBnb jo).astiBa b sb aAijuBjsqns b jo uoyiuSoo aqi SuydaooB ui uuBq ou si ajaqi lBqi pajaMSUB si ii joj ( vuyufnisisiA ) uoyiuSoo paijipnb Xjoao jo astiBO b si ooi ( ouvufvKsastA) (pafqo aqi jo uoiiiuSoa aqi ‘si lBqi) aAyuBisqns b jo uoiiiuSoa aqi lBqi aAOJd pjnoM Suiuosboj aAoqB aqi ‘uoiiiuSoa pyuaiajui jo astiBa b si (vuvufosyvd) laafqns aqi jo uoiiiuSoa aqi aouis lBqi pres aq iou ppoqs li [9Sl •asuB iou pjnoAi .paAOid aq oi Suiqi aqi jo luaiayap Swiaq (ajduiBxa gqj) t jo laajap aqi puB '.(vuoufvuvsdStA) uoiiBOijijBnb B JO* uoiiiuSoa B puB ( vuDufDjsistA. ) uoyiuSoo paijipnb b Oi XjddB osjb pinoM (uoiiBoijyBnb b jo uoiiiuSoa b si qoiqM) ( vuvuMqpys ) paAOjd aq oi Suiqi aqi jo uoiiiuSoa b puB (uoiiiuSoa paijipnb b si qoiqM) ( vupufptumuo) uoiiiuSoa (Biiuajajui ub uaaMiaq Suysixa uoiiBjaJ jBsnBa aqi ‘„(nXi tyiuys) spsjaAiun aqi uaaMiaq ‘apBisqo Xub jo aauasqB aqi ui ‘sjiBAajd osjb (vszsm) sjBpoyjBd aqi uaaMiaq SuyiBAajd uoyBpj jBstiBa aqx„ uiixbiu aqi oi SuipJoaaB ‘aauajajui aAoqB aqi jo paAOjd aq oi Suiqi aqi aj 3 A\ .uoiiBaijqBnb b jo uoiiiuSoa b Suiaq sq jo anyiA Xq uoiiiuSoa lBqi uiojj paanpojd Suiaq, ji uaAa (:snqi pajaMSUB aq pjnoa uoyoafqo aqi) JO 'OAyoajap iou si aauajajui aqi ‘uuoj jaqio Xub ui luasajd aq pinoo , uoiiiuSoa lBqi uiojj paanpojd Suiaq, ‘aauis puy \uoyBoijiiBnb b jo uoyiuSoo UI uoyvjsuv-*! •(mu aqi Xiaureu laafqns aqi jo jayqBnb a*P « am •ajduiBxa ioj) noireS "^ t aq oi Suiqi aqi jo uoiiiuSoa aqi i P ^ si , u 0tJB3 yqBnbB J° Suiaq,) pa^ud aq oi Sinqi am, 8 „, Suiaq s,. JO anuu Xq (uo.reaijiptnb jo) uop.uSoa reqi Zn uaanpoid Sure,,, loo pun .uoirea.j.IBnb « jo uoiiraSoo « U.OJ1 paonpold 3uiaq, aAOJd 01 sqass (pej ut) oouaiojm slip •PmLsub si uoiioafqo aqi .qwppfcdoSapm) aopaa^b a jo uoiiiuSoa u si qaiq* reqi uioi, iou pus Imwuf^pp l pa AOJd aq o, Suiqi aqi JO uoiiiuSoa aqi si qaiq* reqi UKUJ P» -aupoid si uoiiiuSoa pmuaiajut toaa joj .P -AOid aq oi Suiqi aqi jo luaiaijap, si aiduresa si. asuBaaq aa. -laajap s, aauaiaju, sup req, paiaalqo a, A. 1! areuituiaiapu, XjauiBU) auiBS aq, u. s, (usqurf) laafqns aqi in .paijunub, pio» aqi panoid Suiaq l ui* uoudaaiad areu.uuaiapu, o, preSai q,.« uo.sBMad -laao luaaaid o, s. (»aq aq, in) .paijirenb, )» •!« ,o uoiiiuSoa aqi itjaureu) uoiiiuSoa aures aq, o, preSai ipi« io, reuap luaaL o, s, (nre,) uosua, aq, u. .paanpoid, pio» aqi B 1 BA 5 I JO uoiiiuSoa aq, o, aauaiaju, aqi JO uoireaqddB a 5 f,uaA»!d o, si l-W panoid aq o, Suiq, aq, uj^pa ■aupoid pio» aqi (paanpoid iou are ‘iBuiaia Suiaq qa.q»J Z-l,a pub bibas, jo uoiiiuSoa aq, o, preSai qq* uoisnaiad llTno luauald ol's. (vi^vd aq, ui) .paanpoid, l»» aji, suomaid b u, u»ouq uaaq aunq iou p,noa uosiad s,q ioj' quo.idaaiad pa.j!,Bnb sup jo asuBa aqi Suiaq < 1 ™ aiaq papuaiui laafqns aq, Suiaq U.01J squiq loud u, paiinbaB Xiou.au. sapnpsa (ui?W aq, ui) .BirepBaaQ, P J0 * •pajaquiauiaj aq oi piBS aq iquuBO li puB iSBd aqi u, paouauadxa iou sbm ,pooq-BiiB P BAap, joj Xq oasnBa aq oi pauirep aq Iouubo (.pooq-BUB P BAap, Xpuinu) II Xq paijipnb uoydaojad isjij aqi Xjouiaui sapnpxa aauajajui siqi ‘(.ISJIJ, PJOM aqi Xq P^JH^b si aauajajui 3 qi jo vbpd aqi asnBaaq ‘Xbs oi si pqi) uosboj aures aqi vjvivdvupwvudvut^snvj zy uo “"junc- tion cannot arise with regard to the latter because it is bereft of dimen- sion and visible qualities. . , „ n to t K e 4 It may be objected that samyoga too is not the conn ^ t,<3 " ^ed perception of substances because a pot in a dark room ** ” .{*" the through samyoga . It is replied that samyoga is the conne , ved perception of only those substances which are P? ^ ( yogya ), and that a pot in a dark room is not P erc ^ eiv ^ ' non-perception of a pot in the dark is not an obstacle to the acceptance of samyoga as the connection to perceive substances. 1 20 Umapati *s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala qualityness inheres in the quality which inheres in the pot, etc. with which the sense of sight conjoins. Sabdasya , of sound, since t-he sense of hearing is made up of ether (which is a substance) and since sound is its quality; as the contact between a quality and a substance is inherence, the perception of sound by the sense of hearing is through inherence. [65J But then, it may be objected that there is no evidence whatsoever to (prove the existence of) inherence ( samava - ya ).' It is answered that the following inference is the proofs “The cognition ‘that blue pot’ has a connection (between the object and its qualification) as its content ( sambandhavisaya - ka), or is produced by a connection (between the object and its qualification) ( sambandhanimittaka ); 3 4 because it is a cog- nition of a qualified object; like the cognition ‘the staff- bearing man’ The defect of ‘(the reason) not being dif- ferent from the thing to be proved’ (sadhyavisesa) does not arise here (in this inference) because ‘being that’ (that is to ' This objection could be ascribed to the Bhattas, who do not admit inherence as an independent category and consequently, reject connection involving inherence. See Manameyodaya , pp. 16-17. : This inference proves that just as the qualified cognition “the staff- bearing man” has a connection (between the man and the staff) as its content or, is produced by that connection, the cognition “blue pot too has a connection (between the pot and the colour) as its content or, is produced by that connection. It is then shown that this connection cannot be conjunction ( samyoga ) which connects only separable substances. Hence a connection which connects two in- separable entities ( ayutasiddha ) such as a subtance and its quality, etc., is established, and that is inherence. This explanation of Umapati follows that of the later Naiyayikas. According to the Pauskara however, as stated in verses 35 b and 36\ inherence is known through perception, either as a qualification ( visesana ) or as a substantive (yisesya). 3 The second thing to be proved ( sddhya ) by this inference, namely ‘is produced by a connection’, also intends to prove that the cognition “blue pot” is produced by a connection between the object (pot) and its qualification (blue colour). As the law of parsimony requires that effects of the same nature should be produced from the same cause, it is proved that cognitions like “blue pot” are produced by a single cause, which is inherence. Translation 121 say ‘being a cognition of a qualified object’, which is the reason of this inference) signifies ‘being a cognition which apprehends a qualification’ ( visesanagocarabuddhitva ), or ‘being a cognition which is produced from the cognition of a qualification’ ( visesanajnanajanyabuddhitva ).' It may (also) be objected that, since this inference (also) proves the rela- tion of self-linking-connection ( svarupasambandha ), it is de- fective of ‘proving something other than what it proposes to prove’ 0 arthantara ); * 2 and if, (to avoid this defect), it were said that it (namely the inference) does not concern a rela- tion which is not a qualification-object relation ( visesanavi - sesyasambandha), it would exclude cognition qualified by absence ( abhavavisistabuddhi ) (from its scope). 3 It is answer- ed that self-linking-connections, which are of the form of the qualification or the object, are infinite, whereas the above inference based on parsimony ( laghava ) establishes a single connection (namely samavaya) common to quality, action, etc. 5 It cannot be said that, in the cognition qualified by absence ( abhavavisistabuddhi ) too, the same reason would ' The objection is that the reason ( hetu ) and the thing to be proved ( sddhya ) are not different because a qualified cognition also has a connection as its content, or is produced from it. It is replied that the reason of this inference concerns a qualification and not a connection. 2 The above inference could be said to be overpervasive because it also applies to self-linking-connection ( svarupasambandha ), which it does not intend to prove. Self-linking-connection is that which exists between two entities which .onnect to each other without requiring a connection other than themselves. . . 3 The cognition of absence, which has a connection as its content, should form part of the thing to be proved (sddhya) by this inference. But the modified definition would exclude it from the above demonstration because the connection between an absence an i s substrate is a self-linking-connection (svarupasambandha) ana not the connection of qualification-object ( visesanavisesya ). Thus, tne inference could be said to be underpervasive. 4 Because objects and qualifications are infinite. 3 That is to say, this inference also proves the existence o self- linking-connections, but the law of pars 1 mon y which is should be rejected because they are infinite, and inherence, which one, should be accepted. 1 22 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala prove that inherence is the relation of absence (with objects, etc .). 1 For if this were the case, as the absolute absence (of a pot) would inhere in the pot-halves, on the destruction of the inherent cause (namely the pot-halves), the absolute absence (of the pot) too would be destroyed 2 (and the destroyed pot would reappear). [66] But then the above inference, with ‘the cognition qualified by absence ( Ubhavavisistabuddhi )’ as its subject, would also prove ‘being qualified’ ( vaisistya ) to be another connection of absence (with objects, etc.) as held by the Bhattas. 3 This (objection) is answered. If that (yaisistya) were identical in all absences, the cognition “The ground without a pot” would arise about a ground which was previously potless, but which has a pot at the time of the cognition. It is thus: although the absence of pot which existed before (the pot was brought in) is eternal, it is not cognized in the presence of the pot due to lack of connection (with absence). But if vaisistya were that connection and if it were held to be identical (in all absences), later (in the presence of the pot), following the awareness of the absence of pot (which continues to exist, being eternal), ‘being qualified by the absence of pot’ (ghatabhavavaisistya ) also would be present; and there would be the cognition of that (absence of pot) (through the connection vaisistya). And if vaisistya were nu- merous, the connection could as well be of the form of qualification ( visesana ) or substantive ( visesya ), which is al- ready accepted by all, a superfluous connection named vaisistya need not be assumed. Thus, as there is no obstacle 1 In other words, the inference “The cognition ‘the absence of pot’ has a relation as its content, etc.” would also prove that inherence is the relation between an absence and its substrate. 2 By the rule that the destruction of the inherent cause should lead to the destruction of the effect which is connected to its cause by inherence. 3 Some Bhatta MImarnsakas believe that an object is connected to absence by a relation named vaisistya. See Mimamsdkutuhala , pp. 29- 31. Translation 123 to (the inference that establishes) inherence, it is proved to exist. It should not be said that the admission of inherence (as the connection) to quality, etc. would contradict the theory which recognizes identity ( tadatmya ) (to be the con- nection) in the elements; 1 for, whether tadatmya and inher- ence are believed to be identical or distinct, there is no con- flict (with the above theory). 2 [67] Sabdatvam, soundness, the cognition of soundness; samavetasamavayat , inherence-in-what-is-inherent is the con- nection to perceive soundness since it inheres in sound, which is inherent in the sense of hearing. The cognition of absence and inherence is, visesanataya , as a qualification, that is, through the connection of the nature of a qualifica- tion, as “The ground has the absence of a pot”, “The thread has inherence with the cloth”, etc. Or, visesyatvena, as a substantive, it is through the connection of the nature of a substantive when the cognition is “The absence of a pot on the ground” and “The inherence of colour in the pot”. [68] But then (it may be objected by some that), it cannot be said that absence is cognized through the connection of the nature of a qualification ( visesana ) or a substantive (vise- sya). 3 Since the awareness (pratiti ) of absence and verbal reference (y yavahara) to absence arise inseparably connected with its substrate, cognition, or temporal relation, there is r.o evidence to prove that absence is an independent entity. It is answered that (absence is different from these because) absence is experienced as invariably associated with its counterpositive, whereas substrate, etc. do not possess a ' The Bhatta MImarnsakas and Advaitins believe that tadatmya con- nects universal, qualities, etc. to objects. See MJina m eyo ay , pp. 15 and 296; Sankara’s Bhasya on Brahmasutra 2.1.18, £ 2 Because tadatmaya in their doctrine serves the same purp %*£»«*» being defended against the crWds^. may be attributed to the Prabhakara Mimamsakas^ _ that ' n need different from its substrate, etc., and that a distinct not be admitted. 1 24 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala counterpositive. The distinction (of absence) into four kinds, as prior-absence (prdgabhava ), etc., which is the content of cognitions such as “will come into being”, is experienced; this does not happen with regard to substrate, etc. Further, if an absence were not different from its substrate, the state of being the support and the supported ( adharadheyabhava ) (between the substrate and absence), which is irrefutably experienced in the cognition “There is absence of pot on the ground”, would be unintelligible. And, if absence were the same entity as the cognition and temporal relation of absence, the visual perception “(Now) there is no pot on the ground” would be inexplicable. 1 Moreover, if an absence were identical with its substrate, the absence of a pot would be perceived even on the ground with a pot on it. It should not be said that the substrate in question (which is said to be identical with absence) is the bare substrate; for it may be retorted that the notion of bareness, without reference to an absence, is incomprehensible. [69] Now (some others may object that), absence could be an independent entity; yet, it cannot be said that absence is perceived by the senses 2 because there is no evidence to prove that ‘being a qualification’ ( visesanata ) is the connec- tion in that perception. It cannot be said (by those who hold that absence is perceived by the senses) that conformity to the co-presence and co-absence {anvayavyatirekanuvidhana ) of the senses 3 is the proof, for it (namely the function of the co-presence and co-absence of the senses) ceases as soon as the cognition of the substrate (of absence) is produced. ^ It is like the cognition of air according to the Naiyayikas, who ' Because cognition and time are not visible. _ 2 This objection may be attributed to the Bhatta Mimamsakas, who believe that though absence is an independent category, perception is not the means to cognize it because it is imperceptible. A distinct pra- mana named non-apprehension (.anupalabdhi) must be accepted to cognize absence. See Manameyodaya, pp. 133 sqq. 3 In other words, the cognition of absence arises when the senses function and it does not arise when the senses do not function. Translation •J;r ■' ■ '125 V . \ believe that the role of the co-presence and co-absence of2™ if** vastubf * *™ah, because of the state so ,S so 3 5 b ? CaUSe h is a product - That which is ,y ha ' hkC: kulalasa P ek ^ d m n, mud dependent on a potter, mud handled by a potter; this reason is anvayt, positive, means, it is an only-positive reason.' to provl th’ H may ^ ° bjeCted * hat this (reason which aims to prove the existence of God) cannot be an only-positive Vbe^o eCaUSe t ? e thing to be Pfoved ( sddhya ), namely (becoming an effect) being supervised by someone’, is though 7h iH egard l ° (thC b ° dy °° God ‘ 2 11 is re P be d that gh the thing to be proved is absent in the case of God of God T 1,01 kn ° Wn 31 thC timC ° f Pr ° ving the existe nce of God, the presence of the above feature, namely ‘being evoid of a dissimilar instance’, is not an obstacle (to th2 inference). It should not be objected that this reason deviates •n the case of God; as the deviation was not known before proving the existence of God, it does not impede the erence, and that knowledge (of deviation) is of no rrr: the inference * drawn - 11 ^d not be said that the above inference is fallacious because it is produced from a reason which is actually devious, 4 for its IStlipsSraS |y. dr. ° fms "s*" 1 C ««***■ defective reason rbein * a P rod “ cl ') of the inference is SuXZTJL ? God ' 5 tody) where ihe lhin“ “ 4 Because P rhic i i in ® by a conscious agent’) is absent Of a vipaksa, actu^^Y^ 0 "’ Whkh “ SUpP ° Sed 10 devoid Translation 149 validity arises from the irrefutable nature of the subject (namely God), Or it may be understood that the word punah (in the verse) refers to (the well-known) only-positive rea- sons (of inferences) such as “Pot is namehble, because it is a product”, “[Pot is nameable], because it is a substance ”. 1 Thus, while the feature ‘being devoid of a dissimilar in- stance’ is intended, there is no defect if ‘possessing an only- positive concomitance’ also is implied. Kdryam, effect; sad eva, being existent, every effect; utpadyate , arises, while existing (in its cause); the reason because it is produced’ means, ‘because it is an pbject of action; dharmamsah 2 purvam as an, an effect which is not pre-existent (in the cause); na kriyate, cannot be produced, an effect which does not pre-exist cannot be- come an object of action just as a hare’s horn, etc. (cannot become an object of action ). 3 The words ‘this reason is only- negative’ are to be supplied (to the verse). (It is only- negative) because it does not have a similar instance. This same inference is, accordingly, the example also of sdmd- nyatodrsta and visesatodrsta-, it is not mentioned separately. While it is possible to have a positive vyapti ‘whatever is a nroHurt whatever ,s a substance, is nameable; lZ a piY of doth' it X Sua k neg f ve y°Pti ‘whatever is not nameable, is not a the r substance because everything is namenble; and in * f £- nce of i!f ch vyapti, a vipaksa which could demonstrate it can- not be shown. Thus, they are only-positive reasons. Literally, that whose aspects are manifest’, for according to the p “p^iZv, n °“" 8 b “' m “‘ fe!t ' d f °"" ° f i0 lI? e Jhein 0f ,? e infere J lce (Paksa) includes all effects and a sapa- ■ ’ where the dung to be proved could be observed as positively connected with the reason, cannot be shown. Therefore, this reason is only-negative. Since a single inference cannot illustrate both sdmdnyatodrsta and visesatodjsta reasons, the reference is perhaps to the inferences mentioned in verses 47 - 49 . The positive-negative inference clearly contains a sdmdnyatodrsta reason because it leads to the inference of '^Wluch is perceptible. The other two reasons may be held to produce inferences of imperceptible entities. Positive-negative reason is sometimes identified with sdmdnyatodrsta , and only-positive and 1 50 Umapati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala [88] Having thus discussed reason, since (inferential) cognition depends on the cognition of the (reason), [the author] examines fallacious reasons, each characterized by the absence of one of the five features (of reason) described above. 1 Fallacies of reason are held to be five here in the Saiva doctrine ( sivdgama ). Unestablishedness ( asiddhi ) is the first; it arises from the uncertainty of the presence of the reason in the subject. Unestablishedness in (the inference) “Atoms are the (material) cause (of the universe); because they are eternal” is due to the nature (of the reason). Due to the unestablished- ness of the attribute, substantive, etc., arise the corresponding (fallacies of unestablishedness). ( 50 - 51 ) Hetundm dusandni , fallacies of reason, causes which impede inferential cognition; atra sivagame pahca, are five here in the Saiva doctrine. They (namely reasons vitiat- ed by these fallacies also) are classified into five as, the un- established ( asiddha ), contradictory ( viruddha ), deviating {anaikantika), counterbalanced (prakaranasama) and untime- only-negative respectively with purvavat and sesavat which are also known as visesatodrsta. See Nydyabhusana on Nydyasdra , p. 190. Jhanapraka£a*s commentary (PauskaraV, p. 863), which is not explicit, seems to suggest that each of the three reasons can be drsta and sdmdnyatodrsta depending on their specific and general nature: drstam samanyatah drstam vaksyamanahetutrayasya visesena sddha - ranena ca. 1 Thus, the reason which is not the attribute of the paksa is asiddha , that which is absent from a sapaksa is viruddha , that which is present in a vipaksa is savyabhicdra , that which is contradicted is badhita and that which has a counterbalancing reason is prakarana- sama. While this is true with regard to the fallacies recognized by Umapati in the commentary, and as defined by him, it should be noted that the fallacies and their definitions in the Pauskara concern only the first three features of reason, not five. Translation 151 ly ( kdlatyayapadista ); ! (these are five) because (the fallacy named) ‘unestablishedness due to the absence of cognition’ ( ajhandsiddhi ) is subsumed in unestablishedness ( asiddhi ) and (the fallacy named) inconclusive ( arvadhyavasita ) in de- viating (, savyabhicdra , that is, anaikantika). But then, as virud- dha and savyabhicdra (which vitiate inference by unsettling the pervasion) could be subsumed in ‘unestablished due to pervasion’ ( vyapyatvasiddha ) (which also vitiates inference by unsettling the pervasion), why is it said that they (that is, fallacious reasons) are fivefold ? This objection is replied: al- though there is commingling within an entity (having mul- tiple attributes) (here the reason), since the attributes which constitute vitiating fallacies (in this case) are clearly specified (to be five), it (namely reason also) is said to be fivefold. 2 [89] Of these, [the author] defines the (fallacy named) un- established {asiddhi). Hetoh, of the reason, of the mark ( lihga ), the pervaded; paksavrtteh aniscaye , when there is uncertainty of the presence in the subject, uncer- tainty of its being the attribute of the paksa\ and here, uncer- tainty is the absence of certainty (and not doubt); prathamah , the first, fallacy named asiddhi arises. Asiddhi is the ab- sence of the certitude of the pervasion of the mark and (the absence of the certitude) of its being the attribute of the pa- ksa (paksadharmatd ). But this definition is according to others’ doctrine ( matdntara ). 3 According to our own doc- trine (, svamata ), however, asiddhi is mere non-presence of 1 While anadhyavasayika is a distinct fallacy according to the Pau- skara , Umapati subsumes it in savyabhicara-anaikdntika and intro- duces prakaranasama which is not recognized as a fallacy by the Pauskara. The definitions of viruddha , anaikantika (named savyabhi- cdra by Umapati) and kdlatita (named kdlatyayapadista and bddha by Umapati) proposed by Umapati differ from those of the Pauskara. Umapati also introduces varieties of asiddha and anaikantika which are not mentioned by the Pauskara. 2 That is to say, when a reason is affected by several fallacies, the same reason is considered to consist of as many fallacious reasons as the fallacies affecting it, because the fallacies affecting it are distinct. 3 For example, that of the VaiSesikas. See Kanadarahasya , p. 101. 1 52 Umapati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala the pervaded, namely the hetu, in the paksa . And this asiddhi is of four kinds: svarupasiddhi , vyapyatvasiddhi , asray asiddhi and jnanasiddhi. [The author] first explains svarupasiddhi with illustration, nityatvdt, etc. Anavah , atoms; hetuh, are the cause, the material cause of the universe; nityatvat , because they are eternal. Here the unestablishedness of the reason ‘eternity’; svarupatah asiddhih , is due to the nature; as atoms are numerous and inert, they are not eternal. 1 Such is the meaning. [The author] defines other kinds of asiddhis , visesana , etc. Of the attribute, namely pervasion, which is the attribute of consideration ( lihgavisesana ) 2 ; of the substantive, namely substrate, hill, etc., which is the substantive of consideration ( lihgavisesya ); the expression ‘etc.’ (in the verse) refers to the cognition of the pervasion and of the reason’s being the attribute of the subject (paksadharmatd ). From the unestab- lishedness of these (three) occur; tattaddtmika, the corres- ponding, unestablishedness, namely ‘unestablishedness due to the pervasion’ {vyapyatvasiddhi) , ‘unestablishedness due to the subject’ (asrayasiddhi) and ‘unestablishedness due to the (absence of the) cognition (of the vydpti, hetu and paksa which constitute consideration)’ (jnanasiddhi ). Of these, vya- pyatvasiddhi is of two kinds: caused by the absence of the means of apprehending the pervasion and caused by the presence of a vitiating condition ( upadhi ). The first is illus- 1 According to the Pauskara , the inference “That which is numerous and inert, is non-etemal; like pot, etc.” proves that atoms are non- eternal. See Pauskara 6.277‘: anekam yaj jadam vastu vastv asat tad ghatddivat. 2 The Pauskara refers to the attribute and substantive of reason (hetu). But Umapati interprets them as the attribute and substantive of consideration (pardmarsa ) in order to introduce four varieties of asiddhi. Thus, the expression lihga in the commentary refers not to hetu , but to lihgaparamarsa, namely the cognition that the hetu qualified by the vydpti is the attribute of the paksa', for example, the cognition that the hill possesses smoke which is invariably connected with fire. As it will be seen shortly, Umapati subsumes asiddhi due to the attribute and substantive of reason, in svarupasiddhi . Translation 153 / trated by (the inference) '‘The earth is scratchable with a hare’s horn; because it is earthen”; 1 the second, by “Injury caused during the agnistoma sacrifice l&ads to demerit; because it is an injury; like any other injury”, in which ‘un- prescribedness’ is the vitiating condition. 2 Reason qualified by irrelevant attribute, such as ‘blue smoke’, also is subsum- ed in the same ( vyapyatvasiddhi ). 3 Asrayasiddhi is illustrated by (the inference) “The sky- lotus is fragrant; because it is a lotus; like the terrestrial- lotus”. 4 ‘Proving that which is already proved’ (siddhasa- dhana) also is subsumed in asrayasiddhi. 5 Jhanasidddhi is unestablishedness due to (the absence of) the cognition of (reasons such as) smoke; for example, when smoke, etc. are not known to have a vydpti and to be the attribute of the paksa. Unestablishedness due to the attribute ( visesana ) and substantive (visesya) of hetu should be considered svarupd - siddhi, while the unestablishedness due to the attribute, etc. of paksa is to be subsumed in asrayasiddhi. Thus, the hetu is ‘unestablished due to the attribute (of the hetu) y ( visesana - 1 The hetu is unestablished because a vydpti involving a hare’s horn, which does not exist, cannot be known. 2 As only that injury which is not prescribed by the scripture is said to lead to demerit, this hetu, whose connection with the sddhya depends on a condition, is fallacious. Unprescribedness (avihitatva) is the upadhi in this inference because it co-exists with the sddhya (wherever there is unprescribedness, there is demerit) but it does not always exist with the hetu (injury) because unprescribedness is absent in the case of sacrificial injury (which is prescribed). 3 The hetu in the inference “The hill is fiery; because it has blue smoke” is vydpyatvasiddha because the pervasion is between’ smoke and fire and not between blue smoke and fire; blueness is irrelevant to the inference. 4 The hetu (‘being a lotus’) does not occur in the paksa (sky-lotus) of this inference because sky-lotus does not exist 5 Since the paksa is already proved to have the sddhya, the two conditions which induce inference, namely the doubt about the presence of the sddhya in the paksa (sadhyasamdeha) and the desire to infer ( sisddhayisd ), are absent in siddhasadhana. In the absence of an entity which could serve as a paksa , the hetu is devoid of a substrate and is unestablished. i 1 54 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala siddha) in the inference “Sound is non-etemal; because it is a quality while being visible”; ‘unestablishedness due to the substantive (of the hetu)' ( visesydsiddhi ) arises when the same (reason) is inverted (‘because it is visible while being a quality’). 1 2 It should be understood that inferences such as “The golden hill has fire (because it has smoke)” illustrate ‘unestablishedness due to the attribute of the paksa ( asraya - visesanasiddhi)' ? All these (varieties of asiddhi) are indicated by the expression ‘of the respective nature’ (in the verse). 3 4 [90] [The author] defines contradictory reason ( viruddha ). The reason which is present in the subject and in a dissimilar instance is contradictory (viruddha). “The pervading is not all-pervasive; because it is not limited by space”. (52) The (word) connection is paksavipaksayor vartamano hetuh viruddhas sydt : the hetu which is present in the subject and in a dissimilar instance is contradictory. Here, the defini- tion of viruddha is, ‘presence only in a dissimilar instance’; the word ‘subject’ (in the verse), however, is to indicate that the hetu is also present in the subject in certain cases of viruddha* It should be noted that the word ‘only’ (mdtra) prevents the overpervasion (of this definition) in deviating reason which is too general (sadhai ananaikantika ) . 5 [The author] illustrates, vyapaka , etc.; vydpakah avyapakah, the ' The feature ‘being visible’, which is the attribute of the hetu in the first inference and the substantive of the hetu in the second inference, is absent in the paksa (because sound is invisible); thus, the hetu is unestablished. 2 The hetu (smoke) is not present in the paksa (golden hill) because a golden hill does not exist; the unestablishedness is due to the attribute of the paksa. 3 The Pauskara only refers to svarupasiddhi, visesandsiddhi and visesydsiddhi ; Umapati introduces vyapyatvasiddhi, asrayasiddhi and jhandsiddhi through this commentatorial device. 4 The Pauskara definition of viruddha is thus modified in the commentary. 5 While sadharananaikantika hetu occurs in similar as well as dissimilar instances, viruddha occurs only in dissimilar instances. This explanation only concerns Umapati’s definition of viruddha. Translation 155 pervading is not all-pervasive, “The pervading, self, etc. is not omnipresent; because it is not limited by space”. This hetu (‘because it is not limited by sp,pce’) is contra- dictory because, while striving to prove the absence of omnipresence, it exists only in dissimilar instances (that is, omnipresent entities). Likewise, the fallacy is viruddha when the attributes of the sadhya and those of the hetu contradict mutually as (in the inference) “The sandal-wood hill has fire; because it has non-fragrant smoke”. 1 [91] Deviating (savyabhicara) is of three kinds:^ 1 too general (sadharana), too specific (asadhdrana) and incon- clusive (anadhyavasita). Of these, [the author] defined and illustrates sadharana. Anaikdntika is that which is present in the three, the subject, etc. O twice-born! it is illustrated by (the inference) “The self is eternal; because it is knowable”. (53) Paksdditritaye , in the three, the subject, etc., among these; vartamdnah, that which is present, present in a similar instance and a dissimilar instance, is the anaikdntika which is too general (sadharana). It should be noted that the definition (of sadharana) is, ‘being present in a dissimilar instance while being present in a similar instance’; the clause ‘while (being present in a similar instance)’ is to prevent overpervasion in a viruddha reason, 3 and the substantive (of the definition, namely ‘being present in a dissimilar in- ' The attribute ‘non-ffagrant’ of the hetu is contradictory to ‘fragrant’ which would be the attribute of the sadhya, sandalwood fire. 2 The classification of savyabhicara into three kinds is introduced by Umapati, who also defines them. He interprets verse 53 to be the definition and example of sadharana-anaikdntika which he considers to be the first variety of savyabhicara. This verse of the Pauskara, however, defines and illustrates the fallacy of deviation (anaikdntika). 3 Which is present in a dissimilar instance but not in a similar instance. 156 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala stance’) is to prevent overpervasion in a valid reason. 1 [The author] illustrates, “The self is eternal”. The reason ‘be- ing knowable’ is sddhdrananaikantika because it is present both in a similar and dissimilar instances. 2 [92] [The author] defines asadharana and anadhyavasita . 3 Anadhyavasayika is that which does not lead to the thing to be proved, (that which is present) only in the subject. (54*) Sadhyaprayojakah , that which does not lead to the thing to be proved, (because it) is not pervaded by the sadhya , that is to say it does not co-exist with it. By this, it should be understood that the definition of inconclusive {an- adhyavasita) is, ‘that whose co-existence (with the sadhya ), which gives rise to the cognition of pervasion, is not known’. This same (fallacy) is also known as anupa- samharin. Paksa eva , only in the subject, that which is present (only in the paksa); ‘in spite of having a similar instance’ is to be added to the verse; thus, the definition of too specific ( asadharana ) is, ‘that which is present only in th z paksa while having a similar instance’. The phrase ‘while (having a similar instance)’ is to prevent overpervasion in only-negative reason 4 and the word ‘only’ is to prevent overpervasion in a valid reason. 5 [93] [The author] illustrates anadhyavasita. 1 A valid reason is found in a similar instance but not in a dissimilar instance. 2 Because all eternal entities (which are similar instances) and non- eternal entities (which are dissimilar instances), are knowable. 1 Anadhyavasayika is the third variety of fallacy according the Pauskara. It is defined in verse 54 a and illustrated in 54 b . But Umapati, who names it anadhyavasita , considers it a variety of sa- vyabhicdra. He makes verse 54“ yield the definitions of anadhyava- sita and asadharana and interprets 54 b as an example of anadhyava- sita. 4 An only-negative reason is not present in a similar instance because it has none; asadharana has a similar instance but is not present in it. ■ A positive-negative reason exists in the subject and a similar instance. Translation 157 It is illustrated by (the inference) '“Universe exists constantly; because it is a product”. (54V Visvam, universe, everything; santatyfrvartate , exists constantly, in succession, in the form of a manifold con- tinuous flow; vastutvat , because it is a product. Since everything is included in the subject (of this inference), the co-existence (of the hetu and sadhya) in presence and in absence, which produces the cognition of pervasion, cannot be known. 1 Hence it (that is, the reason) is inconclusive. ^The example of asddhdrandnaikdntika “The earth is eternal; because it has smell” 2 is not given (in the verse) because* it is well known. But then, it may be objected that the definition of asadharana is overpervasive in the valid (only-positive) reason of the inference “Sound is eternal; because it has soundness”. 3 This objection is answered: in case of favour- able reasoning ( anukulatarka ), where the sadhya is certain (to be present in the paksa), the paksa also serves as the sapaksa 4 and the feature ‘presence only in the paksa ’ does not apply; 5 but, where that certainty is absent, it (namely the reason) comes within the range of the definition (of asadharana ). Thus, the definition is not overpervasive. [94] [The author] defines the fallacy named bddha . 6 1 Since the paksa of the inference includes the entire universe, the reason (‘being a product’) does not have similar and dissimilar instances where its positive and negative connection with the sadhya (‘constant existence’) could be observed. 2 Smell exists neither in an eternal entity, which could be a similar instance, nor in a non-eternal entity, which could be a dissimilar instance; as the hetu exists only in the paksa (the earth), its relation with the sadhya cannot be known. Soundness exists neither in eternal entities, nor in non-eternal entities; it exists only in sound. 4 See Vadivinoda , p. 16. 5 Here the hetu has a similar instance {sapaksa) although it is not different from the subject (paksa). 6 Umapati differs from the Pauskara in interpreting the fallacy of kdldtita as bddha. Though kdldtlta (or kdldtyaydpadista) is often identified with bddha (see Nyayakosa , p. 233), these two are distinct fallacies (see, for example, Nydyasdra , p. 310). Umapati’s explan- 1 58 Umapati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala Whereas kaldtita occurs due to the contradiction of the subject (paksasya )' in the subject (pakse) by a pramana. “All effect is devoid of a material cause; because it is adventitious”. * 2 (55) Paksasya , of the subject, of the thing to be proved found in the subject (paksasthasadhya ), absence of heat, etc; 3 pakse , in the subject, fire, etc.; manavirodhatah , due to contradiction by a pramana, perception, etc., which reveal that heat is its nature; kdlatitah , (the fallacy named) kaldtita occurs, that is to say the reason ‘because it is a sub- stance’ becomes a fallacious reason known as ‘(that which has a) contradicted content’ ( bddhitavisaya ). It should be noted that the definition of badha is, ‘having a paksa which has the ascertained absence of the sddhya'. 4 If the definition, ation of badha (illustrated by the inference “Fire is not hot; because it is a substance”) bears upon the contradiction to the thing to be proved (perception reveals that fire is hot). The definition and example of kaldtita in the Pauskara , however, concern contradiction within the subject. The paksa (‘The universe which is devoid of a material cause’) is contradicted by verbal testimony and perception which prove that the universe has a material cause. This fallacy is named ‘untimely* ( kaldtita ) because the very declaration of a fallacious paksa renders the statement of hetu inopportune. 1 Both JfianaprakaSa’s commentary ( PauskaraV , p. 874) and the cit- ation of the same verse in the Saivaparibhasa (Madras edn, p. 33) read sddhyasya for paksasya. But Umapati ’s commentary confirms the reading paksasya although he interprets paksasya as paksastha - sddhyasya to suit the standard definition of badha . 2 This translation follows Umapati who not only reinterprets the Pau- skara definition of kaldtita but also modifies the example presented in the Pauskara to suit his interpretation. The inference according to him is, ‘All effect* (the paksa of the inference) ‘is devoid of a material cause’ (the sddhya) ‘because it is adventitious’ (the hetu). The inference intended by the Pauskara is, ‘Universe which is devoid of a material cause’ (the paksa) ‘is an effect* (the sddhya) ‘because it is adventitious* (th e hetu). According to the Pauskara , kaldtita arises when a reason {hetu) is found in a subject (paksa) which is contradict- ed, that is to say proved to be unsound, by a pramana. 3 In the inference “Fire is not hot; because it is a substance” chosen by Umapati to illustrate the fallacy. He explains the Pauskara inference of kaldtita , but according to his own definition of badha , in the following part of the commentary. 4 This is Umapati *s definition. Translation 159 were merely, which has the ascertained absence of the sddhya', there would be overpervasion with regard to a valid (only-negative) reason;' it is prevented by the clause ‘having z paksa'. It should not be said that this definition is over- pervasive with regard to (the fallacy) virudOia (which exists in a vipaksa which has the absence of sddhya ), for (in badha) the ascertained absence in the paksa is that of a sddhya which is not opposed to it (namely the reason), while in viruddha , the sddhya (which is absent) is opposed to the reason. [The author] illustrates, nirupaddnakam , etc. visvam kar - yam, all effect; nirupddanakam, is devoid of a material cause; agantukatvat , because it is adventitious. This is contradicted by verbal testimony which declares, f“The supreme bindu is the material cause”; 2 “Maya tattva is the source of the universe; indestructible, insentient, omni- present, unique, pure, subtle, beginningless, changeless. supreme”; 3 and also contradicted by perception with regard to objects such as pot. 4 The definition of the fallacy prakara- nasama was stated earlier as ‘by the two (reasons) with regard to the (respective) thing to be proved’. 5 Although the definition of badha was also discussed earlier by the statement ‘contradiction is that which is caused by another means of knowledge’, 6 it should be understood that it is restated here to discuss the varieties of contradictions arising from verbal testimony, perception, etc. Because an only-negative reason is connected to the absence of the sddhya by co-existence in absence. 2 Pauskara 8. 1 8 b . 3 Compare Svayambhuvasutrasamgraha, vidydpdda , 2.8. 4 Perception proves that effects such as pot are not devoid of a material cause; they are produced out of clay, etc. 5 Pauskara 7.46 b . But this half-verse concerns one of the five attributes of a valid reason and not a fallacy. In fact, prakaranasama and badha are not discussed in the present context because the Pauskara does not consider them to be fallacies of reason. Umapati includes them among the fallacies because he believes that the absence of each of the five features of a valid reason lead to a fallacy. 6 Pauskara 7.46*. in iiu mu 1 60 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala [95] Now, there could be impediment (to inference) by contradiction ( bddha ) and counterbalancing reason (satprati- paksa) because they constitute respectively, the cognition of the absence of the thing to be proved (in the subject) and the causal aggregate whifih produces that cognition; 1 but how do other fallacious reasons obstruct inference ? [The author] explains. Reason, known as such, is capable of establish- ing a thing to be proved through a pervasion; the breakdown of the pervasion in some way or other, due to a fallacious reason, is held to be the main impediment to inference. (56-57*) Yaihdvadvijndtam sadhanam, reason known as such, cognized as pervaded (by the thing to be proved) and as being the attribute of the subject; sadhyasiddhaye , estab- lishing a thing to be proved, to prove (for example) the presence of fire on a hill; vydpteh, through a perva- sion, by means of the cognition of pervasion ( vyapti ); this also implies the cognition of (the reason) being the attribute of the subject (paksadharmata ); 1 parydptam, is capable, means, is fit. Such is the fact. Asato hetoh, through a fal- lacious reason, such as unestablished reason ( asiddha ); yena kendpi vartmand, in some way or other, through the disruption of one of the constituents of pardmarsa ; vydpti- bhangah, the breakdown of the pervasion, which dis- rupts pardmarsa-, anumdnasya prathamam dusanam matam, is held to be the main impediment to inference. * Because m satpratipak^a, besides the hetu which aims to Drove the ° f ^ >n the paksa, there exists another hetu which z Wh£ fh Tp the abse " c f of ‘he same sddhya in the same paksa. While the Pauskara holds that the cognition of the vyapti produces inference and that the breakdown of vyapti impedes En^ Umapat. seems to believe that inference is £r£iuced P by parima™’ namely the_ cognition that the hetu, which is invariably connected with the sadhya, is the attribute of the paksa. The breakdown paramarsa impedes inference. 1 Translation 161 [96] [The author] briefly describes other grounds of defeat (nigrahasthdna)' in ‘the context of the discussion :f fallacious reasons. When it is declared, “Not hot, (is) fire”, etc. accompanied by the reason, the transposition ( vaiporityaf of the first two of the five members of the inference is ill-enunciated ( sadurdista ). J Those pertaining to example ( drstdnta ) are now stated. The example is deficient of the thing to be proved when it is stated, “The self is eternal;, because it is all-pervasive; like the sky”, and the same is also with regard to the thing which- proves. (57 b -59) Anusno vahnir iti, “Not hot, (is) fire”, etc.; ‘etc.’ refers to statements such as “Has fire, this hill”; pratijhdte sahetukam, when stated together with the reason, de- clared preceded by the reason, for example, “Because it is a substance, fire is not .hot”, “Because it has smoke, the hill has fire”, etc.; anumdnasya pancdnam avayavanam, of the five members of the inference, among the sentences like proposition (pratijhd ), etc., which constitute the inference; purvayoh, of the first two, of proposition (pratijhd ) and reason (hetu); and this also implies part of the proposition; vaiparityam, the transposition, statement in an inverse 1 According to the Nyaya school, faults which lead to defeat in reasoning (nigrahasthdna) are twenty-two. They include some defects of proposition, but do not seem to include those of example. The following verses of the Pauskara clearly deal with fallacies of proposition (pratijhabhdsa ) and example (uddharantibhdsa). Umapati seems to employs the term nigrahasthdna to signify all kinds of defects, for he not only discusses uddharandbhdsas in detail, but also refers to nigrahasthdna, chala and jdti. ‘ The translation follows Umapati’s interpretation. The illustration of the Pauskara rather suggests a fallacious proposition (pratijhdbhdsa) produced by the contrariety (vaiparitya) between its two constituents, for example, the subject (fire) and the thing to be proved (absence of heat). Thus, the error is also due to the meaning, and not merely due to the order of utterance as stated in the commentary. 1 It is not c‘ear if sadurdista is the description or name of the fallacy. 102 Umapati s Commentary on the fails fear apramanapa tala order, is the ground of defeat named apraptakala-, [and] sa- durdistam , ill-enunciated, possessing ill-enunciation, that is, endowed with a fallacy of proposition (pratijhdbhdsa). The meaning is that the ground of defeat ( nigrahasthana ) named apraptakala arises when the members (of an infer- ence) are transposed, whereas the fallacy of proposition (pratijfidbhasa) arises when a part of the proposition is in- verted. It is said by the followers of Gautama, “Statement of the members of an inference in an inverted order is (the ni- grahasthana named) apraptakala These two are errors due to the speaker, etc. (purusadidosa ) and not due to meaning (arthadosa). Adhuna, now; drstdntasya ucyate, of example are stat- ed, fallacies of example are illustrated. (In the inference) “The self is eternal; because it is all-pervasive; that which is so (all-pervasive), is so (namely eternal); like the sky”, drstd- ntah sadhyavikalah, the example ‘sky’ is ‘deficient of the thing to be proved’ because the sky, which is a product of the subtle element sound ( sabdatanmatra ), is not eternal . 1 2 [The author] states that the same is an example of (the fal- lacy named) ‘deficient of the thing which proves’ ( sadhana - vikala), sadhane c a , and with regard to the thing which proves. Since it (namely the sky) is created (in the lower realm), it does not pervade the upper realm, and the reason, namely ‘being all-pervasive’, does not apply to it. The word ‘and’ ( ca ) (in the verse ) 3 indicates that the same is also an example of ‘deficient of both (the sddhya and sadha- na)' ( ubhayavikala ). It should be understood that the same word (‘and’ in the verse) also indicates (the fallacy of ex- ample named) ‘deficient due to (its) nature’ ( svarupavikala ) ' Nyayasutra 5.2.1 1. 2 See Pauskara 6.279 b -280* and 6.355 Wbis) . 3 Umapati justifies; through this commer.iatorial device, the introduc- tion of various fallacies of example, as well as grounds of defeat (nigrahasthana^, quibble (chala) and false rejoinder (jati ) which are not mentioned in the Pauskara. Translation 163 which is found in the inference “The pond-lotus is fragrant; because it is a lotus, like the sky-lotus”.' And these are fal- lacies of example as well as errors due to meaning. The word ‘also’ in the expression ‘also arise’ (tat ha bhavet) (in the verse) indicates other grounds of defeat, as well as quibble (chala) and false rejoinder (jati). Of these, fallacies of example of the form of erroneous utterance are as follows. The fallacy of example named ‘unexplained positive pervasion’ (anupadarsitanvayodaharanabhasa) arises when, instead of “The hill has fire; because it has Imoke”, it is only stated, “like a kitchen”. The fallacious example named ‘unexplained negative pervasion’ (anupadarsitavyati- rekodaharanabhdsa) occurs when only “like a lake” is stated under the same circumstances . 2 “Wherever there is fire, there is smoke; as in a kitchen” illustrates (the fallacy of) ‘inversely explained positive pervasion’ (viparitadarsitanva- ya), and “Wherever there is absence of smoke, there is absence of fire; as in a lake” is an example of ‘inversely explained negative pervasion’ ( viparitadarsitavyatireka ). 3 Grounds of defeat (< nigrahasthana ) 4 5 are twenty-two; the nigrahasthanasutra 5 enumerates them: weakening the proposition by referring to counter examples (pratijhahdni ), changing the proposition (pratijhdntara ), contradicting the 1 Sky-lotus, which is non-existent, cannot illustrate the relation between lotus and fragrance nor can it lead to the conclusion intended by the inference. Hence, this example is fallacious due to its nature. 2 These fallacies arise because the positive and negative examples are stated without a prior declaration of the positive and negative reason which they are supposed to illustrate. 3 Since fire is found in hot iron, etc. where smoke is absent, being of greater extension, fire pervades smoke; it is not pervaded by smoke. Thus, the declaration of positive and negative examples, which demonstrate an inverted vyapti, is erroneous. 4 Grounds of defeat (nigrahasthana), quibble (chala) and false rejoin- der (jati) arise due to the procedure of the debate, the conduct of the debaters and the significance of words respectively. They do not directly affect pervasion or consideration but, nonetheless, impede inference. 5 Nyayasutra 5.2.1. 1 64 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala proposition (pratijnavirodha ), giving up the proposition ( pratijnasamnyasa ), changing the reason ( hetvantara ), chang- ing the subject ( arthantara ), meaningless statement ( anartha - ka), incoherent statement ( apdrthaka ), unintelligible state- ment ( avijnatarthaka ), inversion of the order of the members of the inference ( apraptakdla ), omission of a member of the inference ( nyuna ), addition to the members to the inference ( adhika ), repetition (punarukta), refusal to answer ( ananu - bhasana), ignorance \(ajnana), inability to reply (apratibha), evasion ( viksepa ), admission of error in one’s own reasoning ( matdnujhd ), passing by the opportunity to criticise (pary- anuyojyopeksana ), criticising the faultless ( niranuyojyanu - yoga), adopting principles contrary to one’s own doctrine (apasiddhanta ) and citing a fallacious reason ( hetvabhasa ). False rejoinder (jati) based on similarity ( sadharmya ), dissimilarity ( vaidharmya ), addition ( utkarsa ), omission (apa- karsa), certainty (varnya), uncertainty ( avarnya ), etc. are twenty-four (fallacies known as) false rejoinder. 1 Quibble ( chala ) 2 is of three kinds: based on the particular and the universal evoked by a word ( samanyachala ), on the meta- phorical and literal sense of a word ( upacarachala ) and on the different meanings of a word ( [vakchala ). 1 These are counter-arguments which have the appearance of an inference but are devoid of all validity and connection with the subject under discussion. For example, when a debater states, “Sound is not eternal; because it is a product; like pot, etc.”, the opponent counter-argues, “Sound has to be visible; because (as admitted by the debater) it is similar to a visible product such as a pot” and concludes that, since sound is not visible, the debater’s reasoning, based on sound’s similarity with a pot, is invalid. This is an example of the false rejoinder ‘based on an addition’ ( utkarsa ) because the opponent adds visibility (as a characteristic of sound) which is not intended to be proved by the inference of the debater. 2 These are strategies employed by the opponent to outwit the debater by resorting to one of the multiple senses of the word uttered by him; for example, when the debater’s expression navakambalah (‘having a new blanket’) is interpreted by the opponent to mean ‘having nine blankets’ because the word nova means ‘new’ as well as ‘nine’. This illustrates vakchala. Translation 165 [97] [The author] explains the pramana (named) verbal testimony ( sabda ), which follows in the order of succession. Verbal testimony ( agama ) is the utterance of a trustworthy person; and 1 ( api ) it is the ultimate means to the cognition of mediate objects. (60 a ) Aptoktih, the utterance of a trustworthy person, the sentence of a trustworthy person is; verbal testimony, the pramana named verbal testimony (sabda). A trustworthy person is the one who speaks truth while having the true cognition of the sense of the uttered sentence. Here the word ‘sentence’ signifies a group of words possessing expectancy (akafiksa) and juxtaposition ( dsatti ); it does not include com- patibility (yogyata) because it is implied by the very expres- sion ^trustworthy person’. 2 If compatibility were included, it should be known to be of the form of ‘the absence of ascertained lack of connection (between word-meanings)’ (i ananvayaniscayaviraha ); and this compatibility is the cause (of the cognition of meaning) by its mere presence. 3 Expectancy ( akdhksd ) is the non-completion of meaning. It is explained as follows: the word without which a given word fails to reveal the connection between meanings, which (connection) is the content of the intention of the speaker, that word is said to be expectant with the given word in regard to that connection (between meanings). 4 This (defini- 1 The word api is employed here in the sense of ‘and’, and not of ‘also’, because sabda woujd be redundant from the point of view of logic if it served the same purpose as anumana. So the distinction is that anumana is the means to the cognition of mediate objects (see Pauskara 7.36 b : paroksdrthavabodhakam ) while sabda is the ultim- ate means to the cognition of mediate objects (paroksarthaikasadha - nam). 2 Because the sentence of a trustworthy person would not contain incompatible words. 1 If compatibility were considered necessary, its presence in the sentence is adequate; it is not required that the speaker and hearer be aware of this presence. 4 For example, the word ‘pot’ in the sentence ‘Bring the pot’ is expectant with the word ‘bring’ because the word ‘pot’ cannot convey the meaning intended by the speaker without the word ‘bring’. It I 1 6t> Umapati s Commentary on the Fauskarapramanapatala tion) wards off the criticism that if the sentence, “Pot (ghatah) being the object of action ( karmatvam ) bringing (i anayanam ) act ( krtih )” had expectancy, it would produce the comprehension of these (words) being connected as an act and (its) object (but it does not); and if it lacked expect- ancy, it would not give rise to the comprehension of these (words) being connected by non-difference ( abhedanvaya - bodha) (but it does). * 1 For here, the absence of the compre- hension of these (words) being connected as an act and (its) object (that is to say, the non-comprehension of meaning) is caused not by the absence of another word (since all the words which make up the sentence are present), but by the absence of their capacity (to make them expectant towards each other). 2 The clause ‘the content of the intention of the speaker’ (in the definition of expectancy) is to prevent (for example) that the word nadi, uttered with the intention of being connected with the word jalam in the sentence aho vimalam jalam nadyah kacche mahisas carati , 3 be construed with the word kaccha . should be noted that verbal roots have expectancy with case-endings, stems with suffixes, etc., because they are considered to be full- fledged words. 1 Connection between the word-meanings in a sentence is of two kinds: connection based on difference ( bheddnvaya ) and based on non-difference ( abhedanvaya ). The first exists between the stem and suffix, between verb and case-ending, between words possessing different case-endings, etc., where the words come together to give rise to the meaning of the sentence, as in the sentence ghatam anaya (‘bring the pot’). The second is found between the words possessing the same case-ending, number, etc. which retain their own status and meaning, as for example, in the sentence ghatah karmatvam anayanam krtih (‘pot, being the object of action, bringing, act’); The first sentence has the expectancy as defined above, but not the second sentence though its words are connected by abhedanvaya. 2 In this case, capacity consists of possessing the appropriate case- endings. Thus, the non-completion of meaning (namely expectancy) depends not on the presence or absence of a word in a sentence, but on the presence or absence of the capacity of words to come together to convey an intended meaning. 3 This sentence could give rise to two different meanings depending on whether the word nadyah is construed with the word kacche or Translation 167 Juxtaposition ( asatti ) is the uninterrupted presence of the connected words (in a sentence). 1 Thus, an Authoritative sentence is a group of words possessing expectancy and juxtaposition, uttered by the one who speaks truth while having the true cognition of the sense of the uttered sentence. If it were merely said, ‘an authoritative sentence is a group of words’, there would be overpervasion in ill- juxtaposed (words), such as “Hill, eaten, has fire, by Deva- datta”; therefore it is said ‘possessing juxtaposition.’ If this much were said (to be the definition), there would be over- pervasion in sentences such as “pot, being the object of action”, which lack expectancy; therefore, ‘possessing ex- pectancy’ is supplied. If this much were stated, there'would be overpervasion in the statement of a liar; hence, it is said, ‘uttered by the one who speaks truth’. Yet, there would be overpervasion with regard to erroneous statements; thus, it is specified ‘while possessing the true cognition*. Sir re (definition) could apply to the true cognition cr (any; grov;. of words, such overpervasion is warded off by the clai’se ‘the sense of the uttered sentence’. [98] But then, (it may be said that) verbal testimony could be subsumed in anumdna pramana 2 (and that it is not an independent pramana). It is as follows: “These words are preceded by the true cognition of the connection which with the word jalam which are found on its either side; *0 the purity of the water! the buffalo wanders in the marshy area of the river’ in the former case and ‘O the purity of the water of the river! the buffalo wanders in the marshy area’ in the latter case. The intention of the speaker, which is to point out the stupidity of the buffalo which prefers the dirty marsh to clean water, indicates that the word nadyah is connected with the word jalam and not with the word kacche . 1 For example, “The hill has fire”, “(Food is) eaten by Devadatta”, etc. 2 This objection may be attributed to some VaiSesikas. They hold that since the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence is the mere cognition of the word-connection which is intended by the speaker, it could be inferred, that is, known through anumdna pramana; and consequently, an independent pramana called sabda need not be admitted. See Kanadarahasya, pp. 104-105. 168 Umdpati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala (connection) is recalled by these particular words and is the content of the intention of the speaker; because they are a group of words possessing expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition; like the group of words ‘bring the cow with (the help of) a stick’ The clause ‘recalled by these par- ticular words’ is to prevent overpervasion (of this infer- ence) with regard to the statement “There is smoke” 1 which is preceded by the true cognition of the connection (of smoke) with fire. 2 The clause ‘the content of the intention of the speaker’ is to prevent application (of this inference) to (the statement) “knowability’\ which presupposes the true cognition of the connection of inseparability (abheda- samsarga ). 3 The word ‘true’ is to prevent the application (of this inference) to (statements preceded by) an erroneous cognition of connection. The word ‘expectancy’ in the reason ( hetu ) is to prevent deviation with regard to the word-connections which are not intended, for example between the words nadi and kaccha in the statement aho v/- malamjalam nadydh kacche mahisas carati. And expectancy is only that which is intended (by the speaker). 4 The word ‘compatibility’ is to prevent deviation with regard to (in- compatible) statements such as “Wets with fire”. The word ‘juxtaposition’ is to prevent deviation with regard to ill- juxtaposed (words), such as “Hill, eaten”, etc. Thus, (since 1 Uttered by a person desirous of inferring the presence of fire from the perception of smoke. 2 This statement, though preceded by the cognition of a connection, does not come within the scope of the above inference because the smoke-fire connection is not recalled by the uttered words. 3 The above inference, which attempts to prove the presence of a connection between the words in a sentence, could also prove the presence of connections which are not intended by the speaker; for example, the connection between an object (knowability) and the cognition about it (the cognition of knowability) in the sentence “knowability”. Thus, it is specified that the connection to be proved is that which is intended by the speaker. 4 For words and meanings, which are insentient, do not possess expectancy. They are expectant because a sentient speaker intends them to be so with regard to a meaning which he wishes to convey. Translation 169 the meaning of the utterance of a trustworthy person could be known through inference,) sabda need not be admitted as a distinct pramana. % [99] If it is said so, the answer is, no. If the word ‘com- patibility’ included in the (above) reason were to signify compatibility of the form of ‘the absence of ascertained lack of connection’ ( ananvayaniscayaviraha ), there would be deviation (of the reason) with regard to contradicted statements. 1 And if compatibility were to mean ‘having a non-contradicted object’ ( abddhitartha ), the fallacy of* ‘the reason being unestablished due to the presence of a dotibt’ 2 ( samdigdhasiddhi ) would arise (and render the reason invalid). The inference 3 “These word-meanings are mutual- ly connected; because they have expectancy, compatibility and proximity” also is to be rejected for the same reason. 4 [100] But then (some others say), 5 the inference “These words are preceded by the cognition of the connection 1 “Wets with fire” is a contradicted sentence because perception proves that the act of wetting cannot be associated with fire. The above reason fails with regard to this sentence because the thing to be proved (namely meaning) is present in the sentence, but the reason (‘absence of lack of connection’) is not present, for the words of this sentence lack connection. 2 Doubt about the connection of the reason with the thing to be proved, for the absence of all contradiction in all cases cannot be known unless the inference is drawn, that is, unless the meaning is known. 3 The first inference (which produces the cognition that, for example, the words ‘this’ and ‘silver’ are connected) would not induce action in a person desirous of silver, because only the cognition “This is silver”, which directly cognizes an object as characterised by the features of silverness, induces action in that person. Therefore a second inference is proposed which produces the cognition that the word-meanings of the sentence are connected, that is to say the sentence has the meaning ‘this is silver’ which should induce action. 4 Because the word ‘compatibility’ included in the reason of the inference cannot be defined with certainty. 5 This argument may be attributed to the Prabhakara MImamsakas, who hold that only the Vedas, which are impersonal ( apauruseya ), are sabda pramana Secular statements are not sabda pramana because they reflect the defects of human beings who are imperfect by nature. which they convey; because they possess a particular inten- tion of the speaker ( sandarbhavisesa )” may be accepted; although there is absence of word-connection in (contra- dicted) statements such as “wets with fire”, the thing to be proved (by the inference), namely ‘being preceded by the cognition of connection’, is present. * 1 It should not be said that this (inference) fails with regard to the utterances of a parrot which are devoid of a particular intention of the speaker (but convey a meaning). 2 Nor should it be said (to overcome the above objection) that the absence there (in the meaningful utterances of a parrot) is only that of the intention of the speaker, and not of the prior cognition of connection; for it would discredit the inference of the knowledge of a speaker (from his speech), which is admit- ted by all. Nor should it be said that since the reason (of the inference), namely ‘possession of a particular intention of the speaker’, is absent (in parrot’s speech), it would be difficult to explain how the cognition of meaning arises here (through inference). For (those who hold that meaning is inferred through the intention of the speaker and that parrot’s speech is not a counter-example, reply that) here (namely in parrot’s speech) the cognition of meaning is derived (not through inference, but) merely through the order (of words) which They believe that the meaning of secular statements is infened through the intention of the speaker who is aware of the meaning of the uttered words and that secular statements are anumana pram an a. See Prakaranapahcika, pp. 242-244. 1 Thus, this inference, Which is free from the defect pointed out in the previous inference , proves that meaning is inferred. • It may be objected that this inference is invalid because the reason (‘intention of the speaker’) is absent where the thing to be proved by it (‘meaning’) is present (in the utterances of a parrot). 3 This commonly accepted principle (which is based on the invariable connection between an utterance and the meaning which the speaker intends to convey through it) would be challenged if it were admitted that there could be an Utterance devoid of the intention of conveying a meaning. ■ ■■ < . Translation 171 is similar to the order (of the words of a humdn being), which (order) has an intention that presupposes the, cogni- tion of the meaning (of the uttered words). It is comparable to the gesture ( cesta ) of a mad person that is similar to the gesture (of a sane person) which presupposes the desire to convey a meaning. Although it (that is, the meaning) is not inferred here (in the gesture of a mad person) since it is not a gesture which is invariably preceded by the desire to convey a meaning, it (that is, the meaning) is remembered from the perception of similarity with it (that is to say *ith the gesture of a sane person). Thus, the above inference is not defective. T It should not be said that since the word-connection (that is to say the meaning) is not cognized directly, it would not induce any action; for, as in the case of gesture, etc., 1 where meaning induces action in spite of being the content of an intention ( abhiprayavisaya ), here (in the inference of meaning) also meaning could induce action in spite of being the content of a cognition (jnanavisaya ). If not (that is, if it were not accepted that gesture, etc. convey a meaning through intention), gesture also would have to be considered an independent pramana. [101] It is replied (to those who hold that meaning is inferred): The cognition of meaning which is independent 2 is inducer to action, not any cognition of meaning, for if it were the case, the cognition “I wonder if there is a pot in the house also would induce action. 3 Therefore, only the cognition of meaning which is independent of being the content of (another) cognition induces action. And such 1 The w prd ‘etc.* should refer to writing and other symbols. That is, understood directly from words and not derived through another cognition like inference, doubt, etc. 3 But this does not induce the person desirous of a pot to act because the pot is known not directly as the content of a valid cognition, but indirectly as the content of a doubt, which also annihilates the valid- ity of the cognition. LLUJJLWJJ 1 72 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala (cognition of meaning) can be obtained in two ways. The meaning is either cognized directly (from the utterances of a trustworthy person) [or] 1 it is inferred. But such inference cannot be drawn because, as noted earlier, if the reason (of the inference) did not include compatibility of the nature of ‘having a non-contradicted object’, the inference would fail (with regard to contradicted statements) and if it included compatibility of that nature, the fallacy of ‘the reason being unestablished due to the absence of the cognition of perva- sion’ ( ajnanasiddhi ) would arise. [102] Now, it may be objected that the inferential cogni- tion produced by a gesture also would not induce action, for that (cognition) has a meaning, which is the content of an intention, as its content; 2 since it (namely gesture) is also found where meaning is absent (for example, in the gesture of a mad person), it is not invariably accompanied by a meaning and thus, it does not have a direct meaning as its content. This objection is replied (by those who believe that gesture induces action) that it is not claimed that it (namely gesture) gives rise to the inference of intention through an invariable concomitance (between the gesture and the mean- ing); it is only said that it makes the meaning (which is the content of the intention) known directly. 3 And this (admis- sion that gesture reveals meaning directly) does not render gesture, which cannot be subsumed ig any other recognized 1 Since meaning is said to be known in two ways, the text should give the two alternatives. As it does not, the word ‘or’ should perhaps be supplied. This passage could also be amended following a parallel passage in the Sivajhanabodhavistarabhasya (p. 121 : yadi saksad- artha evanumiyate yadi va pramanumlyate ... na ca tathanumanam , etc.; but this aims to prove that neither the meaning of a sentence nor the cognition of the validity of that sentence, which induce action, can be inferred). . 2 Because the meaning of a gesture is inferred through the intention of the person who gesticulates. . 3 In other words, the meaning of a gesture is known directly from the intention of the person and not through inference. Translation 173 pramanas, an independent pramana. 1 Since everything that conveys a meaning through convention (satnketa) is of the nature of sabda pramana and since gesture is such, it is sub- sumed in sabda pramana. It should not also t»e objected that since words (of parrot) and gestures (of a mad person) are present where meaning is absent, they cannot be considered direct denoters of meaning; for inconsistency is an impedi- ment only to an invariable concomitance and not to the denotation of meaning through convention. Tradition ( aitihyaf whose subject is not contradicted is subsumed in sabda pramana, while that whose subject is contradicted is but unauthoritative. Thus, everything is sound. f [103] But then, the definition (of sabda pramana 1 ) is underpervasive because the Veda, Agama, etc., which are the ultimate means to the knowledge of mediate objects such as liberation, could not have been composed by ordinary (trustworthy) persons. [The author] answers so ’pi, etc.; so ’pi, that also, means, as the Veda, Agama, etc. also 3 are uttered by trustworthy person, the definition is not underpervasive. The manner in which the Veda and Agama could be considered to be uttered by someone, was described earlier . 4 [104] Now, what is the definition of a trustworthy person and who, then, is the trustworthy person ? [The author] explains. The one who utters the sense well ascertained by perception or inference, that very person is a ' As believed by the Tantrikas. See Nyayakosa, p. 282. 3 The Pauranikas hold that, since the origin of a tradition (for example, the belief that Vaisvanara resides in every fig tree) cannot be traced to any authoritative person, it cannot be considered verb?! testimony, and that it is an independent pramana. See Kanddas-Jlra ■ vrtti, p. 406. 5 The interpretation of so 'pi here in the commentary, seems to be problematic, for it not only forces the word-order of the verse, but also differs from the idea expressed in it. 4 In PauskaraBh on 1 .94 b _ pp. 66-67. 1 /*+ umapan s commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala > trustworthy person; Siva is more trustworthy than that person. (60 b -61*) Pratyaksena, by perception, through the sense of sight, etc.; yadivd anumanena, o r by inference; suniscitam artham, well ascertained sense; yo, who, utters as it is known; so’yam aptah syat, that very person is a trust- worthy person. The nature of a trustworthy person was clearly defined earlier. 1 Who, then, is such trustworthy person with regard to the Veda and Agama (which are the ultimate means to mediate objects) ? [The author] answers, tasmat , than that person, than the person recognized as a trustworthy person; sivah aptatarah, Siva is more trust- worthy. The significance of the comparative affix ( tarap ) is that there is possibility of defect in (trustworthy) human be- ings and others (like divine beings) at some time or other, but never in Siva. [105] But then, since it is said, “Defilement (caused) by affection, hatred, etc. is found in (all) beings”, 2 how can ISvara be proclaimed to be defectless ? [The author] answers. Possessor of intensely pure senses, omniscient, holding everything within the range of His awareness, free from partiality, eternal perceiver of truth, He is changeless, perfect, independent, destroyer of the bonds of the bound selves; His utterance is the ultimate authority, true, repository of welfare for ever. (61 b -63‘) Suprasannendriyagramah, possessor of intensely pure senses, He is said to be the one whose totality of the senses is extremely pure; this indicates the absence of defects such as inefficient senses in Siva; sarvagocarah , holding everything within the range of His awareness. His ' In PauskaraBh on 7.60 4 . Not traced. Also cited in the Tarkabhasaprakasika (p. 173) where the second half of the verse is, atah pramanyasankapi niskalanke pra- Translation 175 omniscience is never concealed by mala as it is it* the case of ordinary human beings and others.' The expressions sarva- jnah and sarvagocarah imply the absence of error and in- attention (in Siva). Paksapatavinirmuktah, tree from parti- ality, signifies the absence of injustice. Yatharthagrahakah (eternal) perceiver of truth, signifies the absence of the likelihood of deluding others; the word ‘eternal’ is a qualifier which differentiates Siva from ordinary (trust- worthy) human beings and other (released selves). Avyayah, changeless, eternal, refers to (His) function of uttering scripture at the beginning of t every cyclic creation (of the universe). Paripurnah, perfect, means, He is the one ihose wishes are fulfilled; the possibility of uttering untruth prompted by any desire whatsoever is thus rejected. Svatan- trah, independent; excludes the likelihood of the utterance of untruth under duress. Pasupasaha, destroyer of the bonds of the bound selves; this indicates compassion. The one who is compassionate would not utter untruth. Such is the meaning. Tadvdkyam, His utterance, the utteiance of Siva described above, that is to say the (Saiva) scripture, etc.; tathyam, true, unrefuted; sreyonidhih, repository of welfare, conductive to welfare such as release; ekam prama- nam, ultimate authority, is only authoritative and never, nowhere and in no degree could also become unauthorita- tive l^e the words of ordinary human beings and others. But then, how can Siva, who does not possess a body, be attributed with pure senses ? It is answered that although He does not have a body made up of bindu, etc., 3 (it is said that fromthfh J n e . v, ^ na ^ /a , selves in the pure path, which are free S? 8 CaUSC ? ^ karma and maya, but whose omniscience remains slightly concealed by mala. ^ ot ^ er scr *ptural texts recognized as the word of Siva, and therefore, authoritative. indu is the material cause of the bodies of the selves which reside in the pure path, while the bodies of those in the impure path are produced from maya. See Pauskara 2.13 b -14: kirn ca mayddyupd - 176 Umdpati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala He has pure senses) because it is admitted that He has a body constituted of His capacities and because the scripture declares “His body is said to be composed of saktf’.' This same notion will be made clear, by way of objection and reply, by the statement “(Siva) described earlier (as formless and devoid of the sense of speech)”, 2 in the chapter which describes the descent of scriptures ( tantravatarapatala ). [106] Now although the scripture ( agama ) uttered by Siva (in the higher region) is authoritative for the reasons ex- plained above, how are those (texts) which are heard here (in this lower region) beginning with Kamika and ending with Vatula , 3 authoritative? [The author] answers (that they also are authoritative because they are composed by Siva). After the creation, Isa, having exalted the selves 4 which belong to the pure path, with regard to their cognition and action by a mere touch of His rays, the compassionate lord as SadaSiva, taught them the knowledge about the six categories which arose in the form of nada; (having composed) it (namely the scripture) in many meters, (He taught) first the tenfold siva variety and then the other, eighteenfold rudra variety. (That) ocean of scripture ( tantra ) des- cended to the Meru through successive regions. (63 b -66) danam dehendriyavatam nrnam // ksubdham kdryakaram tasya kartur dehendriyadikam /yad upadanato jatam sa bindur iti gamyatam. ' Not traced. The capacities or powers ( saktis ) of Siva, which are also said to be His mantras , are considered to form His body because they perform the functions which limbs perform in a body. See Pauskara 1 .63 Wb “ ) -64‘: evam mantras tu pahcaile yair nibaddha tanus siva / vastutas tu na bhinnds te yato nanye svasaktitah, 1.58-63 and 8.29- 30“. 2 Pauskara 8.26 b . 3 Kamika is said to be the first of the ten texts named Saiva and Vatula is the last of the eighteen texts named Raudra. See Mrgendra, caryapada 1.43 b -47*. Translation 177 Isah, Siva, at the beginning of the creation; srsty- anantaram, after the creation, of the scripture! in the form of nada which is a transformation of kundalinl agitated by Siva’s power. 1 This will be described laljpr (in the tantrava- tdrapatala) by the verses beginning with “Then, at the time of the creation” arid ending with “scripture in the form of nada (came into existence)”. 2 The (selves) which, belong to the pure path are those for which the pure path is the sphere of activity, in other words, those which dwell in the pure path; 3 svamsusamsparsandd eva, by a mere touch of His rays, by contact through His power; drkkriyaya ’ utkatdn krtvd, having exalted them with regard to f(their) cognition and action, that is, having unveiled their capacities to know and act, which explains their competence to acquire, retain and transmit (knowledge); bhagavdn, lord Siva; sadasivo ’ pi , as Sada$iva, remaining in the form of Sadasiva; 4 nddarupataya agatam , which arose in the 1 Bindu (also named kundalini), impelled by Siva s power, evolves not only into the pure material world but also into the universe of speech, nada being its first evolute in this domain. See Pauskara 2.33 b -34‘: vasturupah kala jheyah sabdarupah puroditdh / sabdava- stubhayatmasau bindur nanyataratmakah. Nada is the most subtle of all forms of speech. For speech exists in a subtle form in the pure realm, in a gross form in the mixed realm, and in the grossest form in the impure realm. See Pauskara 2.30 b -31“: suksmas suddhadhvani gi- rah sthula misradhvani sthitah // asuddhadhvani ta vdcah sthita sthu- lataras sada. The instruction of Siva, namely the scripture, is expres- sed through nada at the time of creation, but it is taught by means of subtle speech by Sadasiva in the pure realm. 2 Pauskara 8.4 b -6\ 3 The dwellers of the pure path are the vijnanakevala selves; they are selected by Siva out of grace or according to the maturity of their mala and appointed to perform different duties in the pure path or to enjoy. See Pauskara 4.49-50“: icchayaivanugrhyadau sivo vijnana- kevalan / malapdkam apeksyaiva kamscic chuddhadhvagocare //yoja- yaty adhikdresu krtva drkkriyayotkatdn ; 4. 1 0: vijhanakevalds saxsat sa eva munipumgavah / suddhadhvavartinah pascal bha'».sy<'.rti Trvpr- chaya. , 4 Sadasiva is the appellation by which Siva is referred to, ' J sets about to create the pure realm. See Pauskara 1.2.,: udyuiuas ... I /» Umdpati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala f ° f , D a ’ Wh,Ch inStrUCtS the six categories beginning ith the Lord (pan); that very jhanam, knowledge, which is Saiva scripture ( sivasdstra ); anekacchandah , in many metres, having composed in various metres; purvatah dasa- samkhyatam stvabhedam, first, the tenfold siva variety the scripture named Siva (because it is taught to the ten Sivas), tatha astadasavidham aparam, subsequently the M .'“‘V , ei *‘“ ,een,old (variety); tebhyah f-T: . "* gh them ' om of compassion, to the ten Sivas headed by Pranava and the eighteen Rttdras led by Ananta.' We disappearance of the affix signifying the agent is archa- 15UC« [The author] explains how it descended to the earth ar- te/, etc Gradually, from the higher to the lower tattvas; me- rau X o Meru, through those (preceptors) who are free from to/a, agatam tantrasdgaram, the ocean of scripture came down, Saiva scripture ( sivasdstra ) descended. Scrip- ture (tantra) is considered an ocean because it is immense and profound. [107] Since the purport of the whole scripture ( dgama ) could be learned from those well-known (texts) KSmika, etc of what purpose is the composition of this (text named Pau> skara) ? Having raised the objection, [the author] replies that because they are very extensive, inaccessible and profound (in sense), this is composed to favour everybody. tads /labhate stva udyuhaa sa em 3M3 (Dcvakonai edn), pp, .ex^i^d bTfhem he W ““ ei8,U “ n Rudras ' and ° f ^ * just a? .k'" ',° whlch word lhis mnwrk applies. £3.2^^ P ? h h , a '" ! “• “ C *hich Com, possess kata, etc producet^hv se v * s ' n lhe pure path also governance etr Ce °- bmdu ’ wh >ch confers enjoyment, Pauskara 258 60 w,thoul constituting their bondage. See to beX£ who receive the scripture are said as pure bindu kalds. y ^ fr ° m the ,m P ure m§ ya kalds as well I Translation 179 O sages! having selected this Pauskaratantra from there with skjll, setting aside eulogical statements, etc., (I) transmitted it to you. Pro- mote this on the earth among the qualified who are devoted to the preceptors. (67-68*) Tatra, there, means ‘from there’ ( tasmin ), that is, from the ocean of scripture (dgama); (since the Pauskara. is select- ed from there) the locative case (of the word tatra, which refers to the scripture) signifies specification; arthavadddilo- patah, setting aside eulogical statements, having eliminated eulogical passages such as the description of worlds found therein; bahuyuktibhih uddhrtya, leaving selected with skill, having collected the essence, like am- brosia (from the milky ocean), honey from lotuses; the text (tantra) named Pauskara on account of its similarity with pauskara (that is, the honey of the puskara lotus); viprdh yus- mabhyam, O sages, to you, who are endowed with the abilities of deep faith, devotion, knowledge and retention; kathitam, (I) transmitted. The declaration of completion by the expression ‘transmitted’, in spite of the topics which remain to be discussed, 1 is to indicate the small quantity of subjects which remain to be instructed. [The author] states that this (Pauskara) is to be instructed only to the qualified and not, out of greed, etc., to the un- qualified, sthapayadhvam, etc.; idam, this, Pauskaratantra; bhumau, on the earth, also; guruvartmasu, among those for whom the preceptors are the path, means, those who are devoted to preceptors; preceptors are considered a path because they indicate the way to welfare; yogyesu, among the qualified, those who are disposed to devo- tion, etc. (towards the preceptors) and faith, etc. (in their teaching); sthapayadhvam, promote, means, diffuse it for the continuity of the tradition. It is said in the Nisvasa, “O 1 In this patala and in the tantrdvatarapatala , which is the last chap- ter of the vidyapdda of the Pauskara. 1 80 Umapati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala beautiful one! reveal this knowledge to my devotees; it should be diligently guarded (from the unqualified) as wealth (is guarded) from a thief’. 1 And (it is said) in another text ( agama ), “This text ( tantra ), which belongs to the pure Saiva ( suddhasaiva ) (tradition), should neither be given nor revealed. It should be instructed to the initiated, the com- posed and to the one devoted to $iva. Its teaching elsewhere is not approved”. 2 3 The expression ‘it should neither be given nor revealed’ should be supplied with the words ‘to the un- qualified’; ‘elsewhere’ means, ‘to the unqualified’, (its teaching) is not approved. Scriptural statements which ex- press the same opinion are also found in the chapter on the madhuvidya in the Chandogya and in the sixth chapter of the Svetasvatara . 4 [108] But then, while the scriptures (agama) taught by Brahma, Visnu and others exist and instruct, of what purpose is the instruction of the Saiva scripture (agama) ? [The author] replies: Although (they form) another path, the initial part of the Veda 5 and those (scriptures) composed by Brahma, Visnu and others propose the goals which constitute the bondage of the individual self, for they have prevalence (only) up to the realities (tattva) admitted therein. The path to release (however) lies beyond the enjoyment of heaven, etc. (68 b -69) ' Not traced. Also cited in the Sataratnasamgraha (Delhi edn) and attributed to the Nisvdsa by the Sataratnollekhani, p. 93. • 2 Suprabheda, kriyapdda, 1.25-26*. 3 See Chandogya Upanisad, 3. 1 1 .5-6. 4 See Svetdsvatara Upanisad, 6.22. 5 The translation follows Umapati’s interpretation. It appears that Umapati rejects the ritualistic part of the Veda as the means to the knowledge about liberation, but he accepts the Upanisads, the doctri- nal parts of the Veda. Perhaps this is not meant by the Pauskara because the expression vedadi seems to refer to the Veda and connect- \ ed Vedic texts. Translation 181 Brahmavisnvadikartrkah, (the scriptures) ^composed by Brahma, Visnu and others; the word ‘others’ refers to Brhaspati and others. Vedadih, the initial part of the Veda, a part of the Veda, the section which instructs ritual practices. Although (they are) a path different from the Saiva scripture (agama), scriptures (agama) such as Pancara- tra composed by Brahma and Visnu; pasupasarthadarsakah, propose goals which constitute the bondage of the individual self, and not the final release. 1 [The author] explains why this is so, sva, etc. They (that is, scriptures composed by others) are said to be those, whose prwrfepr? extends up to the realities recognized in the respectiv^ scrip- tures. As reported by the statement, “The elements (bhuta), the subtle elements (tanmdtra), the senses (indriya), mind (manas), egoity (ahamkdra), intellect (buddhi), the consti- tuents of transformation (guna ), the unmanifest (avyakta) and (the two) selves (nara) are (said to be) the states (of release) to be attained by the beings”, 2 the scriptures 1 While the Pauskara seems to distinguish between the Veda (whose instruction leads its followers to bondage) and the scriptures compos- ed by Brahma and others (which are authoritative only with regard to the realities recognized by them), the explanation of Umapati does not seem to differentiate between them. 2 Pauskara 6.68. Since these states are considered by the respective doctrines to be the true nature of the self, attaining them constitutes liberation for the followers of those doctrines. According to the Pau- skara , the Carvakas, Jyotisas and Kaulas (bhuta), the Smartas (tan- mat r as), the munis who believe that the senses constitute conscious- ness (indriya), the Bauddhas and Naiyayikas (buddhi), the Syadvadins ( gunas ), the Pancaratrins (avyakta), the Vedantajnas (nara, that is pums- tattva) and the Samkhyas (nara, that is purusa- tattva) believe that these states are the ultimate reality. See Pauskara 6.69-76 and Umapati’s commentary on these verses. The attainment of ahamkdra is proclaimed as the state of release by the Vaisesikas, that of manas by the Naiyayikas and that of buddhi by the Bauddhas according to four verses attributed to the Pauskara in the Ndnavaranayilakka - mdpdtiyam (p. 508): cdrvdkd ... pare (= Pauskara 6.69*-71 with vai ; - ants) //vaisesikas tv ahamkdre manas thah ny ay avadinah // buaani- tattve sthitd bauddhd gunesv evarhatdh sthitdh // prakrtah ... harm (•- Pauskara 6.74 b with variants) // veddntajhds ca samkhyas ca yoginan puruse sthitdh . Of these verses, the three half-verses, which are not 1 82 Umdpati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala revealed by Brahma, Visnu and others teach the welfare which consists of the attainment of (these) different states and not the release which constitutes the supreme welfare. Therefore, they only instruct the bondage of the selves. It is also said in another text (dgama), 1 “Authoritative statement (aptokti) is the (Saiva) scripture (siddhanta) 1 because only Siva is authoritative ( apta ); no preceptor of welfare is comparable to them (namely to Siva and the scripture uttered by Him). Only the (Saiva) scripture ( siddhanta ) is the accepted doctrine (siddhanta), all other scriptures (dgama) are prima facie views (purvapaksa ); (because) Siva alone is siva (that is, omniscient and omnipotent), (every) other (preceptor) is non-iiva (that is, possessor of limited knowledge and action)”. And it was said earlier, “Those who are recognized in other scriptures (as the creators of the universe) are only bound souls because they lack presence (in the pure regions); they (also) are to be purified and enlightened (by Siva) because bondage persists in them”. 3 But then, why cannot the very attainment of different tat- tvas be considered as release ? [The author] replies, parastdt, beyond the enjoyment, in the heaven, etc; ‘etc.’ refers to enjoyment in the worlds up to siva tattva; 4 moksamargasya ,h- c A1 an . a P ada of Pauskara (numbered 556 b , 557* and StSma!? Nanavaranavilakkamdpatiyam), are attributed to the Siddhantarahasya in another passage of the fldndvaranavilakka- 2TTc m nV m f d D ^/r nd in the Siddhdntarahasyasdra ( p. IrLJ L r, n ; R ' 7710 ’ “ restored from n ° R.6635”). This second passage of the Nanavaranavilakkamdpdtiyam rightly attributes several verses to the Pauskara (6.71 "-73* in the edition) annDules Compare Ratnatrayaparlksd 10-11. n A | S 4 m Pl , a /" ed b * Aghoraiiva in his commentary (Ratnatrayollekhini, p. 149), the word siddhanta came to signify ‘the twenty-eight texts rudhi). In other words, the true meaning of siddhanta namelv the bypopui " usase “ «*«■ * Pauskara 1.95. J.Z a t “£* 331(1 sadd * iva tattva are created out of bindu in the Dure path for the enjoyment of those selves whose faculties of enjoymem Translation 183 sthitih, lies the path to release. It was said earlier Those who are joined to the laya tattva are liberated and not (those joined) to the other (states of bhoga tattva, and adhi- kdra tattva)’; 1 ‘to laya tattva’ means ‘to siya named laya'. 1 Since the purpose of the instruction of thi Saiva scripture (saivdgama) is thus to teach the ultimate release, they are not futile. Such is the meaning. [109] But then, what is the purpose of the Upanisadic teaching ? It is replied that (they also are authoritative, for) as proved by the teachings of different treatises such as Kdmika, a means does not vitiate another means. The special (bhoga) and governorship (adhikdra) are freed by initiation. 'These two tattvas consist of numerous divine cities filled with infinite ° bj , ects P lea j“ re - See Pauskara 2.37 b -38: bhogddhikdrayoh saktir abhivyakteha diksayd / yesdm tesdm tu bhogdrtham sivena pari- Kalpitarn / tattvam sadasivam tadvat sivatattvam ca nirmitam k 10)10 tattva is one of the states (avasthd) of bindu to which the selves are initiated in the pure path: those which have some traces of mala are alloted to bhoga tattva (or adhikdra exhaUst mala throu S h enjoyment and governance fmm iH| hlCh i they ,n , ltiated into laya tattva; those which are free from all mala are dnectly assigned to laya tattva from which they do not transmigrate; it constitutes liberation. See Pauskara 1 .50^-5 1 ; tarn prapydni sarvais tu diksayd yojitaii nrbhih // yojita layatattve ve te mukta naparatra ca /bhogddhikdratattvasthd vyaktacinmdtrasaktayah . The word laya could refer to Siva, the superintending gods as well as the selves in the pure path because they all are designated by the names of the states (avasthd) and transformations (parinama) of bindu with which they are associated. For example, Siva is named laya (also laya tattva and siva tattva) when bindu is in the state of S*/*®**®" 1.18 b -19*. But union with Siva cannot be said to be Uie goal to be reached by the selves because firstly the self is distinct from, and as eternal as, Siva; secondly, release signifies the recovery of omniscience and omnipotence by the self (which state is described as sivatva) and not becoming one with Siva. As regaids the word siva, it is applied to everything connected with the pure path including the insentient bindu and its evolutes, the selves, super- intending gods and Siva. It is not clear whether the above words laya and siva refer to a place or state to be reached. Jhanaprakaia refers to a state named parasiva (in the laya tattva) in which the released self attains similarity with Siva. See PauskaraV, p. 72. Ramakantha lists paramasiva as one of the seven places of release ( vimoksasthdna ). See M atangapdramesvaravrtti , vidydpada , p. 69. t 1 84 Umapati ’s Commentary on the PauskarapramanapatalA significance is as follows: both the Vedic scripture ( veda - gama) and Saiva scripture C saivagama ) are authoritative with regard to (the practice of) their teachings for those who belong to the (first) three social classes in accordance with the maxim ‘all branches’ (. sarvasakhdnydya ),‘ but only Saiva scripture is authoritative (with regard to the practice of their teachings) for others. The commentary on the verse “(Initia- tion to) the one who is not devoted, not twice-born, not kind (destroys both the initiated and the initiator)” 2 explains the manner in which those who belong to the fourth class (catur- thavarna) also are eligible to study the (Saiva) scripture (aga- mddhyayana) and to undergo the consecration (hat authorizes them to initiate others (deary abhiseka). [110] But it may be objected that, since scriptures (aga- ma) y which are made up of words, require to be produced through the sense of speech, as well as the function of the organs of speech like palate, lips, etc., and since these are absent in the one (namely Siva) who transcends all tattvas 3 and is free from kalas ( niskala ), how could He be considered as the instructor of scripture ? Such is the question of the sages: It was said that knowledge-path (that is, scrip- ture) in the form of nada comes forth from the one who is free from kalas, 4 This does not seem 1 The generally accepted rule that all the branches (sakha) of the Veda enjoin the same ritual and that they are equally authoritative. But a person practises only the ritual for which he is eligible, that is to say the ritual prescribed in his own branch. Similarly, both the Vedic and Saiva scriptures are authoritative for all classes, but the rituals prescribed by them are practised according to the eligibility of the practitioner. ~ Pauskara 4.46 b . . , 3 The evolutes ( kala ) of maya and bindu provide respectively, tne bodies of those in the impure and pure realm. But Siva, who tran- scends maya and bindu, cannot be said to have a body made up of these evolutes. 4 Siva is the material cause neither of the scripture nor of nada, because if they were to arise from Siva, He would cease to be unchanging. He is the origin only figuratively, for His powers induce Translation 185 appropriate, due to the absence of the sense of speech. (70) , ( It was declared by thd statement “The Lord; after the creation, etc.” 1 thatjndnamargah pravartafe , knowledge- path issues forth, (that is, scripture arises) in the form ol nada. But this may not seem appropriate. (The author] explains (the objection) vagindriya , etc., due to the absence of the sense which produces speech; in other words, the act of speaking is found only in those who possess it (namely the sense of speech). [Ill] ISvara replies that, because the faculty of action ol ordinary human beings is ^concealed by mala, kald is required to manifest it (namely the faculty of action) aid the sense of speech also is required to speak. As Siva’s faculty is never obstructed, 2 He is not dependent on them and instructs the scripture without the sense of speech, through His ever manifest faculty of action. His power being absolutely pure, is operative everywhere and is not dependent on the sense of bindu to produce nada, the subtle speech which conveys Siva’s knowledge. According to Umapati, the verse 70 refers to verses 63-64 of the pramdnapatala . But they describe the transmission and not the origination of the scripture. The reference here could be to a verse which is cited and attributed to the Pauskara by Ramakantha in his commentary on the Matahgaparamesvara, vidyapddaX.'hy (p. 19), but not found in the vidyapada of the Pauskara : adrstavigrahac chantdc chivat paramakdrandt / nadarupam viniskrantam sdstram sarvam. It states that scripture in the form of nada emerged from the formless, undisturbed, pure, ultimate cause, namely bindu. Jnana- prakasa cites the second half of this verse (PauskaraV, p. 896) but does not seem to recognize it as a verse from the Pauskara though he refers to it as sruti. 1 Pauskara 7.63 b -64 b . # . 2 The omniscience and omnipotence of Siva, which are considered to be His powers, are real and eternally operative because they are never affected by mala which obstructs the omniscience and omnipotence ot the bound self. See Pauskara 1.39 : jhdnakriydtmikd sapi satya mtyo- ditaprabhd / sd pardbhimukhi sarvabandhalesavivarjita . 1 86 Umdpati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala speech. What wonder if He pronounces through it. (71) Asya saktih , His power, Siva’s faculty of action; vimala- tvena, being (absolutely) pure, because it is free from all association with mala in the three times, the past, present and future; sarvatra , everywhere, with regard to each and every object; nihsrta, is operative, is manifest; vagindriya - napeksd , is not dependent on the sense of speech, because it does not require it. The meaning is, since it (namely Siva’s faculty) is naturally free from mala, it does not require those (entities) which originate in it (that is to say in mala) (and) which remove mala. 1 If He utters scripture {agama) without depending on the sense of speech; tayd , through it, through the faculty described above; hm adbhutam , what wonder, means, it is not surprising. [112] The faculty of action (of Siva) could be operative (as explained above); yet, Siva, who is free from kalas, cannot be considered a speaker because the function of a speaker consists of the function of the (organs of speech such as) palate and lips. [The author] answers the objection. The function of being a speaker consists of the streaming forth of the bindu of nada according to the inclination of His cit-sakti, and of the emergence of words from it. (72) Pravaktrtvam , the function of being a speaker is; svacicchaktipravrttyanugunasya , according to the inclin- 1 Although the senses, kald , etc. are produced from maya (see Pau- skara 3.60 b -62*: mdydto dvividhd srstih sthula suksmdtmikety api fl drkchaktivyanjikd suksma sthitd tattvdtmandtmani / sthula bhuvana- rupena sarirddydtmand sthitd // suksma kalddayah purvam sthula badhnanty anums tatah , and 3.3: pralaye linadehasya karmino’nor aharmukhe / dehddeh kdranam maya suksmasthuldtmakasya tu ), it is said that they originate in mala because the cognitive and conative apparatus, which is produced from maya and which removes mala, occurs only in the self affected by mala. See Pauskara 4.147V male sati kalddindm yathd sambandha isyate , and 4.3 b : maloparuddhadrk- saktis tatprasrtyai kaladimdn. Translation 187 ation of His cit-£akti'; nddasya nihsrtih , the stream- ing forth of nada, the subtle pasyanti speech ^nd not the operation of the palate, lips, etc. But then, ^ince the ' scripture {agama), uttered by fevara and couched in iiada, is inaudible to ordinary human beings like us, why is it- said that the composition of the scripture is to instruct the ultimate human goal ? [The author] replies, bindoh , etc., from the bindu, sent forth from nada 2 ; prasrtih , the emergence, of ma- dhyamd', tatah, from it, from madhyamd ; sabdandm , of words, in the form of vaikhari (that is, the audible yords), nihsrtih , come into being. 3 Thus, the utility (of the utterance 1 It should be noted that the agency of Siva and of His powers is not connected with activity, for any action would set aside their immut- ability. They are said to be active only because they bring about changes in bindu. See Pauskara 1 .30: sivas samkalpamdtrena bindu- ksobhakaras sadd / na vyaparavisesena yendyam vikrto bhavet. According to the descent of scripture described in the tantravatara - patala of the Pauskara , when Siva’s power sets bindu (called v/iva- karana, the material cause of the pure path) into action, nada emerges first, and from nada, arises an entity also named bindu. The second bindu, further impelled by Siva’s power, produces twenty saktis beginning with ambikd which are the source of the fifty varnas. The evolution described in the tantravatdrapatalc is as follows : bindu > nada > bindu > 4 saktis , ambikd , etc. > 16 saktis, jayd, etc. > 50 varnas . See Pauskara 8.5-13 and 25. According to Umapati, the bindu which is produced from nada is known as aparabindu {aksara- bindu according to Jfianaprakasa, see PauskaraV , p. 920), while the bindu which produces nada is named parabindu . See PauskaraBh on 8.7*, p. 571. 2 The Pauskara verse describes the function of speech in Siva (which is, causing nada to appear from bindu at the beginning of the cre- ation), and not the evolution of speech. Thus, the word bindu here should refer to the bindu which produces nada, and not, as explained in this part of the commentary, to the bindu which is produced from nada. The translation of the verse follows the commentary. 3 This explanation interweaves the notion of speech comprising of nada, bindu and $abda with that of the three stages of speech, that is, pasyanti , madhyamd and vaikhari , which is not attested by the Pau- skara verse. It identifies nada with pasyanti and Sabda with vaikhari, ^abda is said to arise from madhyamd produced by bindu. This explanation seems to suggest the following scheme: nada (= pasyanti) > bindu > madhyamd > Sabda (= vaikhari). 1 88 Umapati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala of Siva) towards the ultimate human goal is indirect. Such is the meaning. [113] And yet, the scripture ( agama ) (constituted of aud- ible words) cannot be the means to infer Siva’s knowledge ( sivajhana ) as stated earlier,' because the audible word does not originate from it (that is, from Siva’s knowledge). Hav- ing raised the objection, [the author] answers it. Words are the means to infer Siva’s knowledge, only indirectly. (73*) Paramparyena, indirectly, through the inference of (the existence of) madhyama, etc.; sivajhandnumapakah , are the means to infer Siva’s knowledge, not directly. 2 It is said in the Ratnatraya, “That from which the pure path arises, where it subsists and into which it merges, is the bindu (also) named supreme nada (parandda ), the source of nada, bindu and arnd"j vaikhari (referred to here by the word arna) is the audible syllable ( varna ). 4 But then, the designa- tion of Saiva scripture ( sivagama ) would not apply to these (audible words). Having raised the objection, [the author] answers, sabdah, words, audible words composed of syllables; paramparyena , indirectly, through the inference of their (own) cause, namely bindu;. sivajnandnumdpakah, are the means to infer Siva’s knowledge. They lead to Siva’s knowledge which, as declared by the statement In Pauskara 1.7 k : sdbdam tadanumapakam . Umapati explains that, just as the knowledge of a speaker is inferred through the meaning of his speech which conveys his knowledge, Siva’s knowledge is infer- red through the meaning of the texts which He utters. Since the gross speech comes into being from the successively subtler speech, gross audible words could be traced, through the inference of the existence of the intermediate states of speech, to the most subtle speech which conveys Siva’s knowledge. 1 Ratnatrayapariksa 22. This explanation traces the origin of^audible speech ( vaikhari ) to sivajnana (which appears in the form of nada) through madhyama, and is in keeping with the commentary on the previous verse. The immediately following passage of the commentary explains the production of varnas through the bindu which arises from nada* it matches the process described in Pauskara 7.72. 18 * Knowledge of the six categories which arose in the form of nada , is in the form of nada, and is the origin of bindu. Since they (namely audible words) originate in’* the bindu which arises from nada, their designation (as scripture) is figurative, supported by usage (nirudhalaksgna). 2 [114] But then, while the Saiva scripture ( sivagama ) that enjoin the ultimate welfare exists, why did Brahma, Visnu and others, though conversant with it, instruct different paths ? [The author] explains. And those (£aiva texts) which discuss pure entities were not received with faith by- the sages, those which came from the wise deal witW (the entities of) the lower realms such as prakrti’* (73 b -74 a ) ' \ Va is here employed to mean ‘and’; thus {atha vd means) atha ca, nevertheless, that is to say, although Saiva texts (agama) existed; sivagocardh, those which discuss pure entities, the texts whose subject matter deals with the pure entities (which exist beyond prakrti); sadbhih, by the sages, by the authors of other scriptures (sastra); sraddhayd aprdptdh, were not received with faith, were not studi- ed with attention. Therefore, prakrtyddyavagocardh, deal with the entities of the lower realms such as pra- krti, they (namely the other scriptures) describe the realities ( tattvas ) which belong to the realm of prakrti and other inferior regions; anye, those, texts (agama) such as Panca- ratra; sajjanaydtah , came from the wise, also come from 1 Pauskara 7.65. In a nirudhalaksana or faded metaphor, the primary sense of a word is forgotten and its metaphorical meaning becomes prevalent due to popular usage. The primary sense of the word agama is the knowledge which was uttered in inaudible speech when the pure realm was created, but it commonly signifies the texts, composed of audible words, which convey that knowledge. the same wise, Visnu and others who are the authors of scriptures ( sastra ).‘ [115] Since other scriptures ( sastra ) are thus composed at variance (with the Saiva scripture), [the author] puts forward the rule which fixes the state of being the overruled and the overruler ( badhyabddhakabhava ) in case of conflict between the Saiva and other scriptures. Therefore the knowledge contained in the utterance of Siva is not contradicted by others’ words. The words of the sages cannot be set aside by those of ordinary human beings; nor the words of the divine beings by those of the sages; nor those of Brahma by those of the divine beings; nor those of Visnu by those of Brahma; nor those of Rudra by those of Visnu; nor those of Siva by those of Rudra, due to the excellence of the successively superior. The successively inferior is set aside by the (succes- sively) superior. (74 b -76) Tatah , therefore, since the other scriptures ( agama ) deal only with the tattvas which belong to prakrti and lower realms; sivagiram bod ha ft, the knowledge contained in the utterance of Siva, which deals with all tattvas; anya- ya giro, by others’ words, by scriptures ( sastra ) such as Pancaratra; vibodhah na, is not contradicted, for vibodhah means, ‘that whose thought is contrary’. 2 1 The commentary does not make the distinction which the Pauskara seems to make between the sages who did not acquire the instruction of Siva with attention (and propagated doctrines different from that taught by Siva) and the sages who composed the scriptures which deal only with lower realms (and consequently, contain limited knowledge). On the other hand, the commentary seems to distinguish between the scriptures ( sastra ) composed by Visnu and others, and the texts (agama) also composed by the same authors. ■ In other words, the Saiva scripture, which contains more knowledge, cannot be contradicted, that is to say proved to be wrong, by another scripture which contains lesser knowledge. Translation 191 [116] Or, the following is another interpretation of atha va, etc.: 1 The statement “The ocean of scripture (tatjUra) des- cended to Meru through successive regions” 2 declared that the very words uttered by Siva came down tp Meru through the lineage of preceptors. Another thesis is*proposed now, athavd, or; sivagocardh, those which discuss c pure en- tities, are words constituted of pure syllables; sadbhih, by the wise, by those (Saiva preceptors) who are 'free from kala, etc.; apraptah, were not acquired, in the regions below maya (but were acquired in the pure path); whereas, sajjanayatah, those which came from the wise ^ the words mentioned above (namely those of Visnu and others) are indeed different (from the words composed of ^)ure syllables). The reason is, prakrtyddyavagocardh, they be- long to the lower realms such as prakrti; prakrti means maya, therefore, they are produced from maya, etc. 3 But then, how can they (that is, the pure syllables) be said to convey a meaning, for they are inaudible, and of what utility are the prakrta syllables? (The present verse explains). Tatah, through them, through the prakrta syllables; siva- giram bodho, the knowledge of the pure speech, arises because they (namely the prakrta syllables) manifest them (namely the pure syllables). But, does the cognition of the meaning (of the pure speech) occur through the prakrta speech ? [The author] answers, anyayd gird, through the other speech, through the prakrta (speech); vibodhah r n perfect cognition does not arise. The meaning 5? th?* the cognition of Siva and other pure entities (of !*• 1 Verses 73 b -74. 2 Pauskara 7.66 b . 3 Speech is said to be subtle in the pure realm, gross in the mixed realm and grosser in the impure realm. See Pauskara 2.30 -31*. While the subtle speech in the pure realm is composed of syllables produced from bindu, the gross and grosser speech in the mixed and impure realm is composed of syllables produced from prakrti, namely maya. 1 92 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala realm, which are the subject of the pure speech) cannot arise through the impure (speech).' • [117] [The author] (further) explains that the statement of a more learned person cannot be overruled by that of a less learned. On the contrary, it overrules the latter, na carsam, etc.; arsam, that of the sages, the sastra composed by the sages, Manusastra, etc., cannot be set aside; paurusaih, b y those of ordinary human beings, by the statements of | ordinary human beings. The phrase ‘cannot be set aside’ is to be supplied to all (the following sentences). Rsibhih , b y those of the sages, by the statements of the sages; daivi- kam, those of the divine beings, those uttered by Indra and others; devaih, by those of the divine beings, by the utterances of the divine beings; brahmano vakyam, the utterances of Brahma, those uttered by Brahma; padma- janmand, by utterances of the lotus-bom, by the state- ments of Brahma; vaisnavam, those of Visnu, (scriptures) such as the Pancaratra; tathd, so also; harina, by those o f Hari, by the utterances of Visnu; raudram, those of Rudra, those uttered by Rudra; rudrena , by the words o f Rudra; sivdtmakam, that of Siva, the scripture uttered by Siva cannot be set aside. [The author] explains, urdhvordhva- vaisistyat, since they are successively superior, due to their excellence. It is well known that the words of the sages, compared to those of human beings, and those of the divine beings, compared to those of the sages, and so on, are suc- cessively superior. The excellence (of the words) .of Siva with regard to all, is proved by us in the patipatala 2 supported by evidence from Sruti, smrti, itihasa and purana. Urdhvatah, by the superior, by the successively superior, that is, the scripture 1 In other words, the impure syllables manifest the pure syllables, but they cannot convey the meaning of the words constituted of the pure syllables. 2 PauskaraBh on 1.6*, pp. 5-11. Translation 193 (< agama ) of Rudra by that of Siva, the scripture pf Visnu by that of Rudra, and so on; adho’dhah, the successively inferior; bddhyam, is set aside; due to the absence of excellence, deficiency of knowledge, etc.* It is said in the Sarvajnanottara , “The utterance of the sages cannot be overruled by that of the human beings, nor the utterance of the divine beings by that of the sages, nor that of Brahma by that of the divine beings, nor that of Visnu by that of Brahma, nor that of Siva by that of Visnu”. 1 The Matahga also declares the same in the passage beginning witlj “The Lord, who has the five mantras as His body, is said to be sakala” and concluding with “His utterance cannot be contradicted by the gross means of knowledge of the human beings”. 2 The expression ‘of the human beings’ (in this statement) also implies those of the sages and others (such as Gods). [118] In fact, the inquiry into the states of being the overruler and overruled does not arise because, as declared by the Vayavyasamhita, which is based on the scripture ( sruti ), “The scripture ( sruti ) states that the trident-bearer Siva Himself is the creator of these eighteen sciences which teach different paths”, 3 Siva Himself is the redactor of all doctrines. It is clear that the subject under discussion concerns the scriptures ( sastra ) composed by Visnu and others who are the secondary authors of different scriptures (composed by Siva Himself). But then, it may be objected that since it is said, “Purana is set aside by the Vedas, the teaching of which is overruled by the Agamas”, 4 how can the Veda, which is composed by Siva Himself and not by a secondary author, be set aside by the (Saiva) scripture (agama)'! It is answered that the purport of this statement is ' Not found in the Devakottai and Adyar editions. 2 Matangapdramesvara, vidyapada, 3.18-19. 3 Compare Sivamahdpurana, Vayaviyasamhita, purvabhaga, \ . 24. * Attributed to the Mohasurottara in the Madhydrjunasidahdnta- dipikd, GOML ms n° R.7710, “restored from n° R.6635”, p. 114. > i y-* umujjuu s ^ommemary on me rausKarapramanapatala as follows: with regard to subjects like the creation of kala , etc. which are not discussed in the Veda, (the teachings of) the Veda and the Saiva scripture (, sivdgama ) should be ren- dered non-conflicting from the point of view of the (Saiva) scripture (by supplementing the teaching of the Veda with that of the Saiva scripture) following the maxim ‘the chapter on ether’ ( viyadadhikarananyaya ).‘ If not, 2 the importance given to the Vedic duty in certain treatises, attested by state- ments such as “Having first performed the Vedic (duty), ong should then perform the Saiva (duty)”, 3 and the declaration of the eminence of the teaching of the (Saiva) scripture on account of its being the essence of Vedic teaching, by state- ments such as “Having taken the essence of the Veda”, 4 would be contradicted. [119] Even if the .Saiva scripture {sivagama) cannot be overruled by the Raudra scripture {rudrdgama) for the reasons explained above, why is it not overruled by other scriptures ? Having raised the objection, [the author] replies that, in case of conflict with a scripture which is superior because it pervades, it is proper that the scripture which is pervaded (by it) and which is (as a consequence) inferior | The maxim demonstrated in the chapter on ether {viyadadhikarana) in the Brahmasutras that the notion of the creation of ether, though not mentioned in certain texts, is to be admitted because it is mentioned in some other texts. So also, kola and other Saiva con- cepts, even though not mentioned in the Veda, are to be accepted because they are recognized in the Saiva texts. This is the meaning of the setting aside of the Veda by the Saiva scripture. 2 That is to say, if the Veda was overruled by the Saiva scripture, as declared in the statement, and if the Veda was not admitted as authoritative by the Saiva scripture. 3 Cited by Umapati also in the patipatala {PauskaraBh on 1.6\ p. 10) without attribution: vaidikim tu puraskrtya pascac chaivim samd - caret / iti varndsramdcdrdn manasdpi na lamghayet / yasmin varne sthito dehiprdpto diksam sivdtmikdm / tasminn eva sthito nityam siva - dharmah ca pdlayet. The last three lines are cited with variants by Aghorasiva in the Mrgendrav^ttidipika (p. 11) and attributed to the Bhdrgava. # . • 4 Not traced. Translation 195 should be interpreted in a different manner, an i ao? the inverse. , All scripture (sastra) is constituted unopposed to the Saiva scripture (, saivdgama ); the^aiva scrip- ture (sivasastra) should not be determined (that is to say declared to be authoritative) as unop- posed to another scripture, or in conformity with it; for it (namely the other scripture) is the pervaded and it (namely the Saiva scripture) is the pervader. (77-78*) In case of conflict with the Saiva scripture, sarvJm sa - strain, all scripture, Samkhya, etc.; vyavasthitam , isf con- stituted, means, should be constituted, as having a doctrine unopposed to it (namely the Saiva scripture). 1 Sivasdstram , the $aiva scripture, on the other hand, when in conflict with another scripture; na vyavasthapyam , should not b e determined; anyasdstrdvirodhena , as unopposed to an- other scripture, as unopposed to the Samkhya and other scriptures, that is to say as having a purport different from its own; athavd, nor, even in case of agreement; na vyavastha- pyam y should not be determined; tatsamvadataya , in conformity with it, Saiva scripture should not be declar- ed as authoritative because it has the same purport as the other scripture. [The author] explains why it is so, tad y etc.; yatah , for, the reason is that; tat vydptam , it is pervaded, scripture like Samkhya is pervaded by the £aiva scripture because it (namely Saiva scripture) discusses the tattvas up to prakrti which are described there (in Samkhya). Saiva scrip- ture on the other hand; vydpakam , is the pervader, of ail scriptures because it also discusses the tattvas which are not mentioned in other scriptures. It is superior to those (scrip- 1 By interpreting ‘is constituted’ {vyavasthitam) as ‘should be consti- tuted’ ( vyavasthdpaniyam ), Umapati seems to differ from the Pau- skara which states that all scriptures are unopposed to Saiva scripture and that each scripture is authoritative with regard to its own sphere of application. jniiu 196 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala tures) since it is composed by someone who has the know- ledge of greater subjects. Such is the meaning. [120] But then, if scriptures like Samkhya conflict with the Saiva scripture, which is the ultimate authority ? [The author] answers: The authority of each scripture ( sastra ) is only as great, O sages, as the pervasion proclaimed by the respective scripture. (78 b -79*) Yasya yasya hi sdstrasya, (proclaimed) by the re- spective scripture, composed by Carvaka and others; yd- vati vyaptih, as the pervasion, extension ( yydpana ), that is, relevance ( tdtparya ) with regard to the elements (bhuta), etc., (which are declared as the ultimate reality in the respective scripture); isyate, is proclaimed; tavaty eva, only as great, only with regard to those, elements, etc.; tasya tasya, of each £astra, Carvaka, etc.; pramanam bhavet, is the authority. But then (it may be objected that), this seems contra- dictory because Lokayata and other doctrines were rejected earlier by the statement “The inferior is overruled by the successively superior”, 1 whereas their authority is maintained here. It is replied that the earlier and later statements are not contradictory because the intention is as follows: when there is conflict with regard to doctrine ( vastvamsa ), about topics such as the origin of the universe, the nature of the individu- al self, of Isvara, etc., about which an alternative stand (vj- kalpa) cannot be taken, they (namely the non-Saiva scrip- tures) are overruled with regard to those aspects. But they are authoritative with regard to practice ( kriyamsa ) because, following the maxim ‘Sacrifice (which could be performed) before or after the sunrise (according to the religious status of the performer)’, an alternative to a fixed rule can be adopted according to the qualification of the agent. And this 1 Pauskara 7.76 b . Translation 197 validity of all doctrines is clearly stated in the tSutasamhitd' and discussed by us while dealing with the validity of the (Saiva) scripture. 2 [121] [The author] introduces the nejt (subject) with a recapitulation of that which has been discussed so far. Having thus explained the means of knowledge (named) verbal testimony ( agama ), [the 1 author] discusses the remaining (pramana). (79 b ) Evam, thus, in the above manner, having explained; aga- mamane , the means of knowledge (named) ^verbal testimony (agama); sistam , the remaining, [the, author] discusses the pramana named presumption (artm^patti), which is the remaining of the four pramanas. [122] [The author] illustrates the same. 3 And it is (as follows): the description of the state of release found in other scriptures ( anyasdstra ) leads to (the knowledge of) these (scriptures) having certainly been composed by someone who is not omniscient, for something superior to that (state of release) is taught by the Saiva scripture (sivasastra). (80-81*) Tat, it, the pramana named presumption (is as follows): ( anyasastrasamsiddhamoksatattvopadarsanam ) means, the description of the state of release found in other scriptures, in Lokayata, etc. The fact, that these groups of sentences are unaccountable without their having been composed by someone who is conversant with their meaning, leads to the presumption of an author who is conversant with their meaning. Since, sivasastrena, by the $aiva scripture; tasmat param kimcit bodhitam, something superior to that is instructed, the existence of a (higher) state of re- ' See Sutasamhita, vol. 2, 4.22. 1 -29. 2 In PauskaraBh on 1.6*, pp. 5-11. 3 The Pauskara does not define arthdpatti pramana, it only g' ves two examples in verses 80-82. 1 98 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala lease is revealed by the Saiva scripture ( tantra ); through the presumption of the definite absence of omniscience of the composers of those respective scriptures; asarvajnapranl- tatyam, (their) having been composed by someone who is not omniscient, is presumed. Such is the mean- ing. * 1 Or (it could be explained as follows): the statement, which describes the state of release such as the attainment of the elements, etc., found in the Bauddha and other scrip- tures; tasmat param, superior to that (state of release), such as the similarity with Siva ( sivasamya ), which is higher than the states of release described in the Bauddha and other scriptures; bodhitam, is instructed, vehemently proclaimed as the ultimate release by the Saiva scripture; tat, that, the same (statement about the superior states of release in the Saiva scripture), is inexplicable without the above mentioned scriptures’ being composed by authors who are not omni- scient. Therefore, asarvajnapranitatvam, (their) having been composed by someone who is not omni- scient, is presumed; and that is the pramana named pre- sumption ( arthapatti ). This (second) explanation brings out the relevance of the (seemingly) redundant expressions (as - mad iti param kimcit and anyasastrasamsiddham of the verse. [123] Having thus illustrated presumption from words ( srutarthapatti ), [the author] illustrates presumption from ex- 1 ' According to this explanation, it is first presumed that sastras are composed by authors who are conversant with their meaning ( sva - rthabhijnapranetrtva), then, through the presumption of the absence of the omniscience ( asarvajhatva ) of these authors (proved by the fact that the Saiva scripture proclaims a higher state of release), it is further presumed that these Sastras are composed by those who are not omniscient (asarvajhapranitatva). This explanation could be attribut- ed to the actual reading tac ca in verse 80*. The second explanation in the commentary, which is perhaps based on the reading yac ca, is simpler and more direct. Translation 199 perience ( drstdrthdpatti ), preceded by the declaration (of the subject). 1 ' i ( And the means of knowledge^ named pre- sumption is illustrated in another manner. Ac omniscience is known from the scripture, the absence of omniscience which is experienced implies (the existence), only in the (bound) selves, of something named pasutva which pro- duces that (absence of omniscience). (81 b -82) Anyatha ca nigadyate, and is illustrated in tinother manner, means ‘ drstdrthdpatti is proposed’; drsy^tmanam asarvajnyam, the absence of omniscience Which is experienced, the limited knowledge experienced by the (bound) self, which is omniscient by nature, is inexplicable without (the presence of) some obstructing factor; kalpayet, implies, some obstruction; svopapddakam, which pro- duces it. Sdrvajnye sthite, as the omniscience is known, since the omniscience of Siva, which is never ob- structed, is known; sastratah, from the scripture, which declares the absence of mala, etc. (in Him). Supported by the (scriptural) evidence which proclaims His omniscience, an obstruction; pasutvdkhyam, which is named pa&utva, is presumed to exist; pasusv eva, only in the (bound) selves. Or (the meaning of the second half of the verse 82 is as follows): it is said that pasutva is presumed. But the very fact that other categories (like buddhi, elements, etc.) lack con- sciousness, proves that the absence of omniscience exists in the (conscious) selves; 2 why is an obstructing factor named ' The classification of arthapatti into srutarthapatti and drstdrthdpatti is introduced by Umapati, who also supplies the definition of artha- patti. Jnanaprakasa does not make this distinction, for according to him, verses 81 b -82 merely give another example of arthapatti ( Pau - skaraV, p. 907). He does not give any definition of arthapatti. i In other words, since omniscience belongs to the selves (which are sentient, and not to buddhi, etc. which are insentient), the absence of omniscience also belongs to the selves. The presumption of an entity 200 Umdpati ’ s Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala pasutva presumed? This is explained, pasusv eva sastratah sarvajhye sthite , since omniscience indeed exists in the selves according to the scripture; asarvajhyam , the absence of omniscience, which is perceived, im- plies in the selves (pasutva which obstructs their omni- science). 1 Thus, it should be understood that the definition of presumption, 4 Arthapatti is the presumption, from the co- gnition of something which is inexplicable, of something which explains it’, is implicitly stated. [124] But then, (it may be objected that arthapatti is not an independent pramana because) the inference “The scripture (sastra) which describes the state of release recognized by it, is composed by someone who is acquainted with its mean- ing; because it is a scripture; like any other scripture”, sup- ported by contradiction from the scriptural statements which instruct another doctrine, namely that there is a superior state (of release), also proves the absence of the omniscience of its author (although it is not the thing to be proved by that inference); 2 just as the inference “The earth, etc. have a creator; because they are created” proves the oneness of the creator although it (namely oneness) does not form part of the delimitor of ‘the state of being the thing to be proved’ (sddhyata) by that inference. Thus, since the cognition pro- named pasutva, which is said to produce that absence of omniscience, is redundant. 1 According to both the explanations, the absence of omniscience of the selves, which is inexplicable, leads to the presumption of pasutva which explains that absence. According to the first interpretation, the presumed obstructing factor exists only in the selves because Jhe scripture declares that Siva’s omniscience is never obstructed. Accord- ing to the second interpretation, the obstructing factor is presumed to exist in the selves because the selves, though omniscient as proclaim- ed by the scripture, experience limited knowledge. 2 In other words, the inference which proves that a scripture has an author who is conversant with its meaning, also proves (supported by the presence of another scripture containing greater knowledge) that the same author (whose scripture contains lesser knowledge) is not omniscient. Hence arthapatti need not be accepted as a distinct pramana. Translation 201 duced from presumption could be derived throqgh infer- ence, it (namely presumption) need not be admitted as an independent pramana. [The author] wardS off the above objection: And it is different from (the pramana named) inference because the subject of the two is different. (83*) Dvayoh y of the two, of anumana and arthapatti ; because the subject of the two is different, that is, since the r|sults arising from the two pramanas are distinct; tat bhinnamAt is different, arthapatti pramana is different from anutpana pramana. The results obtained from it (that is, the above arthapatti) cannot be obtained through the proposed infer- ence because a feature which is not delimited by ‘the state of being the thing to be proved’ of an inference cannot become the subject (visaya) of that inference; 1 because the cognition of an entity through its previous cognition (upanltabhdna) is not admitted with regard to inference; 2 and because that which is to be explained (upapddyd) and that which explains (upapadaka) are inverted in the analysis of the two (pro- cesses). 3 It should be understood that the cognition of one- 1 The thing to be proved of the above inference is ‘being an author who is conversant with its meaning’ (svdrthabhijhapranetrtva). The proposed arthapatti is the means to the cognition of ‘being composed by an author who is not omniscient’ (asarvajhapranltatva). This can- not be proved by the above inference because it is not specified as the thing to be proved by that inference. 2 According to some Naiyayikas, upanltabhdna is the awareness of an object as it was previously experienced, like the olfactory perception of fragrance in the visual perception of a piece of sandalwood as ‘I see fragrant sandalwood*. See Nydyakosa , p. 163. This awareness is ;id- mitted in the case of perception because an object, which is not present in front of the senses, could be said to be perceived through extraordinary perception. But it is not admitted in inference because something, which is not the thing to be proved by an inference, can- not be proved by that inference. Therefore, the absence of omniscience (asarvajhatva) cannot be brought within the range of the above infer- ence through upanltabhdna . 3 While anumana proceeds from that which proves (for example, smoke) to that which is to be proved (fire), arthapatti progresses from 202 Umdpaii 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala ness (of the creator in the above inference) also is known (not through inference, but) through another pramana.' [125] Thus having discussed in detail the tattvas, which form part of the six categories, and pramanas (the means to know these categories), 2 (the author) explains the nature and order of the dissolution of the creation. The withdrawal of the objects, thus known through the means of knowledge, should be admitted to be in the inverse order due to the re- lation of cause and effect. The dissolution of the cause cannot take place prior to that of the effect; therefore (dissolution) beginning with the last effect is appropriate; (and) the earth (elem- ent) is the first to undergo dissolution. (83 b -85‘) Evam, thus, in the manner explained above; pramana- siddhanam , known through the means of knowledge, such as verbal testimony; arthdnam, of objects, realities and their evolutes from siva tattva to the earth element 3 ; upa- samhdrah estavyah, withdrawal should be admitted, dissolution should be accepted (to be in the inverse order). [126] But then (it may be said that), there is no evidence whatsoever to prove the withdrawal of the entire creation; on the contrary, there is proof for a beginningless continuous succession of the created entities. It is proved by inferences such as “Day and night are preceded by day and night; be- that which is to be explained (for example, the absence of omni- science) to that which explains (pasutva ). 1 Through sabda according to Umapati. See PauskaraBh on 1 .93*, pp. 62-63. Tattvas were described in the previous six. chapters and pramanas in the present chapter. 3 While siva tattva is the first and the most subtle substance produced from bindu in the pure realm, the earth element is the last and the grossest element ( bhuta ) produced from maya in the impure realm. See Pauskara 2.34 b -35* and 6.279 b -280*. Translation 203 cause they are day and night; as recognized (by ajl)”, 1 and “Brahmana and other classses ( varna ) are preceded by brah- mana and other classes; because they are* brahmana and other classes; as recognized (by all)”. 2 Moreover;- pitilessness would befall the highly compassionate Siva if He were to dissolve the entire universe created by Him (for the benefit of the bound selves). [127] This (objection) is answered. Evidence which pro- ves the dissolution of the universe is not lacking, foij the inference “The continuous seines of effects (consisting of objects) like pot, which is the subject of discussion, ceases to exist completely at some time or other; because it is a con- tinuous series; like the continuous series of a flame” and the inference “The two mayas 3 existing simultaneously, are subject to the cessation of the succession of their effects at some time or other; because they are material cause; like threads” prove it. This (second) inference does not apply to the successive destruction of effects (which takes place in the pure and impure realms) because the adjective ‘simultan- eously’ that qualifies the subject (‘two mayas’) also qualifies the thing to be proved (‘subject to the cessation of the suc- cession of their effects’). 4 The invariable connection 1 As day and night are uninterruptedly preceded by day and night, there cannot be a period during which day and night did not exist; this proves that the universe exists continuously. 1 Since only the person who is bom of brahmana parents can be a brahmana and since there is continuity of brahmana-hood in the world, it is proved that there was never a period during which brah- mana parents did not exist; this also proves that the world exists continuously. 3 Since maya, which is the material cause of the impure realm, is one and eternal ( nityaikd , Pauskara 3.2*), the reference here to a second maya should be to bindu, the material cause of the pure realm, which is sometimes named makamaya. See, for example, Siddhantasara- valivyakhyd on 27 b : mayadvayam mayeti bindur iti asuddhasuddha- jagadupddanadvayam; Raurava, vidyapada, 3.28 b : mayopari rnahd- mdyd sarvakdranakdranam, etc. , 4 The above inference would be said to be defective if it were to prove the successive destruction of the creation of maya and bindu, which is > r 204 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala between day and night and the precedence of day and night by day and night (mentioned above) does not obstruct (these inferences) (because the inference comprising of that invari- able connection is defective). For, if the subject (paksa) of that inference were the day and night of the present time, the defect of ‘proving that which is already proved’ ( siddhasd - dhana) would arise; 1 and if the subject were the day and night prior to the creation, the defect of ‘the non-establish- ment of the reason due to (the non-existence of) the sub- strate (in which the reason could exist)’ ( asraydsiddhi ) would result. 2 Moreover, it (namely the reason ‘precedence of day and night’) is contradicted by verbal testimony. 3 It should not be said (by those who do not admit dis- solution) that brahmana-hood, etc. 4 would not be assured if brahmana and other classes at the time of the creation were not preceded by brahmana and other classes; for it is accom- plished by a particular unseen potency ( adfsta ), as proved in the case of Visvamitra and others. 5 And this does not lead to the defect of ‘(an effect) not following (its cause)’ ( ananu - admitted by all. It is therefore specified that the inference intends to prove not the common destruction of objects, but the simultaneous destruction of everything in the pure and impure realms, namely the great dissolution of all creation. 1 Because everyone perceives that day and night precede day and night. 1 As the day and night, which constitute the subject (paksa ) of the inference, do not exist prior to the creation, the reason (‘because they are day and night’) is devoid of a substrate (the subject) in which it could exist and in which it could prove the presence of the thing to be proved ( sadhya ). 3 Since scriptures declare that day and night are interrupted during the great dissolution. ° ‘ Etc. ’ should refer to scorpion-hood, etc. 5 It is said that Visvamitra, who was a ksatriya because he was bom of ksatriya parents, obtained brahmana-hood through the perfotmance of austerities. It is also believed that although all scorpions are bom of parent-scorpions, the very first scoroion came into existence out of a heap of cow-dung due to a particular adrsta . Translation 205 gama)' because unseen potency is the cause everywhere; and the (causal) following exists ( between a particular unseen potency and brahmana, for as in the case of qow-duhg and scorpion, the potency is the same. 2 i [128] It should not be said that the simultaneous dissolu- tion of the universe would prove the pitilessness (of Siva); it is intended to give respite to the selves exhausted by trans- migration in cycles of existence, 3 to restore the inclination to create to the two mayas whose powers are rendered faint due to repeated production of effects, and to allow the karma (of the selves) to ripen. It is said in the MrgendAa, “Having withdrawn the apparatus of experience, having merged (it) into (its) cause and having seized the sarhe (cause) along with the selves (which reside in it), (Siva) remains for the repose of the selves wearied of transmigra- tion, because He is the benefactor of all beings”. 4 The mean- ing is, having dissolved the apparatus of experience com. prising of bodies, the means (of experience), worlds (filled with objects of experience), etc. into the cause which is maya; and having seized, that is to say having dominated it together with the selves whose presence therein is declared by the statement, “(The abode of the sakala, pralayakala and vijnanakevala selves is respectively) at the beginning, in the 1 If brahmana-hood were produced by an adrsta at the time of the creation and subsequently by birth from brahmana parents, the causal relation between birth from brahmana parents and brahmana-hood would be variable, for the effect (namely brahmana-hood) does not invariably follow its cause (which is birth from brahmana parents). 2 In other words, the birth of a brahmana from brahmana parents at present is caused by the same adrsta which gave rise to the first brahmana at the time of the creation; just as the birth of a scorpion from parent-scorpions at present is due to the same adrsja which caused the very first scorpion to appear from cow-dung. Thus, the causal relation is not disturbed. , 3 See Pauskara 5.69 b -70*: kirn tu bhogesu khinnanam visrantyartham mahesvarah // svecchayaivopasamhdre niyamam vidadhdti sah. 4 Mrgendra, vidyapada, 4.13-14*. 206 Umapati s Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala interior and at the end of may a”, 1 the Lord remains (without inducing further activity) for the respite of the individual selves. It is said by Trilocanasivacarya in the Siddhdntasdra - vali , “Sambhu brings about the great dissolution for the re- pose of the selves weary (of transmigration), to allow the totality of karma to ripen, and to restore the power of ma- ya”. 2 Bhoja too said, “The Lord undertakes the great dis- solution out of compassion for the sake of all beings tired of cycles of existence, for their own repose, (and) for the ripening of (their) karma’’. 3 4 [ 1 29] And that dissolution is to be admitted, vyatyayena , i n the inverse order, in an order contrary to that of the creation, that is, in the reverse order. [The author] explains why it is so, karyakdranabhavatah , due to the relation o f effect and cause, since they constitute that which inheres (namely the effect) ( upadeya ) and (its) material cause (; upa - dana). A But then, why is dissolution in the regular order not admitted between those which are connected as the material cause and as that which inheres in it (namely the effect) ? 1 Pauskara 4.6 b . The location of the selves in different regions, how- ever, is metaphorical because they are all-pervasive. They are said to be confined to a particular realm according to the type of bondage which exists in them. See Pauskara 4.7*: avasthdnam ca bandhena laksyate ’ nor vibhutvatah . Umapati explains that the beginning of ma- ya means the sphere of tattvas between the earth element and kola, the interior of maya signifies the maya which has withdrawn its creation, and the end of maya is its upper part. The Pauskara specifies that the vijnanakevala selves (which are free from karma and maya), cannot be said to be situated at the end of maya. It only means that they remain between the impure realm, which they have transcended, and the pure realm which they will join when initiated. See Pauskara 4.9: bho - netarasya ca / arthdd eva sthita madhye IT. 4 Upadeya is that which exists in a substance by inherence; a piece of cloth is an upadeya because it inheres in the threads which are its cause. Updddna is that in which an effect is produced while being connected to it by inherence; threads are updddna because the cloth, which is produced by them, exists in them by inherence. Updddna is also known as the samflvayikdrana (intimate cause). ksyamdnatayd tasya bhuktatve prokta vijhanakevaldh. 2 Compare Siddhantasdravali 3 Tattvaprakdsa 70-71*. Translation 207 [The author] answers, na hi , etc., kdryopasamhdjrad adau, prior to the withdrawal of the effects/ before the dis- solution of that which inheres; kdranasamhrtih , the ' with- drawal of the cause, the dissolution of the material cause is not proper; for, prior to the dissolution of effect which consists of its (namely the effect’s) remaining as a potency in its material cause, the dissolution of the material cause cannot take place; moreover, it would render the effect baseless. Others also admit that the destruction of effect, brought about (in certain cases) by the destruction of the non-intimate cause ( asamavayikarana ),” exists in the material cause; since the destruction of effect in every case coull be explained by the destruction of the non-intimate cause, there is no evidence to prove the destruction of effect through the destruction of the intimate cause (samavayikarana). It should be noted that this (notion), namely that a material cause is that from which the effect is produced, where it exists and into which it merges (on dissolution), also agrees with the nature of material cause described in the Vedic scripture ( srutyagama ). Tad antimdt kdrydt, therefore from the final effect, the withdrawal of the creation, beginning with the ultimate effect, is appropriate for the reasons dis- cussed above. [The author] explains that very process of dissolution beginning with the last effect ,prthivyadi, etc.; the ‘ Non-intimate cause {asamavayikarana) is that which connects an effect and its intimate cause {samavayikdrana) while inhering in one of them; for example, conjunction between threads {tantusamyoga) is a non-intimate cause because, while existing in the threads {samavdyi- kdrana , the material cause), it connects them to the cloth l kdrya , the effect). Some Naiyayikas hold that the destruction of an effect is brought about by the destruction of its material cause {samavayi- kdrana ), except in the case of the binary (which is an effect because it is produced by the conjunction of two atoms). The destruction of the binary is caused not by the destruction of the atoms (which are eternal according to them) but by the destruction of conjunction between them ( asamavayikdranandsa ). Some other Naiyayikas hold that it is simpler to admit that the destruction of every effect is brought abcut by the destruction of the non-intimate cause. See Tarkadipika , p. 10. 208 Umapati s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala earth (element) is that whose destruction takes place first, in other words, it is the foremost to dissolve. [130] [The author] gradually explains the process of dis- solution in the inverse order, with illustrations: The elements merge into the subtle elements; the subtle elements and the senses, together with mind, into egoity; that (egoity) into intellect; that (intellect) into gunas \ those gunas into pra- krti; that (prakrti), as well as the group of five tattvas beginning with raga (merge) into maya; it (that is, maya), however, is declared to be eternal. (85 b -87*) Tanmatresu, etc.; bhutani, the elements, earth, etc. merge respectively into the subtle elements, smell, etc. 1 It should be noted that all (the sentences) are connected with the above verb (namely ‘merge’). Tanmatrany api, the sub- tle elements also, smell, etc.; indriydni, the senses, the five senses of action beginning with the sense of speech, 2 the five senses of cognition beginning with the sense of smell; 3 manas cdpi, and mind, merge into ahamkrtau , egoity. And here the disposition is that the subtle elements merge into the egoity predominated by tamas, the senses of action into the egoity predominated by rajas, and the senses of cognition and mind into the egoity predominated by sattva; sa, that. ' The five elements, ether, air, fire, water and earth, merge into the five subtle elements, sound, contact, form, taste and smell, from which they are produced. See Pauskara 6.279 b -280*: mahdbhutani jd- yante kramat tanmatrapahcakat // dkdsam pavanas tejas toyam bhur iti samjnaya. 1 The senses of speaking, walking, holding, excreting and procreat- ing. See Pauskara 6.195*: karmendriyani vdkpddapaniguhyagudani ca. 5 The senses of smelling, tasting, seeing, touching and hearing. See Pauskara 6.158: buddhindriyani kathyante srotram tvak caksur eva ca /jihva ghranam ca pahceti suprasiddhdni tdni ca. Translation k 209 egoity; matau, in intellect, that is, in the. buddhi tattva; 1 sa, that, intellect; gunesu, id gunas, in guna tattva; the plural number here (in the word gunesu) only signifies that gunas are divided (into three) and not that they are multiple tattvas since the oneness of the (guna ) tattva was proved by the text “Since they produce effects conjointly”. 2 Te gundh , the gu- nas, the guna tattva (merges into prakrti); 55, that, prakrti and, rdgddyam tattvapancakam , the group of five tattvas beginning with raga , (the group) consisting of kdla , ni- yati, kala, vidyd and raga? mdydydm layam ay anti, merge into maya. The dissolution bf prakrti and the groua of ra- 1 Buddhi tattva is that state of guna tattva in which the sattvaguna is predominant. See Pauskara 6.42 b -43*: rajastamobhyam nyagbhuta vrttis tattvena cotkatd //sa buddhir uditd tantre visayddhya vasayini. 2 Not traced, but the expression in the commentary seems to suggest that it is from the Pauskara. Guna tattva is the state of equilibrium of the sattva , rajas and tamas gunas. See Pauskara 6.29*: satt'v- dayas samavastham praptds tattvam gunatmckam. Th- diff?r?ncc between the prakrti, guna and buddhi tattvas is as follows : , * v s three gunas are in a state of equilibrium but merged indist: . prakrti is known as pradhdna , avyakta or prakrti tattva. When they are separated from each other in that state of equilibrium, it is called guna tattva and finally, when the equilibrium is disturbed by the predominance of the sattvaguna , it is known as buddhi tattva. See Pauskara 6.35 b -36: avyaktagunasamyam tu pradhdnam paripathyate // vibhaktagunasamyam tu gunatattvam ihoditam / vibhaktagunavaisa- myam tattvam buddhyddikam dvijah. 3 Since this is the order in which they were created, their dissolution in the inverse order begins with raga. For an order different from these two, see Pauskara 5.1 b : kala vidyd ca ragas ca kdlo niyatir eva ca , in which order these tattvas help the self to regain, though parti- ally, its capacities to know and act. Of these, kola first appears from maya and vidyd emerges from kala (Pauskara 5.8); subsequently raga emerges from kala. (Pauskara 5.26). Umapati explains ( PauskaraBh on 5.1 b -2\ p. 305) that kala is mentioned first when the creation of the universe is examined because creation takes place in time. But it is mentioned after kala , etc., when bondage is discussed, because kala and niyati can direct the experience of the self only when its faculties to act, know and desire are activated respectively by kala , vidyd and raga. See Pauskara 5.47 and 5.23 b -24*. f 1 2 1 0 Umdpati *s Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala ga , etc. 1 also take place in an order inverse to that of the creation described earlier. 2 Maya, however, does not dis- appear because it is eternal. [The author] explains, sa tu y etc. It is proved to be eternal on the basis of reasons such as, its being the substrate d ! >l ^^WMU^drM’^l Mdld'Hd' fid^SLI : fTdTd^TfPfdfd': II * II 3PRT HUdR-l^ld': Mdiuilfd *hMI Hd tr I o o c dd4-d*Mdlq31lM Mddl o^PT II ^ II d*-HK<-mc3RT: I WVp: '-I'-dlP^I ' r - ^TOTT: NdOT : ddP^gT : dTOdT frofw frW I ddjfT dtl'd^dW: W3T T pH^PMdl :, dvrfr f^TFTTT ftWRTT: fNMd d>l'd>Mdld*m ' W Mi>l'-KldPd*^l' ^ , V^lf iT ^T %7T o ^ v aFuTT’ d^l'TO “dtlTT dlddrdiyrPT” T ~>~ " 2 1 6 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala re i qrj:w- ?r ddirdY^R^FTpr htt: i srvHidPwfdr: “dPwdlwii % fTTW" ffk 4ldvddd4dddlVii|rd , d': I m R n^iRidH^' T^yPri 3rd"dT §f?r i c \o ^ SFPTTWT HrdiqWl STdTWrT^qTTTT^ fd ^Pldcd 5nrrwFT^Tsr?^#w:, rrf^rrw ^rq>MPirdd snir I d*-d STRWFq’ R * Mdlddy Tdd'dlPd srfWRT S^TcdT ST^T: drdTlTT^Pp: fdfd^ts^T: otp-p: Hfrrv fcEPT: | rPTT % cRIddldlPid* SIHIui T %f?r dfT dfcWTCT d’ 4%^ W, SFRT S TH l ~ U| H d Pi Td P* h q q Pi d d\ ^TTprsrfT fFd^Pd'-lddl : dddTrT,* Pi * P-m i-^fr ^iPd'P^Pydyid ?Pt HTT: I rfrT: f^FT- f^HT 3TTf dHUftld I dpH-Mdld 5HH I U| M it ^ fH *. TJil^rqin 1 1- ^TTT ! ddPddJlTdMd ! 3|ddld> pjfjTPT- c HH d I Pi 5RWrPr dW Pd *■ mP-HH 3T^f%r ?rW: I [2] n^- q-rq-sr^T; ypridldddi 3d I u i I Pd Pr*"- wPti d m i Pi ’sfnr qCid^H dir ii 3 ii d’-qiP' rrrf=r HMiPd y cd Text 217 ^ 1 1 f&rr: ! rnfr smwrfdr ac wflpr ^tIt 1 3TT ^TMdHKldi WTW qrn u i rd 3WR-- Hlqq^dTcft FTdpH*yU|ldd''' ^Td: , an fci^qm - . ^rnJTrr^ sfrq«nr ?Pr 1. ddfddidd “yvd^dddH d - w- ^ %P=T 91 i^’ ?r^fHVRTTV^ 5nw I wfr dldl^M^uididdM^RT fVdW: ?T^T- f^::, fTVTfr SHIIddldldldi SR mird l dddl dldl^n«, u ,|.qHdldlPidltl l ^ l fd ^KI^VddMd l. 7 U| d q 1 Pi oq 1 Pn *1 | *-q I p; Pn nPiqrdd'dddldldldl- ^Tfr Fr8^rq-=nq»iiq 3TT^ favTFT: dPT: | f%~ 9H H M U | Id I didi^n«dydd>cdPdddM FJ raf7T d Iqqis d *1 d $Pl 1 d 9| d I Pi Pd - : d y| d Pd M d d _ PqPi4l ’'dirdd I d"- o[rq^riimciiyPid'lPldd' yd>l ^d>- Fdd-| 9i TT d d q^HKirddrdd l dT ^T PdrdlPi VFr ^Tfd-- 2 1 8 Umapati s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala 5qrr^r:;fTT ->dd*yHT l cycfdHlddy i ddrd -rl Id I dTFd H ^ <+.1^ ui rTTTSTNMy^l^rNIrT I [6] dTfr ii| ^ pH Vi4-i -H ■» iTh M I y rrl n I M H y <+» I ^ ^=1 - tT I 7 drf dd- , ’-MPdrd l PdydN l dod | id :; fTW: STRTdT: dd-'y>MPd^yiddldyp]dYd<'P^d*yd^y*l<'*rdlcr I MdydlPdPldd^lMddy TTTdT: ddydPdVildldyPdyinr- yl''d>d'yi ddlodl'^ | fidPNHiy IH<*TT- '^psn [7] HI^’MI^rMd l RrdH; I ddlodPddlP''rdydfdldt- Y d^lldPrlcd l >M*t>cd d^- dt: ?rfr d^f dPr VFT ipi^wR^l' ?f TT scpq-- ?WT dlld^l'^T: I [9] dlfd M l /MI J M’MlPdj i md.rdH I fH^lMddMm- dldl'’d’dpHd-ddr^l^ld.rdld^dd rTtTrST^P^r- rd“ d"dTd'"dH I [12] fd Pd T) 1 PddM['dd'^Jd%f?T f%%W7d^FT rdTTT- d^cSdd d.pMddNldP^|W]d> ifPr dffWTPd' fPf 5TpT ■^priodiP^Pddi '"jh i d - ^ddPdodiP^dPddi^rr^ *=df- rdd^dd>ddld^ddrddlfd Pd c rd dddV 5TFT ^odlP-dPd ^IfUdrdfd; I dP-H^HIdPl (d ilH *J| d I d Kd d m I c^i^PM Td d d d. HlP^rT: <-H>Ped<7- rdldl ' dT rT 5T#d dd fddPdrdTrfl -SO V [14] 3H -*dd d drydtl-'dx-dPdrddrdT odrdm^T fd od I P -d : df&mT I d R-d'd' TT3WTwrfddr s d^rdTd‘- v O O ^dd drf^rdlTWdFd-, d r^Pd^l ^^iy>d<^yrdd I i^dP^Xflldrddd dHHdFf- Prfd wi * 220 Umapati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala [is] fd dr df^dfdrnrr ddTdrddrsrrdTw rr *=dd ^d h-i*ii dlCTd" d d TdT: I fiPdfj rf wnm dr^reirw dfdd d^iri [16] FfRT 1 P&q (^■>lrl^ , Ml l 4rq*H«IHI'J^'(-^ ddrft- il I^JC^XIH ^PHhqrll ’T* I -1 <-«< | 4 p] ^ <4 iqc'r'jl Pn- [17] ft d" TVdfr-cM I P«H : dfd dldHl •Md 1 dTdTdd- HI^IMldPdPdWH dd ^dd dt ^dd^Pd dPdd- v dl *t-d3 <'Jld5lldd'l^''>lrqtt1u| y IHI'Jdld^’JTTrT did ffd ?W fa/fdH I *dTddttd ; dddd MddHJIdyidl- C X U^KI MddMJlld'Hcqtf unbuild dTdT fdr.'H : I dTd- rrc|Hc( d* fdHddd td SNHIUilfK^l d ddTd I d d" dT^d dWdHHI dd- dMddird qfdddSSdt dldTdtrf^ddfdRJtsft dST- c c P^imPdddfryNMyyPdP'Pd I d1WRtdrd^Tffd?r- 5ft dFd tm=d dFdrdTrT; d^dddd fd d H d Pi dd- fddddT idiPdfd d]rMycy^l WT 3T dHtindld" I Mi*u g <4M * Pi P< f^FTT- ft- ^yidiuy^yyPdy 1 iPiyrfi^ n' HTdlw stwt yr- 7exJ 223 oMiy«t>dy T ^cddldf dfTrT: dQdiqd n<5ild: P^T- fftpf dTWT I ^yidl'JdMITfr y 'dfrdd - dcxPi^^- Hiw I ftry 3]y IHI^d midldlddldpT Mldi^Mpdd: ^dMMKI^ I [27] W d" d £rd Id did I M d ddMI Mldl g Md^l d | V>d y ff| P^dddNdd l ^MdN4 d Pd^l ^d^yif^TT dife $<-ydyy>r y 'dfrdd; i [28] 3TTFTTW d“ TTrft 3lldd I d - d" ^yidl g d^iy- Pd^rdld«H-dld ^ ^ dP^yy + MrdPd-^fd' dl^dd I dwmtd" d^dNd^r itw dcy Mdlr^f-d H v d- f-rdPlPi d Idd I [30] y1 <+» 1 44 r-c< | fWrj* f^i%rf: | r rei^feSn irr 3t. ^ Pi raided T f^dl^-T ^ sql^PT f^tT: I 5T T W SmTr^ f ^pTlrcMd - * mr r|r^|rf 1 [31] wfr •TTH j|rf‘ f%f%r[ ^RW- P* ^-^rfr pt%i>i h 1 ^ 'rarfacFdTrr, ^HUd^l'W T 5tT: ! FRTT % ST?W- ^nrnrr ipr: i P2] 3^fiTf?nmRrr ^^rfr w ^Hfr^idaiMi jjwct T ’ THc< ^ 1 ; dPj^Pd WFf WtfFFT : sth 1 <-ci 1 ri 1, rr^tj n 1 j 1 »ri v 4 1 ^ m 4^ <+> 1 h Pm h* .* ^n^rfr WP-lP-i ;p '1*1*1 ^TRRTfWFqT- ^ 1 ’ M pj^l ^ dt^-d 1 q ^ i|ciyiil 5m | f-d 4H M ^ j ii| ^ VT HrdHMdvId | O x P3] JT^nrRrr ^ wj t ^r- ’TtTH^^^yHN, 5TTVT:; rT^T^RlVT TT=PFRT- ^ c Text 225 rq^r-HlIrl | 5f ^T d|Ji|dldl o J||r t; u^ddidddd ^VididPiaicd-dl Pd >41 Pj 1 - ^ d d 1 Pi ^1 ^ <~d"TH 1 d * H ' - d 3i«-d'|*-d idlddddli i(d |4-K]d Pd d 1 * 1 d; nddsidl gdrMl^l^d^FVsiMWI rT^T- c o rr ="' c d 1 =r ^r ^dJi*MiTiJiidiPmi]«+»yi]iiiF ir^- j pirdd - Pi dKdd I fTRTT: fa ^d^ddPdcd^iqiiddd l Pr*T- ^ h ^ q H-i n m 1 ^rT^r M «M q 1 1 ^rpTTV^T HWIM^ ut- C -III - 1 - 1 < Pi P^d l d riiHdid I FTdH*-y^lPM W: 3TRT- ^T: I [34] 3TT !>! d 1 u i c*i jji ui y (d Si M I ?t?PTTffaf rT8ffWT?T I FspfT FHHI«+.l^yHid II i( II f^^4i[>j=qv7?i , MddrfyyrdradH 1 ^T^Mrfl^Pd^ilHPd : ddPdP^'KiH II % II ^fd Rf^l d I n*^pM : SldlUIrdd - ^4-Hdl I ^TTrRT U’Ttp-Hd d Ph pi| Pi ^^dMl i, 4TdHpddl %: fWrWT HHd 5UT d PHU|d l ^ ^l*il^Pd 1 HFFTRTR: RFW^WTfcTRTJT: g ^rdlPd I «o <0 ■'Tl H l h 226 Umapati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala ?TT jfcr ?TfS?TT^Tc^T: I 3FT- y*FIH'U| 5TR“ rTTHMdP£$M4> STTT- fdrfr tTRrT P«m4M: I 3^rT ^snTFcTTT “^-ddPd^- wjwR^Twnr ?wr ffr i . . . [35] dP-ddddrydd; ®RTOl*»4rrr wfadfd £ i md>yqPd~’ , q ' H^mny- o c fFMR *TTW?r ydPddN ddHyKlcf I T T T^TT dT 'ddPdPd dMKpf McjfrlMfiJl:, fEHTtrf at -4| I *»i| I rMI M rl P? Td W; HdWlyPf^dSiddld^KM ydd+cdld' I Iw f^rCTFradlT fWTOF, PdinuiPd^lwi^t: dP>ld>N ':, ddddFdddld^ d>l 'UUPd' I sr^tfr ^^drdyr^tfT T Pd^n«mr» < T>^ * H«M ' f «u*iidd >a PdPv i ayciiad i ddT r ^ fqVdi # STWT ? T ^ ydN I dq 1 fcSTWTfaTTRT *>TT- W|rdd ; o ^ fW^TFTaTRTT Pd$iyu|dPd'd>yH|ld)l''U|cT T^T qP^Pd- fTOTFTOTTfT: I rPTT ff yTdt d P^d I Pd d Pd PrRTT Mdd*yPd$ rgr ^PdddPvidT:, ?tt- Text 227 •d^TFTH^mrf ffr fafti&yc^ddidiiTr PqqjdidcdM i d - ^cTTdTtTT WR^rfW^rW l^T cFT «hl *uirq >9 Hd Tcd fr qi^dR; dV dT Pd'dcicqid_ I dFTT^TTT- ^Mi Tf r yd i mmN Rr srrw qrrr jft: i [36] 3IW I T dTTrT HTIWKT yqrqMHpd: I ^d '’ ^'M lP^T T^T^TrT ffrr dd$ic»iqdqddqri TT%TT5r WTT ydPdPddrqiyd : I f%T dcqyqPnc-qM PqPd£- jHHF T l < "dcd , jH^rd l d - 1 T ^dddr^ydPdHTFr PqPi 7 t^t^i d.FUM^MdK^IN I ddKV|jfl
r>Md rr I T %T M^cTf qP^dlPirq^iTy 5tldrn««mPd- PdOdldt-qd", dH id fr^T M rq ttl d I d ■wd I dH<- c%5f, dpgyrdlillHpTir^rd q I ■'•q d I 3lidr*t«i u idPd- dtMf ^T aiHtPhdx-dd' ddidPqqd a>»rqddld4l'- dl^dPdPddlddTT dHdrdld I W TTITyrqciHIT- l^rWFTfWTFT TFTr^T | T T TT^iT | Pdni l g.dHd>FU I dldl^yd l u lT JTTfTTTT PqP^ia^id- l 228 Umapati s Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala jf) rq<-d a'l-H I pj| I r1 , Sddlfuidijfl 'ddd ^TK'Hrqirl | rT^T^q^nWr^^Tp- q f%fqq 5 fTW- f^rlrr i [37] qq 3TFcqq Tqrqfqfqgqrqq I rTMTfr qq SHflddld <','dddcq-dldqq I SRTqq 7"v ddPdPd STcft^T:, U| ^ o O c ^sq- ^WsqT^T^rr; fq^rdd qj jddda ii qi 3T- ^Tt j ji d I q d q Ml Mrq Id ?fq Tdlddlqr: I F RT I qqirq qq ^d Pi Idd i qrd H M d : I q q • qddd Idqd 3T^Mrdldd)'l qq ?fq qr ^H I q qioHd l TfW d^Pi dldq>ci^iq1 d^viidiqqddHqq ^rT- TdMHHri :, qTd i d m ■" H Ih '''Jidilq^cirdyfiJIl^d I qq dK*qWi qfTT^TliqW:, qq q dddqd^fid qq -H-dqi^inrqaqi^dJMoiirdid I qq q Kaq*|Hl d": dqipM q ddqqqiddqdl, qqf TdrMdl qr 3d | U | - ^ " -O d P^d I % Pi Td Ph qj Pd dd dqqqqildd^iflldqddrM^ i q - q fKdqdMfqPdMd I qqTrq HPdKMpH dT HMdl - rqPdydJIlPjPd I “dddd qfqqq” slrqiPddl fiPdd'l fqwqnTrq- fqwrqq qrqpqq ^ m i q>i ^ ^qq qftdrq mqq sfq 3] I cH *»d I Id q I Id d "l drf Pd d-+
qiPd- I ~q q M H H rd I dddl ^rflddH Tqq dddP^MOT- dqld qqPn l qq qqrfqqq^qqfq3ITq: fsrqFq" ^qq q | “T^qrfq^q % q y cqdldq^Mff T - y diP-i<&: I dddiq^q^l^iPd ^q ddld>dodi i [38] ddld fq&rqfq 3H»jclfd I qRTpqpqinq ddld- fTrqq dlrMd q q qqTqq | qMd l P^d l dKIdPdoq i - i qif^TTrqq qiqrpqr^qrqfqqwrq qqsqqrqt' q d I Id oq i P-d P' Id S^sqq I ITq qfqqrfqqT Id + 'q dqq- qf^rqrqqfqq Frerq qql dPdrdl^ qf^Tfrfq l ara' d«+d-Mi'-qi^|qj PlH Pd M d q Pd rd q WFfr. qrqqi [39] q^qqqfr qqqifqjqfqqqq qiqpdrdd qdTW- Hd IJ ld’Hi q q q Paq d i q Id oq i P-d q 1 1 «i i d fq^jfqq- •o o c 'h q Ph Pd qr^qq 5i Pm i d Ph Pd HTqoqrqwrqqq^q N o qP>l , '’lddddlPild qq I qqiuiird-qPdoqiPvr: | q^IT- °rrq fq^dqqqqq i 230 Umdpati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala [40] d -d d d Pd I dd«-dd¥l I dIHPd HHd l- odd^FH-MlPdrdlVlddl^ I t tot dFr ITT t ttt r: n vs n 3TT Pd^JPddMdd T^W: Fdddl-d'dl TtT ITT f^fw: T ^FTT: 3HddPd^iPddyd>|i!l frTT: | [41] TT 3TTrJHHli,fT f^TrTrf^mTT rFTrfT JTFT- -9 C v rdd 'Hil^ : djcfT T P*dd Scdd 3TT^ I •T rTFTrfMTTW 5TFT TTfTT TFT T FI-d J dH I y ° # ^ ° TTRTT add *dHlr*H *H TFT cTFT rddd^dllNH^ T c \a fTTTSr^TW %rTT: I TTFT SRFT %dldd> fTTdt- -H'NH” ^rTrlrfir: wmr frrfq?r d^dM^ddH i ^ v O • ^ ITT ^ TTFpTrT^^TTHT^NTT TI HlPd ri&odH | [42] 5TFTFT HHcd'[^d>F ^ S WIUlfd ^TTrT- fWTTrT SI'HlPdP'ddfd d>HfdldTTRf dTTHfd 1 : 5PTT- °TrT SJ^IUM-d^-rnTT cl'ddNFfd f%W=T d>HrdPHrdd STTITI TT* yildHIdlPdodNF: WtTWTII c; || Tt Td^Tf^W I ^mTrTTT dddIHdsimid : I SFT- THTTlfT: JFFFTTT: SFTTcT Pd ^ d cd fM rd T: I fTW- PnP^HTTdd-T *f*T ^TTWI ^iPdMdd PdNdddHMdl JT^FT I W ITT scnw: TTT Pd^dd : 'FT- Text 231 cddNTlPdidd I dddd MVlddH ‘‘7 cT*FtPt fid-d^d - o o rd>ldH” ?fr, “dpf4]p>l^< drdtld UPFT dddlrHd>d 1 T 'dldd TcT: d>|i5Pd Pi TFT HHId frdcPT” ffr T it- T^dddd'l : da >*. dl-ddlodlP-d^R^ 5FTFT drrftWTII ?oj| TTFTdPTT TT ddidldddl'C^ I 3T5T FRFT ^odl'^dlPddlNIHIT *FFT: FHIddlPT TTFTtFFp: I ddl^dlPviHlHld^diir fT8H U| 4-d I d dT I cTtTT- ddlfdlrdl^ yrd^Pd I SFWf^FTFJT Mdlddd" d^FT- fT odiv-dl odlUjdddld ^FdTfFKWT ^odlPd^OT- ' vs. v ^FFT: I F^dPd^mtTT FTOTPT ddddPdodTf^"- C' dr^Tf^lF I cTTfr drdl^ HHIHI^T rT8=di%fWT ^TT ■ 232 Umapati 's Commentary on ,he Pauskwapramtoapaula ' nrrarft T %r*nh m II ^KN«J|KMr ’rei UMH^Id ': , ^rf^rr:,, m ‘ FTT 5T«ilfT f^W^TT: | ' r * W5r % q^- ^ (| *7 ^ irfaftrcnvw STO^jt qp^pjj. jrrr wra- ? %=r 5 mn- =r Hnftsw : i ^ ^ r . fa- -re TOTr: f^W: ^ qpqsj *THrqifacq«h | <121 d •* fa *q I V<| r J^rfa- w . ,T ^r , ^rar^rd^ < id i CTR-idM i fa^ r T® 5 *' WW sra^r, ^ ^fa-^fac*: | =R-. ^ Text m Pl^||p^p r ^^ | ^ i pnfmr rWr^- TTWTf Iffcft- I 5R-|UMHirwf H ^ d 1 ^ dWRpRv^TfVrPr sfh SR F ^dr^Irl 3TT^-| m^i+hIPi Rrr: 3TrHlddirl ■'Id T rf3T rTT- > 234 Umapati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala | Pd^dHp-IHlpH JP^T vrfHIHlrMI - Pjodd^l^^ydd'dtrdd I [46] nmuir^nfe rf o •r f vfM'MMMfd'diPwi wn r ^d i Pdcdi^ i •T ^'■’RTlfT Mdlddd dP^dl wf?T 5TRTH ** II cTPT ^RTIt T dK«H I •o c ^ =T W: JflwSfifa'TlI =T ’jflT II W II fRT y i Ptf #f%?r dcnr i ^T^rf^T: PdPl d ^dd I yid>drdlPdiilMU| dJIld^ldVI^'d': II *\S II ■ydPdd|r+fd>'^ T ff f£: ydiuidl I dP<^ d^FT fw ^TRpdlPd^yR: II ^ \\ yH|Uld>IMdl dT d^/Pd =T d^-Hdl' I srf^: UdlP-ddc^d ^T8FTOW*Tr 7 i Pddl "M I H I Pd d ER7TT dd»pMM dp£' WMWMt- rd^d.l-'ld, HdTd^fMVFW ddy rdctlotllM^FW *TFT yTTFrftrfdT d>Hlld v d^d *Td WPT: I MP^fd - JTT^*- fir I d^^Pd yd.Pdd>ldrdfimi-dd frnr: d^FTTf^W- HTdTd- ydluirddPddPdPd HR: I dR dP^dTT: STRFT- >a o c rdlPj^ldu fr di|l<]dW«l yd>$!yd>iyi» pHrdd 3TTS' ^tiP^PlPi I viisy tii^i ^Hidl q>^''inl < nq>l ydluirddPddPdcW: I o f%T d ^Pd dJTd.'F«l d>fd y Pd dl fldyPdrWy- fwnsfr HIMlrdl^ dPS^rfdT I H^T^lPd^yrdlrT df^r fl^ldil v dd I R W 4^FT ddT RTTST dd-FT yfR ddlrddl+HUIrdld d%: JFTT^JFrRTT ddypHF^- od Pd d I d dlMlrdd*: I =f^: dJdiPd^Md’Tr SFPT*- 236 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala ^ -H I 'Jl -H -1 H H >i H h frl y cfi drl ot| | p«f f^| ft I *1*1 d^dld : yddrdH :Hd l g lcd Idlt Pd ’'^Jdrl ■^'-dd- ^HNIHlRSH*d ^ 'll d ddldPdld d I ^d d I Pd^J>dd : dddHd>l*l- firiMrdd HfldNi n»N eld yHIU|l-d^rd' ; M«r^ , f'fr I [48] 5RT ^-’Kldi STW ^otrfddl^'JINdl'JIrd^fT srcmFnnTr: srfar^raqfiHmd snTPfct ^tr t mft- X X O r^|J»i«KI Pd'hMlPd I awfiffl^l dldtfl %T tmril II a^NlRwdlH'l HrHd fcJdPd^yid I O x i Id I 3Tt ydldl, ft ydild, ft 5PTTW, ft d 1 ^1 ri| | p; Pd Pd - Text 237 4n^q^|/rdlM : ydvrdd | fTt W fcW 3TT^ *TT?T*irt- ft I d^iidpH dididldl dldyl^yMdliJI^nHPdftHVIrqi- 1 SR* dd^l'»U|dHddy dldtlcdd STRTW^r^T- T:, IdPnnidi y<-dd> . SPHMlfco<4<1gl * : TfcW trrfdftl ?Rtr ftPHd«fr ^ ftlW l PdP'ddd^ l ^1 Pdd T "^■Vdcl ddfdoilld^UI yn |U| I _ HRTitft dTT: I y rdrl 3THT ^ yHIU|dHlrl||^ l ^*yril d^did ^TfdP ,< +ddi|| ^ pw rRT dHi I dPq>nT I 3TT f HM : ^wRId I WT qr-nr-d^M fdiHdidi 5??fdP'ddrddNi |< ydH RT- ddidfd>i4d I pt *didifdd>i * : «i i fri <«hU|Ki!A|dMI d'|H - tP rTrftSfH^tft dd^pM dldoi|d^l ■'yfidd 3Td^tt- JTdNlPioiid^lfl W Rrrftft HTf: I ddHKdHddddd ^ HTf^Hjyfi^^rd PT ^N I flfd I [49] TT^rr 3]^(XHI g lrd^U||Pd fPp-pfTTft ^ ffdodlPd I rHfr % if rTFRf ‘‘^TTftn d 1 4 J I -d yd|U|d” fft HTfT- ^ Sdiwirnflnr dd^d; dT^TffWRTtr 3 T ^|V| : | 5TRTW’ fft JJW FTOT; ^IdldPd - 5? H T ^r : I 5f ^ W Hiddlld dl-^dd; fllfydrdld I 3T T i ^ r ^' ^ ^rPdoi|PdP^5lMrd dm W ^HrH l pH- C HlcdiWKo^i^-,1 | q- %gt | M frl : , 3Rff|^l-dld I rTJ- ^rT yilPndHltr “dRPddH^drm frTrfl" *TTrrf7 ^ 5HTT ^TT?H I r^h I P»rd d l d I -d I d yryitlrdd f|*-ddl” fft I r 238 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala 5rRwftrf?r ^Rciqi- ^^mRh^ i n-MfdP.frf ' I dddd - “«H|UHR^4 d> qV Tm oq i m-i ^>i i ^KIMFr f;, ddT *fk iJ4^l4*rp[' dddoiT: I d"dT d" Pd ^y*dd : ?T3r dHMdrqd" d>l ■i'JIcqifidqiq-qqoqpH-qi * id m -h i i| Pdd fq N q fid ^I'ift : flTddrd’SfT MqlddqfadfdT C O Mriiyi P^Tfrurr^fHr^>r^ 3TM'nH^I>ur MP'^fd’ $s?T: I fTr^ HMMdcdd ^Td^d yPdf«d W dP-sJqiqdN'WI fi«»T PiPddd^dd' I dfdfd^m-Hd^d IT^fgrf^FWfll ^V9 li d I Hd I cd I Pdfi d^d fl P^rT I W Pd^Ptd'H'lfM R*>rMd1dltf dldMHcdlPdHW- Pd d I did I Ud^ - rld'M MlWII^MHd'J'ld; I TR T fd - - d gRRMdrdlPdPd I ^Vd'dld Pd'^siddl v >3 C d~ dTddl 'UHd Ml-dPd I HTW d" d-dNdHlVd'dld- qr?w grdi-d^dmi^bT i trffr d" mt^ttt d^R ^rFr odfadl'dHUIId I fdfWTS' d~ HTWIHH' PdPddx-HVt' sqf ddl'd l -MJIId i W d - fdfVTSdT d %d" dTVdTTWTd' I [55] d" dldPHTdcdld^idd d I W4 si I d cd I d P^y >1 dd^ l cdT rT, rdVIN'JIslldrdld^yVd' l4d>TT- dMTT: drHldl-ddVP4 dTW fddT ?fd" -dldd gR“- Pnldrdd HTVddldrdd' d" d>l^d>l sidl'd PdPviSLdldrd- d" (dVIMUNHrdd d" d>ldd>l ^ldld'Ki'd44-dlPd d" dTW- %^ddTTI [56] d“ ^ d%d" -dldd gHPddT WW < M #u ;rdl- d; PdPv i Sid l dH I d ' PdVI^ddldfdlPT «t>HU|rdNPdP' Pd' d | 4-| I Pd Pd dir-M d.f=dTH d Pd N d d d I dTdTfRdrRrT5T- rTdT rdV|V44lldfd MHdirdl £ldd ^ dTddtldldld; I df^ d*, d^TM I d d d d d H Pd Pd sTFT dTM I dTdPddtr-M^Md <47 grmd^iidHi yPdd'inNHMi-dd'dT frfg^rrdRTWT- PddHd dddld^Pffddir-M^mHd'RT gTrfPSdiWH * W- 242 Umapati ' s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala Pdd»^4»d d vjHdTdvtlddd ; FTdfT ddJMTdfddTWG FT dT 'O ^ 3RdR4T fdiPdcddidfd$iwj'dr Ffsirfr dfc PdVI^ I d dRdT rTdT Md<^dd4-MMI*<4«-W4fdflp£i>|W4dldrdd' dddrd d ddddf- fd d PfcPddPdSid' I [57] 3TdTdldrd!4d>Vd>!4Fd4!^iqr^y>d srfd M Pn <4 1 - fWFFd 'jH^ dTH I d !4 <-d y cd I d P^vl ^rfd S^HT- Pd^l'd^rdfr^dKlPd fd , Id [Vi Sid Id d I d 4ll Pd W- d l ddldlds fd rdPddir'MdtddcJId, flS't'fi' «i Pg^i ^ d> rri^TTW dT !TrWfPrfFf d SdfddF - :, FKT dlddTdT- dlP^|W43lld<-ddllV 'jH'bcddfd df flfd: I WT- ^TTdTd^fr PdPdd»t'Md>[ , ‘-dMdd : I 3T^TVT 'i^P^MTt- cdld l Md : “ 34 1 HH d I M I / f*4 P-< <4 1 «l I *f” *TFdrfd HffldfjS44l«lt Pdld^^df SFdd dTd^rdfWrT: I [58] 3TddT “d" dlifFd Ucddl r'H'TtPnPi: I Text 243 dfddTdW FTSTdfd dlAfd I 34 1 Pd *4 dd d ^ l dd l JT^Fd I dTT dd'-^flP|d f^d1%ddfdrd>P: I. [59] yrilWfd SPfTRTdTTd ^ddTf I 4FT^%f^ddTdarfk7W d*PT dll =*q II 3TdT:^TFddTWfdfd fVfddfd^d I fd^wfdfd I dfk‘:d>^ | J||-rl ufld d fd ' H W cd I rl fd- ■'•MdlPdril^ild I FTdW “STrd&T fdfdd M l ddd^HHdPd - -O >3 £^1 Id” ?fd I FTd fd'ddRd d^4HI>J||dlddPd^'M4i- <-Hd>M4 TTVT^d'l d SddT^rddTdfHdd ^jdTddddd JddtdT d«T PddPddH I [60] fd*4HI$ I FTdfeddW d HdVT rdddd-ddl II ^ II pqo^«tr^id'Tld)dl'o-d dtdTddTHTfd^T dd: I FTT ddPJTFdW ffHSdld^# STcW dW FdPdT ddt- rddT cddFTd^ddT fdTIdfFTdFdlfSd^ddT fd^FFrdT 34 d -d dl J 1 1 d 3Td>dd 34'4p'P^U>ld 34lrMdl Hlldd dT did Id 3Td TT^- dP-ddldM^ddd SlcW^d I Hddfid'- f^RT M pv d d d H d d ^rf^Tiryi'dr^T dT d: RTHTfwP dtd": W ^rdd: I fddd d fdTW dlddlrdPdNdrd' ^dddd pyidTdMdrd 4^ddd : *h^lfl l Vtf Tvqt v v fw MiiPdKid’: | [62] 3T^:5frnJTCTTW P-H'+dPd I 3T^TT:farWTTT JFRTdt: I O VO ¥I«*M| SO^T JJfHflHddddl f^TrT*TII 3* II. V|«*cd fHddldflddldTrr Udldd I Pdiimnd^lMNflHdNHrdR-Wdl II 3* II Pdjimrdd TT MNflMdR^fdR-HId l I Text 245 sraRT^r Tapiftf^Tdim dNvi*r: Ud^iiHi-qMi MHqiqm qqqntiHqld- o O V O dpHdt i - IrdT: I JpTcTdt: d did M Pd - f5iw# S'rfHW ffa W I PTWTf^fmpfRT- y dd" P d-ddd f%%: fd^TW- (q#l^<-q*^|U||HH'r1r^|r| I d - ^dPdTdfdf^TTidlaJd^- dd*iddl 3TMTd dPdTdlldf^PPT: I ddTcd' tddfdrPd 4 >mihk1 pp^ptwft pp^TiwTtprnmrf ^miiPm dlViyfid: i [66] dT UddTd 3PM r^fVfyi ^ ^ P^H y I + ^U| ^ddTW- dd" MftWTtrm %f5lwrfT ddFdl'd'dMTd Pd<£dPd- Pt drf, dPd ddtdTdT ^qtrq dd" ddTdlddPl T^THT d^dPd ddTHIddPdPd d^FTH": I ^ ff # f^rTRT ddTHId^-d Pdcdcdd dddrdd^lldi dd^dT M r dd T d T ^- dTddiPddUdl I 3dld! M^T^T r|cdd-dcd dW|^d»- >-dl jfl«hl' T^TFT ddldldyd : l'KHdf''iJ| ddTdTd^far- ^r^rrfr dr dr-did; d^fdw: i 3?%^%* d" ^fwdFd - di^TdT PdinU|Pdii|V]*mU||iHc| Pd^dcdFFP j% n -a ?^I^HirdP'J| PrTTnTTlf>mW dT ddfdTtdTtT I [67] i»l«*<5cd Jlddl Ir WId l HSfdflPvMu i - rW: I ddT MddT ddTdTd: dd“ ^WddFT ^fd - STdtfd": ddT Iq^l^c^d dfdTdTTd' | • 168J dd - rd^nuiNvi v] v rrd dl?]NunHNi]^ ?rddT- ^*t; 3HPnnMqnriq Pddi ^'Jld'rdHdrdd'Mdd ^VdTHT- dMd'lfnoqq^i^'Hi^HHri :, srfdP'ddldTd dTdT d l d l PdPd %rf, d M Pd ^1 PJ I / U| I dl H I W- afdJlrdld I dVT ^d'l ddd dldMd l f ft' fdfdf^r- x O 248 Umdpati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala qi^qoqrq''’M[qqM*-q +-M ^1 Pd ^’d ^*41 M *Sl) u l cq rf§’- rT I ^apT 3WNH5 H I W I rd» f\ 4VPt ddRqipM PdddHd- crfHr^TTW dl>J|d'3T 3TF3TTdT f^TT qiqd$ HTOT- I f%^T 30TT^T q^Rfr^sfr d'Rdl’fT- FT®=T: SfTpuTr^ fdld.doddd' I rf^ T d'Rdrd dW 3f?T- q]Ri<-iqoqi , -qd I dd %f^5^T- W| [fqr FfTT^TH d>l Pi PdPd £ <~d d' q'ljqdiqeqidqi 3T^- O ^d>rdd l -dd l Pfl'grd l d , dil'UIrdHi dWTSTWc^- o . " ^1 3Tfr ^r 1% dddlPdd>ldt ^ft d^T ? ff?T ^dPqd HblVf JS": HT STW Wllrdl drl'dlf dT dldld ?f?T I 3PT ^ Admid^': I Pled I MR" PddlfT dTFT- HHrddldMl 1 y-Hl^^l i<-h * dqd clT iyfid : | T ^ y Pd dl Hi -U I ^*j| P-d W STfa^RWFT cT- I I'M Radford - ^TWT; dTdft *Hidiqiq§M^did^ I d*-dlH ^d^dlPd^r^dl^dodPd^dtldPd ' q idid PqJdM'ddidl : rdldPdrdHjfH^TldiT I T ^ dVqdiqcqtdqi 5f^- [MH-MMlpHr^: I ^ d d d> r<5 ^ i n 1 q> d dl ^ d * h q d ,1 V U|d | f| - T^Trf I 3rRaPidlld>y ^JdifT frfVid>SH] srRf- dl P i oq | v-q d q I ?PddlPddd <^l^d'd l dddMH ! Hd>fidd- v >a d Id * q q"l q q i q | 3Tfr fHT drdld I rf fHId yPdd l Pil - dr^>(d'fldi<^IPiidJffddini < t»rd4 : ld di J dcdH | f7^ ^r d'R q d l PidUridHSif-q P^dlHldtdld ddd^dHf-dM "T H^f?T HfWTTHT%T H IddlRlflrddRyHHMfi^d l - HRTrTl [72] ^T&KiPqoqiHi/ Id d I Pm ^dlHIdydPPd^d, HT ^TTTTT ddl ^dldiqqrTl ddl Aqdq^qi'-qd / dldddM- N a ^^ddqr^drq did ^rd>IHldH^dvii*-d£ldirdyddt- -3 dd|q^-d ■'uiPq^^^rqid, rddddldld I 3T3T E T dldr-dPd - 5TWT 3T ddq cTVlPddld'ycddl^rraTcT ddldHT ^i^r>Kldldldld v , rTrSnftrr^T d d Pd M d di rf- P^qrqdiqiq rHT ^ddfd ocrfvrdl^l p pfd : I [73] srfr ^ ^f'ddJIdd'iyuiimdy^u'! i ^d l u i dd HTT- I dqqlldjq'Jt-^rq dldd I T ^Jdil >'d dlfdl- Rt rfi^d^ldrqPdiqqi^rqH I ddd^ltFr fd^iyuidldl ^rfT flT^ 3rd I f| Pd rd d I [74] 3TdyiV1HddH fd*Mdld I 3TOFT d"dodlVdl T^Tdlddlddtd II ^ II 250 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala 3TOiH|UdVldtMIM>Pid<^lfVlPl(WyrddddMrqPicd4‘: I fT dlddMlndii 7 '- d,HWU I * T I d^lddldrTOT r: I 3TrT: <9 | dldHf fd fH?PTTTR3TrW ^TfdWpF: I 3T?f: y ^iil fd I d d - MrdlMd&^'-dd' ^TdfdcddT ^rinl*- ot] | Pm P* Icf W I dfad>dW ; drd7 : ^d' dTdfdTTW- rd ' ^ T T^tanfT^T PddPiKlrqm I yd^d VdFTRTTdF'- OTTW^rWT I SldHIdydl'JiMdW d* dVTdrdPliiP’iH >9 s O ^p^FT I l^cWdlddld' fefo* ^dl'-T dPl' I ^^>d- MPd^q rT *m\ f5^T W M / M Pn m d^T dF y >d I d d d" dl^ y ^ddHUM^dVMd^cqnindMc^ddlfT- rri [75] ddd - dYIdlddR' Pl*MMpd I d^df y>dlddd" ypisii^nrd d" I d&l-rfl'Hdlddt iwraTfr H>dd : II ll SJUdlPfd': y Pi si I cT ^d^d^iP-dd^d : I |EFrfr P^PdMKJ^f r ^dw^rM^td^rii ^ ii d^l-dPMddT oyi'-dyt-nlPHddl MdrT I c W: !4PddlPddJ f r Pd^HH-MIrfl^^: II II dW Y ■Mdlddld' d" ^ 5TR% y Pi 31 1 Pi M >d l d m q I - oHdiF I 3Tdd“ “^Y^Tr^TOTT^FdT d^l < *i^' , ' J iiP' ,T " , i Text 251 H)Hidd>l: ff)Jldl J -d fnMdlfdH<4l$fdH” *cddddddl- ddd£dlrHd> ^Iddld^Pdrdd'' Nm»-dMJ|H) PdiPHdrddldl- i^ ui I F=q- ^IHd>rdPHrdld>ilMldi JIHd>dl YdWd> odP-dfd*^ PjldlPdd, aQoqiP^yPiHiddtcWldi§'y|didd<-didiiPir- drdldPfdFRPdd WpT I 3TrT: dldiilMcdld yPddlPT- d>H^fldWldd I dTfT dtddT^TTJTFrTFdPr WT W: I dMddHpJVT- d N >9 d* SdP-dPd Pilled %rfT: Wdddldl sHpklrdldldld «HiPV.IH *rtT- rdTd Y d M Id d^ d Id cY frl Y fj J 1 1 d I Pfl4dd fd^SpF- TRT fd JIHdf-d dTdY Pd MIM Pd d M did dl M dl P I rd I d I Jdd-dldd fPddirdHdl^PdP]Pd TWt P-HYd: I dfdld dW Y>dldddcdd I o x. [76] 3]ddddldl^HIM>JlddPdPdd^d>l<'JpddPr^ v - M^ld^yd1vHd»ill«d5lld'ddd>dlddrdd I dlddddlP-d- HTdd'lP^VlPd yPl^rdlPddl I d^Fff : PdH'M4-rl ^T: dTf^r ^dP'rdd’: I Mdd" f^ Hdrd’rlMdd WTT^f W^r[?MTT dHdd", dW T dP^F FT fPf fWT^T^r^TT ^ dlPd^lP^n I vjd l g W rtmfa fSFtT Wfk I fEPrft 'TPT FfFT- fTKt §JW fa**TVdid^dodln diPs,d d nPdHidHH M I'JI I Text 253 *TPFFFT ?W:?TP>ddl'ddl odlPd^dd I flldddd FTddrdlPddddq 'FTIT: dl^d FP^Fd"- c : TTfdHd+-d d^dlTddl *T: ^frftS ^T*T: TTFdyddd': *FR=F w odlP-dPvrd'cdd I ^dlMlPH'hfid-^ sqrf^T- >3 P' Id d Idd I dd 3Hd*l M I pHdird did dHI'^Fdddrdd I ^ >3 v TMlPdrd ^ 7TT^|oi||Md)rd FpT HTddl°dmcdd I fFT dPrdiPdrHI^'<^N'y TTlf^- ^ c c PTW TTT dT^T: I *T dldd'lNId': Pr^TT^T: ?T ^ pT- ^^H I yPdiTlPlrd ^ dd^^dd^rdVH: I dddd+d dldrdNdirMd>'"J|lPyd>''- >3 >3 orww^r 1T^- od I P-d : | 3FFTT PT ot||d^dl^^T- dl'rdd l4di»ddldddl ^ d Pd Pd M dl d d) rd l r^d I d d I ^-d I 3 rPTT ^ Fgfrf^iws^ci ^ldr^irMd»^UMf^dt^ldtrdd , 4t Pfdw ?td" dPddoi) : | 3TT 3TpT FP^T- ^i|Mrd|tnTf^d)^||Pdd>''U|d.rd ^TtP rPJTfT HTW- dTd'^dd.M| dP^rdl^+rdd Ml^d'^PT rTW ^PTT- Pf I dddP^ddl^^rddddMttPJIWP dl^°d : I [78] d-dddld T SFTTW I ot| | p-d 4J | ^d>y dl UFdFTrf I W fTTdT smPvwi^t, FJW I V- ^JT^didl odiP-dxrdttiddidddid I diPn vpr:d^di ' - C c ON ^ 254 Umapati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala STTTHlPRcr I wqf* >W:Wf*TT3nT HI -M4N V oMfM-dK’H U \ dTTT I qrfT d c drd Td ^ dfafddPfdr^ d^=dT- ^iftHI' r T I dl^MlPM'+icdsIHfl^d’R; I ^f^ f=re^ ^dNd^iPd^Pd'^.HiT- Pd^dr d - 1 dlfd oMrM-dKdHrqr^ruj+OM^I J --»l |Tr * 'mfrdtd*n d^NldcdSdd^Fr- fdlddcd Tcf, a^Tfa d I ' Pd ^ dTdl d rd 31 -Ml *-m i •d d I dd^HH^ I ^^I^ *^ lH K I qr^oqMf^- dHdfitf d- WTK51IW dd?T Pd^HT- vFTWrr:; MddPdW T dP^IHHlPd-VW 5n^TFT MdddPdcdH-llfT sUdrqlcT I d" qM^MixWIUd" ^dPdMd^qftT : I dU^d^rd^^ldfr 5TW- WTrT: ffd" dd\ [ 79 ] 3 Td^d?n =r dTdd sdiP^di^HFTTMTd: i *d- dfd" y1 ^*" r^TrTlo ^dl^ldPd^ ddfdddfa; TT^ | Pd£d~) I *T ^ d^iPT odir^HH+rddHd<-dl'dTT: I STOTT d«r»i w.-lltf I d" Text 255 f^T H^sT STdvdT HPddodpHfd' fddH : I *T d“ d>'lPd^dlM- felcdHrdd odlNdK'HSIdlHMIcT Hcq«l<-d ®MlPcdld I dlPM MHdVKOT i djl - : Pd^rdld f^TT^FFT I kaPki-d- d>d P^Pd VI H^l I £Sd Md) d i Pd MydrddMMTr^r I d* ff» df^rlddddTtc^- fkldl^' PdktMydPd^Md0 d MHimPdPd ' dTdPdddyiddrdl^; dT*ddfd^TTdTd; ^yiHIUd^T d Mcd^dl dTdddrddrddTddTd^d 51 Id - oqrdTd I dMd Pd^HdHHHT dFTWdd I [80] dHHMfiHddV^d^dl'TlMidlcr d" ddT: WdT 5TTTTTW fd1d.doEF[ | ddT ff d dTdcT 4|qqp^«r-d JlddSl^dl^cddP^& dldldHTd *dtd»^dd dt-qiTd- dii| diddl'd fd^cdRT I ddT dTTTFdt' dddd" ?cddd dT- ddd dddrH^d dKdcddP^ik: I dlPd dddrdFd dT- Wfddf^^dP^ drH^IT: I ddddd dddf^rfdddr Hdcd Id dd l PdM^ dd ??W[R Hlddd^fd" drf ddd"- > ' 5 ft 256 Umdpati 's Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala r^MI M d Td Pd Pd d rd P) d dl ”1 Pn I R I d d *-d MHIddl- dd^ddP’cdlrf | 3TrT ^ f^lP;* H^WpTr?T%^v = T- faf^: | 3TFT TT^- du^ I dl d I H 'd d °d rd>-^T«TT d ^dyH^diRi'-ddild'^rdid' F^fr w i tht- ^fifeMNp^v)y^|*MrM^ra - ^Idd^ldP^JtvndlddiaTT- „ RTlfT SRFTRFT Pd^ld - iM'fqrmPdPd fedf I VO'® [81] dddodl^PdWTTf I HT ^ odlP-dftdT 5HTT sqfhr^F^TTf^TII ^dd I ■3 dldddlddd^lPvT^ldddd^y^TII II FTT T^rRTOTFTfaRTT ^MlP-d*. «<(n\^i^Mi(Vi^l odPdFd>l-ddfd*m Pn^ oq I P-n * d oq l P-d Prl f^fwr 5PTc*Pp: I FTT W 3T^TWf^f: *FT ^Pn^- oMlP-rlP^rMr^ t^NIHI^ fllHI^Pd I dl*q*ii*Hdl : FTP^-I rd d I d d cd i fd H ct ql 4 : FTd^d": FT *PPT dddR-l fFT FTTfWT^T PdPdMddPcT I 3F^- ^T: 3F^T: fRFd - ?Rph I FT ^ «w. ^^M«>MiPrdRR T I H*R=T: 3WI^5T: ^N* o d>l d pH f d~ o^iPd^^H^ : HTSW oq ^.wi P-d Hr- <9 RPT: I [82] ^|oH|Pk1d<4HHH' f^fddPHrqi^ I Text 257 ZZ FTTRTRRTT^eMfT FTFRTW f^T I c <* ddldldydlJdfd .ydld^lddNd^ll H I FTT ddd«dlP*dH><?M: I FT RT M>d*MlMM?lrFf Rraw I W H RRTfti ^ Pq 4 -sTT- drdN l PMdPd^^rdmryrdy^rd^ H >q h i -t m x : ^F^- i| ot| fd"< P+>F»d P^ P=T ^TTWI [85] 'TW: V F^TTf^T FTOTR^FTfirrFRT 3TT^ I TTTW'^T^Tf: W: II H dP^R T i%W: RTIrT TP4T HMi'^v’l^^'- I fnw g^q'i fV^ ^ nrd dH 5lMils, v iy^T II <%. II / t*. JO umapan s Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala fTT W: dpajd^TdcT: dfoddlwidH I WW'- tTcT fanyddcddlddddld I fdW: cTf5*Ph PdPyriri^HidTdFfOT df£*4dddH I dPT: dHI-d<)- I 3T^ofrsfrT: Tdl^cdlPdrdld/d.jid') : 3]pH*uJ| ^PT: ^PdpTidycdOTP^ydl'JII'd'ddrd’: I dcdPd- >3 ^ d’ ^d^rd'l : fd'brdHHdUIrdlPd’Md'l: ^TT«r fd*- rd rd I f«H cd cd ^ M R?W«T fdW Pd^dcd T&T Wddl - I HrSrfdW ^dlPddrdlfl'-y(d l inddrd*M- y dt^dVdlrTI *T rT d'lfdldd* fd*Mcd Pd *d HodlcH PWl ?Wdf?r I PdRMjyU^^dPd idw^dddr tt: i f^rftw: fdW*f|pr: d>dHI'dPddld^T ?f?T dldrT I dd" * rd^rdP<«TT 5CITMM : I PdHWodlddrdlfdP'- ddHdldddd^'ildMdrri H I -d Pd rd Pd Td dldd I fr:- ’H h dfTi d d $ 1 d Ps x : 1 ''di^d*CidoqiPvid> ff?r dTdrT I dT * rd^rdP^odidld: I TT: frdHod - frrhft I dd &[ d rd * d od I d P/drl*ddrlSiddrd >>dHod - o fd^f't.rdPdrdd": I FFT Mddld d“ d - dT fddKIdPdod l- f^T: I [ 87 ] WPJTf *d«Ndlj|'U|dli£ I Text 259 dlPHd^l : dd'drdK-d'l T^ddl d>JTII *\$ || %dr=dWfdrT fdW d^Td - Fdl'ifddTW: | W ^TFTdTWT dPirddli-dd) Td": II J|rd^dd : I ^dddd fdfd?T ddTST: VlVI^-dd II *\ II 3Pdt fddldldddlddl MddlPi I IJd^d Pd. C\ V c rdV: I dS'tddldddd ridddd 1 ^dd zpir 'l fctny^ ^HlPd ddddltdlfdddPdPvid dcT 'O «S PHtT *hTdldf*T vr^r dddMMd: dfdcdld ddd - ddd - ddT $HIHdl^OT ^HIHlPdPvidl dfdfd ^dV-d41 d.dHI-ddlrdd': I H'dlVd'* >>HI'-dPdPvirlrdfd HT ^dddlM I d l d^ W- df-M ^qrdl^rdrdfdlrl drl AdH I ^?dT dT^dTdTd - - drd^fT ^dld)dl^d''dlddldd> dddlfd^dd fdfd“- TSTrdTT dVPfdHW'JIdyrd^dd I d - dTFq- '^d'ldddT- fTSd^ odfirdTT: fdlT^Pd dKdd I ^d^Pd^: d# odfd d I J 1 51 M d M Td Pi M pr| d •^dTd I d I d I ^dldrdn '’ |H d - dryPdddMfdlPbPdr^^rdld I T d - ddddT Sdfd’- dlP'PH^'d-drddHPdd : VFTrd" ddlPdfd - dl^d'd; fdd’d'ldld'ld FR=dT: ^d l rdlMT d - : I 3TddT WiSr^- zou umapati s Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala dfw: ^Hl^PddlW: dZtsfHVRT: dFcTrdTrT 5^T- ~ o *>■ rdlPdcdlPd^dsteod: | 3Trft f^ftWr^TTOTRT fddfSTTT ^dHMPdfH^d>cd^l*frfT T TtT: I PddHodPd'd*M*d^d>Pd^*dldl^ I |ddT fWRdd '-Rdlddl Pd PddNH I 3Tf^f<: dddT ^?Tf: TO'fd^Pd^d II «© II fdcdcdldddlPdd'xd'lddlPd ^P^cdpH^rdl- ^dilP^flicqafl^YmdrdddMIcddHPd&cdHdd'; 3T5TRT- 3Td«T'dpHd<-d d^dfadF' 3TRT- dtdlPdPd HTR: I ^FddHpM Pd ©d Th d I ' 41 ©d | U| . rqita^iq-n^crnddld W d >-d fj *»d | d»rd ( m I d W I ^ddfidPsfr dd'hdid^i'ir^^di'Jii ddnmdlmd P- dl+i+lfltKicdd wnkf d>dfi^l'hrdM I Text 261 t 8 9] ^diTfip^ RsrErf?f ^r^r^rd i Ph flfd Wf%: TSTddrdP^lPdV^ I Pr^dTVTd TT^T- Pd^d : I ^pMp£: dddt ^rdldlfl: I PH^Rd 5dlP-d- WdddTW fWdfdT^ - : ^1 Pd P^P'rd d: I ^ d rdW Hdl*rl3 *- fdTf Ud l PdP^d l W : I fd dlPHP<$ldPddT fd*HI- pH P^odl'-dcdl pH I ^ d I Pfl P^Jll d I Pfl Pi^l f?T I ddd H^HlPdP^ddlsI'PT difldPd IdcdcdlRfd I 3TW: TT- TO - : MiddMKH Pdcdcdlfecdd' Pdrdrd^d'l': fd^Md : «rfrrf^: ^TWrfrrf^:: ST^TTRfr 'Jiscfl fl cd d *bcd d I Id rd rd I fd"fw did: I di ^^Hldl^ Pd^urfd I PdWIfd fcrjf- P^inu,^ oqi'-r) :, fddr^dTd" P*isTd ^ *-d STFddPT Md'dTd:, ^llPdddd odlP-dTlifMddlddlp5d.ld'’ c d' d 3T- Pd^dT dTldllcHd>l 3 tM^: odl^cdlpHf^:, ^l^dl- X PhP^:, sUdlPdP^Pd I ffd" om'^rqiRiPaRr^dT ^dT- P-d d I H I ^1 1 H I d K H I Pd ^13 1 ^ I I 3TKTT ^TdT 5T5T- Pd d I «il r*rd Rs n I M": MrdTrT fRf I Pg^dldl ddT ^iPd- C ^ ' ^IdPdP^H T ^HdlPd+l' P^dlrdlR frR^ndrf ?f?T; ^ Pd r^d'rd" ^TTfd': I dPHdHrdldoddPd^H'JlfdlfT ^^dl-ddld: I ^l^dlPfl^l ^TdT dddl/Pd-d RTpT 3TTfd^r^TrT F dHKPd^dTf ff?TI pH^lddH'-dlddlPfl^ 3FrT- ^rFTI dldlPfir^fTl d^T ddlPi^T ofliP-nM«Tddndl W c- X ^ sO c> f tf Iti 262 Umdpati *s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala 5TTW rTTT FTTT: dMlRHp£: I d U| fa $1 vq : 3i Ph P< : i iJdFi^Pd$nuiH i Hpftfig- TPJRTfHf^T I W 5T5?t fr^T: FT3TW Tfr w- o o cFTfecW r^nu||p^4l |T:..I PdVI*]|R^W 3F^T I Fsi 4 I T *rH\< \ BTTW- f^mu||pf|p^p» pH I TTrTr^ T dTKl(rH^»rMHH' nfwn [90] fart rT&rgfr i FrFTTFt TOfdWFT: I s^TT^rs^TTT^r: 'J^iM^P^'yoi^^dri : II i(R II TSi rqH«iIM£ 3]Pr|oM|p>|^|VU||i| TrTFTT | fl4dNPd^ ' lP<1dl^lN fw^FT I 3TTFTT f=T- FT- cT fpT I 3R yddcd^d' M I ^uil^l^l P-ridT: I [92] 3mT^I^'J|MW]dRTrft FrcrdfT I flP*dlMd^d> : TST iJdHtddfHPddi: I U|W4lildWd>: TIWFTFrT: dqti^'qp'd frcpT: l 3FFT ot] | Pvi^^H^H lildldd^d I ^cddd tddPfldrdfiT- fk FW ZZ&1W I fTRT dMMfi^ldrdPdrdUfETT I W ddTTT: HW fldlPd 1 ?FT: ! W ^ TW qr^HIddPdrdddldK'JIMOTT I d^ld PddHTld I uiHTf I fjdrdl FFT Id^q qddrqiPqrdqi^d : II ^ < II rq'5T^- ?nr 'Hdr^TT d^P fidMIrHdT ddcxqn^JI F^?T d^drd l ldrdq - flW Wt^rR^Trf oqiP^n^m^- HMdfl^dl^.odPd/^fl^dl/dVM dldrclldd^qPidq; I dPdrdl JFddTdlPdcddldl^ll^+lP^d^dl^W aP^;- c rdlddnUdH I FT fFrT: 9P5T: ^|«drd I TdriTT F^rTTT- O ^ >3 TRi /u iH«i u id(d ,: >qi'-dr*iPi dvl I ^d^«dnq>lqni ,, dVII- FT UI«]pHinidld*-d T&RCT W -H H P^ y l tPT: I Pi ”? H I q I *1 q» ^T^TTFFrnvr^TT: || ** || O WW qw^TTbi|M|Hvj||^ : ^ ^zn?r H l dld^- ^T‘ * Ml WJUJ riiy I PiPq /| M M ^fl VIldld : ^ q i q rq i p; Pi kdqiPMdPqyqi JTPT ^FdTRTRT ^ddlrq - ^ I yPinMl^TTHT^-qr-Hy^rci •.^TrTarT g^ogrr I 3TT y Pdddl'^TRIqqr^cqpir^diqq-c-qHM 'H^d Id Pl«M I'- fcr: ^^Trr $nr i t Pn^fwr srProqrfFr- P'Pd dl-^q+i l y Pi d <-q i Pq '■■%*-[ i sqrm i q q r-M T^l Pd Pdq«i«iid Pq dTW?=T i|dPd ^IH H | p-| o »4 1 - P*T: i dqi^Pi pRdldHdiPHPd I fdW fR*d ^ fdT- Miqiqq) H Pq d h r Pi 3i Mi»"dq>rq id *+> i q i P^rq>rq i Pqf-q . « 'O > I ^ “viHiqid fT Pq-q'ic ’, “H I d I d rd IR^Pir- dPldl^qp^iqirHq* fd*%^*R7T ?TOTHd |qididd : HM'K||qiMMr rT ydjiH : | 3 -d c ^T^trtr fiqfq?* fEPrR^TV^TSZR'l! its || pTrq- 3TTrTTT f^fr%T *TVT^'I i>l pH dl P» d I f^PrT: FTT«jf^rT: fTIVT ^ rfVT H%rni y 0 . II 3 f*f W fr ^WPl ^iPqqqi^P^HMq W yqiqrqm §f?f ^pt ^'d 'T# d P^i i Pi Pi T Srfddld 3R HHHI ^TFTdT- H >-q i d i h q q q mi y-Pddldldl itw y<$d) : y Pd 51 1 ^rq) : dlHn^prr SrpTt^?REnfT ^Mplrd 266 Umapati ’s Commentary on the Pauskarapramanapatala yPddlMIddddPHrCpr: I Md^'rd' 3 ^‘ ■Hdl-TT PdMdld ^yi'-d'hl^f TFT Pm^<-dK aPlsI^Wl- ?=or uuM^Wddyifr ?^Nt- I od y 4 1 ■* li ^ m i — M Plu^WT- =TTpT dPdd l Pd ' ^TWTrTW I d^Tf^d^TT^TRT^nT- C- # vrmt w yddt dpg^H d*HcqiRfd m<^ j i %*^r d$r- dddPdrddydP^ldMd ldl^ u IH>^ : I d4d W H^l"- ^rddydP^ldodPi^^^i^^lldld : I dd~ dP,g<"nd vfc tp-TT d*»Md ffd“ fqM'^n^lVmi'^d • I ddidid- f^fsr d^dd w ^rr sfd - R^m^M-dPi r - ^T: I PdU^-MHd y I VI <+>l H ^RTrMr dlddyfdHlPd&T: dcnWTT^nTt^TtWJT P'Hddl'rdl- >9 >9 O ^frn*: ^yRn^i-d: ffir Phu^himiPh £lPdVlPd: I fn^J- 4 ^dJ- 41 r^Niy-+,^ u-^-<-q- : ddRviPd'dldd : I >d d I H I **M ^ril M ^ q I ^ItT f^f^T Wrlld- Fmf^r jotti .• [97] ^Thdyi^i i*i «i y h i «i‘ rd*ydPd i 3d'-d')fdd tmi5lMdrd dfd" SRJPT- c \ ?FFdT I ?TW dldld>iwidrddrMdd»ddd>d I * d - ^ >3 dldddPy ^IMMd^d drHIdld I d^ddld'^ W 3FT- 4Vddl SZ^TT I V* T dPddl dT- *ydcdd |d*: I 3TT^im d* 3TfvrdMiy4ddHH I dd4*d‘ ^TPT '^RT v <9 *FT '7TT RrT dlcy4PdNddddl^dHHdldd.cd' dT*T TdT^T d*1 Hd*1 dT^T df^TT 3Fd7T fil^i^r^Pilci I ^d ^ d)drdHHdd d.PdPfPd dTW dWTST %rT c ^ P+idldfMMIddl'-d'dddld" ^RW Pdd+ittT ddHdl*^^- dtvdfr ?r 'dddPdPd ?w yfrfdd - ; Rt*di+4didi^r- dTMPd''^dy fd^y41‘drdmidydddrddiy> r ¥ 268 Umapati ’ s Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala 3TrT ddJT: vdHdflddlcMd'JI' .SPf- RFCT ^ST^rsfr «i«ni«rqfn^i*.«IN I ^l'Hrr1^yio^c4t4iHHI--=4^yn-l<<-riJddd>rd PTWWT I 3R M<;rd SPRW- ^|RddTW Snld^dl- f^FT:; 3TcT 3drf 91 M q Hi fn I dFTTfr spjTTd d H d »-d Id ri^l q i Ta <*h i P-d :; 3R 3Wf1 JT^rT- dTdR^PtRHTT I [98] JR J>l«d4-dMHR Ud RTHldU^-d I rRTT % i - fT ddlTH y+dMdf^lpMdlrMdPd^M^dM^lHq’TMp'i ^Idd&lddlddldPdHrdd^dddtrdM^ dIHMd cdRd l ^ J dKU| l d r mFTdid'Tdfd' I ^^^rdHNl'd^dH'JITM ynPd I frfr dldiisii'-iq 3T^T fgrRrT ^TrT ddrr: HP^d^-Micdd' j ll HfM^l^q r 3TWT cTfcRW o4|pMdHdl I 3T^mT ^ dlrMddP^dR Id d HtH I I dlJddl^ dld'lR df^- R oqpHdlRT ^ Wra 1 I 3TTWisiilRj| Fd^Pq£nqcqiP;rq*lHM+Hrd«l' FT VFFT flrdTff I F F yjdtKJdlP^d odPMdl' : FR fid^Pd$HIHIdrPMrddR- *. «3 S -O c I d oiTd'jfl I'dTpH d H I d I FdT ddddddldPddldddRET- X O ^ Pdi3 ., rfdT STdTddddicdH ydddird d" ddTcT; 3TdTdTdofT drdrdd' 3T>jodl Vddldd dTTOIddPdyd'hcdlfiNdlPdfd' dr^HT I ?TTO od I P^d d M d Tfd y I d Id d I d died Id ■^'dilTTrT, 'HIrdl*-i|yj|'Hld I T %d dSildl 3dfr ydT- -ddd I [103] d^T d^lPdM^llimhTdtd^r ddlddldl ^fddT- rdyjildrdidddKoiiipHp^riid' dliMlPcr i dftsfr ddlddlldf Py STTdTWtrT d | oi| | p<1 P' rW: I V VT d - ddHItre t: Ttl^Wd rTdlddddddFT I Tec* 271 [104] d'd' f^dT^TPrSTd - dit dT ddlVi : fdlldrdd 3TT1-I drqei«iMHM*l dir dPT ttldP&Idd II II >3 3 v dt dfw dfl'STOI'I'-df-fdld dfdKIVId 4 : fw: I Jirdr^r wrrfddr dfr dr ^hhi^H gfdfw srfdr- rRT^* dt ddT dfipr ddfrr fiUddIVI: ddTcT 1 3TOTdW f fdMi^d ildPiflddd TO I fddT: didrTff ddHIHKIdl- TO frdrT 3TT^ dfdlfcld I cRW 3TTTOFrafTOr%TOTO- rf fw: dlimdC I 3TPddTfdT didlPdSldfWIddl dW iror drrfr difdlTd crw: i [105] TOT “Tm^TTfddfTrT^r d^dddHVdd” ff?T ^ d T dd wft*d'*-d PddSledPdedd STT^ I H3m%fediTPT: rr^r: fr^ntdr: n \\ n Wd ldPdPdddd'l d^phrmdT: fTdT I 3TOTO: yP^MUpy Hd-d: dWdTfTII ^ II SRFRdT dTSJdd rM ddlPdPd': ddT I dMd^P^dUld: HrTTT TO: ^P-dd dRfT dTO dT: rTdTdrT: I T^Td" dTdWTdT3dTfddtTri1%rd' fdTdPd' ^dTT I 3TTOdTfddrT fll4dd dHIdd d“ dddlrdl^ dpfrfPdT ffrr I TTdd" dT^* H^ntdT ^rddd Vdr I cFT ^dlfcTfWlcH 3FTT TT:, FTTTf^T: 3T2T- TTfoiTTT I 'tsiq^rqid C 'O N T^fr T^ff i rTmfr TTlTfrTRTfTrW FTMT I fltl^- cTrTTTITTFrrTT ^6" f^FTrfes£FT 3TFTT ^TFRTT fill d 1M | f-9| Jd C| rD U 1 T I D *-•») ^-M M I ■' rq i r| Fh! < n <4T T FTTFTT fTTFIT I [107] flTT 3 ^qHI*ll4t-qiq^-T T^H I ^drtlunr r f^mfTFTTWT dNmrdrdddJIiFT- JTTtTrTTT T^tTJ^FHTT IFTtrrfFrTT^ 1 dTT Ml'****' T ; TT^TRTlTr 5 ft T IT: I fw ^r«r Tfw q^qRdfT: 11 h ni mm^fLy \irft TTtTTTT 11^^ 1 vinuyuu j Ksummeruury on me rausnarapramandpoUJlci rnr dR-H>iiJPT^mT i Idvmr wztft i anldTdrfd- HlHd : cTdcd ^ddd'JHlR^MH^dKN' fd^Td ^cM 'O ^HdW 3TTf%RT d?>TRfdd flKRT ^^RwPf: dT- MdK I d 3Td I^d Mlvh/fiKviFT h! ^ " i I *1 ?Fd ![ ivNd i d dtr- [ird^MfVd dd fl> d- 3|HlcT ?fd IT??T y^l^NPdfd ?fd 9T- T: I 3Fdd ddddd d ydfFdd ?cdd: I T^R^rfd- M I Pd di r dfdTfd SJTRtrd d^PddJNI 5ddT9drR d*5T- «TRT d I [108] dT df^lJIHpM^dlJIdlPdd flrHddy'd^ld: ^d- ^Tdlddddd: P^Hd pHrdl 3TTd I 3FdTsfT dldt 3drfd:- M^Miyil'MdVldT: II S,c; II ^IdddrdHpyoqiPdf : sl^Pd wdlPid.R>: I Tec/ 275 TTFm^d&TdPTFd f7=yrdH-d4|lPdN | JTd: II II dSrfd^RTfddi^dr: 3dfdTdd \ ddlfd: d^d>dill : ^vJfjdTddTRWrd: 3Fd: SldFTdTd fHddTTfrsfr d^Pd^diJidyid^idinr: d^rorntefar: TddT yi^l^yy^vjIHd'Vid: d d dTddfddddSidr: I dd- ts o 'O d dd *cdd 3TR F%fd I dddMIdlddlfd drdrfd 3Td- fd: RdTdfd: d^TT: dT ddTddT dTdsft ot|| R-rl : 5dT- Cv Ci Td ddd d rTdTdd: I 3Tdd*h d^fd®dRJPTdT: “dd- d^TTddTOTTfd d^pHTd^d: JpTRRddd^d dRd- fdTdrfd drfddTd” ?rddrFdTdd ddcRyTfddWd:- ydddd TTd d d M^^^ + qdt^yPrlMK^l : I dd T^d d WqTdPhrfTTTTddrddd I ddWdddTWdd “dT- O -O 'dtfdrTTd fd^Fd: fdd TT^rfddTd dd: d dTW d- pT: +Py ^y444Hli,Pfrl fddPRT: fdSTdf T^d fdlJdT TdTSddTd:qT 3TTddT: fdd dtd": ftTdPS^dddldTdt dd:” ?fd I rRdddddTRd “rFdFdTd df fdgT: «a o TSTdt SCTTdddTdd: dTWT dt«TRr d dd dd^ddd Sddfcdd:” ?fd I dd ddrdTdfdSrrf^TOd 1% d dfdd: ? HrdT^ dT- >a «a ^ ddfdfd I JddTfddmd: dTfdWf^RdrddddTddd- vfmr d^pd I cTd: dTTdTdd Hl^HRtfd fTdfd: I dd- ?ddddTTd “dridTdT dddfd d d dW dTd^d d” ffd I fdddrd ffd dddTddf^Td ?rdd: I rrd d 276 Umdpati *s Commentary on the Pauskarapramdnapatala M rd HR: I [ 111 ] ^WKIdld'l pMJ|iH«M^MMd^ld RrfWRW IH WS f? HHfid-M ■'T^dt-d'd' d4d PT:Hdl TRT ddPdW T fjr:HdT d-H+ft dlPlPadld^OT «ITp ! P-R << I - ^3 c 3 qrsn-ST^TT d -r'd *-d H H Pd d I ^ ^1 Hd' RcTf fr^TcWR- TOTTfe^nT: I d^faPdWT 5R= dT dfar W Phd^rf HR P^Pddl^dPHrW: I V 'O [ 112 ] JR- 3 RT PdtdllddrdpMoqPra : WTfT faRR- Tq- fSRRT dddR dlHHdJd dirfal^MC«4Mi , ' c dKf q- Pd’dft: ydPrf: STRRT fH:d(d<-dtf: II V9R II Mdddrd JTR HdPd^yPdtlxqrMdd u IHd diqt-d HP- £HTdT: M^d^R T dTR: Pr:^fir: H“ dKfal*oxc«ndK- dPldPHrirq -: I HR HHIM^dPlqtidiqirMHudHfd 3RT- >3 dlfaddUlldlldcdR WdW TRPbdTF5d‘ 3TFRW- ddPd fd~ 1 rRTl' Pd-dlPTpT I dRR WtdR f^tdW- cfrqT: Mdfd - ddt WHtf: ^l«Jldr d^^irM^ldV fT:- flldP'Pr TRRT m ^^ ivr^HMlPirdfdrqd": I [113] JR rRTWTRRT PiqaMM^iiHdiHddvl rl'spT- 'O q7RR9I«5Tq- d d d -d H I pq rM i ^>i ^rM I *5 I C 5R5TR MKM% W fTOTTOW: I MKM^ nr q ^HKJdPd fd - §JTT H[NdldldHlW: T cf fUlti l PdrW : I dddrT TRW “WRS^dT W: ^4' 3 ° u Ksunimeruury on me rauskarapramanapatala My Hl^ri W Hsj : T^^TTP^Tt *T K fa I J U| - *T’ ^ =r ^ ^1 q 'j'l : I cTT f3NNIHr^ot|cj^| ■/’l'jlrr T 7TJT- Tf^rfk ?r^r kk i I ?w^rr w i oH -mi fq d l d di fi»NIJ|d dlilfd FTTfk- ^TFrnrfT ^plk^JdTkdT d I dl'd^ Molded T Vfdcdd ^ I 3TWT fl Hs * M I vi i f^Ndld '1 : II II ?T fl vr\n d I d I <1 1 : sr^iri]|<|<|4f]^ ; | ^r^PT: I 3TV* T fd'-4||J|- m: ?T\jMH|i||dl : W: fT ™H« fr fk- WTrf^vq-: 5TT^iyuM«T: 3|Td I d 1 : 3TTW: 5TW irfk TTWI [115] dT d$Jd klckf STT^TPtRW^T rHTT: kr* dd^iyii^ifird/itr frrfk 3TTf I dd rk.dPm kdT fodW di-ddi frpTn vsi' || Text 279 »T dTT Tt^kNk: Tilkfdkfdk FRIT I •T %%kgWT TFFT k*k ddd'ddl II vs* II rRTT kk T ffW TOT d* fVNIrH^H I ^ ^ *4d I *5 k) ^^Tld 1 • II 'S^ II 3RT: snW^nFFW yd>rdlr: fk*kr kv: w fr fkdkr: t 3T«it k=Tk: i [116] T3J 3 RRTT frmkTTn 5JTTW I dd£i>ld>dld' k^RTW d^dm^Hfd f^Nyufidi itt st®st ijwkr- ^TT dk fPTPTcTr ^fWPT I WZTft Tai'd'dl* 3TVTT ffk I STS5T: frfk: fw^Tkfk: Hldldl 3T- STTT^TT irr?TWd" %w mm'i^iT* dvr fT§^r ^Ruii ftr *5iy fVM ^ d ' J l Tr^ Tr ; yPddd-ddd dW FT d - - dFT: SrdlPddl “dwflRM : TR%:dddT: ST- / c jtrTt ^r W’ ^Hinin i mi P Td ainKldid^y- <0 ww 1 [ns] ?Krfr “snrr^iHiHdifii fWrdir fw^drpr 3TTfcwr fw: dlWI^HyiPuiPPd ’ffd":” fpT ’ffd'- dM*dld*dfiP$dMddlddf'TT W Hhdd 1 d-dddTy “TdW ^TWf * 3 ^ 3 T^W^I:” ifd" dMyu|d^r^dW| PvM^d yifldMI %TRT Text 281 flrr %ft %^rdf>ri%dFTTdfT ^rrfewr SdddlddP'wi IdMdPMdKyi^IdKH^^fVMIddiiR- 3 >3 (d /| tH'-Pd dHodTdrild dlrMd*' d^ddH I 3FWT ^Nldl'd'-'M “%fa# d* TR dirdT M^ll^dT ddld'- 3 -3 >3 C fT ff?T J.W.ui , “%W dTT dd^ciT Tfd* ddfddmdldfd ddlddHrddlrd*?^ ^Vd - d" fd^TT I C ' [119] dT ddddddlddl/ui 75IW Pvidlddf-dldT- WTcdSfr sM'IdddlWTcd % d’ fd I (d ri| ! 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